The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
THEODRIC ANDERSON
:
v. : Civil Action No. DKC 25-3251
:
MONIQUE TURNER/KINGDOM GLOBAL
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The above-captioned complaint was filed pro se by Theodric
Anderson (“Plaintiff”), currently a Maryland resident, on
October 1, 2025. (ECF No. 1). Defendant Monique Turner/Kingdom
Global (“Defendant”) is a resident of Tennessee. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff alleges that, in June 2025, while he was President of a
Florida business, he and Defendant Monique Turner, President and
Chief Executive Officer of Goshen and Global Enterprise LLC,
entered into a loan contract. (ECF No. 1-2). Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant has breached the loan contract as payment on the
loan is overdue and has not been received. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 6).
The court directed Plaintiff to show cause why this case
should not be transferred to the United States District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),
due to the lack of venue here. (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff responded,
but refers to another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides
for a discretionary change of venue. (ECF No. 15). For the
following reasons, the case will be transferred.
The complaint asserts personal jurisdiction over Defendant
“as she transacted business with the plaintiff via bank wire
transfer originating in this judicial district.” (ECF No. 1-1 ¶
4). 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides, in relevant part:
(b) Venue in general.--A civil action may be
brought in—
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of
the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is
situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought as provided in this
section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
As noted at the outset, Defendant resides in Tennessee, not
Maryland. Plaintiff urges the court to retain the case here
because Plaintiff now lives here and is receiving pro bono legal
assistance from attorneys in the area. (ECF No. 15, at 1–2).
Plaintiff also says that a substantial part of the events giving
rise to the claim occurred in Maryland including “obtaining the
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funds from three different banks in Maryland to consolidate the
funds for the wire transfer from Maryland to the Defendant in
Tennessee; [and] all meetings with the Defendant’s other business
partners associated with the endeavor [whose] offices are located
in Washington D.C., (and who are also victims to the fraud
scheme).” (Id. at 1). The property mentioned in the Note as
security is in Tennessee. (ECF No. 1-2, at 2).
The complaint arises from a Promissory Note entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendant on June 6, 2025, signed by
Plaintiff, who indicated a Florida address, and Defendant, who
provided an address in Georgia. (Id. at 4). A confirmation of
the wire transfer on June 9, 2025, from TD Bank is attached to the
complaint, and reflects a mailing address for Plaintiff in
Maryland. (ECF No. 1-3). The wire was directed to a bank account
in Tennessee. (Id.).
The complaint relies on the wire transfer from Maryland as
the basis for personal jurisdiction over Defendant regarding this
transaction. That is not enough, either for personal jurisdiction
or venue.1
1 An additional concern is presented because Plaintiff has
also moved for a default judgment. (ECF No. 13). A court cannot
enter default judgment against a party over whom the court does
not have personal jurisdiction. Carmax Enter. Servs., LLC v.
3
Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. A court
with general jurisdiction over a defendant can hear any claim
against that defendant; a corporation is generally subject to
general jurisdiction in its state of incorporation and where it
has its principal place of business. Bradley v. DentalPlans.com,
617 F.Supp.3d 326, 334 (D.Md. 2022) (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)).
Specific personal jurisdiction can arise when the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state give rise to the cause of action.
“[A] federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant in the manner provided by state law.” Carefirst of Md.,
Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th
Cir. 2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A); ESAB Grp., Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 1997)). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit previously described
the analysis required in a case arising out of the District of
Maryland:
[F]or a district court to assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, two
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the exercise
of jurisdiction must be authorized under the
Precision Glob. Med. Distribs., LLC, No. 22-cv-463, 2024 WL 68551,
at *5 (E.D.Va. Jan. 5, 2024) (collecting cases).
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state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the exercise
of jurisdiction must comport with the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of the
First Church of Christ v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209,
215 (4th Cir. 2001). With regard to the first
requirement, we must accept as binding the
interpretation of Maryland’s long-arm statute
rendered by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
See Mylan [Lab’ys, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V.], 2 F.3d
[56,] 61[ (4th Cir. 1993)].
Id. Analysis of both the state long-arm statute and the scope of
federal due process is required:
The Maryland long-arm statute authorizes the
exercise of personal jurisdiction to the
limits permitted by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Perdue Foods [ LLC
v. BRF S.A.], 814 F.3d [185,] 188[ (4th Cir.
2016)] (citing Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime
Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. 1, 22[] (2005)).
This broad reach does not suggest that
analysis under the long-arm statute is
irrelevant; rather, it reflects that, “to the
extent that a defendant’s activities are
covered by the statutory language, the reach
of the statute extends to outermost boundaries
of the due process clause.” Dring v.
Sullivan, 423 F.Supp.2d 540, 545 (D.Md. 2006)
(quotations omitted). Both the Maryland Court
of Appeals and the Fourth Circuit have held
that it is not “permissible to simply dispense
with analysis under the long-arm statute.”
Pandit v. Pandit, 808 F.App’x 179, 185 (4th
Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (quoting Mackey v.
