ALLEN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

EUNICE ALLEN,

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 25-15348 (RMB-EAP)

v.

OPINION

ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY PROPERTY &

CASUALTY INS. CO., et al.,

Defendants.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the filing of a Complaint,

[Docket No. 1 (“Compl.”)], and application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by pro

se Plaintiff Eunice Allen. [Docket No. 1-2 (“Pl. IFP”).] Ms. Allen’s IFP application

establishes her financial eligibility to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and

will be granted.

I. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL

When a person files a complaint and is granted IFP status, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) requires courts to review the complaint and dismiss claims that are: (1)

frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3)

seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts,

however, must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122

(3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Allen brings this case against Allstate New Jersey Property Casualty

Insurance Company, Francis X. Ryan, Esq., Kevin W. Fay, Esq., and Kenneth D.

Ross (collectively “Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleges that

Defendants failed to protect her interests while mentally incapacitated, depriving her

of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Compl. at 3-4.] She also makes

reference to N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 and § 2A:14-2(a), but she does not allege any factual

allegations in support. [Id. at 3.] She also checked the box on the form indicating she

was bringing a Bivens claim against federal officials but does not name any. [Id. at 3.]

Ms. Allen properly filed her IFP application with her Complaint. [Pl. IFP.]

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim

Section 1983 imposes liability on individuals who deprive a person of a federal

constitutional or statutory right “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage” of a state. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983’s “under color of law”

requirement is the “equivalent of state action.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d

Cir. 2005); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (“The ultimate issue

in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question

posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement

of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the State?’“ (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))). Thus, to avoid dismissal of her Section 1983 claim, Ms.

Allen must plead enough facts to show that she suffered a deprivation of a federal

constitutional or statutory right by a state actor. Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339. To determine

if state action exists, Third Circuit courts apply three tests:

(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are

traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2)

whether the private party has acted with the help of or in

concert with state officials; and (3) whether the [s]tate has so

far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with

the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint

participant in the challenged activity.

Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Ms. Allen’s Complaint passes none of those tests. Even under the liberal reading

this Court gives to her Complaint, there is nothing in the pleading from which the

Court could infer that any Defendant qualifies as a state actor. [Compl. at 4.] Rather,

Ms. Allen describes only private conduct by a private insurer and private attorneys.

[Id.] Therefore, the Court dismisses Ms. Allen’s Section 1983 claim without prejudice.

B. Plaintiff’s Purported Claims Under N.J.S.A. §§ 2A:14-1, 2A:14-2(a)

Even though not explicitly pleaded, Ms. Allen states her Section 1983 claim “is

connected to this issue, since under [N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 and § 2A:14-2(a)] (Breach Of

Contract under Personal Injury).” [Compl. at 3.] As the Court is obliged to construe

pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, the Court reviews these claims as well. See Erickson,

551 U.S. at 94.

N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 simply establishes the statute of limitations to bring a

contractual claim as being “six years . . . after the cause of any such action shall have

accrued.” N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by law, every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful

act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two

years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.”

As both provisions are statutes of limitations, they do not provide Ms. Allen

with a private cause of action but rather govern the timeliness of her alluded to breach

of contract claim. Moreover, Ms. Allen has not produced or alleged the existence of a

contract, nor has she identified which Defendant allegedly breached it.

Although entitled to liberal interpretation, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th

Cir. 1996)). “Even a pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if

the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed as supplying facts to

support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273,

282 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)). Thus,

the Court dismisses Ms. Allen’s claims under N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1, and § 2A:14-2(a) as

well.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Ms. Allen’s IFP

application and DISMISS her Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An appropriate

Order follows.

February 9, 2026 s/Renée Marie Bumb

Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge