PATRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

SUSAN N. PATRICK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00048-JAW

)

JONATHAN BROGAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

An inactive attorney proceeding pro se filed a complaint against an attorney

and their law firm for wrongful use of civil proceedings. The defendant attorney and

law firm moved to dismiss the complaint and for sanctions. The court grants the

motion to dismiss, because a state court’s prior adjudication of the complaint’s

allegations precludes their re-litigation in this action and the complaint fails to state

a valid claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. As sanction for filing her

complaint, the court orders the inactive pro se attorney to pay the defendants’

attorney’s fees. The court also strikes her complaint and brief in opposition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On February 25, 2025, Susan Patrick, an inactive attorney, filed a pro se

complaint against Norman Hanson & DeTroy LLC (NHD) and one of NHD’s

members, Attorney Jonathan Brogan, (Defendants) alleging wrongful use of civil

proceedings arising from Defendants’ alleged conduct as opposing counsel in a

separate pro se medical malpractice suit filed by Ms. Patrick and her husband against

Defendants’ client. Compl. for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings (ECF No. 1)

(Compl.).1

In response, Defendants filed two motions. First, on April 3, 2025, Defendants

moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Mot. to Dismiss of Defs.

Jonathan Brogan and Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, P.A., LLC (ECF No. 10) (Mot. to

Dismiss). Second, on April 16, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for sanctions against

Ms. Patrick. Defs. Jonathan Brogan’s and Norman Hanson & DeTroy’s Mot. for

Sanctions Against Pl. (ECF No. 11) (Mot. for Sanctions). On April 21, 2025, Ms.

Patrick filed her response, opposing Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for sanctions.

Pl.’s Opp’n to Two Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and for Sanctions (ECF No. 12) (Pl.’s Opp’n).

On April 30, 2025, Defendants filed their reply in support of their motions to dismiss

and for sanctions. Defs. Jonathan Brogan’s and Norman Hanson & DeTroy’s Reply

Mem. in Supp. of Their Mots. to Dismiss and for Sanctions Against Pl. (ECF No. 13)

(Defs.’ Reply). On September 2, 2025, this matter was reassigned to this Judge.

B. The Allegations in Susan Patrick’s Complaint

Ms. Patrick’s complaint alleges Defendants, in their role as opposing counsel

in Ms. Patrick’s pro se medical malpractice suit, committed the tort of wrongful use

of civil proceedings by allegedly raising a baseless counterclaim accusing Ms. Patrick

of fraud. Compl. ¶ 8. Ms. Patrick alleges that Defendants knew there was no

evidence to support their fraud counterclaim and that they failed to withdraw the

counterclaim after depositions and trial further demonstrated no evidence supported

1 The complaint initially named Medical Mutual Insurance Company (MMIC), but Ms. Patrick

later voluntarily dismissed MMIC as a defendant. Deletion of Def. MMIC as a Def. (ECF No. 16).

their allegation, resulting in the state court ultimately entering judgment in favor of

Ms. Patrick on Defendants’ fraud counterclaim. Id. ¶ 9-12. Ms. Patrick seeks $6

million in compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages and litigation costs.

Id. at 5-6; id. ¶ 15.

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Ms. Patrick’s claim

“is precluded and is patently meritless.” Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Defendants argue Ms.

Patrick’s claim is collaterally estopped because the parties fully litigated the issue to

final judgment in state court, concluding with the Maine Law Court considering and

rejecting Ms. Patrick’s claim that Defendants lacked a factual basis or proper purpose

in asserting their fraud counterclaim. Id. at 8-9. Defendants also move to dismiss on

the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim for wrongful use of civil

proceedings because Ms. Patrick’s “allegations are conclusory, and the actual facts –

which appear only in the state court records attached to her Complaint –

affirmatively disprove her claim.” Id. at 10-14. Finally, Defendants signaled their

intent to move for sanctions in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 at

the appropriate time. Id. at 14 n.7.

B. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions

Defendants ask this Court to sanction Ms. Patrick because, as a former

attorney, she knew or should have known that her assertion is collaterally estopped

and meritless, particularly given the state court previously sanctioned Ms. Patrick

for pressing the same claim in the underlying state proceedings. Mot. for Sanctions

at 2-6. Defendants explain that, prior to filing their sanctions motion, they provided

Ms. Patrick notice of their intent to seek sanctions if she did not voluntarily dismiss

her complaint and, twenty-one days after Ms. Patrick did not respond or withdraw

her complaint, they filed their motion for sanctions. Id. at 6. Defendants ask this

Court to order Ms. Patrick to pay their costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees incurred

in defending against the complaint, and for any additional sanctions the Court deems

appropriate under the circumstances. Id. at 6.

C. Susan Patrick’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motions

In opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Ms. Patrick argues that her

complaint sufficiently pleads a new claim of wrongful use of civil proceedings that is

not subject to res judicata and survives Rule 12(b)(6). Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-5. For that

same reason, Ms. Patrick explains, sanctions against her are also unwarranted. Id.

at 4-5. Lastly, Ms. Patrick accuses Attorney Brogan and his counsel of misconduct

for the arguments and “derogatory statements” contained in their motions to dismiss

and for sanctions. Id. at 4-5. In addition to urging the Court to deny Defendants’

motions to dismiss and for sanctions, Ms. Patrick asks the Court to impose “damages

and sanctions for Attorneys Brogan and [his counsel].” Id. at 5.

D. Defendants’ Reply

In their reply, Defendants point out several arguments in their motions to

dismiss and for sanctions that Ms. Patrick’s opposition fails to address, each of which

Defendants argue are therefore conceded. Defs.’ Reply at 1-3. Defendants dispute

whether Ms. Patrick’s complaint alleges a new claim, and that, even if her complaint

did raise a new claim, it is barred by res judicata. Id. at 3-5. Defendants reiterate

their argument that the complaint fails to state a claim for wrongful use of civil

proceedings. Id. at 5-6. Finally, Defendants argue that the accusations of misconduct

against Attorney Brogan and his counsel contained in Ms. Patrick’s opposition should

be stricken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Id. at 6-7. Defendants

reiterate their request to dismiss the complaint and for the Court to impose sanctions

on Ms. Patrick for Defendants’ costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees incurred in

defending this action, and any additional sanction the Court deems appropriate

under the circumstances. Id. at 7.

III. Legal Standard

For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), it “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). Plausible means “something more than merely possible” or “merely

consistent with a defendant’s liability.” Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71-72

(1st Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (first quoting Schatz v.

Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012); and then quoting

Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011)). Although this

does not require “detailed factual allegations,” the facts pleaded must at least “raise

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, a

facially plausible complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, dismissal is

appropriate if a complaint’s well-pleaded facts do not “possess enough heft to ‘sho[w]

that [the plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.

2008) (first alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Assessing a complaint’s plausibility is a context-specific task that requires “the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679. In the First Circuit, district courts apply a “two-step analysis.” Cardigan

Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015). “First, the court must

distinguish ‘the [counterclaim’s] factual allegations (which must be accepted as true)

from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).’” García-Catalán

v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of

P. R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)); see also Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55 (stating that

a court may “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal

labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements”).

“Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations are

sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” García-Catalán, 734 F.3d at 103 (quoting Haley v. City of Bos.,

657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)). “If the factual allegations in the complaint are too

meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere

conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal.” S.E.C. v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442

(1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Which Documents the Court May and May Not Consider

“Ordinarily,” when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “any consideration of

documents not attached to the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, is

forbidden, unless the proceeding is properly converted into one for summary

judgment under Rule 56.” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). However, “courts have made narrow exceptions for documents

the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records;

for documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in

the complaint.” Id. (citing caselaw).

First, under Watterson, the Court may consider documents attached to Mr.

Patrick’s complaint. Id. The parties appear to agree that the attached documents

are what they appear to be and neither party has challenged their authenticity. FED.

R. EVID. 901, 1003. Furthermore, the attached documents are official public records,

are central to Ms. Patrick’s claims, and are sufficiently referred to in the complaint.

Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3. These documents include:

• Ms. Patrick’s December 18, 2023 appellate brief before the Maine Law

Court (Docket No. WAL-23-472), Compl., Attach. 1, Brief for Appellants

(Law Ct. Brief).

