J. Brown v. Philadelphia Board of Ethics, & J.S. Creamer, Jr.

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jeff Brown, David Maser, :

For a Better Philadelphia 501(c)(4), :

and For a Better Philadelphia PAC, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

Philadelphia Board of Ethics, : No. 1382 C.D. 2024

and J. Shane Creamer, Jr. : Argued: February 3, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE TSAI FILED: March 25, 2026

Jeff Brown, David Maser, For a Better Philadelphia 501(c)(4) (501(c)(4)), and

For a Better Philadelphia PAC (PAC) (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal from the order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court), sustaining in part

the preliminary objections of the Philadelphia Board of Ethics (Board) and J. Shane

Creamer, Jr. (collectively, Defendants) and dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint. After

review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts as set forth in Plaintiffs’ complaint and its attachments are as

follows: Brown is a resident of Philadelphia and was a candidate in the May 16,

2023, Democratic primary election for Mayor of Philadelphia (Mayor). Complaint,

¶ 6, Reproduced Record (R.R.) 7a. The 501(c)(4) is a Pennsylvania non-profit

corporation, and the PAC is a Philadelphia-based political action committee

(collectively, For a Better Philadelphia). Id., ¶¶ 3-4, R.R. 7a. During the relevant

period, Maser served as the chairperson and treasurer of the 501(c)(4) and the

chairperson of the PAC. Id., ¶ 5, R.R. 7a. Brown engaged in fundraising activities

for For a Better Philadelphia prior to the official announcement of his Mayoral

candidacy on November 16, 2022, but he ceased contact with For a Better

Philadelphia after the announcement. Id., ¶¶ 21, 23, 25, R.R. 10a.

The Board consists of five members who are appointed by the Mayor and

confirmed by Philadelphia City Council. Id., ¶ 8, R.R. 7a. Among the

responsibilities of the Board are the enforcement of the campaign finance laws

enacted by the City of Philadelphia (City). Id., ¶ 9, R.R. 7a. Creamer serves as the

Executive Director of the Board. Id., ¶ 10, R.R. 8a.

In March 2023, the Board began investigating the 501(c)(4) and PAC for

campaign finance law violations. Id., ¶ 54, R.R. 11a. Although the PAC voluntarily

agreed to cease campaign expenditures, the Board commenced an action in the trial

court against For a Better Philadelphia on April 10, 2023 (Enforcement Action). Id.,

¶¶ 64-67, Exhibit B, R.R. 17a, 67a-81a. The Board alleged that For a Better

Philadelphia violated the City’s campaign finance laws and Board regulations

prohibiting coordination with Brown’s campaign. Id., Exhibit B, R.R. 69a-75a. In

support, the Board cited Brown’s solicitation of funds for the 501(c)(4) prior to the

announcement of his candidacy, as well as communication between his campaign

staff and the PAC after the announcement. Id., R.R. 71a-75a. The Board requested

the following relief: (1) a judgment that For a Better Philadelphia violated the City’s

campaign finance law; (2) a $2,000 civil penalty for each violation; and (3) an

injunction prohibiting further campaign expenditures and other activities in support

of the campaign. Id., R.R. 75a-79a.

Brown finished in fifth place in the primary election in May 2023. Following

the primary, the Board filed an amended complaint, in which it withdrew its request

2

for injunctive relief but otherwise sought the same relief as in its original complaint.

Id., Exhibit D, R.R. 134a-152a. For a Better Philadelphia filed a preliminary

objection in the nature of a demurrer to the amended complaint. Id., Exhibit E, R.R.

154a-171a.

On September 11, 2023, the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed

the Enforcement Action. Id., Exhibit F, R.R. 193a-202a. The trial court reasoned

that “a faithful reading of the Board’s regulations” demonstrated that a political

action committee was prohibited only from coordinating with a “campaign,” but a

campaign did not exist until a candidate filed nomination petitions or publicly

announced his or her candidacy. Id., Exhibit F, at 1, 6-9, R.R. 193a, 198a-201a.

With regard to Brown, the trial court determined that “[t]here was no ‘Jeff Brown

campaign’ prior to November 16, 2022”—the date he publicly announced his

candidacy—and, therefore, it was “impossible to conclude that the ‘Jeff Brown

campaign’ could have coordinated with” For a Better Philadelphia before the public

announcement. Id., Exhibit F, at 7, R.R. 199a. As the amended complaint solely

alleged Brown’s involvement in donations and solicitation of funds prior to

November 16, 2022, the trial court ruled that the Board could not hold For a Better

Philadelphia liable for violation of the City’s campaign finance law or Board

regulations. Id., Exhibit F, at 1, 7-10, R.R. 193a, 199a-202a. The Board initially

appealed from the dismissal of the Enforcement Action but discontinued the appeal

prior to an appellate ruling. Id., ¶¶ 50-51, R.R. 15a.

Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint on January 29, 2024. They allege that

Defendants lacked any factual or legal basis to initiate the Enforcement Action

because they knew Brown had cut ties with For a Better Philadelphia following the

public announcement of his candidacy. Id., ¶¶ 27-32, 72-84, R.R. 11a-12, 18a-19a.

3

Plaintiffs aver that Defendants lacked good faith in prosecuting this action, acting

with the intent to impugn Plaintiffs’ reputations and to interfere with Brown’s

candidacy in collusion with other Mayoral campaigns. Id., ¶¶ 33-34, 57-58, 60-62,

71, 85-86, 89-90, 98, 113, R.R. 17a, 20a, 22a, 24a. According to Plaintiffs, Creamer

was personally motivated by animus towards them and his desire for media

coverage. Id., ¶¶ 35, 62, 71, 95, 99-100, R.R. 12a, 16a-18a, 22a. As evidence of

Creamer’s alleged bias and ulterior motives, Plaintiffs cite, inter alia: (1) an email

from Creamer to a Philadelphia Inquirer reporter expressing his opposition to “dark

money groups;” (2) his Inquirer editorial stating that he hoped the Enforcement

Action “sends a message to Philadelphia candidates [that the city] has different rules

[that] will be enforced;” and (3) a leaked email exchange with the PAC’s lawyer in

which Creamer ended settlement negotiations and stated he was “prepared to go to

court to expose the most massive scheme to circumvent the city’s contribution limits

in 17 years.” Id., ¶¶ 91-94, Exhibits G, J, K, R.R. 20a-21a, 204a-213a, 225a, 227a-

231a.

Plaintiffs plead four counts in their complaint. Counts I and II, brought on

behalf of all Plaintiffs, seek monetary damages for wrongful use of civil proceedings

and abuse of process.1 In Counts III and IV, brought on behalf of Brown and Maser

(collectively, Individual Plaintiffs), respectively, the complaint alleges that

Defendants violated their right to reputation under Article I, Section 1 of the

1

A plaintiff asserting a wrongful use of civil proceedings claim must prove that the

defendant acted in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause in pursuing the underlying

litigation and the prior proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8351(a). To

establish a claim for abuse of process, the plaintiff must show that the defendant used a legal

process against the plaintiff for a purpose other than for which it was designed. Morley v. Farnese,

178 A.3d 910, 919 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

4

Pennsylvania Constitution.2 With respect to the right to reputation claims, the

complaint requests a declaration that Defendants violated Individual Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights and a name-clearing hearing on their behalf.

Defendants filed preliminary objections, raising seven objections in the nature

of a demurrer. As relevant here, Defendants argued that: (1) Counts I and II were

barred against all Defendants on the basis of governmental immunity under what is

commonly referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act

or Act);3 (2) Creamer enjoyed absolute immunity from Counts I and II under the

doctrine of high public official immunity; and (3) a name-clearing hearing, the

remedy sought by Plaintiffs in Counts III and IV, is not a right to relief under the

Pennsylvania Constitution.4

On October 8, 2024, the trial court entered an order, sustaining the objections

in part and dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. Specifically, the trial

court dismissed Counts I and II against the Board based on governmental immunity

under the Tort Claims Act and against Creamer based on high public official

immunity. The trial court dismissed Counts III and IV on the grounds that

Pennsylvania law did not provide a remedy for a name-clearing hearing. The trial

court overruled Defendants’ remaining preliminary objections. This appeal

followed.

2

See Pa. Const. art. I, § 1 (providing that “[a]ll men . . . have certain inherent and

indefeasible rights, among which are . . . possessing and protecting property and reputation”).

3

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8541-8564.

4

Defendants additionally argued that: (1) Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to

establish that Defendants lacked probable cause for the Enforcement Action; (2) Plaintiffs did not

plead facts showing Defendants brought the Enforcement Action for an improper purpose;

(3) Plaintiffs failed to plead any factual inaccuracies in the Enforcement Action; and (4) Individual

Plaintiffs received due process for the alleged infringement of their right to reputation.

5

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs raise three issues before this Court.5 First, they argue that the trial

court erred by granting the Board governmental immunity under the Tort Claims

Act, notwithstanding that the complaint alleged the Board’s employees engaged in

willful misconduct. Second, Plaintiffs contend the Executive Director was not a

high public official under our well-established case law, and, therefore, Creamer was

not entitled to absolute immunity. In the alternative, Plaintiffs request a remand for

fact-finding regarding the nature of Creamer’s duties and responsibilities. Finally,

Plaintiffs assert that the trial court should have afforded Individual Plaintiffs the

opportunity to demonstrate that Defendants violated their reputational rights.

