The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1399
MARION THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DANIEL MCAULIFFE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-06061 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 17, 2026 — DECIDED MARCH 23, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and TAIBLESON,
Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Marion Thomas brought this Section
1983 action against Officer Daniel McAuliffe, Officer Michael
Botica, and the City of Chicago after he was arrested by the
defendant officers. The jury returned a verdict for the defend-
ants; Mr. Thomas moved for a new trial. The district court de-
nied his motion. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
2 No. 25-1399
I
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On November 19, 2019, Officers Michael Botica and Daniel
McAuliffe, while patrolling in an unmarked car, observed
Mr. Thomas’s vehicle as he failed to signal a left turn. They
decided to stop the vehicle. Shortly afterward, additional of-
ficers, including Officers Nicholas Morales and Juan Sanchez,
arrived at the scene.
Officer Botica and Officer McAuliffe both detected, as they
exited their squad car, the smell of marijuana emanating from
Mr. Thomas’s vehicle. Officer McAuliffe approached the
driver’s-side window, and Mr. Thomas rolled down his win-
dow “about two inches.” 1 Officer McAuliffe testified that he
could not clearly see Mr. Thomas’s movements through the
window because of the tint, but he could see that Mr. Thomas
left the car in drive. Officer McAuliffe asked Mr. Thomas to
put the car in park. Mr. Thomas complied only after the officer
repeated the request three times. Officer McAuliffe also asked
Mr. Thomas to roll down his window further several times,
but he refused. Because of his refusal, Officer McAuliffe asked
him to step out of the vehicle. Mr. Thomas also refused this
request.
Officer McAuliffe opened Mr. Thomas’s door, and he and
Officer Sanchez pulled Mr. Thomas out of the car. Officer
McAuliffe testified that Mr. Thomas “went limp” and fell to
the ground, began to scream loudly and, at one point,
1 R.152 at 32:24.
No. 25-1399 3
exclaimed that he felt like he was having a seizure. 2 The offic-
ers then placed Mr. Thomas in handcuffs and walked him to
the squad car. They testified that Mr. Thomas “began kind of
moving and pulling his arms and legs back and forth … in an
effort to try and defeat getting placed in handcuffs.” 3 Officer
McAuliffe testified at trial that the initial arrest was for ob-
struction and resisting.
Once Mr. Thomas was restrained, two other officers
searched the vehicle. They found a tray in the back seat and a
partially burned marijuana cigarette (a “roach”) with a lighter
in the driver’s-side door pocket. When one officer said,
“there’s a tray in the backseat, too,” Mr. Thomas interjected,
“No, no, no, that tray is nothing. That tray is not for rolling
out. That tray is just back there. Sometimes it gets used for
eating.” 4 He claimed that the roach belonged to his mother.
Shortly after this exchange, a transport vehicle arrived to
take Mr. Thomas to the police station. The officer driving the
transport vehicle diverted to a hospital when Mr. Thomas told
her that he was having a seizure. Officers Botica and
McAuliffe then drove to the hospital and issued a ticket to
Mr. Thomas for his failure to use a turn signal and a civil cita-
tion for the possession of marijuana.
B. Proceedings in the District Court
After the arrest, Mr. Thomas filed this lawsuit against Of-
ficer McAuliffe, Officer Botica, and the City of Chicago. He
asserted claims of illegal search, illegal seizure, and false
2 Id. at 43:14–16.
3 Id. at 121:04–07.
4 R.53-7 at 21:15–21:30.
4 No. 25-1399
arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a malicious prosecu-
tion claim under state law. 5 The claims of illegal search, illegal
seizure, and false arrest eventually proceeded to trial. 6
At trial, Officer McAuliffe and Officer Morales testified to
the facts of the arrest as we have just recounted them. Officer
Morales also testified that they had found a “small tray and a
marijuana grinder” in the vehicle. 7 Counsel for Mr. Thomas
objected to this testimony but did not state a basis for the ob-
jection. The court overruled the objection. After the jury was
dismissed for the day, counsel raised the issue again, explain-
ing that the word “grinder” was not used in any of the body-
worn camera footage or at Officer Morales’s deposition. Later,
on cross-examination, Mr. Thomas’s counsel confronted Of-
ficer Morales with his deposition testimony, in which he tes-
tified, after watching body-worn camera footage, that one of
the officers said they had found a “cutter.” When asked about
the inconsistency in verbiage, Officer Morales testified that he
believed a “grinder” and a “cutter” to be the same thing. The
parties ultimately stipulated to the fact that the word
“grinder” was not used in any of the footage, and the court
notified the jury of that stipulation prior to closing arguments.
