Barker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SAMUEL BARKER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-907

DANIEL DYSART, ET AL. SECTION “O”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court in this tort litigation in which Samuel Barker, pro se, seeks

equitable relief and to recover damages for alleged “reckless, malicious defamation of

character” from three judicial officers—one state appellate judge, Daniel Dysart of

the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and two federal judges, former U.S.

Magistrate (now U.S. Fifth Circuit) Judge Dana Douglas and current U.S. District

Judge Susie Morgan, each of whom presided over criminal proceedings against or

collateral challenges thereto by Mr. Barker—are two motions to dismiss, one1 by the

United States which substituted itself for the federal judicial officer defendants, and

one2 by the state judicial officer, Judge Dysart.3

I. BACKGROUND

Samuel Barker is serving a life sentence after a jury adjudged him guilty of

multiple state-law counts of burglary and criminal damage to property perpetrated

during a four-day crime spree. Approximately nine years after his criminal

conviction, Mr. Barker filed this lawsuit pro se in state court against federal Judges

1 ECF No. 4.

2 ECF No. 6.

3 It appears a third defendant, Kyle Daly, purportedly an assistant district attorney, has not

been served.

Douglas and Morgan as well as state Judge Dysart and assistant district attorney

Kyle Daly. Specifically disclaiming that his lawsuit challenges any criminal

judgment, Mr. Barker seeks the following relief due to allegedly defamatory

statements written by Judge Dysart in state court rulings and reproduced or passed

on by the other named defendants: declaratory relief, a public retraction, prospective

injunctive relief prohibiting all defendants from using the statements in the future,

and monetary damages.

By the instant lawsuit, Mr. Barker challenges judicial and prosecutorial

conduct in three prior cases: a criminal case; a state civil action; and a federal habeas

proceeding. A brief summary of these proceedings contextualizes the instant lawsuit

and the motions seeking to dismiss it.

Criminal Case

First, State v. Barker, No. 525-837, was the criminal proceeding against Mr.

Barker in state court. After “fil[ing] no less than sixty-five pro se written notices,

statements, pleadings, and motions[,]” Mr. Barker went to trial, was convicted on

various counts, and sentenced to life in prison as a fourth felony offender. When Mr.

Barker directly appealed his conviction and sentence, Judge Dysart wrote the

Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s opinion, which affirmed Mr. Barker’s

conviction and sentence, having rejected 19 assignments of error raised by either Mr.

Barker’s attorney or solely by Mr. Barker, pro se. State v. Barker, 2017-0469 (La. App.

4 Cir. 5/30/18), 317 So. 3d 422. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs. State v.

Barker, 2018-0968 (La. 3/18/19), 267 So. 3d 85. And, Mr. Barker’s writ application,

seeking post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

was later denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Barker, 21-00705, p. 1 (La.

9/27/21), 324 So.3d 83.

State Civil Lawsuit Challenging the Underfunded Public Defender’s Office

Second, in Barker v. Judge Karen Herman, et al., No. 2016-9230, Civil District

Court for Orleans Parish, Mr. Barker, pro se, sued the Governor, the Office of Public

Defenders, its chief district defender, a state legislator, a legislative commission,

various judges, a district attorney, and the attorney general, alleging that his

constitutional rights were violated as a result of the underfunding of the Office of

Public Defenders. The state trial court entered judgment overruling the chief district

defender’s exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no

right of action. Though the state Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal denied the chief

defender’s writ application, Judge Dysart dissented from the majority, finding that

the exceptions were erroneously denied by the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme

Court reversed, agreeing with Judge Dysart’s dissent and granting the exception of

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Barker v. Herman, 18-1725 (La. 4/22/19), 267 So.

3d 585.

The state civil case proceeded as to other parties. In Barker v. Herman, 2022-

0301, 2022 WL 5421090, at *1-2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/7/22), the court summarized the

state criminal and civil proceedings and ultimately affirmed the trial court’s granting

of exceptions of no right of action and dismissing with prejudice Mr. Barker’s claims

against certain defendants. The court noted that Mr. Barker moved to recuse Judge

Dysart in his writ application to the appellate court due to the 2018 dissent at issue

in the instant lawsuit; Mr. Barker’s request for recusal was denied as moot. Id.

