CPC Parts Delivery, L.L.C. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp.

[Cite as CPC Parts Delivery, L.L.C. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2026-Ohio-1058.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CPC Parts Delivery, LLC, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 25AP-403

(Ct. of Cl. No. 2022-00515JD)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

Mahle Behr Dayton, LLC, et al., :

Plaintiffs-Appellants, : Nos. 25AP-406 and 25AP-408

(Ct. of Cl. No. 2021-00706JD)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 26, 2026

On brief: Poling Law, Jennifer L. Myers, and John B. Bauer,

for appellant, CPC Parts Delivery, LLC.

On brief: Reminger Co., L.P.A., Ronald Fresco, Evan M.

Schantz, and Brianna M. Prislipsky, for appellant, Mahle

Behr Dayton, LLC. Argued: Brianna M. Prislipsky.

On brief: Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, James D. Abrams,

and Lauren A. Kemp, for appellee. Argued: James D.

Abrams.

APPEALS from the Court of Claims of Ohio

DINGUS, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, CPC Parts Delivery, LLC (“CPC”) and Mahle Behr

Dayton, LLC (“Mahle”) (collectively “appellants”), appeal from a decision of the Court of

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 2

Claims of Ohio granting the motions for summary judgment of defendant-appellee, Bureau

of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This is the second appeal before this court in these consolidated cases. In the

prior appeal, this court summarized the procedural history of these matters as follows:

These consolidated appeals arise from two cases filed in the

Court of Claims by appellants against BWC. The first case (No.

2021-00706JD) involves both CPC and Mahle, wherein

appellants challenged the methodology utilized by BWC to

calculate the amounts of premium rebates issued to certain

employers participating in the Ohio Bureau of Workers’

Compensation Fund (the “State Fund”) established to

compensate workers injured on the job for the policy years

ending June 30, 2012, 2013, and 2016. That case was originally

filed in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas but

was ultimately dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals

affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Mahle Behr Dayton,

LLC v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., [2021-Ohio-145 (2d

Dist.)] (“Mahle I”). Therein, the appellate court held that

appellants’ suit against BWC was within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Ohio Court of Claims and not within the

subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Id.

The second case (No. 2022-00515JD) was filed by CPC only. In

that case, CPC alleges it is entitled to a larger dividend than it

received for the policy year ending June 20, 2020. Both the first

and second cases involve essentially the same facts and causes

of action and were eventually consolidated in the Court of

Claims. (See Oct. 14, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.) In both cases,

appellants claim BWC was unjustly enriched and violated equal

protection by allegedly calculating rebates due to employers

participating in the large deductible program differently from

rebates due to employers participating in the individually

retrospectively rated program.

...

On October 3, 2022, the trial court issued a decision and

concurrent judgment entry in which the trial court granted

BWC’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment

in favor of BWC on appellants’ unjust enrichment claims. The

trial court dismissed appellants’ equal protection claims,

without prejudice, finding that the Court of Claims lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges.

(Oct. 3, 2022 Decision; Oct. 3, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.) As noted

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 3

previously, on October 14, 2022, the trial court consolidated

the two cases and granted summary judgment in favor of BWC

in the second case for the same reasons given in the first case.

(Oct. 14, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.)

CPC Parts Delivery, L.L.C. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2024-Ohio-18, ¶ 2-3, 11 (10th

Dist.) (“CPC I”).

{¶ 3} In CPC I, this court concluded that although the Court of Claims did not err

in granting summary judgment in favor of BWC on appellants’ claims for unjust

enrichment, it erred in holding that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over

appellants’ equal protection claims. Id. at ¶ 26, 32. Consequently, this court affirmed in

part, and reversed in part, the judgments of the Court of Claims, and remanded the matters

to that court for further proceedings as to the equal protection claims. Id. at ¶ 34.