5 R.1 at 3–7.
6 The complaint had been amended to add Officers Morales and Sanchez
as defendants. R.44. The amended complaint also added a claim of exces-
sive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted summary judgment
on all claims against Officers Morales and Sanchez and granted summary
judgment on the excessive force and malicious prosecution claims as to
the remaining defendants. R.71.
7 R.154 at 401:14–15.
No. 25-1399 5
Additionally, footage from the officers’ body-worn cam-
eras was shown to the jury. In one video, Mr. Thomas could
be heard saying that he had no criminal record. During
Mr. Thomas’s cross-examination, defense counsel asked him
if he had a criminal record. 8 Mr. Thomas’s counsel objected;
the court sustained the objection. The parties moved on with-
out further discussion.
There was a protracted dispute between the parties about
the jury instructions. Two instructions are relevant on appeal.
The first of these is the “Issues” instruction, which provides
in pertinent part:
Defendants claim they did not violate Plaintiff’s
rights under the Fourth Amendment because
they had a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff
had committed a traffic violation and probable
cause that Plaintiff had committed a crime. 9
The second is the “Authorized Acts” instruction, which pro-
vides:
8 In the final pretrial conference, Mr. Thomas proposed a motion in limine
barring evidence of arrests or bad acts. R.87 at 17:17–20. The motion was
granted without objection. Id. at 18:05. The court also noted that any mo-
tion in limine is subject to reconsideration at trial. Id. at 17:10–13. After the
body-worn camera footage was shown at trial, the court reconsidered this
motion in limine, ruling that the video “open[ed] the door” to questions
regarding Mr. Thomas’s prior arrests. R.154 at 299:15–18, 300:07–15. De-
spite this, the court sustained Mr. Thomas’s counsel’s objection when de-
fense counsel asked about his criminal record. Id. at 374:08–13.
9 R.102 at 18.
6 No. 25-1399
If a police officer has reasonable articulable sus-
picion to conduct a traffic stop, the motorist
must comply with the officer’s commands.
If a police officer does not have reasonable artic-
ulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop, the
motorist does not need to comply with the of-
ficer’s commands until the officer has probable
cause to search the vehicle. 10
On the penultimate day of trial, Mr. Thomas’s counsel cir-
culated additional revisions to the proposed jury instructions.
This version deleted the “Issues” instruction on the basis that
it was superfluous, unnecessary, and would serve to confuse
the jury. It also deleted the “Authorized Acts” instruction and
replaced it with a new instruction with two sections titled
“What Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting a Law Enforce-
ment Officer” and “What Does Not Constitute Obstructing or
Resisting a Law Enforcement Officer.” Counsel explained that
they believed the new proposed instruction better defined
“resisting.”
On the final day of trial, the court presented the parties
with a semi-final version of the jury instructions. The court
explained that it would not include an instruction explaining
that “resisting” must be physical under Illinois law. The court
reasoned that because it was not the defendants’ argument
that Mr. Thomas resisted verbally, the distinction was not rel-
evant. The court determined that the “Authorized Acts” in-
struction provided enough information to prevent the jury
from finding that spoken words qualified as resistance.
10 Id. at 27.
No. 25-1399 7
The jury entered a verdict in favor of the defendants, and
Mr. Thomas subsequently filed a motion for a new trial. In
that motion, Mr. Thomas argued, for the first time, that the
“Issues” instruction was erroneous because it allowed the
jury to consider whether the officers had probable cause to
arrest based on the turn-signal violation or cannabis posses-
sion. He also argued that the “Authorized Acts” instruction
was erroneous because it did not include a definition specify-
ing that “resistance” must be physical.
Mr. Thomas also requested a new trial as a sanction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) based on Officer Mo-
rales’s “fabricated” testimony about the presence of a
“grinder.”11 He further argued that defense counsel’s ques-
tion to Mr. Thomas about his criminal record justified a new
trial.
The district court rejected all of Mr. Thomas’s arguments.
First, it ruled that Mr. Thomas’s complaint with the “Issues”
instruction misrepresented the law; the jury could, in fact,
find that there was no false arrest if they determined that
there was probable cause for any crime. The court also could
find no error of law in the “Authorized Acts” instruction. It
observed that instruction did not suggest that mere verbal ar-
gumentation constituted resisting and noted that the defend-
ants had not argued to the contrary. The court noted that “re-
sisting” required physical resistance and “obstructing” re-
quires only interference, but that under the facts of the case, a
jury could have reasonably concluded that Mr. Thomas had
engaged in either one.
