Everett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JESSE E.,'

Plaintiff DECISION and ORDER

6:24-CV-6516-CJS

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a final

determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner’” or “Defendant”)

denying Plaintiffs application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. Now

before the Court is Plaintiff's application for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 7) and

Defendant's cross-motion for the same relief (ECF No. 11). For reasons discussed

below, Plaintiffs application is denied, Defendant's application is granted, and this action

is dismissed.

STANDARDS OF LAW

The Commissioner decides applications for disability benefits using a five-step

sequential evaluation process:

A five-step sequential analysis is used to evaluate disability claims. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the Commissioner considers whether

the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not,

1 The Court's Standing Order issued on November 18, 2020, indicates in pertinent part that, “[e]ffective

immediately, in opinions filed pursuant to Section 205(g} of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(q), in

the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, any non-government party will be

identified and referenced solely by first name and last initial.”

□

the Commissioner next considers whether the claimant has a severe

impairment? which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities.* If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third

inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an

impairment which is listed in the regulations [or medically equals a listed

impairment]. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment,

the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he

has the residual functional capacity [("RFC’)] to perform his past work.4

Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the Commissioner

then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could

perform. The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps,

while the Commissioner bears the burden at step five.®

Colvin v. Berryhill, 734 F. App'x 756, 758 (2d Cir. 2018) (citations and internal quotation

2 “At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a ‘severe medically determinable

physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in [20 C.F.R.] § 404.1509, ora

combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement.’ /d. If not, the claimant is

deemed not disabled, and the inquiry ends.” Koch v. Colvin, 570 F. App’x 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2074); see

also, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a}(4)(i)} (“At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your

impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that

meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a combination of impairmenis that is severe and meets

the duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled.”).

The Commissioner's Regulations define basic work-related activities as follows: “Basic work activities.

When we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.

Examples of these include— (1} Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, {ifting, pushing,

pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3)

Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) Use of judgment; (5} Responding

appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) Dealing with changes ina

routine work setting.” 20C.F.R. § 404.1522 (West 2023),

4 Residual functional capacity “is what the claimant can still do despite the limitations imposed by his

impairment.” Bushey v. Berryhill, 739 F. App'x 668, 670-71 (2d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted}; see also,

1996 WL 374184, Titles ll & Xvi: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in initial Claims, SSR 96-8P

(S.S.A. July 2, 1998).

5 "The Commissioner's burden at step five is to show the existence of possible employment for an

individual with the RFC determined by the ALJ in the fourth step of the sequential analysis.” Smith v.

Berryhill, 740 F. App'x 721, 726-27 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The ALJ typically does this either by

resorting to the medical vocational "grids" or, where the claimant has a non-exertional impairment, by

taking testimony from a vocational expert [("VE")]. See, Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1986}

(‘{T}he mere existence of a nonexertional impairment does not automatically require the production of a

vocational expert nor preclude reliance on the guidelines. A more appropriate approach is that when a

claimant's nonexertional impairments significantly diminish his ability to work—over and above any

incapacity caused solely from exertional limitations—so that he is unable to perform the full range of

employment indicated by the medical vocational guidelines, then the Secretary must introduce the

testimony of a vocational expert (or other similar evidence) that jobs exist in the economy which claimant

can obtain and perform.").

marks omitted).

An unsuccessful claimant may bring an action in federal district court to challenge

the Commissioner's denial of the disability claim, in which “[t]he court shall have power to

enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying,

or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without

remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West).

The issue to be determined by the court in such an action is whether the

Commissioner's conciusions “are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole or are based on an erroneous legal standard.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501

(2d Cir. 1998); see also, Barnaby v. Berryhill, 773 F. App'x 642, 643 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[We]

will uphold the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal

standards were applied.”) (citing Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010) and

Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012).”).

“First, the [clourt reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d

Cir. 1999); see also, Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]here an error

of law has been made that might have affected the disposition of the case, this court

cannot fulfill its statutory and constitutional duty to review the decision of the

administrative agency by simply deferring to the factual findings of the [administrative law

judge] [(‘JALJ[)’]. Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversai.”)

(citation omitted).

If the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, the court next “examines

the record to determine if the Commissioner's conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence.” Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d at 773; see also, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (‘The findings

of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial

evidence, shall be conclusive.”). Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d at 773 (citation omitted).

The substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review—

even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard, and the

Commissioner's findings of fact must be upheld unless a reasonable

factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Social Sec. Admin.,

Comm’'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (emphasis in

original). “An ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence

submitted, and the failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that

such evidence was not considered.” /d.

Banyai v. Berryhill, 767 F. App'x 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2019), as amended (Apr. 30, 2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, Snyder v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-277-

CV, 2023 WL 1943108, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (“While the substantial evidence

standard requires we find more than a mere scintilla of support for the Commissioner's

decision, it is still a very deferential standard of review requiring us to uphold the

Commissioner's findings unless a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude

otherwise.”) (emphasis in original; citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Schillo

v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2022) (‘We may vacate the agency's disability

determination only if it is based on legal error or unsupported by ‘substantial evidence’—

that is, if no reasonable factfinder could have reached the same conclusion as the ALJ.”);

Lisette R. o/b/o C.J.O. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-CV-00784-TOF, 2023 WL 6357961, at *3 (D.

Conn. Sept. 29, 2023) ("A disability determination is supported by substantial evidence if

a “reasonable mind” could look at the record and make the same determination as the

Commissioner. When the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court

defers to the Commissioner's judgment.”) (citations omitted).

In applying this standard, a court is not permitted to re-weigh the evidence. See,

v. Colvin, 669 F. App'x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Krull's disagreemeni is with the ALJ's

weighing of the evidence, but the deferential standard of review prevents us from

reweighing it.”); see also, Riordan v. Barnhart, No. 06 CIV 4773 AKH, 2007 WL 1406649,

at “4 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2007) (“The court does not engage in a de novo determination of

whether or not the claimant is disabled, but instead determines whether correct legal

standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the

Commissioner.”) (citations omitted). “Even where the administrative record may also

adequately support contrary findings on particular issues, the ALJ's factual findings must

be given conclusive effect so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.” Genier

v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In other

words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference,

and ‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might

justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” Melia v. Colvin, No.

1:14-CV-00226 MAD, 2015 WL 4041742, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 2015) (quoting Valente

v. Sec’'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir.1984)).

