Bordages

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES HARRY HEBERT BORDAGES, )

JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 2:25-cv-02653-TLP-cgc

v. )

)

FEDERAL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS )

IN PERSONAL OR OFFICIAL CAPACITY, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS

COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pro se Plaintiff James Harry Hebert Bordages, Jr., sued unidentified “Federal and

Military Officials” in June 2025, alleging unspecified constitutional violations. (See ECF No. 2.)

Under Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge

Charmiane G. Claxton to manage all pretrial matters. Judge Claxton issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) in July 2025 recommending that the Court dismiss the Complaint.

(ECF No. 9.) Her R&R notified both parties that they had 14 days to object to the R&R. In

response, Bordages amended his Complaint. (ECF No. 11.)

In the R&R, Judge Claxton recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to

state a claim because “[p]laintiff does not state specifically what any defendant is alleged to have

done which requires that relief be granted to him under any legal theory.” (ECF No. 9.) For the

reasons below, this Court ADOPTS the R&R. The Court also DISMISSES the Amended

Complaint because it repackages frivolous claims that this Court has dismissed many times

already.

BACKGROUND AND THE R&R

Plaintiff sued here in June 2025. (ECF No. 2.) He also moved for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis and to appear in Court remotely. (ECF Nos. 3, 8.) Judge Claxton granted leave

for Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis and entered the R&R recommending dismissal. (ECF

No. 9.) Plaintiff responded by amending his Complaint without leave. (ECF No. 11.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A magistrate judge may submit to a district court judge proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for deciding pretrial matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). And “[w]ithin 14

days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file

specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If the parties do not object, the district court reviews

the R&R for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee notes. And the district court

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Objections must be “specific.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

“Overly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449

F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)),

abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); see also Solomon v.

Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 478 F. App’x 318, 320 (6th Cir. 2012). So when a plaintiff submits

only vague, general, or conclusory objections, the district court may review the R&R for clear

error, rather than de novo. See Slater v. Potter, 28 F. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002); see also

Carter v. Mitchell, 829 F.3d 455, 472 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In general, ‘the failure to file specific

objections to a magistrate[] [judge’s] report constitutes a waiver of those objections.’” (citation

omitted)).

These limits on objections support judicial economy. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,

147 (1985) (“The Sixth Circuit’s decision to require the filing of objections is supported by

sound considerations of judicial economy.”). Raising specific objections enables district courts

to “focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’

dispute.” Id.; see Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)

(explaining that a “general objection to the entirety of a magistrate’s report has the same effects

as a failure to object” because it does not focus the district court’s “attention . . . on any specific

issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate useless”); see also

Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]his Court has held that an objection

preserves an issue when it ‘explains and cites specific portions of the report which counsel

deems problematic.” (citation omitted)). With that in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s

objections.

Generally, courts let plaintiffs amend their complaint before dismissing the case sua

sponte. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed. Appx. 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). But a

court may dismiss a claim when “it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the

facts alleged.” Id. (quoting Wolf v. Petrock, 382 Fed.Appx. 674 677 (10th Cir. 2010)). Thus the

Court need not grant leave to amend when the amendment is futile and the deficiency cannot be

cured, which is consistent “with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless

complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not

infringe the right of access to the courts.” Williams v. Dyersburg Police Dept., No. 18-1259-

JDT-CGC, 2019 WL 1895576, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 29, 2019) (quoting Curley v. Perry, 246

F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001)).

Judge Claxton entered her R&R on July 15, 2025. Bordages filed an Amended

Complaint, without leave, on July 29, 2025. Because the Amended Complaint is futile and

Bordages offers no meaningful objections, the Court reviews the R&R for clear error.1

DISPOSITION

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds no clear error in Judge Claxton’s R&R. In

fact, the Court agrees with her analysis.

As Judge Claxton correctly notes, the Complaint “contains no factual allegations,” and it

is “composed of conclusory statements, statute and case citations[,] and a request for judicial

action.” (ECF No. 9 at PageID 36.) Further, “[a] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff]

has not spelled out in [his] pleading,” and “district judges have no obligation to act as counsel or

paralegal to pro se litigants.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Pliler

v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510

(6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of

action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would

transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While

courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that

responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should

pursue.”), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 966 (2011). The Complaint here fails to “state specifically what

any defendant is alleged to have done which requires that relief be granted . . . under any legal

1 Bordages “objects to the [C]ourt’s report and recommendation in its entirety.” (ECF No. 11 at

PageID 44.)

theory.” (ECF No. 9 at PageID 38.) Thus the Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief

can be granted and is frivolous. The Court therefore finds that the Complaint should be

dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1).

To remedy this obvious deficiency, Bordages tries to amend his Complaint without leave.

But this is futile too because Bordages’s Amended Complaint does nothing more than repackage

his frivolous allegations that this Court has dismissed many times. In fact, Judge Christoff

provides helpful background information about Bordages previous and pending cases in an R&R

in Bordages v. WMC-TV, et al.

Bordages is no stranger to litigation in the Western District of Tennessee. On

January 27, 2012, he filed a complaint against Sports Clips, Inc. (Case No. 2:12-

cv-02060-JDT-dkv, “Bordages I”), and on October 28, 2015, he filed a complaint

against numerous governmental and private entities, including Sports Clips (Case

No. 2:15-cv-02708-STA-atc, “Bordages II”). Both Bordages I and Bordages II

involved his allegations that some combination of Sports Clips, various federal and

state governmental agencies, healthcare providers, and media companies

“conspired to plant a chip in Bordages’s scalp during a routine haircut” in April

2010 to remotely surveille and conduct experiments on him. Both Bordages I and

Bordages II were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as frivolous.

Since those dismissals, Bordages has filed a dozen other cases in the Western

District of Tennessee—including this case—some of which have been dismissed as

frivolous, and some of which remain pending.

(No. 2:25-cv-02615-TLP-atc, (W.D. Tenn.), ECF No. 19 at PageID 79.) The Amended

Complaint is another example of Bordages’s long history of wasting this Court’s time and

resources. And while the Court does not doubt that he genuinely believes his allegations and that

he has been harmed, it must once again dismiss his claims as baseless, vague, and frivolous.

Having found no clear error, the Court therefore ADOPTS the R&R’s recommendation.

CONCLUSION

The Court has reviewed Judge Claxton’s R&R and finds no clear error. And so the Court

ADOPTS the R&R’s recommendation. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Claims

WITH PREJUDICE. The Court also CERTIFIES that any appeal by Plaintiff would not be

taken in good faith and that Plaintiff may not proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of March, 2026.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE