The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kareem Sampson, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Parole Board, : No. 615 C.D. 2025
Respondent : Submitted: February 24, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE TSAI FILED: March 23, 2026
Petitioner Kareem Sampson (Sampson) petitions for review of an order of the
Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board). The Board denied Sampson’s request for
administrative relief, thereby rejecting his challenge to the timeliness of the Board’s
revocation hearing and aspects of the Board’s recalculation of his parole violation
maximum date. For the reasons set forth below, we now affirm.
A complete history of Sampson’s incarceration is not necessary. For our
purposes, we note that the Board, by decision recorded on August 13, 2009, granted
parole to Sampson and calculated his maximum sentence date as April 13, 2012.
Certified Record (C.R.) at 9-10. Sampson was released on September 10, 2009,
from State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Smithfield. Id. at 12, 27.
Philadelphia Police arrested Sampson on March 20, 2011, on firearm charges.
Id. at 25, 27. The Board declared Sampson delinquent on March 30, 2011. Id. at
18. On May 17, 2011, the Board issued an order to detain Sampson pending
resolution of those state charges. Id. at 19. On July 19, 2011, federal authorities
indicted Sampson on a firearm possession charge in relation to the March 20, 2011
arrest. Id. at 73. Beginning on August 17, 2011, Sampson was detained in the
Philadelphia Federal Detention Center for the federal criminal case. Id. On
August 22, 2011, Sampson stipulated to pretrial detention in the federal criminal
case. Id. The state charges were nolle prossed on January 3, 2012. Id. at 28. On
February 20, 2013, the Board declared Sampson delinquent for state control
purposes after the expiration of his then-outdated maximum sentence date. Id. at 20.
On July 11, 2014, Sampson pled guilty to the federal charges. Id. at 22, 26, 28,
50-51. Thereafter, the Board lodged a detainer on December 4, 2015, for parole
violations, noting that Sampson’s original maximum sentence date was
April 13, 2012, but that it would be extended due to a new conviction, with the new
maximum sentence date being computed at a future date. Id. at 21. Sampson was
sentenced to 15 years’ incarceration in federal prison on January 6, 2016. Id. at 22,
26, 28, 50-51. Sampson satisfied the carceral portion of his federal sentence on
September 12, 2024, and federal authorities returned him from federal custody on
September 14, 2024. Id. at 28, 87.
On December 9, 2024, the Board conducted a revocation hearing. Id. at 29-49.
By decision recorded January 7, 2025, the Board recommitted Sampson as a
convicted parole violator to serve a recommitment period of 24 months. Id. at 93-94.
In so doing, the Board calculated his parole violation maximum date as
May 30, 2026. Id. Sampson sought administrative relief, which the Board denied
on April 22, 2025. Id. at 95-120, 121-124. As to the timeliness of the hearing, the
Board explained:
With respect to timeliness of the revocation hearing, the Board’s
regulation provides that “If a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction
of the Department of Corrections, such as . . . confinement in a federal
facility where the parolee has not waived the right to a revocation
2
hearing by a panel in accordance with Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau
v. Rundle, . . . 314 A.2d 842 ([Pa.] 1973), the revocation hearing shall
be held within 120 days of the official verification of the return of the
parolee to a state correctional facility.” 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1).
Following your return to an SCI on September 14, 2024, the Board
conducted a revocation hearing 86 days later on December 9, 2024. As
there is no indication that you ever waived your right to a panel hearing
prior to your return to the SCI, the revocation hearing is therefore
timely.
Id. at 122. The Board also provided an explanation as to how it arrived at its
calculation of Sampson’s parole violation maximum date. Id. at 121-124. Sampson
then petitioned this Court for review.