When considering whether a particular finding or decision is supported by

substantial evidence, a court also may not rely on any post hoc rationalizations offered

by the Commissioner. However, a court may consider evidence that was evidently

considered by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) even if it was not expressly

mentioned in the administrative decision. See, Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040

(2d Cir. 1983) ("“When, as here, the evidence of record permits us to glean the rationale

of an ALJ's decision, we do not require that he have mentioned every item of testimony

presented to him or have explained why he considered particular evidence unpersuasive

or insufficient to lead him to a conclusion of disability. E.g., Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d

464, 469 (2d Cir.1982). In Berry, we noted that, although we would remand for further

findings or a clearer explanation where we could not fathom the ALJ's rationale “in relation

to evidence in the record,” we would not remand where “we were able to look to other

portions of the ALJ's decision and to clearly credible evidence in finding that his

determination was supported by substantial evidence.” /d'[; [s]ee also Miles v. Harris, 645

F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir.1981) (“Notwithstanding the apparent inconsistency between the

reports of [two doctors], we are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every

conflicting shred of medical testimony ....”).”); see also, Loni S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 3:22-CV-805 (CFH)}), 2023 WL 4195887, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. June 27, 2023) (“The Court

is required to look at the entire ALJ’s decision when reviewing for substantial evidence.

See John L. M. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:21-CV-368 (BKS/TWD), 2022 WL 3500187, at *2

(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2022) (citations omitted) [While a reviewing court may not affirm the

Commissioner's decision based on an impermissible post-hoc rationalization, it may

affirm where the ALJ's consideration of the relevant factors can be gleaned from the ALJ's

decision as a whoie.’).”).

FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The reader is presumed to be familiar with the factual and procedural history of

this action. Briefly, the various aspects of Plaintiff's motion pertain to the ALJ’s RFC

finding, in which the ALJ stated:

After careful consideration of the entire record, | find that the claimant has

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

416.967(b) except: claimant can frequently climb stairs and ramps; claimant

can frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; claimant can frequently

reach in all directions with both upper extremities; claimant can perform

unskilled, simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; claimant can occasionally

interact with supervisors and the general public; and claimant can

occasionally tolerate changes in a routine work setting.

Tr. 1107.

More specifically, and as discussed below in greater detail, Plaintiff maintains that

remand is required for essentially four reasons: 1) the ALJ failed to adequately explain

why he included a limitation for contact with supervisors and the public, but not for contact

with co-workers; 2) the ALJ failed to incorporate all limitations, from two medical opinions

that he found persuasive into the RFC finding; 3) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the

opinion of a treating nurse practitioner; and 4) the ALJ failed to properly analyze the

opinion of a consultative medical examiner.

The Commissioner disagrees, and maintains that the ALJ’s decision is free of error

and supported by substantial evidence, for reasons set forth below in more detail.

The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and the relevant

portions of the record.

DISCUSSION

Issue 1: Whether the ALJ properly explained why the REC finding limits

contact with the public and supervisors, but not with co-workers?

Plaintiff first maintains that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff was limited to

having only occasional interaction with supervisors and the general public, without placing

any similar limitation on his contact with co-workers. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred

in failing to adequately explain this finding, and, alternatively, that the finding is

unsupported by substantial evidence.

The Commissioner disagrees, contending that this aspect of the RFC finding is

supported by substantial evidence, and adequately explained in the ALJ’s decision,

stating:

[T]he ALJ explained that Dr. Brownfeld’s opinion that Plaintiff had moderate

limitations in his abilities to regulate emotions, contro! his behavior, and

maintain his well-being "were partially the basis for my conclusion that

[Plaintiff] can occasionally interact with supervisors and the public.” Tr.

1115; citing Tr. 1776. Thus, the ALJ made a distinction between adaptive

abilities and interaction abilities and assessed an RFC that limited Plaintiff's

interaction with supervisors and the public based on the former. See id.

Indeed, supervisors and the public, not coworkers, make demands on a

worker, and a person’s ability to respond to demands is an adaptive, not

interpersonal, skill, as the ALJ noted. Tr. 1106 (ALJ explaining that the

domain of adapting and managing oneself refers, inter alia, to a person’s

ability to “respond to demands’). Therefore, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ

provided no explanation for this aspect of his RFC finding is meritiess.

Def. Memo of Law, ECF No. 11-1 at pp. 20-21.

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds, for the reasons

discussed below, that Plaintiffs arguments on this point lack merit.

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to properly explain, or support with substantial

evidence, his RFC finding that “claimant can occasionally interact with supervisors and

the general public.” The Court earlier set forth the relevant legal principles concerning

the substantial evidence standard. The legal principles concerning the ALJ’s duty to

explain his RFC finding are similarly well settled:

Courts in this Circuit have indicated that ALJs must not only identify

supporting evidence, they also must build an accurate and logical bridge

from that evidence to the conclusion. In sum, while ALJs are not required

to reconcile every conflicting shred of medical testimony, they must discuss

the evidence and factors crucial to the disability determination with sufficient

specificity to enable this Court to decide whether the determination is

supported by substantial evidence.

Orlando Christopher D. v. Commissioner, No. 1:24-CV-01526 (PJE), 2026 WL 494026,

at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2026) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also,

Terrence S. B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-0380 (JJM), 2024 WL 4131237, at

*5 (W.D.NLY. Sept. 10, 2024) ("ALJ Bell's explanation was sufficiently specific to satisfy

his obligation ‘to construct an accurate and logical bridge between his recitation of the

facts and the conclusions he reached.””) (citation omitted).

However, it is also well-settled that “this principle supplies a basis for remand only

when the link between evidence and conclusion is so opaque as to frustrate review.”

Lisette R. o/b/o C.J.O. v. Kifakazi, No. 3:22-CV-00784-TOF, 2023 WL 6357961, at *6 (D.

Conn. Sept. 29, 2023) (emphasis added). In this regard, to be sufficient, the ALJ's

explanation need only allow the Court to understand the ALJ's reasoning, and be

supported by substantial evidence. See, Lisette R. o/b/o C.J.O. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-CV-

00784-TOF, 2023 WL 6357961, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2023) ("[The ALJ’s] discussion,

while not lengthy, is nonetheless sufficient to permit the Court to understand his

reasoning: he thought that the data in the school records suggesting a marked limitation

were outweighed by other data suggesting a lower level of limitation.”); see also, Tami B.

v. Commrr of Soc. Sec., No. 3:21-CV-01460 (JCH), 2023 WL 2403898, at *8 (D. Conn.

