Wade

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 7:24-cv-1421-CLM-SGC

CHRISTOPHER GORDY, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tavarius Eugene Wade, an Alabama state prisoner, has filed a pro se

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). As explained

below, the court DENIES the petition on the merits.

BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2008, a grand jury indicted Wade for two counts of first-

degree robbery and one count of theft of a motor vehicle stemming from a

robbery at Hudson Poole Fine Jewelers in Tuscaloosa. (Doc. 10-8, pp. 3–4). The

indictment read:

COUNT 1

The Grand Jury of TUSCALOOSA County charge that before the

finding of this indictment, TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE, ALIAS

TAVARIUS E. WADE, TAVARIUS WADE, whose name is

otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, while being aided by

another person who was actually present, in the course of

committing a theft of property, to-wit: SEVENTY-FOUR (74)

ROLEX WATCHES, the property of, to-wit: HUDSON POOLE

FINE JEWELERS, INC., A CORPORATION, the owner being

otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, use or threaten the

imminent use of force against the person of JOHN POOLE, or

another person present, with intent to overcome his physical

resistance or physical power of resistance, or to compel

acquiescence to the taking or escaping with property, while the

said TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE, or the said other person

present, was armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument, to-wit: A GUN, in violation of section 13A-8-41 of the

Code of Alabama.

COUNT 2

The GRAND JURY of TUSCALOOSA County charge that before

the finding of this indictment, TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE,

ALIAS TAVARIUS E. WADE, TAVARIUS WADE, whose name is

otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, while being aided by

another person who was actually present, in the course of

committing a theft of property, to-wit: A MERONA PURSE, A

BOSCA WALLET, AN AMERICAN EXPRESS CREDIT CARD, A

MASTERCARD CREDIT CARD, A BELK CREDIT CARD, A J

JILL CREDIT CARD AND\OR AN UNKNOWN SUM OF

MONEY, LAWFUL CASH, COIN OR CURRENCY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, the property of, to-wit: NANCY

JONES, the owner being otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury,

use or threaten the imminent use of force against the person of

NANCY JONES, or another person present, with intent to

overcome her physical resistance or physical power of resistance,

or to compel acquiescence to the taking or escaping with property,

while the said TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE, or the said other

person present, was armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument, to-wit: A GUN, in violation of section 13A-8-41 of the

Code of Alabama.

COUNT 3

The Grand Jury of TUSCALOOSA County charge that before the

finding of this indictment, TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE, ALIAS

TAVARIUS E. WADE, TAVARIUS WADE, whose name is

otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, knowingly obtain or

exert unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, to-wit: A 2000

DODGE CARAVAN, a better description of which is otherwise

unknown to the Grand Jury, the property of, to-wit: ROSS GRAY,

with the intent to deprive the owner of said motor vehicle, in

violation of section 13A-8-3 of the Code of Alabama.

(See id.).

In September 2012, Wade was transported from Florida state prison—

where he was incarcerated on an unrelated conviction—to Tuscaloosa County

under the Interstate Agreement on Detainer Act (“IAD”) to face the charges in

the 2008 indictment. (Doc. 10-14, p. 8; Doc. 10-25; Doc. 10-26). Later that

month, Wade was transported back to Florida, but the charges in his

Tuscaloosa County indictment remained unresolved. (Doc. 10-14, p. 9).

In March 2013, Wade was indicted on two more counts of first-degree

robbery arising from the same incident at Hudson Poole Fine Jewelers:

COUNT 1

The Grand Jury of TUSCALOOSA County charge that before the

finding of this indictment, TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE, ALIAS

TAVARIUS E. WADE, TAVARIUS WADE, whose name is

otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, in the course of

committing a theft of property, to-wit: MONEY, the property of, to-

wit: JEFFREY PIERSON AND\OR HUDSON POOLE FINE

JEWELERS, INC., A CORPORATION, use force against the

person of the owner of the said property or another person present,

to-wit: JEFFREY PIERSON, with the intent to overcome his or her

physical resistance or physical power of resistance, and\or did

threaten the imminent use of force against the person of the said

owner or another person present, to-wit: JEFFREY PIERSON,

with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping

with the property, while the said defendant was armed with a

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, to-wit: A GUN, in

violation of section 13A-8-41 of the Code of Alabama.

COUNT 2

The Grand Jury of TUSCALOOSA County charge that before the

finding of this indictment, TAVARIUS EUGENE WADE, ALIAS

TAVARIUS E. WADE, TAVARIUS WADE, whose name is

otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, in the course of

committing a theft of property, to-wit: MONEY, the property of, to-

wit: RACHEL HARLOW AND\OR HUDSON POOLE FINE

JEWELERS, INC., A CORPORATION, use force against the

person of the owner of the said property or another person present,

to-wit: RACHEL HARLOW, with the intent to overcome his or her

physical resistance or physical power of resistance, and\or did

threaten the imminent use of force against the person of the said

owner or another person present, to-wit: RACHEL HARLOW, with

intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the

property, while the said defendant was armed with a deadly

weapon or dangerous instrument, to-wit: A GUN, in violation of

section 13A-8-41 of the Code of Alabama.

(Doc. 10-5, pp. 1–2).

On October 11, 2016, the State moved to dismiss the charges in the first

indictment because Wade had not been tried and his charges were not

otherwise resolved during his 2012 detainer in Tuscaloosa County. (Doc. 10-2,

p. 1; Doc. 10-14, p. 9). The next day, the Tuscaloosa County Circuit Court

dismissed the charges in the first indictment. (Doc. 10-3).

In December 2021, Wade was again transported from Florida to

Tuscaloosa County under a detainer to face the charges in the second

indictment. (Doc. 10-14, p. 9). Wade moved to dismiss the second indictment,

arguing that his new case was “the same” as the dismissed indictment. (Doc.

10-6, pp. 1–2). The State objected. (Doc. 10-8, pp. 1–2). In January 2022, the

Circuit Court held a hearing on Wade’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 10-14, p. 9).

The hearing wasn’t transcribed, but the parties later stipulated to these facts

about the hearing:

10. At a hearing before the Hon. Brad Almond held January 19,

2022, the State acknowledged that the new indictments arose out

of the same transaction, to wit: the Robbery in 63-CC-2012-2281

but claimed that (1) the new indictment[] was proper because [it]

involved different victims than the first; and (2) even if the second

indictment arose out of the same Robbery, the subsequent

indictment was proper because the initial indictment in 63-CC-

2012-2281 was dismissed due to a time bar in the Interstate

Detainer Act prompting the State to argue that the case was not

decided on the merits.

11. At the hearing Wade argued that it was, in fact, the same

Robbery as the first with the same property, and thus, prosecution

was barred under the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. The State argued it was different

victims that controlled, rather than the property, therefore there

was not a Double Jeopardy issue. Wade further argued that even

if the alleged victims were different, the indictment was still due

to be dismissed because they arose out of the same transaction, to

wit: the February 16, 2008 Robbery, violating the [anti-shuttling]

in particular and various other provisions of the Interstate

Detainer Act, in general.

(Doc. 10-14, pp. 9–10). After the hearing, the Circuit Court denied the motion

to dismiss. (Doc. 10-9).

On April 4, 2022, Wade pleaded guilty to the two robbery charges in the

Second Indictment but reserved his right to appeal whether the trial court

erred in denying the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 10-10, pp. 1–5; Doc. 10-13, pp. 68,

74–75). The Circuit Court sentenced Wade to a 25-year prison term on each

charge to run concurrently. (Doc. 10-13, pp. 58–59).

Wade appealed arguing that the second indictment should have been

dismissed because (1) the State violated the terms of the IAD’s anti-shuttling

provision, and (2) his convictions violated protections against double jeopardy.

(Doc. 10-13, pp. 65–66, 68; Doc. 10-17, p. 4). The ACCA affirmed. (Doc. 10-17,

pp. 1–11). After the ACCA overruled Wade’s application for rehearing, the

Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 13, 2023. (Doc. 10-19;

Doc. 10-22; Doc. 10-23).

Wade filed his § 2254 petition on October 10, 2024, stating the same two

grounds for relief that he asserted on direct appeal.1 (Doc. 1, pp. 20–23). In

response to the magistrate judge’s order, Respondents filed an answer in which

they concede Wade’s claims are timely and exhausted but contend that the

court should dismiss the petition on the merits without holding an evidentiary

hearing. After the magistrate judge entered an order under McBride v. Sharpe,

25 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 1994), Wade replied. (Docs. 11, 15).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

governs federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. When a habeas

petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, AEDPA

significantly limits a federal court’s scope of review. To grant habeas relief on

an adjudicated claim, this court must not only find that the claim is

meritorious, but must also determine that the state court’s resolution of that

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)-(d)(2).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly

established Supreme Court precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court decision] but

reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state-

court decision involves an unreasonable application of [the] Court’s clearly

1 A pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the day he delivers the petition to prison officials

for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Wade’s petition is dated October

10, 2024, so the court assumes that is the date he gave his petition to prison officials.

established precedents if the state court applies [the] Court’s precedents to the

facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id.

