The opinion
J-S45005-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JARELL S BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 693 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 1, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division at No: CP-35-CR-0002181-2024
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 25, 2026
Appellant, Jarrell S. Brown, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on May 1, 2025, by the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna
County. He challenges the denial of his suppression motion on the grounds
that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. Upon
review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts as follows1:
Officer [Kevin] Sweeney and Officer Petrucci of the Scranton Police
Department conducted a traffic stop for driver [Appellant] and
passenger Randolf Jefferson (“Jefferson”) on March 14, 2024, at
6:49 p.m. EST. Both officers wore body cameras that retained
audio and visual recordings of the entire interaction. The officers
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 In lieu of testimony, the parties agreed to submit Appellant’s motion to
suppress, the Commonwealth’s thereto, and body camera footage from the
incident to the court for review. N.T. Suppression, 2/19/25, at 2.
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initiated the stop by activating their lights and sirens; [Appellant]
complied. Officer Petrucci approached the vehicle on the
passenger side and asked [Appellant] to roll down the back
windows before requesting license and registration. Officer
Sweeney’s bodycam footage showed [Appellant] holding a lit
Black & Mild cigar.
After [Appellant] provided his license, Officer Petrucci said the
vehicle had a suspended registration due to insurance
cancellation. Then, Officer Petrucci asked [Appellant] for his
registration and insurance cards. [Appellant] found the insurance
information on his cell phone; however, Officer Petrucci
determined that the policy was cancelled. [Appellant] had
difficulty finding the registration card. Officer Petrucci said they
had to run [Appellant’s] information and that he would only
receive a warning; however, Officer Petrucci asked [Appellant] to
step out of the vehicle. [Appellant] followed Officer Sweeney to
the police vehicle for questioning, and Officer Petrucci handed
[Appellant’s] license to Officer Sweeney. [Appellant] questioned
the necessity of exiting his vehicle and Officer Sweeney said he
conducts every traffic stop this way for safety purposes.
Officer Petrucci asked Jefferson[, the passenger,] to step out of
the vehicle and Jefferson complied. While conducting basic
questioning, Officer Petrucci asked Jefferson if there were any
illegal materials in the vehicle. Jefferson said no. The officer
asked if he had a medical marijuana card and Jefferson said no.
Officer Petrucci said he asked the questions because of the car’s
odor, and Jefferson responded that he had marijuana on him;
Jefferson gave a bag of marijuana to Officer Petrucci. A second
patrol car arrived, and Officer Petrucci asked Jefferson for
permission to conduct a body search; Jefferson consented. No
further contraband was found on Jefferson. . . .
After Jefferson’s body search, Officer Petrucci notified Officer
Sweeney that he recovered marijuana from Jefferson. Officer
Sweeney asked [Appellant] if there was illegal material in the
vehicle and [Appellant] refused to answer questions. Officer
Sweeney explained that Jefferson’s drug possession is probable
cause to obtain a search warrant. Officer Petrucci approached and
accused [Appellant] of arguing with Officer Sweeney. While
discussing consent to search the vehicle, Officer Petrucci told
[Appellant] that a suspended registration gives the police
department authority to tow the vehicle and take the tag.
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[Appellant] admitted to having a “clip” under the radio and
marijuana in the center cons[ole]. Officer Sweeney again asked
for consent to search the vehicle, and [Appellant] questioned the
necessity to search the entire vehicle because he stated the exact
location of the marijuana. Officer Sweeney explained that officers
conduct a thorough search in case individuals lie about the
contents of the vehicle. [Appellant] then consented to a search.
Officer Ivanoff stayed with [Appellant] and Jefferson while Officer
Sweeney and Officer Petrucci searched the vehicle. The officers
found marijuana in the locations [Appellant] previously identified.
After searching the vehicle, officers waited for a response to
warrant checks. Officer Sweeney read [Appellant] and Jefferson
their rights because they were “arrestable,” but explained that
they were not leaving in handcuffs. Officer Petrucci received
consent to conduct a body search on [Appellant] and Jefferson
and did not find any illegal material. [Appellant] and Jefferson
were cleared on warrant checks; Officer Petrucci said they were
free to leave and Officer Sweeney returned the license to
[Appellant].
Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/25, at 2-5 (citation omitted).
Appellant was later charged with possession of a small amount of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. He filed a motion to
suppress and argued that the officers “violated [his] Fourth Amendment rights
protecting him from illegal search and seizures when they unnecessarily
prolonged the traffic stop.” Motion to Suppress, 11/21/24, at 4 (our
pagination). The Commonwealth filed a response. In lieu of testimony at a
suppression hearing, the parties opted to submit the motion to suppress, the
Commonwealth’s response thereto, and the officers’ body camera footage to
the court. Following oral argument, the trial court denied suppression. The
case proceeded with a non-jury trial wherein Appellant was found guilty of
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possession of a small amount of marijuana.2 Appellant was sentenced to pay
the costs of prosecution only. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant
and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises a sole
issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in issuing its February 19, 2025,
order denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress the fruits of the
search of his vehicle.
Appellant’s Brief, at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review when addressing a challenge to the denial of a
suppression motion is
limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported
by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court’s factual
findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard
of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the
defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may
consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted.
Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (internal
citations omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the record created during
the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013).
“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass
on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”
Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa. Super. 2019). “If there
is sufficient evidence of record to support the suppression court’s ruling and
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2 The Commonwealth nolle prossed possession of drug paraphernalia.
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the court has not misapplied the law, we will not substitute our credibility
determinations for those of the suppression court judge.” Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187 (Pa. 2014).