Mar. 7, 2023) ("[A] district court must remand where the ALJ's decision was not thoroughly

explained in a manner that allows the court to be comfortable that it was supported by

substantial evidence.”).

Here, in connection with the mental portion of his RFC finding, the ALJ reviewed

the relevant opinion evidence, and, in particular, the opinions of two agency review

psychologists, H. Ferrin, Ph.D. (“Ferrin”) and D. Brown, Psy.D. (“Brown”), and the opinion

of consultative examining psychologist Adam Brownfeld, Ph.D. (“Brownfeld”). The ALJ

noted that Ferrin and Brown each opined that Plaintiff would be moderately limited in

“interact[ing] appropriately with the general public” and “accept[ing] instructions and

respond[ing] appropriately to criticism from supervisors,” but that Plaintiff could otherwise

“respond appropriately to supervisors and coworkers.” The ALJ found that both of those

opinions were “generally persuasive,” since they were “largely consistent with the medical

evidence concerning Plaintiffs mental health issues.”

Brownfeld, meanwhile, found “no evidence of limitation” for Plaintiff “interacting

adequately with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” Tr. 1766. The ALJ found

Brownfeld’s opinion overall only “partially persuasive,” since it was only “somewhat

consistent” with the evidence. However, the ALJ indicated that he partially relied on

10

Brownfeld’s opinion when limiting Plaintiffs contact with supervisors and the general

public, stating:

While his findings that claimant is moderately limited in his ability to regulate

his emotions, control his behavior, and maintain his well-being were not

stated in vocationally relevant terms, those findings were partially the basis

for my conclusion that claimant can occasionally interact with supervisors

and the general public and occasionally tolerate changes in a routine work

setting.

Tr. 1175.

Then, later in the decision, when summarizing the RFC finding, the ALJ stated that,

mental limitations in the [RFC finding] were based on claimant’s own account of his

mental abilities, and the opinions of Dr. Brownfeld, Dr. Ferrin, and Dr. Brown.” Tr. 1116.

Accordingly, it is evident to the Court that, when making the mental portion of the

RFC finding, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to occasional interaction with supervisors and the

public, based on the opinions of Ferrin and Brown, who each indicated that Plaintiff would

be moderately limited in “interact[ing] appropriately with the general public” and in

“accept[ing] instructions and respond{ing] appropriately to criticism from supervisors,” and

on the opinion of Brownfeld, who indicated that Plaintiff was moderately limited in his

ability to regulate his emotions, control his behavior, and maintain his well-being. In

making this determination, the ALJ resolved the conflicting opinion evidence in Plaintiff's

favor, since, again, Brownfeld, who actually examined Plaintiff, opined that Plaintiff had

no limitation interacting with anyone. Tr. 1766. It further appears that the ALJ did not

place any similar limitation on Plaintiff interacting with co-workers, since neither Ferrin,

nor Brown, nor Brownfeld, indicated that Plaintiff was limited in interacting with coworkers.

1]

Tr. 84-85, 98-99, 1766.

Plaintiff nevertheless seems to maintain that the ALJ’s decision not to limit

Plaintiff's interaction with coworkers is inconsistent and erroneous, since the ALJ found,

under the paragraph B criteria, that Plaintiff would be moderately limited in “interacting

with others,” referring to “supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” Pl. Memo of Law, ECF

No. 7-1 at p. 14; ALJ Decision at Tr. 1105. However, the Court again disagrees, since a

step-three finding and a RFC finding have distinct functions, and the ALJ is not required

to incorporate paragraph B findings into the RFC finding. See, e.g., Stonick v. Saul, No.

3:19-CV-01334 (TOF), 2020 WL 6129339, at *12 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2020) (“Though

the ALJ assessed the Plaintiff as having moderate limitations in “interacting with others”

and “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace” (R. 13) at Step Three, she was not

obligated to explicitly incorporate those findings into the RFC.”) (collecting cases); see

also, Serrano v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 22CIV5627JPOSLC, 2023 WL 6049651, at *17

(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2023) (‘The applicable regulations provide that, to determine the

severity of a mental impairment at step three of the disability determination, the

Commissioner assesses, on a five-point scale, four areas to determine the degree of

functional limitation: “[uJnderstand, remember, or apply information; interact with others;

concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself.” 20 C.F.R. §§

416.920a(c)(3)}—(4). As the Second Circuit has explained, these factors only apply at step

three—determining the severity of a mental impairment—‘not a claimant's RFC, which is

relevant to the guidelines’ fourth and fifth steps.” Whipple v. Astrue, 479 F. App'x 367,

369 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order)[.]") (other citations omitted), report and

12

recommendation adopted, No. 22-CV-5627 (JPO), 2023 WL 6039337 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,

2023).

Consequently, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately explained the mental RFC

finding, and that the decision not to place any limitation therein on Plaintiff's ability to

interact with coworkers is supported by substantial evidence, contrary to what Plaintiff

alleges. This aspect of Plaintiffs motion is therefore denied.

Issue 2: Whether the ALJ erred by failing to incorporate all the limitations

Opined to by Brown and Ferrin into the RFC finding?

Plaintiff next asserts that, since the ALJ found the opinions of Ferrin and Brown

generally persuasive, it was error for him not to either include ali limitations contained

therein into the RFC finding, or explain why he did not do so. PI. Memo of Law, ECF No.

7-1 at p. 17. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that, since Brown and Ferrin each

opined that Plaintiff would be “moderately limited” “regarding maintaining attendance and

completing a normal workday or workweek” without interruption from psychologically-

based symptoms, the ALJ should have either included limitations reflecting those opinions

into the RFC finding, or explained why he did not do so. /d.; see also, id. at 18 (“Thfe]

RFC does not account for moderate limitations with sustaining an ordinary routine or

regular attendance at work and completing a normal workday or workweek without

interruptions.”). In this regard, Plaintiff argues that such moderate limitations are not

properly accounted for merely by limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine, and unskilled work,

and that “moderate limitations for sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance

at work require further limitations, including [allowances for] off-task time and absences.”

13

ld. at 20. Plaintiff further maintains that remand is required, since the error is harmful,

inasmuch as Plaintiffs moderate mental limitations would likely cause him to be absent

from work, and the VE testified that one absence per month would be work-preclusive.

Id. at 21.

The Commissioner disagrees, and maintains that the ALJ’s decision not to include

additional limitations, such as those argued-for by Plaintiff, is supported by substantial

evidence, such as Brownfeld’s statement that he found no evidence of limitation in

Plaintiff's ability to sustain a routine or to maintain regular attendance at work, and the

similar opinions of Ferrin and Brown that Plaintiff could sustain a routine. Def. Memo of

Law, ECF No. 11-1 atp. 17. More specifically, the Commissioner states:

Drs. Ferrin and Brown explicitly stated that Plaintiff “can sustain a routine.”

Tr. 86, 100. The ALJ found the same. Tr. 1105. Certainly, the ALJ's

interpretation of Drs. Ferrin and Brown's assessmenis trump that of Plaintiff

under the substantial evidence standard of review. Further, the ALJ also

found Dr. Brownfeld’s opinion persuasive, and Dr. Brownfeld opined that

Plaintiff had no limitations in sustaining an ordinary routine and regular

attendance at work{.]

Id. at 18-19 (citation omitted). The Commissioner further states that, in any event, the

RFC finding, limiting Plaintiff to “unskilled, simple, routine” work, adequately accounts for

moderate mental limitations, and that further limitations, for absences and/or time off-task,

were not warranted. See, id. at 19 (‘[T]he RFC properly accounts for these opinions,

which are consistent with it and the decision’s step five finding for unskilled jobs.”).

Finally, the Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff is incorrect, to assert that when making

an RFC finding an ALJ must include every limitation contained in a medical opinion that

14

he finds persuasive, since an RFC finding “need not perfectly match any single medical

opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” /d. at 20

(citations omitted).

Drs. Ferrin and Brown found that Plaintiff would be moderately limited “regarding

maintaining attendance and completing a normal workday or workweek” without

interruption from psychologically-based symptoms. indeed, Ferrin and Brown both

found that Plaintiff was moderately limited in performing activities within a schedule,

maintaining regular attendance, being punctual, and completing a norma! workday and

workweek without interruption from psychologically-based symptoms. Tr 84, 98.

However, Ferrin and Brown concluded that, despite his limitations, Plaintiff could maintain

adequate attention and concentration to complete work like procedures and sustain a

routine. Tr. 86, 100.

Brownfeld, meanwhile, found that Plaintiff had no limitation in either “sustaining

concentration and performing a task at a consistent pace” or “sustaining an ordinary

routine and regular attendance at work.” Tr. 1766. However, the ALJ did not adopt that

aspect of Brownfeld’s opinion. See, Tr. 1115, 18* paragraph (The ALJ indicated that he

only relied on Brownfeld’s opinion to make the RFC finding concerning Plaintiff's ability to

interact with others). Rather, the ALJ stated that, with the exception of the limitations

on interaction with supervisors and the public, the mental portion of the RFC finding is

based on Plaintiffs own account of his limitations, and on the opinions of Ferrin and

Brown. Tr. 1116. indoing so, the ALJ once again resolved a conflict between the opinion

evidence in Plaintiff's favor.

15

Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, Plaintiff here contends that inasmuch as Ferrin

and Brown found that Plaintiff would be “moderately limited” with regard to maintaining

attendance and completing a normal workday or workweek without interruption from

psychologically-based symptoms, the ALJ was required to include limitations in the RFC

finding for time off-task and absences from work. In this regard, Plaintiff insists that such

moderate limitations are not properly accounted for merely by limiting Plaintiff to simple,

routine, and unskilled work.

However, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff, and agrees with the Commissioner,

that the RFC finding properly accounts for moderate limitations in sustaining an ordinary

routine or regular attendance at work and completing a normal workday or workweek

without interruptions.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff is incorrect insofar as he asserts that an ALJ is

required to adopt every limitation contained in a medical opinion that he finds persuasive.

Rather, an ALJ’s RFC finding need not correspond to any particular medical opinion,

provided that itis supported by substantial evidence:

The ALJ is permitted to discount the opinion of a treating physician if it is

inconsistent with other substantial evidence. See Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32.

And the ALJ bears “the final responsibility” for making RFC determinations.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). It follows from these basic principles that the

ALJ's RFC conclusion need not perfectly match any single medical opinion

in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. See

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 399, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (‘We therefore are presented

with the not uncommon situation of conflicting medical evidence. The trier

of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.”). in so holding, we here reiterate

a point that this Court has previously made summarily. See Maita v. Astrue,

508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that an ALJ's conclusions need

not “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited

16

in his decision” because the ALJ is “entitled to weigh all of the evidence

available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a

whole”),

Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022).

Neither does the Court find merit to Plaintiffs contention that the RFC finding is

insufficient as a matter of law to account for Plaintiff's moderate mental impairments. In

this regard, the RFC finding, in pertinent part, limited Plaintiff to “unskilled, simple, routine,

and repetitive tasks,” with occasional interaction with supervisors and the public, and

occasional changes in the work setting. Tr. 1107. In acase with similar facts, the Second

Circuit stated that such an RFC finding was adequate, to account for moderate mental

limitations pertaining to the ability to maintain a schedule and regular attendance at work,

without additional limitations for time off-task or absences:

The ALJ determined that Valdes-Ocasio had “the residual functional

capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the

following nonexertional limitations: the claimant is limited to understanding,

remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, involving routine and

repetitive tasks; with no high production demands; and no more than

occasional contact with the public.”

Valdes-Ocasio argues that the ALJ's RFC assessment “failfed] to include

any limitations to staying on task and/or attendance despite undisputed

medical opinions assessing such limitations.” Appellant's Br. at 14 (typeface

altered). But the medical record supports the ALJ's findings. Dr. Harding,

the state-agency consultative examiner, concluded that Valdes-Ocasio was

“capable of performing unskilled work in a low contact setting due to

reported difficulties interacting with others.” CAR at 69. The ALJ concluded

that due “to moderate limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining

pace, [Valdes-Ocasio] can have no high production demands.” /d. at 22.

The ALJ found, however, that “greater restrictions are not supported by the

evidence of record.” /d.

17

Dr. Harding indicated that Valdes-Ocasio was “moderately limited” in_ her

ability to “carry out detailed instructions,” “maintain attention and

concentration for extended periods,” and “perform activities within a

schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual! within customary

tolerances.” See id. at 68. Nothing from Dr. Harding's report required the

ALJ to include more detailed limitations in the RFC assessment. See

Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78 (“[An] ALJ's RFC conclusion need not perfectly match

any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by

substantial evidence.”).

