The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kalavathi Shunmugam, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
City of Bethlehem and :
Redevelopment Authority of : No. 1510 C.D. 2024
the City of Bethlehem : Submitted: February 3, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE TSAI FILED: March 23, 2026
Appellant Kalavathi Shunmugam (Plaintiff) appeals, pro se, from the order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court), granting the
motion for summary judgment filed by Appellees City of Bethlehem and
Redevelopment Authority of the City of Bethlehem (Redevelopment Authority)
(collectively, Defendants). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the record owner of property located at 401-403 East Fourth Street
and 405 East Fourth Street in Bethlehem, Northampton County, Pennsylvania
(Property). On June 16, 2021, the Redevelopment Authority initiated an eminent
domain action against the Property by filing with the trial court a Declaration of
Taking pursuant to Section 302 of the Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa. C.S § 302.1
1
The eminent domain action was the subject of our opinion and order in In Re: Taking in
Eminent Domain of Certain Parcel of Real Estate Located at 401-403 East Fourth Street and 405
The Redevelopment Authority proceeded under Section 205 of the Eminent Domain
Code, 26 Pa. C.S. § 205, relating to blight. On September 28, 2021, following failed
settlement negotiations, the Redevelopment Authority filed a Petition to Pay
Estimated Compensation (Petition) and Writ of Possession (Writ). In response,
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike. The trial court conducted a hearing, after which it
denied the Motion to Strike and granted both the Petition and the Writ. On appeal,
this Court affirmed the trial court’s order. In Re: 401-403 E. Fourth St. & 405 E.
Fourth St. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for
allowance of appeal on March 28, 2023. See In Re: Taking in Eminent Domain of
Certain Parcel of Real Estate Located at 401-403 E. Fourth St. & 405 E. Fourth St.,
295 A.3d 237 (Pa. 2023). The Supreme Court of the United States denied Plaintiff’s
petition for a writ of certiorari on October 2, 2023. See Shunmugam v.
Redevelopment Auth. of the City of Bethlehem, Pa., ___ U.S. ___, 144 S.Ct. 120
(2023).
On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging racial
discrimination and fraud in the eminent domain action and seeking to recover
$3,500,000. Trial Ct. Op., 10/11/24, at 2. The trial court characterized Plaintiff’s
claim as being raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Id. at 8, n.5. After the pleadings
closed, the parties engaged in discovery, but discovery disputes arose. Ultimately,
Defendants moved for summary judgment, based on res judicata and collateral
East Fourth Street (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1313 C.D. 2021, filed Oct. 20, 2022) (In Re: 401-403 E.
Fourth St. & 405 E. Fourth St.), 2022 WL 11425742.
2
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2
estoppel, in part, relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Balent v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1995).3 The trial court granted summary judgment
in an opinion and order entered on October 11, 2024,4 and it is Plaintiff’s appeal
from that order which is the subject of the appeal now before this Court. In granting
summary judgment, the trial court, citing Balent, concluded that Plaintiff’s claim
was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.5
II. Issues Presented
On appeal,6 Plaintiff raises a myriad of issues, including whether the trial court
erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrines of res judicata
3
Defendants also moved for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to produce
relevant evidence in violation of the trial court’s order, the absence of evidence to support
Plaintiff’s claims, and the statute of limitations having lapsed on Plaintiff’s claim. Trial Court Op.,
10/11/24, at 11-12.
4
The trial court’s order is dated October 10, 2024, but was served on the parties on October
11, 2024. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (providing that the date of entry of an order in any matter subject
to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is the date on which the clerk gave written notice of
the order to the parties as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b)).
5
The trial court also concluded that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, such
that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed, because (1) Plaintiff failed to comply with discovery
rules and an order of the trial court, (2) the record is devoid of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim,
and (3) the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
6
This Court has explained:
We review [the Court of] Common Pleas’ order for an error of law or abuse of
discretion. Summary judgment should be granted “only in those cases where the
record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”[] Sellers v. Twp. of
Abington, 106 A.3d 679, 684 (Pa. 2014). Whether genuine issues of material fact
exist is a question of law, “and therefore, on that question our standard of review is
de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower
tribunals.” Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 926 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Pa.
2007) (citations omitted). We must review the record, including “all pleadings, as
well as any depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and
expert reports, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we resolve
3
or collateral estoppel.7 As this issue is dispositive, we address it first and do not
address the remaining issues.
III. Discussion
A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Plaintiff argues that res judicata and/or collateral estoppel do not apply to this
matter because the issues she raises here were not discussed or decided in the
previous eminent domain action. Plaintiff’s Brief at 29-30. Further, Plaintiff
contends that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the previous
action because the trial court did not conduct a hearing in the matter. Id. at 30-31.
all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving
party.” Moon v. Dauphin Cnty., 129 A.3d 16, 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
Brown-Boyd v. Southeastern. Pa. Transp. Auth., 320 A.3d 872, 875-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)
(footnote and some citations omitted).
7
Plaintiff raises the following issues for review:
1. Does the complaint on eminent domain case is fraudulent due to pure “Racism”
and “Discrimination”[?]
2. Does [Plaintiff] violated court order and failed to provide complete responses
and evidence and not comply with the discovery deadlines?
3. Does [Plaintiff’s] complaints are part of Eminent Domain case and including
her case held trial to discussed and decided?
4. Does this complaint has genuine issue of material facts and [Plaintiff]
maintained the property in good standing eliminating any dangerous situation?
5. Does [Plaintiff’s] claims are barred by the affirmative defenses of re[s] judicata
and collateral estoppel[?]
6. Does the Defendants follow Blighted Rule, Eminent Domain Law and [Fifth]
Amendment in the Eminent Domain proceedings and cleared all property liens?
7. Does [Plaintiff’s] complaint is barred by the statute of limitation[s] under the
14th Amendment [and 42 U.S.C.] Section 1983[?]
8. Does [Plaintiff] had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue in the prior
action[?]
Plaintiff’s Brief at 4-5 (some formatting altered).
4
Plaintiff also claims that the facts of this case are distinguishable from Balent,
because the property owners in Balent were given multiple reminders to repair their
building, whereas Plaintiff asserts that she did not receive any notices of code
violations. Id. at 31-32. Plaintiff additionally argues that her Fifth Amendment
rights were violated in the previous eminent domain matter. Id. at 34-36. Plaintiff
concludes that the instant matter is different from the previous eminent domain
action because eminent domain involves the taking of property for public use
whereas the instant matter is a suit for money damages because “the eminent domain
case had multiple violations.” Id. at 37.
Defendants respond that the trial court correctly held that res judicata and
collateral estoppel barred Plaintiff’s instant action. Defendants’ Brief at 14-15.
Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the previous eminent domain action because she was represented by counsel in her
previous action and the Commonwealth Court affirmed her appeal of that action,
having concluded that there was no showing of bad faith and that the taking was
valid. Id. at 15. Defendants agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[Plaintiff’s]
present Fourteenth Amendment and [Section] 1983 claim stems from the same cause
of action as the eminent domain proceeding because she alleges that the City of
Bethlehem discriminated against her when it took her property.’” Id. at 14 (quoting
Trial Ct. Op., 10/11/24, at 18).
“Res judicata–literally, a thing adjudicated–is a judicially[ ]created doctrine.
It bars actions on a claim, or any part of a claim, which was the subject of a prior
action[] or could have been raised in that action.” In re Coatesville Area Sch. Dist.,
244 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has explained:
Any final, valid judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies
5
on the same cause of action. Res judicata applies not only to claims
actually litigated, but also to claims which could have been litigated
during the first proceeding if they were part of the same cause of action.
Balent, 669 A.2d at 313 (citations omitted). To establish res judicata, or claim
preclusion, a party must establish four factors: “(1) identity of the thing sued upon
or for; (2) identity of the causes of action; (3) identity of the persons or parties to the
action; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued.”
City of Phila. v. Nelson, 320 A.3d 774, 780 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (emphasis and citation
omitted), appeal denied, 330 A.3d 1254 (Pa. 2024). Once it is established that “res
judicata applies, ‘any final, valid judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies on the same
cause of action.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Balent, 662 A.2d at 313).
“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a doctrine which prevents
re-litigation of an issue in a later action, despite the fact that it is based on a cause of
action different from the one previously litigated.” Balent, 669 A.2d at 313. This
Court has explained:
To invoke collateral estoppel, five elements must be present: (1) the
issue decided in the prior case must be identical to the issue in the
present case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the issue
must be essential to the judgment; (4) the party against whom the
estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair chance to litigate on
the merits; and (5) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted must
be a party or in privity with a party in the prior case.
Brandywine Vill. Assocs., LP v. E. Brandywine Twp., 320 A.3d 827, 839 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2024), appeal denied, 336 A.3d 248 (Pa. 2025).