Federal Habeas Petition

Mr. Barker filed his federal habeas petition in Civil Action No. 21-1997, Barker

v. Vannoy, seeking to collaterally challenge his state-court conviction and sentence.4

Judges Douglas and Morgan presided.

As magistrate judge, Judge Douglas issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that Mr. Barker’s habeas petition be dismissed with prejudice. In

analyzing and rejecting one of many challenges advanced by Mr. Barker to his

conviction and sentence, then-Magistrate Judge Douglas reproduced Judge Dysart’s

written opinion that Mr. Barker’s conduct in adding an attorney appointed to

represent him in his criminal case as a defendant in his civil lawsuit was an attempt

to “fabricate a conflict of interest” and manipulate the criminal proceeding. Barker v.

Vannoy, No. 21-1997, 2022 WL 22879050, at *30 and n.53 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2022)

(quoting State v. Barker, 317 So. 3d 422, 461 n.32 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2018)). Overruling

Mr. Barker’s objections to the Report and Recommendation, Judge Morgan adopted

the Report and Recommendation and dismissed with prejudice Mr. Barker’s habeas

petition. Barker v. Vannoy, No. 21-1997, 2024 WL 4275242 (E.D. La. Sept. 24, 2024).

In so doing, Judge Morgan specifically overruled Mr. Barker’s objection to the

4 During the pendency of his state criminal case, Mr. Barker filed a premature federal habeas

petition, which was dismissed without prejudice. See Barker v. Vannoy, No. 17-6674 ECF No. 26.

Additionally, Mr. Barker, pro se, purported to lodge an “appeal” of state court proceedings in another

section of this Court; when Mr. Barker resisted the recharacterization of his case as a habeas petition,

the case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Barker v. Vannoy,

No. 18-11696 ECF No. 23.

magistrate judge’s resolution of the conflict of interest habeas claim, observing that

“[t]he Louisiana Fourt Circuit explained, ‘Mr. Barker’s pro se supplemental brief . . .

appears to corroborate the notion that he attempted to fabricate a conflict of interest

by suing the judge and his attorney and then attempted to use that spurious conflict

of interest to avoid prosecution.’” Id. at *6 (citing Barker, 317 So. 3d at 461 n.32).5

The Instant Lawsuit

On February 19, 2025, Mr. Barker filed the instant lawsuit, Barker v. Dysart,

et al., No. 2025-1618 in Civil District Court in Orleans Parish against state Judge

Dysart, assistant district attorney Kyle Daly,6 and federal Judges Douglas and

Morgan. Mr. Barker seeks to recover against Judge Dysart for alleged defamatory

remarks written in the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal opinion affirming

Mr. Barker’s conviction and sentence. Mr. Barker alleges that the following remark

by Judge Dysart was defamatory: “In the instant case, Mr. Barker was appointed four

attorneys prior to trial, and each time, he named them as a defendant in his civil

lawsuit, then moved for his or her dismissal under a claim of conflict of interest.” ECF

No. 1-1 at 5 ¶ 4. Mr. Barker claims that the statement was false because not one of

his court-appointed attorneys in the criminal matter was named as a defendant in

the Barker v. Herman matter. Id.

5 Just a few months after his federal habeas petition was dismissed with prejudice, Mr. Barker

filed another habeas petition, which was construed as a motion for authorization to file a successive

habeas petition. See Barker v. Hooper, No. 24-2934. So construed, the motion was transferred to the

Fifth Circuit for authorization, which the Fifth Circuit denied in an unpublished order. See id. (ECF

Nos. 4 and 7).

6 There is no indication that Defendant Kyle Daly was served. The Court issued a show-cause

order (ECF No. 13) to which Mr. Barker responded, indicating that he does not know why three

defendants were served while the case proceeded in state court, but Daly apparently was not. ECF No.

14. Mr. Barker indicated or requested that service should be mailed to Daly. Id.

Mr. Barker alleges that Defendant Kyle Daly’s role in the alleged defamation

was that he quoted Dysart’s “false fact” and “passed that false fact remark to a federal

magistrate judge (Dana M. Douglas)” who allegedly reproduced “the false fact” in

characterizing the conflict of interest issue as whether Barker created a conflict of

interest by adding his trial counsel as a defendant in a civil lawsuit. Id. at 6 ¶ 7. And

Judge Douglas thus passed on this “false fact” to Judge Morgan who allegedly adopted

it without factchecking it. Id. at 6-7.