{¶ 4} On remand, the Court of Claims concluded that BWC did not violate

appellants’ equal protection rights because appellants and the identified comparators were

not similarly situated in all relevant respects to appellants and, even if they were, there was

a rational basis for the disparate treatment. Finding that no genuine issue of material fact

existed, and that BWC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Claims

awarded summary judgment in favor of BWC as to appellants’ equal protection claims.

{¶ 5} Mahle and CPC each filed timely appeals.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 6} In their respective appeals, Mahle and CPC each assigns the same sole

assignment of error for our review:

The Court of Claims erred in granting the BWC’s motions for

summary judgment.

III. Discussion

{¶ 7} Mahle and CPC both allege the Court of Claims erred in granting BWC’s

motions for summary judgment. We are unpersuaded.

{¶ 8} An appellate court reviews summary judgment under the de novo standard.

Estate of Sample v. Xenos Christian Fellowship, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3898, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). De

novo review means the reviewing court independently analyzes the record while giving no

deference to the trial court’s decision. Johnson v. Am. Italian Golf Assn. of Columbus,

2018-Ohio-2100, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 4

{¶ 9} Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party

demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion

and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment

is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor.

Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 1997-Ohio-221.

{¶ 10} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of

informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the

record demonstrating the absence of a material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107.

However, the moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under this rule with a

conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case; the

moving party must specifically point to evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C)

affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s claims. Id.; Vahila v. Hall, 1997-Ohio-259. Once the moving party

discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party

does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts

showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. Dresher at ¶ 17; Vahila at ¶ 19; Civ.R. 56(E).

{¶ 11} Appellants claim that, in connection with BWC’s rebate distribution, BWC

violated appellants’ equal protection rights by treating them, as employer participants in

the large deductible program, differently and without any rational basis than employers

participating in the individual retrospective rating program. The Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Ohio Constitution contains a

“functionally equivalent” Equal Protection Clause. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent.

State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 1999-Ohio-248, ¶ 15; Ohio Const., art I, § 2.

{¶ 12} Generally, equal protection requires that similarly situated persons be treated

similarly under the law. State v. Lawson, 2013-Ohio-2111, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.); see GTE North,

Inc. v. Zaino, 2002-Ohio-2984, ¶ 22 (“The comparison of only similarly situated entities is

integral to an equal protection analysis.”). The “aim is to keep governmental

decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”

Tonti v. Tonti, 2007-Ohio-2658, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 5

Commonwealth of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). “But the Equal Protection Clause

‘does not require things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they

were the same.’ ” GTE North, Inc. at ¶ 22, quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).

Conversely, if an asserted distinction between parties is not relevant to the challenged

action, a government actor will not be able to defeat an equal protection claim on the

grounds that the two groups are not similarly situated. Sherman v. Ohio Pub. Emps.

Retirement Sys., 2019-Ohio-278, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing MCI Telecommunications Corp.

v. Limbach, 1994-Ohio-489.

{¶ 13} Thus, to prove an equal protection violation, the plaintiff first must establish

that it was treated differently than another person similarly situated. Conley v. Shearer,

1992-Ohio-133, ¶ 16; State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 2017-Ohio-5528, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). If

the plaintiff and the party being treated differently are similarly situated, and the matter

does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, the plaintiff also must establish the

government action is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. GTE

North, Inc. at ¶ 22; Shockley v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2005-Ohio-4674, ¶ 21

(10th Dist.); Angerbauer v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2017-Ohio-7420, ¶ 51 (10th Dist.)

(“Once a showing of discriminatory treatment is made, the plaintiff next must demonstrate

the government action against him lacks a rational basis.”). If a plaintiff alleging an equal

protection violation fails to identify any similarly situated party that was treated differently,

it is unnecessary to analyze the purported rational basis of any action. Pung v. Kopke, 2025

U.S. App. LEXIS 2149 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025).