• The appendix to Ms. Patrick’s Maine Law Court appeal, which includes

several relevant pleadings, documents, and trial court orders from the state

court proceedings, id., Attach. 2, App.

• The transcript from the July 18, 2022 bench trial from the state court

proceedings, Patrick v. Grover (Docket No. BELSC-CV-2015-00007), id.,

Attach. 3, Trial Tr.

Although not attached to Ms. Patrick’s complaint, the Court may also consider

the Law Court’s July 2, 2024 memorandum of decision affirming the lower court’s

judgment, Patrick v. Grover, Docket No. Wal-23-472, Mem-24-83, 2024 Me. Unpub.

LEXIS 80 (July 2, 2024). “When the complaint relies upon a document, whose

authenticity is not challenged, such a document ‘merges into the pleadings’ and the

court may properly consider it under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Alt. Energy,

Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Beddall

v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998)); accord Irizarry Sierra v.

Bisignano, 158 F.4th 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2025). “Without these exceptions, the district

court’s inquiry into the feasibility of a complaint would be ‘hamstrung’ by allowing

plaintiffs to ‘thwart the consideration of a critical document merely by omitting it

from the complaint.’” Bisignano, 158 F.4th at 49 (quoting Beddall, 137 F.3d at 17).

Finally, the Court may consider the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision

because it is a public record susceptible to judicial notice. See E.I. Du Pont de

Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Cullen, 791 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (federal court may take

judicial notice of complaint filed in related case even though neither party placed

complaint in the record); see also Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st

Cir. 2004) (“[T]he jurisprudence of Rule 12(b)(6) permits courts to consider matters

that are susceptible to judicial notice”); Boateng v. InterAmerican Univ., 210 F.3d 56,

60 (1st Cir. 2000) (a court “may look to matters of public record in deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion”).

2. Additional Facts

As previously explained, Ms. Patrick’s complaint alleges Defendants, in their

role as opposing counsel in Ms. Patrick’s pro se medical malpractice suit, committed

the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings by allegedly raising a baseless

counterclaim accusing Ms. Patrick of fraud. Id. ¶ 8. Ms. Patrick alleges that

Defendants knew there was no evidence to support their fraud counterclaim and that

they failed to withdraw the counterclaim after depositions and trial further

demonstrated no evidence supported their allegation, resulting in the state court

ultimately entering judgment in favor of Ms. Patrick on Defendants’ fraud

counterclaim. Id. ¶ 9-12. The Court reviewed the documents attached to Ms.

Partick’s complaint and recounts the following additional facts.

Ms. Patrick graduated from law school in 1980. App. at 32. During her career,

she was a member of the Massachusetts, Virginia, and Maine bars. Id. She worked

in Massachusetts and later in Virginia as in-house counsel at Fairchilds Industries,

negotiating leases and contracts with the federal government, private entities, and

landlords, among others. She describes herself as an “astute negotiator” and a “very

good contract lawyer.” Id. at 32-33.

In October 2009, Dr. Robert A. Grover performed a transvaginal mesh implant

surgery on Ms. Patrick. App. at 33, 48. Immediately after the surgery, Ms. Patrick

reported that she was doing great and healing well, and she continued to do well for

a couple of years. Id. at 48-49. Ms. Patrick did not begin to experience problems

until the second half of 2011. Id. On January 12, 2012, Ms. Patrick came to see Dr.

Grover for an examination, id., and Ms. Patrick recalls that Dr. Grover told her the

implant was fine. Id. at 33.

On November 26, 2014, Ms. Patrick’s former attorney, Attorney Bernard J.

Kubetz, reached an agreement in principle on a tolling agreement with Dr. Grover’s

malpractice insurance company (Insurer) extending the limitations period until April

1, 2015 for Ms. Patrick’s medical practice claim arising from the January 24, 2012

annual exam.2 Id. at 34. In a letter dated November 26, 2014 to Insurer, Attorney

Kubetz explained that Ms. Patrick was not claiming that the October 2009 mesh

implant surgery was inappropriate because transvaginal mesh implants were

sometimes used to treat women with Ms. Patrick’s condition in 2009. Id. at 33.

