Merchia v. Ttr Sotheby's International Realty

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PANKAJ MERCHIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 24-3214 (RC)

)

TTR SOTHEBY'S )

INTERNATIONAL REALTY et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, alleges that Defendants breached a conditional offer to lease

him a condominium in the District of Columbia. He sues condo owner Laura Villa and the

realty company that listed the property for rent. Pending before the Court is Defendants TTR

Sotheby’s International Realty, Marco Stilli, Jake Gaddis, and Fred Kendrick’s (hereafter

“Sotheby’s”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. For the following reasons, the motion, ECF No. 10, is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges the following facts based on his “interactions” only with “Defendant-

Realtor.” Compl, ECF No. 1 ¶ 40. On September 8, 2024, Villa “engaged” Sotheby’s to list

her condo for rent. Id. ¶ 44. That same day, Plaintiff responded to a listing on Zillow by

contacting “Defendant Realtor” Stilli about leasing the property and his “need to move in soon

since he had a school going child and work in D.C.” Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Stilli informed Plaintiff that

“he would check with [Villa] regarding acceptability of terms.” Id. ¶ 48. The next day, on

September 9, 2024, Stilli “provided Plaintiff a conditional offer to lease . . . the Property that

Plaintiff “could accept by making a payment to Defendant-Realtor and submitting paperwork to

fulfill the stated conditions of the Conditional Offer to Lease i.e. ‘credit and criminal background

checks.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 49, 52 (citing Compl. Exs. 131, 141). Under the terms of the “Conditional

Offer[,] . . . the lease would have a start date of October 1, 2024,” at the earliest, “a monthly rent

of $3,200 that may be increased after the 3rd complete year based upon increase in recurring

condo fees, and a duration of 5 years.” Id. ¶ 50. The offer was contingent upon Plaintiff

passing a credit and background check. Id. ¶ 51.

Between September 9, 2024, and September 26, 2024, Plaintiff “made multiple requests

for a lease,” which Sotheby’s “refused to provide[.]” Id. ¶¶ 57, 58. On September 19th and

September 25th, respectively, Sotheby’s “wrote Plaintiff had a ‘Great credit score’” and

“Plaintiff’s criminal background check was ‘OK, GREAT’.” Id. ¶¶ 54, 55. Plaintiff took those

comments as “a binding agreement” between “Defendant-Owner and Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 56.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “objected to” his “source of income being money he

receives under a contractual agreement with a company” but “ran a Dunn & Bradstreet (D&B)

check on the company which proved that the company was legitimate in that it had existed for

more than 15 years and had an excellent Dunn’s score[.]” Id. ¶¶ 81-82. The exhibits to the

complaint clarify that on September 12, 2024, Stilli informed Plaintiff by email that “[a]t this

point the application is not accepted or denied” because Sotheby’s and Villa needed “official”

proof of income in order to verify his income. 1 Compl. Ex. 201, ECF No. 1-2 at 15. Plaintiff

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When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may consider

documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint without converting the motion into

one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d). Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119,

1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

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replied the next day asserting, among other things, the illegality of discriminating “based upon

my source of income[.]” Id. at 14.

In an email dated September 19, 2024, Stilli listed six reasons why “the owner decided”

not to accept Plaintiff’s application, which despite a “[g]reat credit score” included “no tax

return,” “no 1099 or W9,” a discrepancy between the preparer of the income verification letter

and the payer of the checks Plaintiff supplied, and a discrepancy between the address on

Plaintiff’s application and the address on his credit report. Compl. Ex. 211, ECF No. 1-2 at 19.

In an email dated September 24, 2024, Plaintiff offered his rebuttal to each reason and asked

Stilli to “follow DC law and provide me a lease for the apartment as per the conditional offer

confirmed in your text messages.” Id. at 18-19. Following “another extensive e-mail” from

Plaintiff, Stilli “received managerial support” from Managing Broker Gaddis who informed

Plaintiff by email dated September 30, 2024, that the decision “to accept a tenant is up to the

property owner” and “as the real estate brokerage” Sotheby’s neither owns nor manages the

condo but rather assists “in the marketing of the home and bringing applications to the owner.”

Defs.’ Mem. at 4 (citing Compl. Ex. 311).