Valdes-Ocasio v. Kijakazi, No. 21-3152, 2023 WL 3573761, at *1 (2d Cir. May 22, 2023);

see also, Raul G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:24-CV-08828 (SDA), 2026 WL 412085,

at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026) (“[M]oderate limitations generally are consistent with the

ability to perform unskilled work. Thus, the Second Circuit frequently has rejected

arguments that an ALJ's RFC determination must include restrictions regarding

attendance or off-task percentage to account for moderate limitations in, inter alia,

concentration and the ability to sustain regular attendance.”) (collecting Second Circuit

decisions). .

Pursuant to such direction from the Second Circuit, the Court finds that the

challenged RFC finding here was sufficient to account for Plaintiffs moderate limitations

in sustaining an ordinary routine or regular attendance at work and completing a normal

workday or workweek without interruptions. The Court also determines that the finding

is supported by substantial evidence, including the opinions of Ferrin and Brown.

Consequently, this aspect of Plaintiff's motion is also denied.

18

Issue 3: Whether the ALJ erred in finding that the work-preclusive opinion

of treating Nurse Practitioner Katelynn Coffey, N.P. was unpersuasive?

Plaintiff next maintains that when assessing the opinion of treating nurse

practitioner Katelynn Coffey, N.P. (“Coffey”), and finding it unpersuasive, the ALJ

committed the following three errors: He failed to properly evaluate the supportability of

the opinion, since he only compared it to Coffey’s own notes, taken on the date she wrote

the opinion; he failed to properly evaluate the consistency of the opinion, since he did not

compare it to any other evidence; and he improperly and inconsistently “took issue with

the fact” that Coffey had no apparent expertise in the treatment of orthopedic or spinal

issues, without applying other medical opinions to the same scrutiny. Pl. Memo of Law,

ECF No. 7-1 at p. 24. Plaintiff contends that these errors were not harmless, since

Coffey's opinion, if accepted, would have precluded Plaintiff from performing any type of

work. /d. at 24.

The Commissioner disagrees, maintaining that the ALJ properly evaluated the

supportability and consistency of Coffey’s opinion. The Commissioner contends that the

ALJ properly noted that Coffey's opinion was not supported by her own notes taken on

the day she completed the report, which notes reported findings that were fairly consistent

with other clinical findings that were reported throughout the alleged period of disability

by Coffey and others, which the ALJ discussed. In so doing, the Commissioner

maintains, the ALJ considered both the supportability and consistency of Coffey's opinion.

The Commissioner further contends that the ALJ’s observation concerning Coffey’s lack

of specialization was proper, though not required, and that the Alu’s decision not to

19

similarly discuss the other doctors’ areas of specialization was “of no moment,” since the

ALJ was only required to discuss the supportability and consistency of their opinions,

which he did.

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Coffey’s medical opinion,

and the legal principles relating to an ALJ’s duty in this regard are clear:

The two “most important factors” for determining the persuasiveness of

medical opinions are consistency and supportability, and an ALJ is required

to “explain how [he] considered the supportability and consistency factors”

for a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)[20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c(b)(2)].

With regard to “supportability,” the regulations provide that “[t]he more

relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations

presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s)

or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical

opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.920c(c)(1) [;20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)]. The regulations provide that

with regard to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or

prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other

medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive

the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20

C.F.R. 416.920c(c)(2)[;20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)].

An ALJ's failure to explain the supportability and consistency of the medical

opinions in the record constitutes procedural error. See Estrella v. Berryhill,

925 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2019); Loucks v. Kijakazi, No. 21-1749, 2022 WL

2189293, *2 (2d Cir. June 17, 2022) (summary order) (finding that “the ALJ

committed procedural error by failing to explain how it considered the

supportability and consistency of medical opinions in the record”). However,

“if ‘a searching review of the record’ assures [the court] ‘that the substance

of the [regulation] was not traversed,” the court may affirm the

Commissioner's decision. Loucks, 2022 WL 2189293, at *2 (quoting

Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96 (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d

Cir. 2004))).

20

Jason A. L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 521CV477FJSTWD, 2022 WL 4354363, at *2

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022).

in most instances, the ALJ may, but is not required to, discuss the other

factors previously required to assess medical opinion evidence ({i.e.,

relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other relevant factors). 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ must consider those additional factors if

there are “two or more medical opinions or prior administrative medical

findings about the same issue [that] are both equally well-supported ... and

consistent with the record ... but are not exactly the same,” at which point

the ALJ must “articulate how [she] considered the other most persuasive

factors ....” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c¢(b)(3).

Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp. 3d 6, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (emphasis added).

And, of course, as a general matter of fairness, an ALJ should, as much as

possible, apply the various factors consistently when weighing medical opinions. Cf,

Passmore v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-1370, 2023 WL 6290646, at *4 (N.D.

Ohio Sept. 27, 2023) ("{T]here is nothing to suggest the ALJ inconsistently considered the

“examining relationship” subfactor to credit only certain opinions[.]”); Butts v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., No. 3:16-CV-874 (CFH), 2018 WL 387893, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2018)

(‘[A]ithough Dr. Wiley is not an orthopedic specialist like Dr. Berard, neither is consultative

examiner Dr. Perkins-Mwantuali, who specializes in internal medicine and pediatrics. In

affording Dr. Perkins-Mwantuali's opinion great weight despite her lack of orthopedic

specialty, the ALJ inconsistently applies this specialization distinction when considering

the opinion evidence.”) (applying old treating physician rule).

Here, when explaining his physical RFC finding, the ALJ began by noting thai,

overall, the medical evidence was not consistent with the severity of Plaintiff's self-

21

reported symptoms. Tr. 1109 (“The medical evidence is not consistent with the severity

of symptoms and degree of limitation that would preclude claimant from performing any

work.”). For example, the ALJ explained that the treatment notes of Plaintiff's primary

care physician, Yehuda Nussbaum, D.O. (“Nussbaum”), indicated that Plaintiff appeared

to be in no distress, contrary to what he told Nussbaum, and that the results of

Nussbaum’s examinations were essentially normal. Tr. 1110. The ALJ further noted that

the results of the consultative physical exam by Harbinder Toor, M.D. (“Toor’) were also

essentially normal, and that Toor found an x-ray of Plaintiffs cervical spine showed only

“mild degenerative changes at C5-6 and straightening of the normal cervical lordosis.” Tr.