Here, Appellant does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop.
Instead, Appellant argues he was unlawfully seized when the officer prolonged
the traffic stop without probable cause.3 See Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
Specifically, Appellant argues that when he was asked to exit the vehicle “to
inquire about the personal information, [the officers] unnecessarily prolonged
the mission of the traffic stop.” Id. at 9.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. See U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. In Pennsylvania, officers must demonstrate
ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens.
Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 792 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation
omitted). Generally, a motor vehicle stop is an investigative detention which
requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Id.
In the context of a traffic stop, the Supreme Court of the United States
explained
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3 As discussed infra, the correct standard for whether a prolonged traffic stop
was constitutional is whether the officer possessed reasonable suspicion, not
probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 311 A.3d 1138, 1146 (Pa.
Super. 2024).
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that the duration of police inquiries “is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’ – to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop
. . . and attend to related safety concerns.” A stop becomes
unlawful when it “lasts . . . longer than is necessary” to complete
its mission, the rationale being that the “authority for the seizure
. . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are – or
reasonably should have been – completed.” The Supreme Court
elaborated that “the critical question . . . is not whether the inquiry
occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether
it prolongs –, i.e., adds time to – the stop.”
“An officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the
traffic stop” such as “checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”
Further, tasks relating to officer safety are also part of a traffic
stop’s mission when done purely in an interest to protect the
officers. This safety interest stems from the fact that “traffic stops
are especially fraught with danger to police officers, so an officer
may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in
order to complete his mission safely.”
Id. at 792-93 (citing Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)) (brackets
omitted). We are further guided by the following principles:
To effectuate the safety of officers, during a lawful traffic stop,
the officer may order the driver of a vehicle to exit the
vehicle until the traffic stop is completed, even absent a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Further, an
officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming
or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. To that end, for their own
safety, officers may ask drivers whether they have a weapon or
anything concerning as a matter of course during a traffic stop.
Importantly, not all inquiries during a traffic stop qualify as
ordinarily incident to the stop’s mission, as measures aimed at
finding evidence of other crimes or safety precautions taken to
facilitate detours from the mission do not pass constitutional
muster.
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Id. at 793 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Thus, “[a]n officer may
prolong a traffic stop if, before completing the purpose of the stop, the officer
develops additional suspicion [beyond the reason for the initial stop].”
Garcia, 311 A.3d at 1146. To establish grounds for reasonable suspicion
the officer must articulate specific observations which, in
conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these
observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his
experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person he
stopped was involved in that activity.
In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable
suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered.
In making this determination, we must give due weight . . . to the
specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the
circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of
only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather,
even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may
warrant further investigation by the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 164 (Pa. Super. 2023).
Here, the trial court found that the officers did not violate Appellant’s
rights and, under the totality of circumstances, possessed reasonable
suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. The court noted the following factors that
were present which formed the basis of the officers’ reasonable suspicion: (1)
odor of marijuana; (2) the passenger’s admission to possessing marijuana;
(3) the passenger’s lack of a medical marijuana card; and (4) Appellant
smoking a masking agent, i.e., black and mild cigar, as officers approached
the vehicle. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/25, at 11.
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Officers stopped Appellant’s vehicle due to an expired registration.
Appellant was the driver and was travelling with Jefferson, a passenger.
Appellant provided officers with his driver’s license and insurance information.
He was unable to locate the registration; however, Officer Petrucci informed
Appellant he did not have to look further and would run the information
through his system. Officer Petrucci then asked Appellant to exit the vehicle
while the officer returned to his patrol vehicle to confirm Appellant’s
documents were valid.
Simultaneously, Officer Sweeney asked Jefferson to exit the vehicle.
Officer Sweeney informed Jefferson that the vehicle smelled of marijuana, and
asked Jefferson if he had anything illegal on him. Jefferson admitted to having
a bag of marijuana on his person and turned it over to Officer Sweeney.
Jefferson consented to a search of his person, and no further contraband was
recovered.
Thereafter, Officer Sweeney informed Officer Petrucci that Jefferson
admitted to having marijuana on his person. As a result, Officer Petrucci
asked Appellant if there was anything illegal in the vehicle. After initially
refusing to answer, Appellant admitted that there was marijuana in the vehicle
and informed the officers specifically where it was located. Officer Sweeney
asked for consent, and Appellant questioned why officers needed to search
the whole vehicle when he told them where to find it. After some discussion,
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Appellant consented to a search of his vehicle.4 Officers located the marijuana
where Appellant had stated, and no further contraband was recovered. After
officers confirmed that neither Appellant nor Jefferson had an active warrant,
Officer Sweeney returned Appellant’s license and allowed them to leave the
scene.
The total interaction – from the initial stop until Appellant left – lasted
25 minutes. The stop occurred around 6:50 p.m.; the search of the vehicle
began around 7:01 p.m.; the search concluded at 7:06 p.m.; and Appellant
was free to leave at 7:14 p.m. Although the initial stop was for an expired
registration, officers learned additional information, i.e., that Jefferson had
marijuana on his person and did not have a valid medical marijuana card,
before the initial stop purpose of the stop was satisfied; therefore, the
information was relevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis. Moreover, during
a lawful traffic stop, officers may ask the occupants to exit the vehicle absent
reasonable suspicion. See Ross, supra.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court
that Officers Sweeney and Petrucci had reasonable suspicion that there was
marijuana in Appellant’s vehicle. Therefore, the prolonged traffic stop was
constitutional. No relief is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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4 Appellant does not challenge the validity or legality of his consent.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/25/2026
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