Attorney Kubetz wrote, however, that after the 2009 mesh surgery, significant

problems had emerged concerning mesh implants, and the FDA had issued warnings

about the continued use of mesh implant surgery and had recommended vigilance

among physicians in monitoring patients with those implants. Id. Attorney Kubetz

therefore wrote to Insurer that it was Ms. Patrick’s position “that Dr. Grover failed

to adhere to the standard of care at the time of [her] January 24, 2012 office visit.”

2 Maine law has a three-year statute of limitations after the cause of action accrues for actions

of professional negligence against health care providers. 24 M.R.S. § 2902.

Id. Attorney Kubetz noted that the three-year statute of limitations for the January

24, 2012 office visit was going to expire on January 24, 2015, and he requested a

tolling of the three-year statute of limitations for claims related to the January 24,

2012 office visit to allow informal negotiations. Attorney Kubetz and Insurer had “no

discussion of extending the statute for the 2009 claim.” Id. at 34. Before the parties

signed a formal agreement, however, Attorney Kubetz withdrew his representation,

and Ms. Patrick elected to proceed on her husband’s and her own behalf. Id.

On December 12, 2014, Ms. Patrick proposed what she deemed “minor”

modifications to the draft tolling agreement, including language precluding the

expiration of the statute of limitations as a defense in any related litigation. Id. at

34-35. Although her intent was to revive her otherwise time-barred 2009 claim, Ms.

Patrick understood that Attorney Kubetz and Insurer discussed only the 2012 claim

against Doctor Grover. Id. at 35.

In December 2014, Insurer, Ms. Patrick, and her husband signed the final

tolling agreement, which included Ms. Patrick’s proposed modifications. Id. On

February 13, 2015, Ms. Patrick informed Insurer of her intent to “expand” her claim

to include her 2009 claim. Id. at 36. Prior to that, Insurer did not understand that

the 2009 claim was part of the tolling agreement because they had not agreed to

include the 2009 claim, nor did they believe that the tolling agreement would bar a

statute of limitations defense to a claim that had already expired. Id. Furthermore,

Insurer did not discuss expansion of the tolling agreement with Doctor Grover, nor

did Insurer have permission or authorization from him to include the 2009 claim in

the tolling agreement. Id. at 37.

In February 2016, Ms. Patrick filed a state court action against Dr. Grover,

including claims based on her treatment in 2009 and 2012. Id. at 36, 74-80.

Defendants—Attorney Brogan and NHD—represented Dr. Grover in defending this

action. Id. at 4. Dr. Grover filed an answer and a three-count counterclaim,

requesting a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of the tolling agreement, and

alleging fraud and promissory estoppel. Id. at 31. The parties agreed to bifurcate

the claims for trial, with a bench trial to be conducted first on the tolling and

limitations issues, including the validity and scope of the tolling agreement. Id. at

31-32.

On July 12, 2022, a few days before the bench trial commenced, Ms. Patrick

filed a memorandum of law, accusing Attorney Brogan of “making deliberate and

repeated mischaracterizations, engaging in ‘egregious lawyer misconduct’, violating

the Maine Bar Rules, misleading the [state] court, and engaging in tactics to obscure

and delay the [state court proceedings].” Id. at 43. She also said Attorney Brogan

had “filed [] a totally baseless counterclaim, and then repeatedly recklessly,

maliciously and egregiously press on with this baseless counterclaim.” Id. Ms.

Patrick demanded that the state superior court issue an order “that defendant waived

the affirmative defense of statute of limitations; a ruling denying claims for fraud,

misrepresentation and equitable estoppel; an assessment of punitive damages for

bringing a baseless claim that violates the Maine Bar Rules; and an award of

compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $500,000 against defendant’s

attorney.” Id. (citing Pls.’ Revised Mem. at 14). In response, on July 15, 2022, Dr.

Grover moved the strike Ms. Patrick’s July 12, 2022 memorandum and asked for

sanctions against her under Rule 11(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.