1111. The ALJ also indicated that the findings of treating physician’s assistant, Coffey,

were largely normal, except for some spasms, tenderness, and limited range of motion in

the lumbar spine, along with a bilaterally-positive straight-leg-raising test on one occasion.

Tr. 1111, 1113-1714.

Overall, the ALJ summarized the medical evidence as typically showing benign

findings consistent with an ability to perform at least light work, stating:

[C]linical findings throughout the alleged period of disability support a finding

that claimant is capable of performing a range of light work. Claimant's gait

was observed to be normal on numerous occasions. There is no apparent

documentation that claimant exhibited sensory deficits or diminished

muscle strength with any consistency. Diagnostic testing shows only mild

degenerative changes in claimant’s spine. X-rays of claimant's cervical

spine performed on September 20, 2022 revealed mild degenerative

changes at C5-6 and straightening of the normal cervical lordosis. No acute

fracture or subluxation was evident. The remainder of the height of the

intervertebral disc spaces and vertebral bodies appeared to be relatively

well maintained. X-rays of claimant’s lumbosacral spine also performed that

day showed no acute fracture or subluxation. The height of vertebral bodies

22

and intervertebral disc spaces wererelatively well maintained (Exhibit 271F,

pp. 5-6).

Tr. 1174.

When weighing the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ essentially found that the

opinions of Toor and the agency review physicians were generally consistent with the

medical evidence overall, while the opinions of Nussbaum and Coffey were not. For

example, the ALJ found that Nussbaum’s opinion, which included statements that Plaintiff

would be severely limited in standing, walking, and sitting, and that he would be absent

from work at least five days per month, was inconsistent with her own findings, and

appeared to be based on Plaintiffs subjective complaints. Tr. 1114 (‘Dr. Nussbaum does

not appear to identify any objective medical evidence in the form she completed to support

these limitations. She merely pointed to claimant’s subjective account of his

symptoms.”). Regarding Coffeys opinion, the ALJ stated:

In a physical treating medical source statement completed on January 172,

2024, Ms. Coffey assessed that claimant can lift and carry 50 pounds rarely,

twenty pounds occasionally, and ten pounds frequently. She determined

that claimant can stand and walk for about two hours and sit for about four

hours in an eight-hour workday. Ms. Coffey concluded that claimant can

occasionally climb stairs, but can only rarely climb ladders. She indicated

that claimant can occasionally stoop, bend, and twist. Ms. Coffey assessed

that claimant can crouch and squat on an occasional or rare basis. She

determined that claimant can use his upper extremities to reach, perform

fine manipulations, and grasp, twist, and turn objects 100% of an eight-hour

workday. Ms. Coffey estimated that claimant would be absent for at least

four days each month. She also indicated that claimant's pain and other

symptoms would occasionally be severe enough to interfere with the

As discussed further below, the ALJ found that the agency review physicians’ opinions were “largely

consistent’ with evidence, while Teor's opinion was “somewhat consistent” with the evidence.

23

attention and concentration needed to perform even simple work tasks

(Exhibit 25F, pp. 9-13).

Even though Ms. Coffey has treated claimant since 2014, | find that her

opinion is unpersuasive because the degree of limitations that she

assessed are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence concerning

claimant's physical impairments. The only clinical finding or objective sign

that Ms. Coffey identifies to support the limitations she assessed is reduced

range of motion in the lumbar spine (See Exhibit 25F, p. 9). That lone clinical

sign is inadequate to support the degree of limitations that she assessed,

especially given the diagnostic testing and the treatment that claimant has

received for his back issues since the application date. Furthermore, the

clinical findings that Ms. Coffey observed on the day she completed this

form do not indicate the severity of physical limitations that she assessed.

While Ms. Coffey noted that range of motion in the lumbar spine was

decreased, but [sic] she did not specify what modalities were limited or to

what degree those modalities were limited. In addition, she noted that

straight leg raising was negative bilaterally and that claimant’s gait was

normal. Moreover, Ms. Coffey detected no sensory deficits or muscle

weakness (Exhibit 26F, pp. 14-18). As indicated above, these clinical

findings and diagnostic are fairly consistent with the clinical findings that

were observed throughout the alleged period of disability. Finally, | note that

Ms. Coffey has no apparent expertise in the treatment of orthopedic or

spinal issues. Based on these considerations, | conclude that Ms. Coffey’s

opinion is unpersuasive.

Tr. 1115-1116.

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that this explanation satisfied the ALJ’s

duty to consider the supportability and consistency of Coffey’s opinion.

The Court also agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ did not err by

mentioning Coffey’s lack of specialization in orthopedic medicine as one of the reasons

he found her opinion unpersuasive. In that regard, Plaintiff asserts that it was error for

the ALJ to note Coffey's lack of specialization, while failing to similarly note the lack of

24

orthopedic specialization of agency review physicians R. Mohanty, M.D. (“Mohanty”), A.

Vinluan, M.D. (“Viniuan”), and J. Randall, M.D. (“Randall”), whose opinions the ALJ found

“generally persuasive.” Mohanty, Viniuan, and Randall each indicated that Plaintiff was

capable of light work, based on their reviews of the record, which, each of them found,

generally reported normal examination findings, and on Plaintiff's reported activities of

daily living.

However, the ALJ’s comment about Coffey’s lack of specialization in orthopedics

was made in the specific context of explaining why the ALJ did not believe that Coffey’s

very-restrictive opinion was supported by the lone positive sign that she listed, that was

orthopedic in nature, namely, decreased range of movement in the lumbar spine. Tr.

2217. Given this difference between Coffey’s opinion and the opinions of Mohanty,

Vinluan, and Randall, the Court does not think that it was unfair of the ALJ not to mention

the agency review physicians’ lack of specialization in orthopedics. In any event, the

Court finds that any error by the ALJ in that regard was harmless, since, even before

mentioning Coffey’s lack of specialization, the ALJ had already indicated that he found

Coffey’s opinion unpersuasive based on the “most important” factors of supportability and

consistency.’ Consequently, this aspect of Plaintiffs motion is also denied.

7 See, Rubin v. Martin O'Malley, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 116 F.4th 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2024) ("For claims filed

on or after March 27, 2017, as is the case here, the Commissioner is required to apply 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c in evaluating medical opinion evidence in the record. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the

Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5852-53 (Jan. 18, 2017). Pursuant to that regulation,

the Commissioner considers the persuasiveness of each medical opinion using the factors listed in §

404.1520c(c){1)-(5). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Of those factors, supportabilily and consistency are

the most importani[.}’) (footnote omitted).