{¶ 14} Therefore, at issue in this appeal is whether appellants, as participants in

BWC’s large deductible program, are similarly situated in all relevant respects to

participants in BWC’s individual retroactive rating program. Because appellants’ equal

protection claims relate to BWC’s rebate of premiums, to review these claims, we must set

forth an overview of the Ohio workers’ compensation system. As quoted in CPC I, the

Supreme Court of Ohio has explained this system as follows:

“Ohio requires public employers that are not self-insured

employers to contribute to the public insurance fund “the

amount of money determined by the administrator of workers’

compensation.” R.C. 4123.38. Employers can choose from a

range of plans. The BWC offers both individual-and group-

rated plans.

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 6

Pursuant to R.C. 4123.29(A), the administrator of the BWC,

with the approval of the board of directors, classifies

occupations or industries with respect to degree of hazard and

risks and sets the premiums that employers must pay into the

state insurance fund for workers’ compensation coverage each

year. The BWC deposits these premiums into a single state

insurance fund (it does not maintain a separate account for

each employer), and it pays compensation benefits associated

with work-related accidents from that fund. With the exception

of a required surplus to maintain solvency, R.C. 4123.321

requires the BWC to establish a procedure for returning excess

premiums to participating employers in order to maintain a

revenue-neutral fund.”

CPC I at ¶ 4, quoting Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2020-Ohio-337, ¶ 3-4.

{¶ 15} And, as directly pertinent to this appeal, in CPC I, this court detailed the

factual and legal framework of appellants’ equal protection claims against BWC as follows:

The State Fund is intended to be revenue neutral—i.e., the

BWC charges Ohio employers only those premium amounts

that the BWC actuarially determines are necessary to pay for

projected claims costs and other related expenses. (May 2,

2022 Michael Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 3.) Nevertheless, because of

the timing of premium payments and claims made, revenue

neutrality does not equate to cash flow neutrality. Id. Any

excess cash flowing in is invested for the benefit of the State

Fund. Id. Thus, a surplus may be generated in excess of what is

required to maintain the solvency of the State Fund. Id. When

such an excess surplus exists, BWC’s Board of Directors (the

“BWC Board”) is authorized to issue rebates to participating

Ohio private employers. (Id. at ¶ 5; R.C. 4123.321.)

In recent history, the BWC Board has approved and issued

three separate rebates, each individually totaling

approximately $1 billion. (Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 7.) The most

recent such rebate, and the one at issue in this appeal, was

issued for the policy year beginning July 1, 2015 and ending

June 30, 2016 (the “2015 Policy Year”). Id. The BWC Board

determined the total dollar amount of rebates to be distributed

based on actuarial recommendations, then calculated the

rebate amounts. Id. at ¶ 6.

The Ohio Administrative Code sets forth several programs in

which private employers can participate, depending on

eligibility requirements. See Ohio Adm.Code 4122-17, et seq.

Two such programs are relevant to this case: the Individual

Retrospective Rating Program (“Individual Retro Program”)

under Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-41 and the Large Deductible

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 7

Program (“Large Deductible Program”) under Ohio Adm.Code

4123-17-72. Both CPC and Mahle participated in the Large

Deductible Program during the 2015-2016 policy year. (James

Tompkins Aff. at ¶ 2; Terri Case Aff. at ¶ 2.)

The Individual Retro Program applies a retrospective premium

whereby an employer pays an initial policy premium to BWC,

which is recalculated at the end of each policy year based on

claims incurred during that policy year. (Sendelbach Aff. at

¶ 13.) In this program, “[t]he employer assumes a portion of the

risk in exchange for a reduction in premium. The exact cost of

a retrospective premium for any policy year cannot be

determined until the end of the policy’s term when claims

experience can be tallied.” Id.

Under the Large Deductible Program, employers pay a

guaranteed premium. (Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 10.) “A guaranteed

premium policy is prospective, calculated prior to the policy

taking effect . . . [and] is unaffected by claims experience during

the coverage period.” Id. Claims experience during the

coverage year may, however, affect the premium charge in

subsequent policy years. Id. The Large Deductible Program

“offers an up-front premium discount since program

participants agree to take on a per claim deductible.” Id. The

maximum amount of the per claim deductible is $200,000.