Later that same month, the trial court held a bench trial and heard argument

regarding Dr. Grover’s motion for sanctions at the close of the bench trial. Id. at 32;

Bench Trial Tr. at 98-108. On February 24, 2023, the Superior Court issued

judgment. App. at 29-42. The Superior Court held that the tolling agreement did not

apply to the 2009 claim, because Insurer “was unaware that [Ms. Patrick] did not

intend to honor Attorney Kubetz’s representation that [she] would not make a claim

for the 2009 treatment, a representation [Ms.] Patrick was aware of and did not

repudiate.” Id. at 37. The Superior Court thus entered judgment in favor of Dr.

Grover on Counts IV and V of Ms. Patrick’s Amended Complaint. Id. at 41. The

Superior Court also granted Dr. Grover judgment on Count I of his Counterclaim,

which had sought a declaratory judgment. Significantly, the Superior Court ruled

that “[t]he running of the statute of limitations on the 2009 claim was not tolled by

the tolling agreement” and that the Plaintiffs’ claims “from 2009 against Defendant

Robert A. Grover, D.O. are barred by the statute of limitations.” Id.

The Superior Court’s rulings on Count II (fraud) and Count III (promissory

estoppel) in Dr. Grover’s counterclaim were nuanced. As to Count II, the Superior

Court reviewed the elements of fraud and then distinguished between “fraud that will

vitiate a contract and fraud that is actionable as deceit.” Id. at 39-41 (quoting

Kuperman v. Eiras, 586 A.2d 1260, 1262 (Me. 1991)). In an action for deceit, the

moving party must prove damages, and the Superior Court found that Dr. Grover

“did not offer any evidence regarding damages.” App. at 41. Regarding the

promissory estoppel claim in Count III, the Superior Court, noting that it has

declared “based on the credible evidence in this record, that the agreement did not

apply to or revive the 2009 claim,” concluded that there was “no gap in this remedial

system for promissory estoppel to fill.” Id.

The same day, in a separate order, the Superior Court recounted Ms. Patrick’s

allegations against Attorney Brogan in her July 12, 2022 memorandum, which are

similar to the allegations in her pending lawsuit in this Court. The Superior Court

granted Dr. Grover’s motion to strike and for sanctions, struck Ms. Patrick’s Revised

Memorandum of Law in its entirety, impounded her Revised Memorandum of Law,

and ordered Dr. Grover to file an affidavit regarding attorney’s fees. Id. at 44-45.

Ms. Patrick appealed both the Superior Court’s judgment and sanctions order.

Law Ct. Brief. On July 2, 2024, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the

Superior Court’s judgment. Patrick, 2024 Me. Unpub. LEXIS at 80. Addressing Ms.

Patrick’s contention that the parties had agreed to toll the statute of limitations

regarding the 2009 mesh implant, the Law Court “conclude[d] that on this record the

court did not clearly err in finding that there was no meeting of the minds between

the parties that would have given rise to a contractual obligation requiring Grover to

litigate Patrick’s 2009 claim.” Id. at *1. The Law Court further “conclude[d] that the

court did not err in determining, given that the 2009 claim was time-barred, that

Patrick’s pleadings related to her 2012 care ‘fail[ed] to establish a prima facie case for

each element of [her] cause of action . . . or otherwise failed as a matter of law.” Id.

at *2 (citations omitted). Finally, the Law Court ruled that “the court did not abuse

its discretion in imposing as a sanction a requirement that Patrick pay Grover’s

attorney’s fees incurred in responding to [Ms. Patrick’s Revised Memorandum of

Law].” Id.

3. Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings3

Based on the record before it, the Court concludes that Ms. Patricks’ complaint

fails to state a claim for relief. First, because the state court action already rejected

her assertion that Defendants lacked a proper purpose and a factual basis for their

fraud counterclaim, she is barred by principles of issue preclusion from re-litigating

that issue in this matter by asserting facts to the contrary.