25

Issue 4: Whether the ALJ properly evaluated

the consultative opinion of Dr. Toor?

Plaintiff lastly maintains that remand is required because the ALJ erred in several

ways when evaluating the report from Toor’s consultative internal medicine examination.

Toor reported almost entirely normal findings from the examination, except for “slight

difficulty getting on and off examination table,” limited lumbar-spine flexion, and positive

straight-leg raising. Tr. 1770 (“Lumbar spine forward flexion 40 degrees, extension 0

degrees, lateral flexion and lateral rotation bilaterally 30 degrees. SLR positive both

sitting and supine bilateraily at 30 degrees.”). Toor further reported that an x-ray of

Plaintiff's lumbar spine was “negative.” Tr. 1771. Toor's medical source statement was

as follows: “He has moderate limitation standing, walking, squatting, bending, lifting,

carrying. He has mild to moderate limitation sitting a long time.” /d.

The ALJ found that Toor’s opinion was “partially persuasive,” but of limited utility

in making an RFC finding, insofar as it did not express Toor’s findings in “vocationally

relevant terms’:

After performing a consultative internal medicine examination on August 24,

2022, Dr. Toor [found that the claimant] is moderately limited in his ability to

lift, carry, stand, walk, and squat. He determined that claimant is mildly to

moderately limited in his ability to sit for a long time (Exhibit 21F). Even

though Dr. Toor examined claimant only once, | find that his opinion is

partially persuasive because his clinical observations support his findings

and because his findings are somewhat consistent with the medical

evidence concerning claimant's physical impairments. However, the vague

terminology that Dr. Toor used to articulate his findings limited the

usefulness of his opinion in formulating physical limitations in the residual

functional capacity in vocationally relevant terms. Consequently, | relied on

the primarily on the opinions of the DDS consultants in formulating the

26

physical limitations in the residual functional capacity.

Tr. 1115.

In particular, the ALJ indicated that the “DDS consultants” to whom he referred

were Drs. Mohanty, Vinluan and Randall. Tr. 1116. Mohanty, Vinluan, and Randall each

opined that Plaintiff was capable of work at the light exertional level. Tr. 87, 107, 1258.

More specifically, Mohanty and Vinluan each opined, in pertinent part, that Plaintiff could

occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand

and/or walk “about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday,” and sit “more than 6 hours on a

sustained basis in an 8-hour workday,” with no postural or manipulative limitations. Tr.

82-83, 96-97. Randall opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds,

frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk “about 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday,” and sit “about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday,” with no manipulative limitations,

and with the ability to “frequently” perform postural functions such as stooping, kneeling,

crouching, and crawling. Tr. 1254-1255.

Plaintiff contends, however, that the ALJ “effectively rejected Dr. Toor’s opinion for

being vague and using nonspecific terminology, without seeking clarification of the

opinion or providing any other assessment.” Pl. Memo of Law, ECF No. 7-1 at p. 25.

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record by contacting Toor for

clarification. /d, at 26. Plaintiff further maintains that the ALJ “pitted” Toor’s opinion

against the opinions of Mohanty, Vinluan, and Randail, and that this was “improper” since

the agency review physicians “rendered their opinions without ever examining Plaintiff.”

Id. at 27. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly explain his

27

evaluation of Toor’s report, since he “did not provide any explanation for which parts of

Toor’s opinion he found to be persuasive and which parts he did not.”

The Commissioner disagrees, interpreting Plaintiff's argument as suggesting that

Toor’s opinion is inconsistent with, and presumably more restrictive than, the ALJ’s RFC

finding. The Commissioner contends, rather, that the RFC finding is consistent with

Toor's opinion. See, Def. Memo of Law, ECF No. 11-1 at p. 13 ("Plaintiff's final argument,

that Dr. Toor's opinion is inconsistent with the RFC, should be rejected. The ALJ found

the opined moderate limitations generally persuasive and limited Plaintiff to light work

with, notably, only frequent climbing of stairs and ramps, stooping, kneeling, crouching,

crawling, and reaching in all directions. The ALJ's interpretation of Dr. Toor's opinion

was consistent with his RFC finding and the prior administrative medical findings [and]

should be upheld.”). in that regard, the Commissioner asserts that “moderate

limitations,” such as those found by Toor, are consistent with light work. See, id. at 14

(‘[T]he Second Circuit has confirmed that moderate limitations in prolonged sitting and

standing are consistent with the ability to perform light work.”) (citing White v. Berryhill,

753 F.Appx. 80, 82 (2d Cir. 2019) and Elizabeth E. v. Commissioner, No. 23-CV-6016S8,

2024 WL 1549686 at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2024)).

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff's argument

lacks merit. In this regard, the underlying premise of Plaintiff's argument is that Toor's

opinion, if accepted, would result in an RFC finding that is more restrictive than what the

ALJ found. However, Toor indicated only that Plaintiff would have moderate limitations

standing, walking, squatting, bending, lifting, and carrying, and only mild-to-moderate

28

limitation “sitting a long time.” Such moderate limitations are consistent with an RFC for

light work. Indeed, in a case with facts very similar to this one, another district court

recently stated:

ALJ Solomon... reviewed and weighed the opinion evidence in the record.

He found [consultative examiner] Dr. Paz's report partially persuasive

because although ‘“{iJt use[d} vague terms,” the opinion “is generally

supported by Dr. Paz's examination findings including a normal gait and

stance, full strength in the upper and lower extremities and no sensory

deficits.” The ALJ also found that the report was “generally consistent with

treatment records.”

ALJ Solomon found the state agency medical consultants persuasive. He

noted that Dr. Saeed's opinion, affirmed by Dr. Putcha, was “supported by

and consistent with objective findings throughout the medical evidence of

record.” Specifically, Dr. Saeed concluded that Plaintiff “could lift and/or

carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; stand and/or

walk about six hours in an eight hour workday; sit about six hours in an eight

hour workday; and occasionally climb, kneel, crouch and crawl.” The ALJ

stated that Plaintiff's treatment records “show few positive clinical findings,

no stated restrictions on standing or walking after surgery, mostly normal

upper and lower extremity strength, [and] no use of an assistance device.”