Plaintiffs contend that, contrary to the trial court’s finding that a name-clearing

hearing is unavailable in Pennsylvania, our case law supports the conclusion that

such a hearing is the only adequate remedy to vindicate Individual Plaintiffs’

reputational rights. We address these three issues in turn.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Governmental Immunity

Section 8541 of the Act sets forth the general rule of governmental immunity

for local agencies: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency

shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property

5

When reviewing a ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, this

Court’s standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Edgell v. City of

Aliquippa, 272 A.3d 1011, 1016 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). In ruling on preliminary objections, a

court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and inferences reasonably deducible

therefrom. Id. However, a court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted

inferences of fact, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. In re FDR Park, 344 A.3d

461, 468 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025). A demurrer will be sustained only when it is clear and free from

doubt that the facts pleaded are legally insufficient to establish a right to relief. Edgell, 272 A.3d

at 1016 n.10.

6

caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.”

42 Pa. C.S. § 8541. “Thus, governmental immunity is the rule, except where the

Legislature has expressly provided otherwise.” N.N. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia,

349 A.3d 1081, 1088 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025).

Under the Act, a local agency may be liable for damages that are

“(1) recoverable under common law or a statute creating a cause of action; (2) caused

by the negligent act of the local agency or its employees acting within the scope of

their employment; and (3) caused by one of the specific acts enumerated in Section

8542(b).” West on behalf of S.W. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Schs., 327 A.3d 340, 344 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2024) (en banc) (citation omitted). “Section 8542(b) enumerates nine such

acts, each of which function as an exception to a local agency’s broad grant of

immunity.” Id.; see also 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b).6 Section 8542(a)(2) specifies that

the “negligent acts” of subsection (b) “shall not include acts or conduct which

constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.” 42 Pa. C.S.

§ 8542(a)(2).

Section 8545 of the Act, relating to official immunity, provides that a local

agency employee is liable for damages caused by acts “which are within the scope

of his office or duties only to the same extent as his employing local agency and

subject to the limitations imposed by” the Act. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8545. “Essentially,

this provision states the liability of local agency employees cannot exceed the

liability of their employing agency.” Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 790, 798 (Pa.

6

The nine exceptions to local agency liability are: vehicle liability; care, custody, or control

of personal property; real property; trees, traffic controls, and street lighting; utility service

facilities; streets; sidewalks; care, custody, or control of animals; and sexual abuse. 42 Pa. C.S.

§ 8542(b).

7

Cmwlth. 2007). However, Section 8550 of the Act abrogates the official immunity

defense and protections provided to a local agency employee in certain cases:

In any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages

on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee in which it is

judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and

that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful

misconduct, the provisions of sections 8545 (relating to official liability

generally), 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity), 8548

(relating to indemnity) and 8549 (relating to limitation on damages)

shall not apply.

42 Pa. C.S. § 8550.

The trial court determined that, as a municipal authority established by the

Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, the Board is a local agency under the Tort Claims

Act. Trial Court Opinion at 3. The trial court noted that none of the Section 8542(b)

exceptions to governmental immunity apply to Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. The trial court

rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the Board was not immune pursuant to Section 8550

of the Act, because the complaint alleged acts of willful misconduct and actual

malice. Id. at 4. The trial court concluded that Section 8550 only strips an employee

of a local agency of official immunity where it is judicially determined she engages

in willful misconduct or acts with actual malice, not the agency itself. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court misinterpreted Section 8550 of the Act,

which by its “plain and unambiguous terms” waives immunity for both a local

agency or its employee whenever the relevant injury was a product of the employee’s

willful misconduct or criminal, fraudulent, or malicious acts. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 31.

Plaintiffs assert that if the General Assembly had intended for Section 8550 to only

waive immunity for local agency employees, the statute would not have indicated

that it applies “[i]n any action against a local agency or employee thereof.” 42 Pa.

8

C.S. § 8550 (emphasis added). According to Plaintiffs, a reading of Section 8550 as

waiving immunity against local agencies for the willful misconduct of their

employees is consistent with Section 8542 of the Act, which they argue only

immunizes agencies for negligent acts but not “acts or conduct which constitute[] a

crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(a)(2).

Plaintiffs recognize, however, that “[s]ome panels of this Court have concluded that

Section 8550 does not waive immunity for local agencies” but aver that “those cases

are wrongly decided” and, therefore, “should not control the outcome here.”

Plaintiffs’ Brief at 33 n.5.

In fact, numerous decisions of this Court have rejected the very argument

Plaintiffs present here. In Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2014), for example, the court of common pleas dismissed wrongful use of

civil proceedings, abuse of process, and other claims against a local agency—the

City of Reading—finding that governmental immunity of the Tort Claims Act barred

the claims. Id. at 1021. We affirmed that ruling, explaining:

It is well-settled that where a plaintiff has averred willful misconduct

on the part of local agency employees, [S]ection 8542(a)(2) of the Tort

Claims Act bars recovery from the local agency because liability may

be imposed on a local agency only for negligent acts. City of

Philadelphia v. Glim, 613 A.2d 613, 617 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992); City of

Philadelphia v. Brown, 618 A.2d 1236, 1238-39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).

In addition, [S]ection 8550 . . . does not create an exception to [S]ection

8542(a)(2), and, as a result, a local agency may not be held liable for

the willful misconduct of its employees. Glim, 613 A.2d at 617; Brown,

618 A.2d at 1238-39. In order to overcome the defense of

governmental immunity, a plaintiff’s claims against a local agency

must sound in negligence and must fall within one of the [nine]

enumerated exceptions to local agency immunity set forth in [S]ection

8542(b) of the Tort Claims Act. Glim, 613 A.2d at 616-17.

9

Id. at 1022 (some internal citations omitted). We therefore concluded that

“regardless of how [the plaintiff’s] claims [were] characterized, as either sounding

in intentional, willful misconduct or negligence, [they were] barred by governmental

immunity.” Id.; see also West, 327 A.3d at 343-44 (citing Orange Stones and stating

that a local agency is immune to intentional tort claims based on the willful

misconduct of its employees).

We are bound by our precedent, which conclusively resolves the issue

Plaintiffs present on appeal. See Gillingham v. Cnty. of Delaware, 154 A.3d 875,

881 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (noting that only an en banc panel of this Court may

overrule our prior decisions); see also Commonwealth Court Internal Operating

Procedure § 257, 210 Pa. Code § 69.257. Even so, we find Plaintiffs’ arguments

entirely unpersuasive. A plain reading of Sections 8541 and 8542 of the Act shows

that the General Assembly only waived immunity for claims based on “the negligent

acts of the local agency or an employee thereof” and not for intentional acts, such as

willful misconduct. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(a)(2). Furthermore, Section 8550 of the Act

explicitly limits its application to Sections 8545, 8546, 8548, and 8549 of the Act,

which establish official immunity protections for local agency employees and do not

pertain to immunity for the agency itself.7 42 Pa. C.S. § 8550; see also Miller v.

Emelson, 520 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (explaining that “Section 8550 only

7

As noted above, Section 8545 of the Act provides that local agency employees acting

within the scope of their duties are liable only to the same extent as their employer, subject to other

provisions of the Act. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8545. Section 8546 of the Act permits employees to assert

defenses of official immunity as well as common law defenses. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8546. Section 8548

of the Act provides that a local agency shall indemnify its employees for the payment of any

judgment and generally prohibits any indemnification of the agency by the employee. 42 Pa. C.S.

§ 8548. Finally, Section 8549 of the Act provides damages against employees are recoverable

only to the same extent as against a local agency under the Act. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8549.

10

waives four specific immunities for willful misconduct which pertain to local agency

employees and does not affect the immunity of local agencies”).

Accordingly, as there is no dispute that the Board is a local agency under the

Tort Claims Act, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the Board

was entitled to governmental immunity under the Act and dismissing Counts I and

II against the Board.8

B. High Public Official Immunity

Plaintiffs next challenge the trial court’s ruling that Creamer served as a high

public official as Executive Director of the Board and thus enjoyed absolute

immunity from Counts I and II of the complaint. “In Pennsylvania, high public

official immunity is a long-standing category of common law immunity that acts as

an absolute bar to protect high public officials from lawsuits arising out of actions

taken in the course of their official duties and within the scope of their authority.”

Doe v. Franklin Cnty., 174 A.3d 593, 603 (Pa. 2017). The purpose of the immunity

“is to protect the high public official from liability, not for his or her own personal

benefit, but for the benefit of the public he or she serves.” Winig v. Off. of Dist.

Att’y of Philadelphia, 347 A.3d 2, 11 (Pa. 2025) (citation omitted and emphasis in

original). “Specifically, absolute immunity from civil liability for high public

officials is the only legitimate means of removing any inhibition which might

8

In their preliminary objections, Defendants claimed governmental immunity as to Counts

I and II of the complaint, and they did not assert governmental immunity as to Counts III and IV.

Similarly, Defendants argued only that Counts I and II were barred as to Creamer based on high

public official immunity, not Counts III and IV. Therefore, we do not address whether either of

the immunity doctrines applies to Plaintiffs’ Article I, Section 1 claims. Cf. Fraternal Ord. of

Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of Philadelphia., 267 A.3d 531, 546 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

(en banc) (holding that high public official immunity, like governmental immunity, only applies

to claims for money damages and to compel affirmative conduct but not claims to restrain official

action and concluding police officers could pursue due process and reputational right claims to

enjoin district attorney from placing them on list of witnesses not to call at trial).

11

deprive the public of the best service of its officers and agencies.” Id. (citation

omitted).

When weighing whether an individual qualifies as a high public official, a

court must consider “the nature of an official’s duties, the importance of the office

and particularly whether or not the official has policy-making functions.” Doe, 174

A.3d at 603 n.10 (citation and brackets omitted). “[A]bsent statutory classification,

the parameters establishing ‘high public official’ status would be delineated by the

judiciary on a case-by-case basis, rather than establishing a bright-line” of

demarcation. Lindner v. Mollan, 677 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Pa. 1996). The fact that an

official lacks a policy-making function “is not the sole or overriding factor in

determining the scope of immunity. Rather, it is the public interest in seeing that the

official not be impeded in the performance of important duties that is pivotal.”

Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 70 (Pa. 2001); see also Feldman v. Hoffman, 107

A.3d 821, 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

Pennsylvania courts have “ruled that a wide range of public officials with

[varying degrees of] policy-making function” are high public officials, including

mayor, township supervisor, deputy commissioner of public property of a city, city

architect, Pennsylvania Attorney General, borough council president, county

attorney, revenue commissioner of a city, parole superintendent, district attorney,

and assistant district attorney. See Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1198-99 (collecting cases).

Courts have also found that a state police captain, the executive director of an

intermediate school unit, and borough council members are high public officials.

See Feldman, 107 A.3d at 827 (collecting cases). Additionally, absolute immunity

has been extended to a county coroner, id. at 828; county sheriff, Doe, 174 A.3d at

603 n.10; school board director, Matta v. Burton, 721 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Cmwlth.

12

1998); school superintendent, Batgos v. Calloway (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1203 C.D.

2021, filed Mar. 15, 2024), 2024 WL 1131335, slip op. at 13-14; and school district

human resources director, Kipp v. Bellefonte Area School District (Pa. Cmwlth., No.

263 C.D. 2023, filed Oct. 7, 2025), 2025 WL 2837404, slip op. at 35-37.9

Here, the trial court determined that each of the three factors—the nature of

the official’s duties, the importance of the office, and policy-making function—

weighed in favor of a finding that high public official immunity applied to Creamer.

The trial court noted that the Board’s regulations entrusted substantial responsibility

to the Executive Director conducting preliminary inquiries, investigations,

administrative and judicial enforcement actions, and settlement negotiations. Trial

Court Opinion at 6 (citing Phila. Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 210). The trial court found

that the Executive Director position was of great importance as it ensured public

trust in government by maintaining ethical standards and deterring campaign finance

violations. Id. The trial court further observed that the Executive Director exercises

policy-making functions, including deciding whether to initiate enforcement

proceedings upon a finding of probable cause of a violation of an ethical standard or

campaign finance law. Id. Finding that the alleged acts and omissions that form the

basis of Plaintiffs’ claims were within the scope of Creamer’s duties, the trial court

concluded that he had absolute immunity from Counts I and II. Id. at 6-7.

9

Unreported panel decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited as

persuasive authority. See Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414(a), 210 Pa.

Code § 69.414(a).

10

See https://www.phila.gov/media/20210606173629/BOE-regulation-2.pdf (last visited

Mar. 24, 2026). “This Court may take judicial notice of public information on an official

government website.” Cunningham v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 330 A.3d 20, 23 n.1 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2025).

13

Plaintiffs contend that the court should have permitted discovery and allowed

Plaintiffs to present evidence demonstrating that Creamer was not a high public

official. In the alternative, they argue that a review of the Philadelphia Code and

Board regulations establishes that the Executive Director does not exercise the duties

characteristic of other high public officials. Plaintiffs assert that the Executive

Director’s role in initiating investigations and administrative proceedings is

overshadowed by the Board’s sole authority to decide administrative actions and

approve the filing of any court action. Plaintiffs contrast the Executive Director with

the position of a district attorney—which our Supreme Court has held to be a high

public official—arguing that Creamer lacks the independent decision-making and

discretion characteristic of a prosecutorial position. Plaintiffs further argue that

extension of absolute immunity would be contrary to the public interest in this case,

considering the serious nature of Creamer’s alleged conduct here involving his

willful and malicious tampering with the political process.

Upon review, we see no basis to disturb the trial court’s conclusion that

Creamer is a high public official entitled to absolute immunity from suit for conduct

within the course of his duties and scope of his authority. Initially, we discern no

error in the trial court’s grant of immunity to Creamer without permitting discovery

or conducting an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiffs offer no support for their claim that

a court must engage in fact-finding before determining that a party is a high public

official. Indeed, numerous prior decisions regarding high public official immunity

have been resolved at the preliminary objection stage. See, e.g., Durham, 772 A.2d

at 70 (affirming determination on preliminary objections that assistant district

attorney was entitled to high public official immunity); Feldman, 107 A.3d at 836

(affirming preliminary objections ruling that county coroner was high public official

14

based upon review of coroner’s duties as defined by law). Additionally, Plaintiffs

do not dispute that the Board regulation cited by the trial court accurately sets forth

the Executive Director’s responsibilities. In fact, they cite the same regulation in

their brief to minimize Creamer’s role vis-à-vis the Board. See Plaintiffs’ Brief at

39 (arguing that, pursuant to Phila. Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 2 ¶ 2.25, the Executive

Director’s role is limited because only the Board can institute judicial enforcement

proceedings).