Mr. Barker additionally alleges that Judge Dysart filed a dissenting opinion in

Mr. Barker’s civil lawsuit, Barker v. Herman, and that doing so “should be a conflict

in and of itself” because Judge Dysart’s dissent “is attempting to thwart Plaintiff’s

civil case.” Id. at 8. According to Mr. Barker, this dissenting opinion “provides to the

Louisiana Supreme Court other false facts” which Mr. Barker contends that Dysart

“should have to retract[.]” Id. at 7-8.

In May 2025, the United States, on behalf of Judges Douglas and Morgan,

removed Mr. Barker’s lawsuit to another section of this Court under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). Accompanying the notice of removal was

the U.S. Attorney General’s delegee’s certification that Judges Douglas and Morgan

were acting within the scope of their employment as employees of the judicial branch

of the United States government at the time of the alleged defamatory conduct. ECF

No. 1 and 1-2. This achieved substitution of the United States as defendant in place

of the named federal judges. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) (in accordance with this

certification, the case “shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against

the United States” and “the United States shall be substituted as the party

defendant”).

The United States now moves to dismiss due to Mr. Barker’s failure to exhaust

his administrative remedies under the FTCA in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).

Even if Mr. Barker had exhausted his administrative remedies, the United States

offers another avenue for dismissal, contending that the FTCA specifically preserves

the defense of absolute judicial immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which covers Judges

Douglas and Morgan’s conduct in presiding over Mr. Barker’s civil habeas proceeding.

For his part, Judge Dysart moves to dismiss claims asserted against him for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity, and he

additionally invokes absolute judicial immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and

contends that Mr. Barker fails to allege any plausible claim for injunctive relief.7

II. LAW AND APPLICATION

A. Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred

by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer

Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

“Rule 12(b)(1) motions challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.”

McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2023). “[A] claim is

‘properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the

7 Mr. Barker’s lawsuit was reallotted to this section of Court after the motions were submitted

for decision. ECF No. 12.

statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate’ the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer Prod.

Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d at 286 (citation, quotation omitted). Courts are to consider a

Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional argument before addressing any other arguments on the

merits. Id. (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the plaintiff bears the

burden of proof in establishing that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” See Porretto v. City

of Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113 F.4th 469, 481 (5th Cir. 2024). To carry his burden

at the pleading stage, the plaintiff generally must “allege a plausible set of facts

establishing jurisdiction.” Burnett Specialists v. Cowen, 140 F.4th 686, 693 (5th Cir.

2025) (citing Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Where the jurisdictional question is confined to the pleadings, the Rule 12(b)(6)

standard, set forth more fully below, applies: “[a]ll well-pleaded facts are accepted as

true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Shemwell v. City of

McKinney, 63 F.4th 480, 483 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). However, in examining its jurisdiction, the Court may go beyond the

pleadings to find a plausible set of facts to support subject matter jurisdiction by

considering any of the following: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” See

Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).

If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action or claim, the action

or claim is properly dismissed without prejudice. See Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe of

La., 79 F.4th 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[I]t’s precisely because the jurisdiction-less

court cannot reach the merits that it also cannot issue with-prejudice dismissals that

would carry res judicata effect. So we’ve repeatedly insisted that a jurisdictional

dismissal must be without prejudice to refiling in a forum of competent jurisdiction.”)

(quotation omitted; emphasis in original). Because dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is

mandatory and without prejudice, “[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in

conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” See Ramming, 281

F.3d at 161 (citations omitted); see also In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab.

Litig., 668 F.3d at 287 (prioritizing jurisdictional inquiries “prevents a court without

jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice”).

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that does not

meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “[T]he pleading standard

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although courts “accept all well-pled facts as true,

construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions are not accepted as true.” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up).

In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court is generally “limited to the contents

of the pleadings, including any attachments thereto.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, there are two

limited exceptions to this general rule in which the Court may rely on evidence

beyond the complaint without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion

for summary judgment. George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022)

(citing Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2014)). First,

the Court “may consider ‘any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are

central to the claim and referenced [or incorporated] in the complaint.’” See PHI Grp.,

Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 838, 841 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

Second, the Court may consider “a matter subject to judicial notice under Federal

Rule of Evidence 201.” George, 36 F.4th at 619.8

Considering that the source of the alleged tortious conduct—allegedly

defamatory statements—is found in judicial opinions, and because the Court may

take judicial notice of the same, the Court considers the various judicial opinions

forming the background for the instant lawsuit in order to resolve the Rule 12(b)(1)

and (6) bases for dismissal. Indeed, the Court considers these materials without

objection.