11 R.114 at 12.
8 No. 25-1399
Turning to defense counsel’s question about Mr. Thomas’s
record, the court concluded that Mr. Thomas was not entitled
to relief. It noted that the court had stopped the questioning
immediately and further observed that Mr. Thomas did not
show any prejudice. Finally, the court concluded that a new
trial as a sanction for Officer Morales’s testimony was unwar-
ranted because Mr. Thomas had not provided clear and con-
vincing evidence of fraud.
II
DISCUSSION
A
We begin our evaluation of Mr. Thomas’s arguments by
focusing on his concerns about the jury instructions. Chal-
lenges to jury instructions are reviewed de novo, but we “af-
ford the district court substantial discretion with respect to
the precise wording … so long as the final result, read as a
whole, completely and correctly states the law.” Saathoff v. Da-
vis, 826 F.3d 925, 932 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
To win a new trial based on incorrect jury instructions, the
plaintiff “must show both that (1) the instruction inade-
quately states Seventh Circuit law; and (2) the error likely con-
fused or misled the jury causing prejudice ….” O’Donnell v.
Caine Weiner Co., 935 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gile
v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 374–75 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Mr. Thomas seeks our review of two jury instructions. The
first is the “Issues” instruction. Mr. Thomas submits that this
instruction misrepresented the law because it impliedly in-
structed the jury to consider whether the defendants had
probable cause to arrest him for any crime, rather than
No. 25-1399 9
instructing the jury to consider only whether there was prob-
able cause for resisting arrest.
Mr. Thomas did not raise this specific objection at trial.12
He raised it initially in his motion for new trial. An objection
to a jury instruction may be considered on appeal when the
basis of the objection is the same as the one raised before the
district court at trial and in the motion for a new trial. Schobert
v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2002); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c). We nevertheless believe that, under the
circumstances presented here, it is appropriate to reach the
merits of Mr. Thomas’s contention for two reasons. First, the
defendants never raised a specific waiver or forfeiture objec-
tion in their reply to the motion for a new trial. Second, the
district court did not rely in any way on waiver or forfeiture
but addressed extensively the merits of Mr. Thomas’s conten-
tion.
There is no error here. Under the “any crime” rule, a false
arrest claim is defeated when there was probable cause to ar-
rest the plaintiff for any crime, not just the crime invoked at the
time of the arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004);
Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.
2007). Here, the officers surely could have arrested
Mr. Thomas for a turn-signal violation. See People v. Fitzpat-
rick, 986 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (Ill. 2013). 13 It is also clear that, at
the time of the encounter, they could have arrested him for a
12 The only objection that Mr. Thomas raised to this instruction at trial was
that it was “superfluous” and “unnecessary.” R.114 at 17.
13 Under Illinois law, a police officer may make an arrest even when an
offense is punishable only by a fine. People v. Fitzpatrick, 986 N.E.2d 1163,
1168 (Ill. 2013).
10 No. 25-1399
marijuana offense based on the smell of marijuana alone. See
People v. Stout, 477 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ill. 1985); People v. Hill, 162
N.E.3d 260, 265 n.2 (Ill. 2020). 14 15
Mr. Thomas next challenges the “Authorized Acts” in-
struction. He argues that this instruction was erroneous be-
cause it did not include a definition of what constitutes re-
sistance and obstruction under Illinois law. The defendants
respond that the instructions did include such a definition.
The “Underlying Crime—Obstructing/Resisting” instruction
provided “a person commits obstruction or resistance of a
peace officer when, (1) knowing that one is a peace officer,
(2) he or she knowingly resists or obstructs (3) the officer’s
performance of an authorized act.” 16
Under Illinois law, “[a] person who knowingly resists or
obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be
a peace officer … of any authorized act within his or her
14 At the time of Mr. Thomas’s arrest, the smell of marijuana alone could
create probable cause of an Illinois crime. See People v. Stout, 477 N.E.2d
498, 502 (Ill. 1985); People v. Hill, 162 N.E.3d 260, 265 n.2 (Ill. 2020). Illinois
legalized the recreational use of marijuana in 2020, after Mr. Thomas’s ar-
rest. See Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act, 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 705/1-1 et
seq. (2020). After that development in the law, Illinois courts have held
that the smell of burnt cannabis alone, without corroborating factors, does
not establish probable cause. People v. Redmond, 248 N.E.3d 1026, 1039 (Ill.
2024).
15 Additionally, after oral argument, Mr. Thomas filed a Notice of Supple-
mental Authority conceding that his conduct could have reasonably sup-
ported an arrest for obstruction.