In making his RFC determination, ALJ Solomon assessed the opinion

evidence and explained which opinions he found were more consistent with

the record as a whole. The ALJ found Dr. Paz's opinion, which determined

that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in bending, lifting, carrying, prolonged

standing, prolonged sitting, prolonged walking, climbing stairs, kneeling,

and crouching, partially persuasive. Although Dr. Paz's opinion used

“vague terms,” it was supported by his examination findings and consistent

with treatment records showing improvements with treatment. The ALJ

found the opinions of Dr. Saeed and Dr. Putcha most persuasive. Dr.

Saeed concluded that Plaintiff could (1) stand or walk with normal breaks

for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday, and (2) sit with normal

breaks for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday. Dr. Saeed

also determined that Plaintiffs physical impairments due to a history of

neck, lower back, and knee surgery would limit him to the light exertional

29

level with only occasional climbing, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. (R.

85, 88). Dr. Putcha affirmed Dr. Saeed’s findings. ALJ Solomon found that

the limitations identified by Dr. Saeed and Dr. Putcha were consistent with

and well supported by the record. Therefore, the ALJ's reliance on state

agency opinion evidence in support of his RFC finding was not in error.

Plaintiff argues that because Dr. Paz found he has “moderate limitations” in

prolonged sitting and standing, he cannot meet the “sitting demands of

sedentary work”. However, Plaintiff cites no authority that suggests

moderate limitations are inconsistent with either sedentary or light work.

Indeed, Courts in this District have found that moderate physical limitations

are_consistent_with physical exertion at or above the sedentary level.

Moreover, Dr. Paz's report supports the ALJ's RFC. Dr. Paz noted that

Plaintiff was in no acute distress, could walk on heels and toes without

difficulty, and needed no help rising from a chair, or getting on and off an

exam table. He had a normal gait, full (5/5) strength in upper and lower

extremities, intact dexterity, and full (5/5) grip strength. Nothing in Dr.

Paz's report suggests an inability to perform light or sedentary work with

additional limitations.

Wuilmer v. Commissioner, No. 25 CIV, 2394 (JCM), 2026 WL 673114, at *13 (S.D.NLY.

Mar. 10, 2028) (collecting cases; internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also,

Tina Marie T.P. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-CV-4 SR, 2026 WL 369790, at “4

(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2026) (“[C]ourts in this circuit repeatedly have held that moderate

limitations in walking, standing, or lifting are consistent with an RFC for light work.

Moreover, courts in this Circuit have repeatedly upheld ALJ decisions that a plaintiff could

perform light work when there was evidence that the plaintiff had moderate difficulties in

prolonged sitting or standing. Thus, Dr. Lee's assessment of moderate limitation for

prolonged sitting and walking great distances does not preclude light work.”) (collecting

cases, internal citations omitted).

Applying this same general reasoning here, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff

30

insofar as he maintains that Toor's opinion, involving “moderate” and “mild to moderate”

physical limitations, was necessarily inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding for a reduced

range of light work. Nor, for that matter, do the relatively benign findings that Toor

reported from his examination suggest a more restrictive RFC than what the ALJ found.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the RFC finding is less restrictive than

Toor's opinion, the ALJ explained that such finding was based primarily on the opinions

of Mohanty, Vinluan, and Randall, which the ALJ found generally persuasive, and less on

the opinion of Toor, which the ALJ found only partially persuasive. The ALJ found that

the agency review physicians’ opinions were more consistent with the medical evidence

overall, and his finding in that regard is supported by substantial evidence. See, Matta v.

Astrue, 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Although the ALJ's conclusion may not

perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision, he

was entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that was

consistent with the record as a whole. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399, 91

S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (“We therefore are presented with the not uncommon

situation of conflicting medical evidence. The trier of fact has the duty to resolve that

conflict.”).”).

For this same reason, the Court also finds no merit to Plaintiff's contention that it

was error for the ALJ to give greater weight to the opinions of the agency review

physicians than to the opinion of Toor, merely because Toor had examined Plaintiff.

Nor does the Court agree with Plaintiff that the ALU was required to develop the

record to clarify Toor’s statement that Plaintiff had “moderate” and “mild to moderate”

31

limitations. The ALJ described Toor’s opinion as “vague” because the terms Toor used,

namely, “moderate” and “mild,” were not “vocationally relevant terms.” The ALJ stated

that this “limited the usefulness” of Toor’s opinion in crafting an RFC finding, but he did

not say that he did not understand what Toor’s opinion was. Indeed, the ALJ necessarily

had to understand the gist of Toor’s opinion in order to say that it was supported by Toor's

clinical observations but only somewhat consistent with the medical evidence overall.

See, Tr. 1115 (‘I find that his opinion is generally persuasive because his clinical

observations support his findings and because his findings are somewhat consistent with

the medical evidence concerning claimant's physical impairments.”) (emphasis added).

In sum, the ALJ’s explanation on this point belies Plaintiffs contention that the ALJ

needed to develop the record in order to understand Toor's opinion. Consequently, this

aspect of Plaintiff's motion is also denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 7) for judgment on

8 Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that that the ALJ had indicated that Toor's opinion was too

vague to understand, such fact would not have necessarily triggered a duty to develop the record where,

as here, the record was otherwise sufficient to allow the ALJ to make an RFC finding. See, e.g Bulgakov

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-2031-EFB, 2021 WL 5882941, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2021)

(‘Plaintiff argues that the ALJ, after finding that the opinions of Drs. Regazzi and Rafanov were vague in

their failure to use the “vocationally-relevant language necessary to determine a function-by-function

residual functional capacity” (ECF No. 11-1, AR 24) had a duty to conduct a further inquiry into whether

plaintiffs stroke caused her to suffer brain damage. However, the ALJ's conclusion that these opinions

were vague regarding precise residual functional capacity language is not the same as concluding that

the evidence was ambiguous or the record inadequate regarding plaintiffs cognitive functioning. In fact, in

Ford v. Saul, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ's duty to further develop

the record was not triggered despite a medical opinion that lacked specificity regarding residual functional

capacity where the ALJ had years of health records and multiple medical opinions to inform her analysis.

950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020).”).

32

the pleadings is denied, and Defendant's cross-motion (ECF No.11) for the same relief is

granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Defendant and close this action.

So Ordered.

Dated: Rochester, New York

March 2& , 2026 ENTER:

Cc

CHARLES J. GUS

United States District Judge

33