On appeal to this Court,1 Sampson argues that the Board failed to grant him a
timely revocation hearing.2 In presenting this argument, Sampson relies on Section
1
This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights
were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
2
Sampson did not include a “statement of questions presented” in his brief, and the Board
argues that we should quash his appeal for failure to preserve any issues. In asserting this
argument, the Board relies upon Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 2111(4) and 2116, as
well as our decision in Wicker v. Civil Service Commission, 460 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2111(4) directs that all briefs shall include a statement
of questions involved. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2116 sets forth the requirements
for statement of questions and provides, in part, that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is
stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” In Wicker, this Court
quashed an appeal based on an appellant’s brief that was substantially defective and emphasized
that inclusion of a statement of questions is mandatory. We have also held, however, that when
“[t]he Court is able to perceive the issues that [the appellant] wishes to raise from the arguments
made, . . . the Court [may] choose[] not to deem the arguments to be waived on the basis of this
defect.” Cash America Net of Nevada, LLC v. Dep’t of Banking, 978 A.2d 1028, 1032 n.1 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2009), affirmed, 8 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2010); see also Laster v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Review, 295 A.3d 17, 21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (holding that despite the claimant’s failure to include
the only issue before the court in the statement of questions involved, the court would consider the
issue because it was included in the summary of argument and argument sections of the claimant’s
brief). In this instance, Sampson’s brief contains the other requisite sections required by Rule
2116, including a well-developed ten-page argument section with citations to cases, addressing the
timeliness of the Board’s revocation hearing. Moreover, the issue of timeliness is addressed
3
6138 of the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code), 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138. More
specifically, Samspon argues that, pursuant to Section 6138(a)(5.1) of the Parole
Code, he should have completed the balance of his initial state sentence before he
began serving his federal sentence. Sampson relies on this Court’s decision in
Fumea v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 147 A.3d 610 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2016), arguing that because the Board failed to assert jurisdiction over him at the
federal sentencing to ensure that he served his sentences pursuant to the statutory
order of sentences set forth in Section 6138(a)(5.1) of the Parole Code, the Board’s
revocation hearing was untimely. The Board counters that its decision should be
affirmed pursuant to this Court’s decision in Brown v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 184 A.3d 1021 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
Section 6138(a)(1) of the Parole Code authorizes the Board to, “at its
discretion, revoke the parole of a paroled offender if the offender, during the period
of parole . . . , commits a crime punishable by imprisonment, for which the offender
is convicted or found guilty . . . or to which the offender pleads guilty.” 61 Pa. C.S.
§ 6138(a)(1). Sampson focuses on Section 6138(a)(5.1) of the Code, which provides
that “[i]f the offender is sentenced to serve a new term of total confinement by a
Federal court or by a court of another jurisdiction because of a verdict or plea under
paragraph (1) the offender shall serve the balance of the original term before serving
the new term.” 61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(5.1).
It is well established that “[d]ue process requires that a parolee receive a
timely hearing after he is taken into custody for a parole violation.” Dill v. Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole, 186 A.3d 1040, 1044 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), appeal denied, 207
throughout the appropriate sections of his brief and was raised before the Board. For these reasons,
we will consider this issue.
4
A.3d 287 (Pa. 2019). To that end, Section 71.4(1)(i) of the Board’s regulations sets
forth procedures for recommitment and provides, in relevant part:
The following procedures shall be followed before a parolee is
recommitted as a convicted [parole] violator:
(1) A revocation hearing shall be held within 120 days from the date
the Board received official verification of the plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or of the guilty verdict at the highest trial court level except
as follows:
(i) If a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction of the
Department of Corrections, such as confinement . . . in a Federal
correctional institution or confinement in a county correctional
institution where the parolee has not waived the right to a
revocation hearing by a panel in accordance with
Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, . . . 314 A.2d 842
([Pa.] 1973), the revocation hearing shall be held within 120
days of the official verification of the return of the parolee to a
State correctional facility.
37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1)(i) (emphasis added). Section 71.5 of the Board’s regulations
addresses parolees in federal custody and offers additional guidance. It provides:
(a) If the parolee is . . . in Federal custody, the Board may lodge its
detainer but other matters may be deferred until the parolee has been
returned to a State correctional facility in this Commonwealth.
....
(c) In determining the period for conducting hearings under this
chapter, there shall be excluded from the period, a delay in any stage of
the proceedings which is directly or indirectly attributable to one of the
following:
(1) The unavailability of a parolee or counsel.