Plaintiff surmises that Villa “refused to provide a lease because she had read on the

internet that Plaintiff had been accused of fraudulently billing a health insurer and failing to pay

taxes to the IRS” and that Sotheby’s “knew that” was the reason Villa had allegedly refused to

honor the lease agreement. 2 Compl. ¶¶ 59, 60. Plaintiff posits that Defendants “knew” they

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Indeed, Plaintiff was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts for health care

fraud, money laundering, conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service, and tax evasion, Merchia v.

United Healthcare Services, Inc., 2025 WL 3760613, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2025) (citations omitted). In

January 2026, a jury convicted him on “all counts” that went to trial, USA v. Merchia, No. 1:22-CR-10355,

Dkt. 675 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2026), and he is scheduled to be sentenced on April 28, 2026, id., Dkt. 679.

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were required by D.C. law to inform him “of the reason they were not honoring the Agreement

to Lease” and to provide him “an opportunity to respond regarding the Accusations.” Id. ¶¶ 61-

62. He contends that had Defendants obeyed the law, they “would have found Plaintiff did not

pose a risk to the Property or neighboring inhabitants.” Id. ¶ 66.

Plaintiff claims: Count 1 – Breach of Contract Against All Defendants; Count 2 – Breach

of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against All Defendants; Count 3 – Conspiracy

Against All Defendants; Count 4 – Violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act Against All

Defendants; and Count 5 – Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Against All Defendants in

Violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904. Compl. at 21-26. He seeks specific performance and

monetary damages exceeding $75,000. See id. ¶¶ 37, 128.

B. Procedural Posture

On November 1, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint and separate

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which was granted on November 26, 2024.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) governing IFP proceedings, the U.S. Marshals Service served

Sotheby’s and Gaddis with process on April 21, 2025 (ECF No. 8). Attempts to serve Villa,

Kendrick, and Stilli were unsuccessful. 3 See ECF Nos. 6, 7 (“unexecuted” returns of service).

On May 5, 2025, the Sotheby’s defendants moved collectively to dismiss the complaint

against them. See Defs.’ Mot. at 1, n.1 (noting Stilli’s and Kendrick’s waivers of service and

joinder in the motion to dismiss). On May 6, 2025, the Court issued an order advising Plaintiff

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The Deputy Marshal certifies that Laura Villa, who has not appeared in the case, does not live at the

address Plaintiff provided. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff’s attempts to locate another address for Villa have been

unsuccessful. See generally ECF No. 12. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), the Court will dismiss this

action against Villa without prejudice, subject to reopening should Plaintiff secure Villa’s address or her

waiver of service and move within a reasonable time to reopen the case.

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of his obligation to respond to Defendants’ motion by May 30, 2025, or risk dismissal of the

case. ECF No. 11 (Fox Order). Meanwhile on May 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to

compel Stilli to disclose “service information” for Villa and, on May 30, 2025, he moved to

extend his deadline for responding to the motion to dismiss by two days after resolution of the

motion to compel. On February 9, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel and

ordered him to respond to Sotheby’s motion to dismiss by March 12, 2026, or suffer dismissal of

the case. See Min. Order. On the due date, Plaintiff moved for a one-day extension to file his

opposition to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 18. The next day, on March 13, 2026, Plaintiff

filed another motion requesting “1 additional day” to file the opposition. ECF No. 19.

Incredibly, Plaintiff asserts in each motion that he is “overwhelmed” by his “malicious criminal

prosecution” in the District of Massachusetts despite its conclusion on January 27, 2026.

Consistent with the advisements in the Fox Order, the Court will address the Sotheby’s

defendants’ motion without further delay. 4

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim” to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which

it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning

v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The motion does not test a plaintiff’s ultimate

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See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) (recognizing the courts’ inherent authority to

“manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution

of cases[.]”).

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likelihood of success on the merits, but only forces the court to determine whether a plaintiff has

properly stated a claim. ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of a prima facie case in the

complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco,

730 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2010). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This means that a plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56

(citations omitted). And “even a pro se complainant must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the

court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’ ” Atherton v. D.C. Office of

Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are

therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need

not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of

the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

When performing the “context-specific task” of deciding whether a plausible claim has been

stated, a court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense[.]” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679.