16 R.102 at 26.
No. 25-1399 11
official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.” 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/31-1 (2014). 17
Failing to define a term of art can render a jury instruction
legally erroneous or confusing. See, e.g., Dawson v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1158, 1167 (7th Cir. 1998); DePaepe v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 1994). But that is not
the case here. When we evaluate the jury instructions as a
whole, it was not necessary for either the “Authorized Acts”
instruction or the “Underlying Crime—Obstructing/Resist-
ing” instruction to define the distinction between “obstruct-
ing” and “resisting” under Illinois law. The “Authorized
Acts” instruction correctly informed the jury that Mr. Thomas
had an obligation to comply with the officers’ commands if
the officers had a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been
committed. Under Illinois law, resisting requires physical re-
sistance, but obstructing requires only a “[p]assive act[] that
impede[s] an officer’s ability to perform his duties.” People v.
Kotlinski, 959 N.E.2d 1230, 1240 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Pryor v.
Corrigan, 124 F.4th 475, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2024) (Rovner, J. con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that ob-
struction occurs when one materially impedes an officer’s au-
thorized acts). While the instruction did not explicitly state
this, it communicated as much to the jury. The district court
had “substantial discretion” over the precise wording of its
instructions. Saathoff, 826 F.3d at 932. The instruction, as
17 This statute was revised in 2023: “A person who knowingly: (1) resists
arrest, or (2) obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be
a peace officer … of any authorized act within his or her official capacity
commits a Class A misdemeanor.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/31-1 (2023). The
changes were essentially cosmetic; the section was broken into subsections
(1) and (2). The language itself was unchanged.
12 No. 25-1399
written, was sufficient to instruct the jury that it should con-
sider whether Mr. Thomas’s refusing to lower his window,
refusing to put his car in park, refusing to exit the vehicle and
falling to the ground, impeded or otherwise interfered with
the defendants’ lawful attempts to investigate a crime.
B
Mr. Thomas next submits that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a new trial because of
Officer Morales’s trial testimony that there was a “grinder”
found in Mr. Thomas’s vehicle. Specifically, Officer Morales
stated in his deposition that he believed that he had heard the
word “cutter” in the body-worn camera footage. At trial,
however, he referred to the object as a “grinder” and testified
on cross-examination that he believed “cutter” and “grinder”
to mean the same thing.
We review a district court’s denial of a new trial for abuse
of discretion. O’Donnell, 935 F.3d at 552. District courts have
authority to grant a new trial as a sanction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) when a party prevents a full and
fair presentation at trial through fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct. Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620 F.3d 747, 758–59 (7th
Cir. 2010). The district courts also have inherent authority to
impose sanctions when a party willfully abuses the judicial
process or conducts the litigation in bad faith. Fuery v. City of
Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 463 (7th Cir. 2018).
The district court did not abuse its discretion. Granting a
new trial as a sanction is “an extraordinary remedy granted
only in exceptional circumstances.” Fields v. City of Chicago,
981 F.3d 534, 558 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Wickens, 620 F.3d at
759). Mr. Thomas has not demonstrated that Officer Morales
No. 25-1399 13
acted fraudulently or willfully abused the process. In his dep-
osition, Officer Morales stated that he believed he had heard
the word “cutter” in the body-worn camera footage. At trial,
he referred to the object as a “grinder,” and testified on cross-
examination that he believed “cutter” and “grinder” to mean
the same thing. This record does not demonstrate fraud or
willful misconduct, but rather a disagreement, or at most a
misunderstanding, about colloquial names for marijuana
tools. Such a disagreement is hardly enough to justify a new
trial.
The district court handled this testimony appropriately.
Mr. Thomas’s counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine
Officer Morales on the issue and therefore was able to assess
his credibility. A stipulation between the parties that the word
“grinder” did not appear in the record before Officer Morales
testified also made the jury aware of the inconsistency. The
jury, moreover, was reminded of that stipulation before de-
liberation. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to grant a new trial as a sanction.
C
Mr. Thomas also contends that the district court should
have granted him a new trial because defense counsel asked
him about his criminal record on cross-examination.
Mr. Thomas reminds us that, in Barber v. City of Chicago, 725
F.3d 702, 714 (7th Cir. 2013), we noted that “[p]resenting a
§ 1983 plaintiff’s criminal history to the jury” presents a risk
of prejudice to the plaintiff.
But Mr. Thomas’s criminal history was never presented to
the jury. The court sustained counsel’s objection to the ques-
tion and Mr. Thomas never answered the question. Moreover,
14 No. 25-1399
in addition to sustaining Mr. Thomas’s objection, the district
court instructed the jury that “questions and objections or
comments by the lawyers are not evidence.” 18 Such an in-
struction is sufficient to negate any prejudice absent a reason
to think that the jury was unable or unwilling to follow the
instructions. See Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 744–45 (7th Cir.
2008). Mr. Thomas has suggested no such reason.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
18 R.102 at 6.