Moreover, we reject Plaintiffs’ invitation to consider the public interest as it

pertains to their ability to vindicate the alleged harms perpetrated by Creamer against

them in this case. While courts must determine high public official status on “a case-

by-case basis,” once a court extends the immunity to an official it “is unlimited and

exempts a high public official from all civil suits for damages” based on statements

or actions within the scope of the official’s duties and authority. Lindner, 677 A.2d

at 1195 (citation omitted and emphasis added); see also Doe, 174 A.3d at 604 (noting

that high public official “immunity is an absolute privilege broadly applied to actions

as well as speech” in all civil actions). Thus, the immunity applies even where the

official’s conduct was “motivated by malice” and regardless of whether “the

innocent may sometimes suffer irreparable harm.” Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1195-96

(citation omitted).

Turning to the Executive Director’s duties and responsibilities, it is clear from

our review that the position is a high-ranking one. The Board’s regulations entrust

the Executive Director with wide-ranging duties, including: (1) conducting

preliminary inquiries; (2) reviewing and taking action on complaints; (3) initiating

and terminating investigations; (4) referring matters to other government agencies;

(5) issuing and enforcing administrative subpoenas; (6) administering oaths and

15

affirmations and taking testimony; (7) initiating administrative enforcement

proceedings; (8) seeking authorization from the Board to initiate judicial

enforcement proceedings; and (9) conducting settlement negotiations on the Board’s

behalf. See Phila. Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 2 ¶¶ 2.3-2.6, 2.12, 2.23, 2.26-2.27. While,

as Plaintiffs argue, the Board retains authority over matters such as resolving

administrative proceedings and approving the filing of judicial actions, there is no

requirement that an official must have plenary authority over every function of a

government body to qualify as a high public official.

Furthermore, the importance of the Executive Director position is plainly

evident. There is no doubt that the Board serves a vital interest in enforcing ethical

rules pertaining to campaign finance, conflicts of interest, financial disclosures,

standards of conduct, and prohibited political activities. Phila. Home Rule Charter

§ 4-1100. The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter specifically requires that the Board

appoint an Executive Director to “exercise [the Board’s] powers and fulfill its

obligations.” Id. § 3-3806(g); cf. Doe, 174 A.3d at 603 n.10 (explaining that a county

sheriff, by virtue of its status “as a constitutionally created office,” is a high public

official). Additionally, pursuant to the rule of Lyness v. State Board of Medicine,

605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992), which prohibits the intermingling of prosecutorial and

adjudicatory roles in certain administrative entities, the Executive Director fulfills

the essential role of overseeing “the ‘investigatory’ or ‘prosecutorial’ function” of

the Board. See Phila. Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 2 ¶ 2.2.11

11

The regulation specifically provides:

As required by law, in the context of administrative enforcement proceedings and

related investigations the Board shall maintain a separation between the

adjudicative functions and the investigatory or prosecutorial functions. In this

regard, the individual members of the Board, any Hearing Officer in a particular

16

Finally, we agree with the trial court that the Executive Director embodies

policy-making functions by virtue of his authority to initiate investigations and

enforcement proceedings. Deciding in which manner and against which parties to

enforce the law is inherently a policy-making activity. In many respects, the

Executive Director position is similar to that of a district attorney, which our

Supreme Court has held to embody substantial policy-making responsibility. See

Durham, 772 A.2d at 70 (finding assistant district attorneys are high public officials

notwithstanding that they, “unlike their principal, the district attorney, are not known

for policy-making functions”).

Once a court determines that a defendant is a high public official, it must then

ascertain whether the defendant’s conduct that formed the basis of the suit was

within the course of their duties and scope of their authority. Lindner, 677 A.2d at

1199; Feldman, 107 A.3d at 828. Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ allegations

related to conduct within Creamer’s duties and authority as Executive Director.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that Creamer was absolutely immune

from Counts I and II.

C. Right to Reputation

In their final issue, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by dismissing

Counts III and IV of the complaint, in which Individual Plaintiffs alleged a violation

of their right to reputation under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution. As noted above, the trial court determined that these claims were

case, and the General Counsel shall be considered to be part of the “adjudicative

function,” and the Executive Director and professional staff or consultants directed

by the Executive Director shall be considered to be part of the “investigatory” or

“prosecutorial” function.

Phila. Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 2 ¶ 2.2.