Compass Mktg., Inc., 391 Md. 117, 141 n.6[]
(2006)). To satisfy the long-arm statute, a
plaintiff must specifically identify a
statutory provision that authorizes
jurisdiction, either in his complaint or in
his opposition to a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2)
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motion. See Johansson Corp. v. Bowness
Constr. Co., 304 F.Supp.2d 701, 704 n.1 (D.Md.
2004); Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc. v.
Playmore, Inc., 158 F.Supp.2d 649, 653 (D.Md.
2001).
Orbita Telecom SAC v. Juvare LLC, 606 F.Supp.3d 240, 247 (D.Md.
2022).
Maryland’s long-arm statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 6-103, provides:
(b) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who directly or by an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any
character of work or service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services,
or manufactured products in the State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an
act or omission in the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or
outside of the State by an act or omission
outside the State if he regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other
persistent course of conduct in the State or
derives substantial revenue from goods, food,
services, or manufactured products used or
consumed in the State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses
real property in the State;
(6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for,
or on, any person, property, risk, contract,
obligation, or agreement located, executed, or
to be performed within the State at the time
the contract is made, unless the parties
otherwise provide in writing.
None of the subsections of the Maryland Long Arm Statute are
satisfied. Only subsection (b)(1) is implicated by Plaintiff’s
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argument. That subsection provides for personal jurisdiction when
a person transacts any business or performs any character of work
or service in the State.
Transacting business pursuant to subsection
(b)(1) “requires ‘actions [that] culminate in
purposeful activity within the State.’” Bahn
v. Chicago Motor Club Ins. Co., 98 Md.App.
559, 568, 634 A.2d 63 (1993); Prince v. Illien
Adoptions Int’l, Ltd., 806 F.Supp. 1225, 1228
(D.Md. 1992); Sleph v. Radtke, 76 Md.App. 418,
427, 545 A.2d 111 (1988), cert. denied, 314
Md. 193, 550 A.2d 381 (1988). Where the
contacts involve a contract, “Maryland courts
could and would assert jurisdiction over a
party to a contract in a suit for breach of
that contract if the party has performed
‘purposeful acts’ in Maryland ‘in relation to
the contract, albeit preliminary or subsequent
to its execution.’” Du–Al Corp. v. Rudolph
Beaver, Inc., 540 F.2d 1230, 1232 (4th Cir.
1976) (citing Novack v. Nat’l Hot Rod Ass’n,
247 Md. 350, 357, 231 A.2d 22 (1967)).
Subsection (b)(1) does not require the
defendant to have been physically present in
Maryland. See Bahn, 98 Md.App. at 568, 634
A.2d 63 (finding that under this subsection
“[t]he defendant need never have been
physically present in the state”); Sleph, 76
Md.App. at 427, 545 A.2d 111 (holding that a
“nonresident who has never entered the State
. . . may be deemed to have ‘transacted
business’ in the State within the meaning of
subsection (b)(1) as long as his or her
actions culminate in ‘purposeful activity’
within the State.”). An essential factor in
determining whether business transactions
give rise to specific jurisdiction is whether
the defendant initiated the contact. CoStar
Realty Info., Inc. v. Meissner, 604 F.Supp.2d
757, 766 (D.Md. 2009). Finally, even a single
7
contact with the forum can satisfy the
transaction of business standard in subsection
(b)(1). Jason Pharm., Inc. v. Jianas Bros.
Packaging Co., 94 Md.App. 425, 432, 617 A.2d
1125 (1993).
Orbita Telecom SAC, 606 F.Supp.3d at 248. Plaintiff does not
satisfy that showing.
There is no indication that Plaintiff was even in Maryland
when the Note (contract) was formed, or that Defendant knew that
at the time. The fact that payment was made by Plaintiff from a
bank in Maryland is of little consequence and is not sufficient
for jurisdiction. The Note provided that the payoff was to be by
wire transfer and does not indicate payment in Maryland.2 As in
OHI Asset HUD Delta, LLC v. REIT Sols. II, LLC, --- Md.App. ----,
2026 WL 221095, at *8 (Md.App.Ct. Jan. 28, 2026), receiving money
from Maryland does not establish transacting business here or
purposeful contacts for purposes of the Maryland Long Arm Statute.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient contacts with
Maryland to constitute doing business here.
2 Rather, the Note directed repayment to a bank account at
Lokahi Federal Credit Union. (ECF No. 1-2, at 4). Lokahi Federal
Credit Union is a Hawaiian bank. See About Us, Lōkahi Fed. Credit
Union, https://www.lokahifcu.com [https://perma.cc/X7U7-74MP].
Plaintiff indicated in email correspondence attached to his
complaint that his bank account is in Hawaii. (ECF No. 1-7, at
35). Therefore, the Note appears to direct repayment in Hawaii.
8
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a case brought in an improper
venue may be transferred to any district or division in which it
could have been brought. Plaintiff acknowledges that the case
could have been brought in the Western District of Tennessee. (ECF
No. 15, at 2). The case will be transferred there. A separate
order will be entered.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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