Under § 2254(d)(2), “a state-court factual determination is not

unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a

different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301

(2010). So “even if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about

the finding in question, on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the

trial court’s determination.” Id. (cleaned up). But “when a state court’s

adjudication of a habeas claim results in a decision that is based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

State court proceedings, this Court is not bound to defer to unreasonably-found

facts or to the legal conclusions that flow from them.” Adkins v. Warden,

Holman CF, 710 F.3d 1241, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013).

Plus, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). And it is the petitioner’s burden

to rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

DISCUSSION

With this deferential standard of review in mind, the court turns to the

two claims that Wade raises in his habeas petition.

A. The IAD’s Anti-Shuttling Provision

Wade first contends that the failure to dismiss the second indictment

violated the IAD’s anti-shuttling provision. The IAD is an agreement between

48 states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia that creates

uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer. See Alabama v.

Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001). “[T]he Agreement basically (1) gives a

prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the

right to obtain a prisoner for the purposes of trial, in which case the State (a)

must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival, and (b) must not return

the prisoner to his ‘original place of imprisonment’ prior to that trial.” Id. at

151. If the receiving State returns the prisoner before a “trial is . . . had,” the

receiving State’s “indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any

further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same

with prejudice.” See id. at 148–49 (emphasis omitted).

In addressing Wade’s claim, the ACCA explained that the remedy for

violation of the IAD’s anti-shuttling provision is a ‘with prejudice’ dismissal of

the relevant indictment. (See Doc. 10-17, p. 6). The ACCA then noted that a

trial court’s dismissal of an indictment with prejudice disposes of the case and

that the defendant may not be reindicted based on the same set of operative

facts underlying the dismissed indictment. (Id.) (quoting State v. Hendrix, 174

So. 3d 978, 981 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)). But the ACCA found that although the

robbery offenses in both Wade’s indictments shared “temporal and geographic

proximity,” they did “not allege the same victims or the same property.” (Doc.

10-17, p. 6). The appellate court noted the first indictment alleged Wade stole

74 Rolex watches from John Poole, a purse and its contents from Nancy Jones,

and a 2000 Dodge Caravan from Ross Gray; meanwhile, the second indictment

alleged Wade stole money from Rachel Harlow and Jeffrey Pierson. (Id., pp. 6‒

7). The ACCA explained that robbery is an offense against the person under

Alabama law and that a single criminal act injuring multiple people could

support multiple prosecutions and convictions. (Doc. 10-17, p. 7) (citing Ex

parte Windsor, 683 So. 2d 1042, 1046 (Ala. 1996)).

The ACCA concluded:

The allegations contained in the two [] indictments involved

distinct victims and property. For all that is in the limited record

before this Court, the robberies of John Poole and Nancy Jones and

the theft of Ross Gray’s vehicle, as charged in the first []

indictment[], did not involve the “same set of operative facts” as

the robberies of Rachel Harlow and Jeffrey Pierson, as charged in

the second [] indictment[]. As a result, a dismissal with prejudice

of the first [] indictment[] as required by the [IAD] did not prohibit

the State from prosecuting Wade for the robberies of Rachel

Harlow and Jeffrey Pierson as alleged in the second [] indictment[].

Accordingly, this issue does not entitle Wade to any relief.

(Doc. 10-17, pp. 7–8).

Wade has not established that the ACCA’s decision was an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented during his direct

appeal. The court recognizes that when reading the factual basis of Wade’s

guilty plea to the second indictment, the assistant district attorney described

the property Wade intended to steal as Rolex watches. (See Doc. 10-13, p. 76).

But as the ACCA pointed out, the second indictment alleged that Wade was

attempting to steal money from Harlow and Pierson. (Doc. 10-5, pp. 1–2). So it

was not clearly erroneous for the ACCA to find that the allegations in the first

and second indictments involved distinct property. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

And even if the robberies involved the same property, it was not an

unreasonable determination of the facts for the ACCA to find that the two

indictments did not involve the same set of operative facts. As the ACCA

explained, “it is the use of force, or the threat of use of force, against the person

that constitutes the crime” of robbery in Alabama. See Craig v. State, 893 So.