17

“legally insufficient for lacking a remedy.” Trial Court Opinion at 8. The trial court

concluded that, while an administrative name-clearing hearing may be available

under certain circumstances, “Pennsylvania law does not provide a name-clearing

hearing remedy in the Court of Common Pleas for violations of” Article I, Section

1. Id. at 8 & n.3.

Our Supreme Court “has recognized that the right to reputation, although

absent from the federal constitution, is a fundamental right under the Pennsylvania

Constitution.”12 In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 16 (Pa. 2014). The Pennsylvania

Constitution “places reputational interests on the highest plane, that is, on the same

level as those pertaining to life, liberty, and property.” In re Fortieth Statewide

Investigating Grand Jury, 190 A.3d 560, 573 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). Thus,

the Pennsylvania Constitution “establish[es] a legally cognizable protection against

government infringement of reputation without due process.” McNesby, 267 A.3d

at 546. The right to reputation “is a right to be protected regardless of allegation of

12

Article I, Section 1 provides that the right to reputation is an inherent and indefeasible

right:

All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and

indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and

liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of

pursuing their own happiness.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 1. Additionally, Article 1, Section 11 provides for protection by “due course of

law” from injury to an individual’s reputation:

All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,

person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice

administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the

Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature

may by law direct.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 11.

18

special or economic damage.” Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 443 (Pa. 1975); see

also D.C. v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 150 A.3d 558, 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

Our courts have imposed different remedies in response to Article I, Section

1 violations, including striking down as unconstitutional statutes that infringe

individuals’ reputations without adequate due process protection. See, e.g.,

Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n v. Com., 607 A.2d 850, 855-56, 859 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (en

banc) (holding statute authorizing compilation of list of attorneys based on suspicion

of involvement in fraudulent insurance claims was unconstitutional because it

damaged attorneys’ reputations without prior notice and opportunity to be heard).

In addition, this Court has determined that individuals may bring claims under

Article I, Section 1 to require notice and an opportunity to be heard before the

government publishes damaging information about them. See McNesby, 267 A.3d

at 547-50, 553 (holding that police officers may pursue a claim that they are entitled

to procedural due process rights to challenge a district attorney’s decision to place

the officers on a list of witnesses not to call based on alleged misconduct). Our

Supreme Court has further held that “in circumstances where the government

maintains records accessible to the public that are injurious to a person’s reputation,

and where no compelling basis exists for them to do so, the affected person has a

right to expungement of those records.” T.G.A. v. Dep’t of Educ., ___ A.3d ___ (Pa.,

No. 21 WAP 2023, filed Dec. 16, 2025), 2025 WL 3653628, slip op. at 53 (directing

expungement of educators’ disciplinary records reflecting suspensions upon the

filing of felony criminal charges, where those charges were ultimately nolle prossed

or the educators obtained an acquittal).

19

Here, however, Plaintiffs seek the novel remedy of a name-clearing hearing.13

See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 46 (acknowledging that, “[t]o date, no court in this

Commonwealth has defined the contours of the right to a name-clearing hearing”).

This Court previously addressed the availability of such a remedy in Thomas v. Kane

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2236 C.D. 2015, filed Oct. 17, 2016), 2016 WL 6081868. In that

case, Claude Thomas, a law enforcement officer working for the Office of the

Attorney General, brought an Article I, Section 1 claim against Attorney General

Kathleen G. Kane based on her alleged false statements to the press regarding

Thomas’ role in an investigation. Id., slip op. at 2-5. Kane filed a preliminary

objection to the reputational rights claim arguing that Thomas was not entitled to the

remedy of a name-clearing hearing. Id., slip op. at 6. The court of common pleas

overruled that objection. Id., slip op. at 6-7.

On appeal, this Court recognized that no Pennsylvania court has found that a

name-clearing hearing is a proper remedy for an Article I, Section 1 violation, but

federal courts have permitted name-clearing hearings for public employees when

“the government’s stigmatizing comments rise to the level of a due process

violation.” Id., slip op. at 10. Ultimately, we did not reach the issue of whether a

name-clearing hearing was an available remedy, as we concluded Thomas did not

meet the initial burden of alleging a violation of his reputational rights:

. . . Thomas focuses his argument solely on the issue of whether Article

I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution allows him to state a cause

of action against Kane for a violation of his right to reputation. We do

not dispute that under the proper facts an individual could make out an

13

While Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that Defendants violated Individual Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights, Plaintiffs have apparently abandoned any claim for declaratory relief as they

focus their appellate arguments entirely on their entitlement to a name-clearing hearing and do not

argue that the trial court erred by not affording them the opportunity to pursue a declaratory

judgment.