IV. DISCUSSION

Sotheby’s argues first that counts one and two of the complaint asserting breach of

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contract and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be dismissed in the absence

of a valid contract. “All contracts in the District of Columbia ‘contain an implied duty of good

faith and fair dealing, which means that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect

of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.’ ”

Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Paul v. Howard Univ., 754

A.2d 297, 310 (D.C. 2000)); see accord Rothberg v. Xerox Corporation, 709 F. App’x. 1, 3

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (The covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply absent a contractual

obligation.). But it is unrefuted that “there was never a contract between the Plaintiff and the

Sotheby’s Defendants,” and Sotheby’s does not have an ownership interest in the condo. Defs.’

Mem. at 7-8; see Compl. ¶ 56 (alleging “[w]ith the conditions of credit and criminal background

checks in the Conditional Offer to Lease having been met, Defendant-Owner and Plaintiff had a

binding agreement to lease the Property”) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the counts of the

complaint predicated on the formation of a contract are dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff’s statutory claims fare no better. In count four, Plaintiff alleges by

incorporation that Sotheby’s violated the provision of the D.C. Human Rights Act proscribing

“discrimination by reason of [one’s] source of income.” D.C. Code § 2-1401.01; cf. Compl. ¶¶

118-119 with ¶¶ 81-82 and Ex. 201. The Human Rights Act is intended to “end . . .

discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit[.]” D.C. Code § 2-1401.01.

The complaint’s allegations and exhibits support Sotheby’s asserted need for additional

information “to verify” that Plaintiff’s income “actually existed,” not to question its source. 5

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In demonstrating the reasonableness of the concerns about Plaintiff’s income, Sotheby’s notes that

during the same time frame Plaintiff claimed to have “sufficient funds” to pay the monthly rent of $3,200,

he had “applied for and was granted in forma pauperis in this matter.” Def.’s Mem. at 13. In the IFP

motion dated October 31, 2024, Plaintiff states under penalty of perjury that he is “self-employed” but earns

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Def.’s Mem. at 12-13. In count five, Plaintiff invokes the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures

Act (“CPPA”), which prohibits “any person” from “engaging in an unfair or deceptive trade

practice whether or not any consumer is in fact misled, deceived, or damaged thereby.” D.C.

Code § 28-3904. The CPPA is violated when a “merchant [has] made a material

misrepresentation under § 28-3904(e), or failed to make a material disclosure under § 28-

3904(f).” Frankeny v. District Hospital Partners, LP, 225 A.3d 999, 1005 (D.C. 2020) (citing

Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64 A.3d 428, 442 (D.C. 2013)). Plaintiff has not plausibly

alleged that Sotheby’s misrepresented or omitted anything, much less something material. His

conclusory string of adjectives comprising count five, Compl. ¶¶ 122-125, does not suffice to

nudge the CPPA claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570, and the Court foresees “no allegation of other facts” that could “possibly cure” this defect, ”

Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Accordingly, counts four and five

are dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, Sotheby’s argues that count three asserting a civil conspiracy should be

dismissed in the absence of a showing of tortious conduct. See Def.’s Mem. at 10-11. The

Court agrees. Under D.C. law, a party bringing a civil conspiracy claim must allege “(1) an

agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in

an unlawful manner; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the

no monthly income. In response to the question about other income in the past 12 months, Plaintiff states

that he does not receive “income, but from time to time I get payments towards a promissory note for a

company I had sold in 2008”; he does not complete the answer by stating the amount he received and the

amount he “expect[s] to receive in the future.” Mot., ECF No. 2 at 1. The Court takes judicial notice of

several cases filed here where Plaintiff has obtained IFP status on less than candid answers. Any future

such motions should undergo closer scrutiny. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“the court shall dismiss the case

at any time if [it] determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue”).

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parties to the agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the

common scheme.” Halbersham v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The conspiracy

is not actionable per se but rather “ ‘depends on performance of some underlying tortious act’[.]”

Ofisi v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 77 F.4th 667, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Halbersham, 705 F.2d at

479)). Because the conduct giving rise to this action is not unlawful, much less tortious, the

conspiracy count is dismissed as well.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for

relief and, therefore, dismisses the complaint and this case. A separate order accompanies this

Memorandum Opinion.

________/s/____________

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

United States District Judge

Date: March 23, 2026

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