In Balent, the City of Wilkes-Barre, after determining the building posed an
immediate danger, demolished a building damaged by fire that had been vacant and
unrepaired for almost two years. See Balent, 669 A.2d at 312. The property owners
commenced an eminent domain action against the city, “alleging that the demolition
6
of their building was a de facto taking.” Id. The trial court found in favor of the
city, concluding that the “demolition of the building was not a compensable de facto
taking, but rather a noncompensable exercise of the police power under” a city
ordinance. Id.
Subsequently, the property owners commenced an action against the city
under Section 1983, in which they alleged that the city’s demolition of the building
“deprived [the property owners] of a right, privilege[,] and immunity secured by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 312-13.
On appeal, the city argued that the property owners’ claim was “barred under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as the [c]ity’s liability for the razing
of the [property o]wners’ property was previously litigated in an eminent domain
action.” Id. at 311. Our Supreme Court agreed that the doctrine of res judicata
applied because the claims the property owners raised in the eminent domain action
and the Section 1983 action were “derived from the same cause of action—
compensation for the destruction of the [property o]wners’ building—[such that]
separate actions would require that the parties rehash the facts and legal arguments
presented in [their prior action], exactly the type of situation that the doctrine of res
judicata is designed to avoid.”8 Id. at 315. The Balent Court further observed that
8
As to Section 1983, the Supreme Court explained that a “Section 1983 action does not
create any substantive rights[] but merely serves as a vehicle or ‘device’ by which a citizen is able
to challenge conduct by state official whom he claims has deprived or will deprive him of his civil
rights. Balent, 669 A.2d at 314 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up). It further
explained:
Thus, in order to maintain a cause of action under [S]ection 1983, a plaintiff must
establish that he has been deprived of some cognizable federal right by someone
acting under color of state law. If a claim or issue related to that federal right has
been determined in a prior adjudication, the established rules of res judicata and
collateral estoppel apply.
Id. (citations omitted).
7
“while the first action technically can be classified as an in rem proceeding and the
second [as] an in personam proceeding, this distinction is merely a technical one.
Both actions involve compensation for the same property and the same exercise of
power by the [c]ity.” Id.
In the matter now before this Court, the trial court explained:
Here, the facts closely mirror the facts in Balent. The City of
Bethlehem initiated an eminent domain proceeding to take the property
from [Plaintiff] due to code violations on her property. This court
ordered a writ of possession to the City of Bethlehem and granted the
request for just compensation. The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed this Court’s order. See . . . [In Re: 401-403 E.
Fourth St. & 405 E. Fourth St. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1313 C.D. 2021, filed
Oct. 22, 2022).]. [Plaintiff] then filed the instant claim. [Plaintiff’s]
present Fourteenth Amendment and [Section] 1983 claim stems from
the same cause of action as the eminent domain proceeding because she
alleges that the City of Bethlehem discriminated against her when it
took her property. Therefore, [Plaintiff’s] claim is barred by res
judicata. See Balent, 669 A.2d at 314.
Trial Ct. Op., 10/11/24, at 17-18 (some citations omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s legal
conclusion that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Specifically, the identity of the thing sued upon is identical because the previous
eminent domain action resulted in the taking of Plaintiff’s real property and the
instant action relates to the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during
the eminent domain action. As our Supreme Court explained in Balent, an in rem
eminent domain action and a Section 1983 in personam action related to the
deprivation of rights for the same real property are the same for the purposes of res
judicata. See Balent, 669 A.2d at 312; see also Nelson, 320 A.3d at 781; Robinson
v. Fye, 192 A.3d at 1232. Further, the parties involved are the same. See Nelson,
320 A.3d at 780. Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated her constitutional rights
8
regarding her real property could have been raised in the previous eminent domain
action, and, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata bars her instant claims.9 See
Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 244 A.3d at 378; Balent, 669 A.2d at 313.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s order granting
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
__________________________________
STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
9
To the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint could be interpreted as invoking a claim under the
Due Process Clause and/or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see U.S. Const. amend.
V (stating that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”), for the
reasons stated above, we conclude that any such claim would be also barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
9
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kalavathi Shunmugam, :
Appellant :
v. :
:
City of Bethlehem and :
Redevelopment Authority of : No. 1510 C.D. 2024
the City of Bethlehem :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 2026, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Northampton County, entered on October 11, 2024, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
__________________________________
STELLA M. TSAI, Judge