20

independent cause of action for a violation of Article I, Section 1 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. Thomas, however, has not done so, because

he has not alleged that he has been deprived of any due process rights

in connection with the violation of his right to reputation under Article

I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Rather, Thomas simply

alleged that Kane’s defamatory statements have harmed his reputation

and, therefore, if he can prove that Kane’s statements were false, he

would be entitled to a name-clearing hearing. If this Court were to

accept Thomas’ interpretation of the right to reputation under Article I,

Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and conclude that Thomas

would be entitled to a name-clearing hearing simply because Thomas

believes that Kane’s alleged false and defamatory statements harmed

his reputation, we would be setting a precedent that any time a

governmental actor made a statement that an individual believed

harmed his reputation, that individual would be entitled to a name-

clearing hearing under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution. This simply is not supported by the existing case law and

is not an extension of the law that this Court is willing to make at this

time.

Id., slip op. at 10-11 (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by dismissing the Article I, Section 1

claims based on the absence of a remedy, where Thomas left open the possibility of

a name-clearing hearing as a remedy upon the finding of an impairment of

reputational rights. They assert that the complaint met the initial threshold under

Thomas of pleading an Article I, Section 1 violation by alleging that: (1) Defendants

falsely claimed in the Enforcement Action that Individual Plaintiffs engaged in

unethical conduct, which damaged their reputations; and (2) Individual Plaintiffs

were denied due process as they were not parties to, and therefore had no opportunity

to be heard in, the Enforcement Action. Although there is no precedent for a name-

clearing hearing in Pennsylvania, Plaintiffs assert that it is “the only mechanism that

would allow [Individual Plaintiffs] to vindicate their rights.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 47.

Plaintiffs urge this Court to follow the lead of federal courts, which permit name-

21

clearing hearings as remedies for reputational harms to public employees, noting that

the Pennsylvania Constitution provides even stronger protection for the right to

reputation than its federal counterpart.

Like Thomas, we conclude that the complaint here does not allege viable

right-to-reputation claims, and we therefore do not reach the question of whether a

plaintiff may avail themselves of a name-clearing hearing remedy to redress

reputational injury.14 First, the complaint does not allege an actionable harm to

Individual Plaintiffs’ reputations. Plaintiffs do not contest the factual accuracy of

the Board’s allegations in the Enforcement Action, including that a company

affiliated with Brown donated substantial funds to the 501(c)(4), Brown solicited

additional donations for the 501(c)(4), and the PAC used those funds to support

Brown’s candidacy for Mayor. We decline to conclude that the mere fact that the

government alleged an individual was involved in an unlawful scheme where the

government’s theory is rejected in court, by itself, constitutes actionable reputational

harm. Thomas, slip op. at 10-11 (declaring that the Court was unwilling to allow a

precedent “that any time a governmental actor made a statement that an individual

believed harmed his reputation, that individual would be entitled to a name-clearing

hearing”).

Moreover, the complaint does not adequately plead a due process violation.

Indeed, a finding that Individual Plaintiffs were denied due process runs counter to

the theory underlying their case that the trial court in the Enforcement Action fully

considered the challenge to the legal basis for the Board’s actions and definitively

14

Although the trial court confined its reasoning to the lack of a name-clearing hearing

remedy for a reputational rights claim, we may affirm the trial court’s ruling for any reason

supported by the record. See In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1175-76 (Pa. 2018). We note that

Defendants raised preliminary objections seeking dismissal on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to

plead harm to their reputation and lack of due process.

22

ruled that no campaign finance violation occurred. While Individual Plaintiffs were

not parties to and did not participate in the Enforcement Action, they did not seek to

intervene, and For a Better Philadelphia adequately represented their interests.

Indeed, the Board did not appeal from the dismissal of the Enforcement Action, and,

therefore, Defendants would be estopped from relitigating the trial court’s factual

findings and legal conclusions in any future litigation. See In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d

1212, 1222 (Pa. 2012) (noting that a non-party may “use collateral estoppel

offensively in a new suit against the party who lost on the decided issue in the initial

case”). Therefore, in light of the trial court’s dismissal of the Enforcement Action—

which was the functional equivalent of an acquittal—allowing any further

proceeding by Individual Plaintiffs to clear their names “would add little value at

best.” Graham v. City of Philadelphia, 402 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding

police officer’s acquittal of criminal charges—which formed the basis of his initial

suspension from duty—constituted all the process due to the officer to “substantially

vindicate[] his reputational interest” and obviated his need for a name-clearing

hearing, which “would only subject [the officer] to further public scrutiny”).

Accordingly, we conclude that Individual Plaintiffs’ reputational rights claims

fail as a matter of law as the complaint did not allege impairment of their reputational

rights without adequate due process. McNesby, 267 A.3d at 546. We therefore find

that the trial court did not err in dismissing Counts III and IV of the complaint.

23

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s order sustaining in

part Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint.

__________________________________

STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision of this case.

24

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jeff Brown, David Maser, :

For A Better Philadelphia 501(c)(4), :

and For A Better Philadelphia PAC, :

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

Philadelphia Board of Ethics, : No. 1382 C.D. 2024

and J. Shane Creamer, Jr.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 25th day of March, 2026, the October 8, 2024 order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

STELLA M. TSAI, Judge