37 Pa. Code § 71.5(a), (c)(1) (emphasis added). “When a parolee challenges the
timeliness of a revocation hearing, the Board has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the hearing was, in fact, timely.” Brown, 184
A.3d at 1025.
5
In Brown, we considered the interplay of Section 6138(a)(5.1) of the Parole
Code and the above regulations. Brown, like Sampson, was arrested on state charges
while on parole and confined in a county jail, and the Board issued a detainer against
him. Id. at 1022. The state charges against Brown were withdrawn, and federal
authorities indicted Brown on federal charges and confined him in a federal facility,
similar to the circumstances in this case. Id. Brown pleaded guilty, was sentenced
to federal confinement, and imprisoned in a federal facility. Id. The Board received
official verification of Brown’s federal conviction five days after sentencing. Id. at
1022-23. He remained in federal custody until the expiration of his federal sentence,
at which time he returned to the custody of the Board and a parole revocation hearing
was held within 120 days thereafter. Id. at 1023. Brown argued that his parole
revocation hearing was untimely. This Court held that under the Board’s
regulations,
when a parolee is in federal custody, confined in a federal facility, or is
otherwise unavailable, the Board’s duty to hold a revocation hearing,
or take other action beyond issuing a detainer, is deferred until the
parolee is returned to a[n] SCI regardless of when the Board received
official verification of a parolee’s new conviction.
Id. at 1025. The Court recognized that Brown was “unavailable to the Board when
he pled guilty and was sentenced, as well as when it received official verification of
his conviction.” Id. at 1027 (emphasis in original).
Here, Brown is controlling. The record establishes that Sampson was in
federal custody before and after his federal sentencing, as well as when the Board
received official verification of his conviction. Sampson’s arguments to the contrary
that the Board had jurisdiction over him and he was available to the Board at the
time of his federal conviction, such that the Board’s failure to invoke its jurisdiction
violated the Parole Code and deprived him of due process, is not based in fact or
6
law. As we wrote in Dill, “the Board does not have ‘the power to pluck a
Pennsylvania parolee from a federal prison for the purpose of recommitting him as
a parole violator.’” Dill, 186 A.3d at 1046 (quotation omitted). As Sampson’s panel
revocation hearing was held within 120 days of when he first became available to
the Board, Sampson’s timeliness argument lacks merit.
Fumea, upon which Sampson relies, is factually distinguishable from Brown
and inapposite to the facts now before this Court. Fumea was arrested and indicted
by federal authorities while he was on parole with the Board. Fumea, unlike Brown
or Sampson, posted bond on his federal charges. Fumea, 147 A.3d at 611. The
Board subsequently detained Fumea pending disposition of those charges, but he
was released to the community after the expiration of his maximum sentence. Id. A
federal jury found Fumea guilty in July 2011, although he remained on bond until
his sentencing in November 2011. Id. at 612. Although a Board agent was present
at his sentencing and the Board issued a warrant to detain him that same day, the
Board failed to take him into custody, and he was instead remanded to the custody
of federal authorities. Id. Fumea was released from federal custody in December
2014 and was returned to an SCI. Id. We held that, despite the expiration of his
maximum sentence date, the Board retained jurisdiction to recommit Fumea as a
convicted parole violator pursuant to Section 6138(a)(1) of the Parole Code, and,
importantly, he became available to the Board upon his conviction in federal court.
Id. at 616. This Court in Brown distinguished the circumstances in Brown from
Fumea and noted that the Board had “actual knowledge of [Fumea’s] conviction, as
evidenced by the agent’s presence at his sentencing hearing,” and that Fumea was
not in federal custody from the time of his guilty verdict through his sentencing
hearing. Brown, 184 A.3d at 1027. As a result, Fumea was available to the Board
7
at that time, whereas Brown was not available to the Board after his trial. The same
distinctions the Court in Brown drew as to Fumea may be drawn between Sampson
and Fumea. Thus, Fumea is not applicable here.
For these reasons, the order of the Board is affirmed.
__________________________________
STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kareem Sampson, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Parole Board, :
Respondent : No. 615 C.D. 2025
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2026, the order of the Pennsylvania
Parole Board is AFFIRMED.
__________________________________
STELLA M. TSAI, Judge