(Tom[p]kins Aff. at ¶ 3; Case Aff. at ¶ 3.)

When the BWC Board approved the rebate for the 2015 Policy

Year, individual rebates were calculated based on a defined

percentage of the actual premiums paid by eligible employers.

(Sendelbach Aff. at ¶ 6, 8.) Employers participating in the Large

Deductible Program—including appellants—did not receive a

rebate for claim payments made up to the deductible amount

they agreed to pay under that program “[b]ecause deductibles

are not defined as premiums.” Id. In comparison, under the

Individual Retro Program, claim costs are specifically defined

as premiums; thus, these claim costs were included in the

rebate calculation for employers participating in this program.

Id. at ¶ 13; Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-52 and 4123-17-41. Thus,

the crux of appellants’ claims is that it was both unfair and

unlawful for BWC to use different formulas to calculate the

individual rebates for employers participating in the two

different programs, and that appellants are entitled to larger

rebates than those that were issued to them.

CPC I at ¶ 5-10.

{¶ 16} We find that, under these facts and circumstances, appellants cannot show

that, as employers participating in the large deductible program, they are similarly situated

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 8

in all relevant respects to employers participating in the individual retrospective rating

program. If certain eligibility requirements are met, an employer can choose to participate

in either of these elective BWC programs that shift some workers’ compensation claims risk

to the employers. Although these BWC programs both offer potential financial savings to

employers, the programs shift claims-loss risk in a substantively different manner.

{¶ 17} BWC’s individual retrospective rating program offers participating

employers a lower initial premium obligation that is recalculated at the end of each policy

year. This premium adjustment is “based on the incurred losses [during that policy year]

and on the audited payrolls of the employer.” Adm.Code 4123-17-46(A). Additionally, in

this program, the “[p]remiums are subject to minimum and maximum premium

limitations as selected by the employer,” and the claim costs ultimately borne by the

participant are limited to a ten-year period. Adm.Code 4123-17-46(F); Adm.Code 4123-17-

52(A).

{¶ 18} Alternatively, BWC’s large deductible program—the program selected by

appellants—offers participating employers up-front premium discounts, with a selected

per-claim deductible, in exchange for assuming some risk. For this program, the

participating “employer shall continue to be liable beyond any deductible program period

for billings [for claim costs] covered under a deductible program for injuries that arose

during any period for which a deductible is applicable, regardless of when payment was

made by the bureau.” Adm.Code 4123-17-72(J)(4). Also, a large deductible program

participant may request an annual aggregate stop-loss limit option in combination with

choosing large deductible levels. Adm.Code 4123-17-72(F).

{¶ 19} Thus, the large deductible and individual retrospective rating programs have

different features and means to shift some claims-loss risk to employer participants,

including differences in the timing and calculation of the premiums that BWC charges.

And, significantly, these differences are relevant to the government action that appellants

allege violated their equal protection rights—BWC’s rebates that were based on the

premiums that employers paid. As such, appellants cannot show that, for the purpose of

their equal protection claims, they, as participants in the large deductible program, are

similarly situated in all relevant respects to employers participating in the individual

retrospective rating program.

Nos. 25AP-403, 25AP-406, & 25AP-408 9

{¶ 20} Because appellants, as employers participating in the large deductible

program, are not similarly situated in all relevant respects to employers participating in the

individual retrospective rating program, their equal protection claims fail. And because

appellants’ equal protection claims fail on this basis, it is unnecessary to review whether

appellants presented evidence that BWC’s actions were not rationally related to a legitimate

government purpose.

{¶ 21} For these reasons, we overrule CPC’s sole assignment of error and Mahle’s

sole assignment of error.

IV. Disposition

{¶ 22} Having overruled CPC’s sole assignment of error and Mahle’s sole

assignment of error, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Claims of Ohio.

Judgments affirmed.

BOGGS, P.J., and JAMISON, J., concur.

_____________