1250, 1256 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). So “the unit of prosecution is the act of

violence against the person.” Id. Because the second indictment alleged Wade

used force/threatened to use force against different victims than those

described in the first indictment, the ACCA’s finding that the two indictments

alleged different crimes was not unreasonable.

Wade has also failed to show that the ACCA’s decision was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Supreme

Court has clearly established that under the IAD, a prisoner’s return to the

sending jurisdiction before disposition of the receiving jurisdiction’s charges

mandates dismissal of the receiving jurisdiction’s charges. See Bozeman, 533

U.S. at 153. That occurred here when the Circuit Court dismissed with

prejudice the charges in Wade’s first indictment. Wade’s contention that the

State could not charge him with other crimes based on the same incident

misapprehends the reach of the IAD. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained,

The Act does not create consequences beyond those accompanying the

dismissal with prejudice of the particular indictment that was subject

to the Act’s time constraints. In other words, the Act does not prevent

subsequent indictments that would not be barred by the protections

against double jeopardy.

United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1150, 1554 (11th Cir. 1992).

Wade has not cited, and the court is unaware of, any Supreme Court

caselaw contrary to the ACCA’s decision. Because the IAD does not prohibit a

second indictment that does not otherwise violate double jeopardy, Wade is not

entitled to relief on this claim.

B. Double Jeopardy

Wade next argues that the second indictment violated the constitutional

prohibition against double jeopardy. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, “[n]o

person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of

life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second

prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and “protects

against multiple punishments for the same offense.” See Brown v. Ohio, 432

U.S. 161, 165 (1977).

The ACCA held that because the two indictments involved distinct

offenses, Wade’s double jeopardy rights weren’t violated. (Doc. 10-17, p. 11). In

reaching this result, the ACCA reasoned that “double-jeopardy principles are

not violated when multiple convictions involving multiple victims are obtained

from one criminal transaction.” (Doc. 10-17, p. 10) (quoting Burnett v. State,

155 So. 3d 304, 307 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013)).

The ACCA’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was it an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The

Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit Alabama from construing its

criminal statutes as allowing for multiple convictions and punishments where

a single incident injures multiple victims. See Miller v. Turner, 658 F.2d 348,

350 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 1981) (rejecting as frivolous habeas petitioner’s double

jeopardy claim based on convictions on two counts of murder committed during

the same criminal episode); Mosley v. Jones, No. 17-13114, 2018 WL 6982924,

at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018) (Julie Carnes, J., single judge order) (in multi-

victim robbery, each robbery constituted separate offense). And as explained,

it was reasonable for the ACCA to find that the two indictments involved

different victims.

As Wade notes, the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrines

of claim and issue preclusion, which are most often associated with civil

litigation. But claim preclusion didn’t bar the second indictment because the

two indictments charged Wade with different offenses. See Bravo-Fernandez v.

United States, 580 U.S. 5, 9 (2016) (Claim preclusion bars a second prosecution

for the same offense). And the issue preclusion component of the Double

Jeopardy Clause “means that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been

determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated

between the same parties.” Id. at 8 (quotations omitted).

Here, the dismissal of the first indictment decided two issues: (1) Wade

was returned to Florida before the charges in the first indictment were

resolved, so (2) Wade can no longer be prosecuted for robbing Poole or Jones,

or for stealing Gray’s vehicle. Whether robberies occurred at Hudson Poole,

whether Harlow and Pierson were robbery victims, and whether Wade was one

of the robbers were all issues that were left unaddressed. So the State was not

foreclosed from litigating these issues with the second indictment. Cf. Ashe v.

Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446–47 (1970) (Double Jeopardy Clause barred state

from trying defendant for robbing poker player when in earlier trial involving

another victim, the jury found that the defendant was not one of the robbers at

the poker match).

In sum, Wade isn’t entitled to habeas relief on his claim that his

prosecution under the second indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court will DENY Wade’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus and DISMISS this case WITH PREJUDICE.

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires the court

to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant. This court may issue a certificate of appealability

“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a

“petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable and wrong,” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or that “the issues presented were

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). The court finds that

Wade’s claims satisfy neither standard, so the court will not grant Wade a

certificate of appealability.

The court will enter a separate final order that carries out this ruling

and closes this case.

Done and Ordered on March 24, 2026.

conmr MAZE >

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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