Under Maine law, issue preclusion “bars [a] plaintiff from asserting an issue

of fact or law” that a court has already decided in a prior lawsuit. Sargent v. Buckley,

1997 ME 159, ¶ 6, 697 A.2d 1272. For the purposes of issue preclusion under Maine

law, a fact is “already decided if the identical issue was determined by a prior final

judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the

issue in a prior proceeding.” Portland Water Dist. v. Town of Standish, 2008 ME 23,

¶ 9, 940 A.2d 1097 (citation omitted). Because collateral estoppel is concerned with

factual issues, it applies even when the prior and present proceedings “offer different

3 In their respective opposition and reply briefs, the parties also argue claim preclusion’s

applicability to Ms. Patrick’s complaint, which is distinct from issue preclusion. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2-4;

Defs.’ Reply at 3-5. However, Defendants did not raise claim preclusion in the motion to dismiss. The

Court therefore will not address claim preclusion.

types of remedies.” Id. It also arises “‘only if the identical issue necessarily was

determined by a prior final judgment.’” Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME

121, ¶ 25, 834 A.2d 131 (quoting Button v. Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank, 666 A.2d 120,

122 (Me. 1995)). A party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden of

demonstrating that the specific issue was actually decided in the earlier proceeding.

Id.

According to Defendants, “[t]his is a textbook case” of issue preclusion. Mot. to

Dismiss at 9. Specifically, whether Defendants were “aware that there was a

complete absence of evidence that [Ms. Patrick] committed fraud” in the tolling

agreement’s formation was already litigated before the Superior Court determined in

a valid final judgment, as affirmed by the Law Court, that Defendants had a

reasonable factual basis to assert their fraud counterclaim. Id. 9-10.

The Court agrees with Defendants. Because the propriety of Defendants’ basis

for raising the fraud counterclaim was already litigated and determined in the

Superior Court’s sanctions order, and that determination was essential to the

judgment of that sanctions order, Ms. Patrick is held to that determination in this

case. See Sevigny v. Home Builders Ass’n., 429 A.2d 197, 201-02 (Me. 1981). Indeed,

Ms. Patrick appealed the Superior Court’s sanctions order to the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court, and the Law Court expressly affirmed the sanction.

In other words, having litigated this issue both at the Superior and Supreme

Judicial Court of the state of Maine, Ms. Patrick is bound by the state courts’

determination that Defendants had a reasonable factual basis and proper purpose in

asserting their fraud counterclaim and this Court may disregard her assertion to the

contrary in her complaint. Aside from this precluded assertion, Ms. Patrick pleads

no other facts to support her claim of wrongful use of civil proceedings. Ms. Patrick’s

complaint therefore fails to plead sufficient facts to survive Defendants’ motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Furthermore, even if Ms. Patrick’s assertion were not precluded, her complaint

fails to state a plausible claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings because the state

court proceedings did not terminate in her favor, which is a necessary element of a

claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings under Maine law. See Leighton v.

Lowenberg, 2023 ME 14, ¶ 19, 290 A.3d 68 (stating that an element of the tort of

wrongful use of civil proceedings is that “the proceedings have terminated in favor of

the person against whom they are brought”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

B. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions

Because the Court finds Ms. Patrick lacked a good-faith basis in fact or law to

initiate this action, the Court imposes the following sanctions. The Court ORDERS

Ms. Patrick to pay Defendants’ costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees incurred in

defending this action.4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). The Court also strikes Ms.

4 Before imposing Rule 11 sanctions, the movant must provide the offending party “notice and

a reasonable opportunity to respond.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). The party seeking sanctions must

privately serve the motion on the offending party, wait twenty-one days for the offending party to

correct or withdraw the alleged impropriety, and only if the opposing party fails to do so within that

period may the moving party file the motion for sanctions with the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).

Defendants assert, and Ms. Patrick does not dispute, that they served Ms. Patrick with a written

request that she voluntarily dismiss her complaint and then waited twenty-one days without a

response from her before filing their motion for sanctions. Mot. for Sanctions at 6. The Court accepts

Defendants’ representation and finds they complied with Rule 11(c)(1)’s notice requirement.

Patrick’s complaint and her additional allegations of misconduct against Defendants

raised in her opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for sanctions.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 empowers a court to impose sanctions on a

party “for advocating a frivolous position, pursuing an unfounded claim, or filing a

lawsuit for some improper purpose.” CQ Int’l Co. v. Rochem Int’l, Inc., USA, 659 F.3d

53, 60 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)). For the purposes of Rule 11

sanctions, “‘frivolous’ means ‘[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit; manifestly

insufficient as a matter of law.” Rumford Free Cath. Libr. v. Town of Rumford, No.

2:20-cv-00066-JDL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122023, at *18 (D. Me. July 13, 2020)

(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)). Although “[t]he line between

frivolous arguments and merely unpersuasive ones is fine,” N. New Eng. Tel.

Operations LLC v. Local 2327, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 735 F.3d 15, 25

(1st Cir. 2013), a litigant “crosse[s] that line” by “asserting arguments that have

already been rejected as lacking legal basis.” Rumford Free Cath. Libr., 2020 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 122023, at *18.

Ms. Patrick’s assertion that Defendants lacked a proper purpose or factual

basis for their fraud counterclaim is frivolous. As explained, Ms. Patrick filed a

complaint for wrongful use of civil proceedings against Defendants based on the same

factual allegations the state courts already rejected on the merits. Not only did the

Superior Court previously reject this assertion, it also sanctioned Ms. Patrick for

doing so, a ruling she appealed and which the Maine Supreme Judicial Court

affirmed. App. ¶¶ 43-45; Patrick, 2024 Me. Unpub. LEXIS at *2. Furthermore, Ms.

Patrick knew or should have known that this alleged misconduct does not legally

constitute wrongful use of civil proceedings because the Superior Court, in denying a

motion to amend her complaint to include an allegation of intentional infliction of

emotional distress and abuse of process against Defendants, explained that “[f]iling

a lawsuit, a regular use of process, ‘cannot constitute abuse’ [of process], even if

influenced by a wrongful motive.” See Mot. for Sanctions, Attach. 1, Order at 4 n.1

(quoting Tanguay v. Asen, 1998 ME 277, ¶ 5, 722 A.2d 49).

As a former attorney and member of the Maine bar, Ms. Patrick understands

the obligations attorneys hold as officers of the court, even if those obligations may

technically not apply to her as an inactive attorney. She also understands the

seriousness of attorney misconduct allegations and the importance and limited

resources of the judiciary. However, in filing this frivolous lawsuit, Ms. Patrick has

made light of the gravity of her claims against Defendants and “waste[d] judicial

resources and unnecessarily delay[ed] the resolution of [other] matters” before this

Court. Adams v. Adams, No. 1:17-cv-00200-GZS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110251, at

*1-2 (D. Me. July 2, 2019). Furthermore, she has subjected Defendants to yet another

round of baseless accusations, which she had every reason to know were entirely

frivolous and vexatious.5 The Court therefore orders Ms. Patrick to pay Defendants’

5 Although they did not provide the letter as an attachment, Defendants report the Board of

Overseers of the Maine Bar, on August 21, 2024, rejected an ethics complaint filed by Ms. Patrick

against Defendants, explaining that “it is evident that the issues you raise in your complaint have

been litigated before the court, they were decided and that the court’s rulings were upheld on appeal.

. . . [W]e cannot review the court’s factual findings through a bar investigation.” Defs.’ Reply at 2. Ms.

Patrick does not dispute the existence of this letter or its content. The Court therefore accepts

Defendants’ representation and concludes that Ms. Patrick clearly understood that the state court had

already ruled against her on the same claims of unethical conduct by Defendants, and that those

reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney’s fees incurred in defending against Ms.

Patrick’s meritless complaint. The Court also strikes Ms. Patrick’s complaint and

brief in opposition for their baseless and vindictive accusations of misconduct.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants Jonathan

Brogan and Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, P.A., LLC (ECF No. 10). Susan N. Patrick’s

Complaint for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings (ECF No. 1) is therefore

DISMISSED. The Court further GRANTS Defendant Jonathan Brogan’s and

Norman Hanson & DeTroy’s Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff (ECF No. 11).

The Court ORDERS Ms. Patrick to pay Defendants’ costs, expenses, and attorney’s

fees incurred in defending this action, and ORDERS Defendants to file their

reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees no later than seven days from the date

of this order. The Court ORDERS Ms. Patrick to file any objection to the Defendants’

submission within seven days of Defendants’ filing. Finally, the Court STRIKES Ms.

Patrick’s Complaint for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings (ECF No. 1) and Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Two Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for Sanctions (ECF No. 12).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 26th day of March, 2026

claims could not be further litigated, but nonetheless, filed the instant complaint based on the same

unfounded and previously resolved allegations.