B. The United States’ Motion to Dismiss Shall be Granted.

The United States moves to dismiss Mr. Barker’s claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the

FTCA and alternatively because Judges Douglas and Morgan (and thus the United

States) enjoy absolute judicial immunity from Mr. Barker’s claims. Mr. Barker

opposes dismissal, contending that he does not seek to recover monetary damages

but, instead, seeks equitable and injunctive relief for the judges’ defamatory

statements, and thus was not required to exhaust remedies; he further argues that

absolute judicial immunity does not apply. The United States replies that Mr. Barker

was required to exhaust his remedies, despite his attempt to recast his purported

alleged remedy and that, in any event, federal judges indeed are immune to injunctive

8 If the Court considers materials outside the pleadings which are not central to the claim or

subject to judicial notice, then the motion to dismiss must be converted into a motion for summary

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, 369 F.3d 833,

839 (5th Cir. 2004). If conversion to summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must notify the

parties, then consider all evidence presented. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Scanlan v. Texas A&M

Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).

and declaratory relief as well as monetary damages. The Court agrees. Mr. Barker’s

claims against the United States must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust and, alternatively, dismissal would

be warranted due to absolute judicial immunity.

1. Mr. Barker Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

The United States certified Judges Douglas and Morgan’s scope of federal

employment and substituted itself as party-defendant in their places under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). Mr. Barker’s claims thus

“shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States”

under the FTCA. Id.; see also Counts v. Guevara, 328 F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2003).

Considering this certification, Mr. Barker’s lawsuit “shall proceed in the same

manner as any action against the United States” under the FTCA and is further

“subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable” to FTCA actions. 28 U.S.C. §

2679(d)(4). One such “limitation” is that “an action shall not be instituted upon a

claim against the United States for money damages . . . unless the claimant shall

have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall

have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered

mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also Barnes v. Gittel, 650 F. App’x 236, 240 (5th Cir.

2016) (applying § 2675(a) to cases removed under § 2679(d)(2)).

The Fifth Circuit has held that the proper presentation and exhaustion of an

administrative claim under § 2675(a) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing and

maintaining suit under the FTCA. See, e.g., McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d

221, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, when a plaintiff fails to exhaust his

administrative remedies under the FTCA before filing suit, his lawsuit is dismissed

without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Id.; see also Victoriana v. U.S. ex rel. Fed.

Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. 08-5048, 2009 WL 2175977, at *2 (E.D. La. July 20,

2009) (“Failure to comply with § 2675 deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over

the claim.”).

Here, Mr. Barker has the burden of establishing this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. The United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity requires that Mr.

Barker present an administrative tort claim to the Administrative Office of the U.S.

Courts and receive a written denial or allow six months to pass (whichever occurs

first) before filing suit in district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Mr. Barker has

neither alleged nor established that he exhausted his administrative remedies.

Because he has failed to satisfy the FTCA’s “jurisdictional prerequisite,” his claims

against the United States must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

See Barnes, 650 F. App’x at 240 (citing Life Partners Inc. v. United States, 650 F.3d

1026, 1030 (5th Cir. 2011)).

Mr. Barker attempts to circumvent this exhaustion requirement by reframing

his requested relief. Though Mr. Barker attempts to recast his allegations as seeking

equitable and not monetary relief, his state-court petition plainly seeks monetary

damages and plainly predicates liability on defamation, a tort claim under Louisiana

law, which is compensable by money damages, not equitable relief. See La. Civ. Code

art. 2315; see also Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 229 So. 2d 83, 86 (1969). Mr. Barker’s

defamation claims against the United States must be dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

Accordingly, under § 2675(a), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

reach or resolve the merits of Mr. Barker’s tort claims against the United States.9

2. Alternatively, Absolute Judicial Immunity Precludes the FTCA

Claim.

The United States advances another dismissal ground which supports

dismissal. Even if Mr. Barker had timely presented and exhausted an administrative

tort claim under the FTCA, the defense of absolute judicial immunity is statutorily

preserved, 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Judges Douglas and Morgan’s complained-of activities

in presiding over Mr. Barker’s federal habeas proceeding are clearly immunized and

must be dismissed for this independent reason.

Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for tort claims “under

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the

claimant” under state law where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

Even so, § 2674 provides that “the United States shall be entitled to assert any

defense based upon judicial . . . immunity which otherwise would have been available

to the employee of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.”

Accordingly, where, as here, Judges Douglas and Morgan enjoy absolute immunity

from Mr. Barker’s lawsuit, the United States may also claim that immunity as a

9 Though he does not request leave to do so, the Court would not retain jurisdiction while

permitting Mr. Barker an opportunity to attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies. See, e.g.,

Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1981); Schexnayder v. St. Charles Parish, No. 12-

416, 2012 WL 1357784, at *2 n.2 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 2012).

substituted defendant. See, e.g., Jones v. Shields, 107 F. App’x 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2004)

(applying absolute judicial immunity to bar FTCA claim based on judicial conduct in

presiding over prior litigation involving the plaintiff).

There is a “long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial

exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential

damages liability.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993).

Judges enjoy absolute immunity from an action for damages for acts performed in

their judicial capacities, “‘even when such acts are . . . alleged to have been done

maliciously or corruptly.’” McAfee v. 5th Cir. Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1989)

(citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived

of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of authority[.]”)).

To be sure, “[absolute] [j]udicial immunity can be overcome only by showing

that the actions complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing that the

actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31

F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). To classify

an act as judicial, courts generally balance these factors, which are broadly construed

in favor of immunity: (1) whether the act complained of is an ordinary judicial

function; (2) whether the acts occurred in a courtroom or appropriate adjunct space

such as judges’ chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending

before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in

his official capacity. See Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985)

(quotations, citation omitted).

Applying these factors, it is clear that Judges Douglas and Morgan’s challenged

acts were judicial acts. Mr. Barker fails to offer any contention that would overcome

their absolute judicial immunity. In the instant lawsuit, Mr. Barker targets certain

aspects of rulings Judges Douglas and Morgan made in his federal habeas proceeding

and claims that they perpetuated defamatory misrepresentations about him. For

example, Mr. Barker alleges:

Douglas and Morgan should have reasonably known the false fact by

Dysart – passed to the Federal Judges by Daly – was a falsity; true to

the extent that where they use the facts against the plaintiff’s character

– going on the record should have been fact-checked.

Noting – All defendants are now aware that the plaintiff has asserted

the false facts (proving them to be false) and have failed to take any

action to retract and/or correct the falsity publicly. Showing their

complete and deliberate disinterest in complying with La. Civ. C. art.

2315 (their obligation to repair the wrong).

ECF No. 1-1 at 7 (emphasis in original).

Mr. Barker’s allegations clearly concern “judicial acts” (writing judicial

opinions) undertaken while presiding over “judicial proceedings” (Mr. Barker’s

habeas proceeding). The rulings Mr. Barker challenges were rulings issued during

the course of normal judicial functions, undertaken in a case previously pending

before Judges Douglas and Morgan, issued from their chambers in the course and

scope of their official duties in resolving controversies such as federal habeas petitions

filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Where, as here, claims against judges arise

from rulings issued during and concerning cases presented to them, those judges are

entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229,

230 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Clearly, the judge was acting within his judicial capacity in his

rulings in the [plaintiffs’] prior lawsuit.”). This is so regardless of whether the relief

sought is monetary or equitable. See, e.g., Simmons v. Edmondson, 225 F. App’x 787,

788 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Insofar as Mr. Barker is dissatisfied with court

rulings, “his recourse was to seek appellate review of the rulings, not to sue the

Judges[.]” Buckenberger v. Nielsen, No. 15-1785, 2015 WL 5061373, at *8 (E.D. La.

Aug. 26, 2015) (citation omitted).

Because Judges Douglas and Morgan would be entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from Mr. Barker’s tort claims, the United States is equally entitled to

invoke this immunity defense. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also Tinsley v. Widener, 150

F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D. D.C. 2001) (“Judicial immunity also protects the United States

from the plaintiff’s FTCA suit. The United States possesses . . . immunity when sued

under the FTCA because the defense is available to the judicial officer whose act is

the basis for the suit.”). Accordingly, even if Mr. Barker had exhausted his FTCA

claims, Mr. Barker’s tort claims against the United States must be dismissed for

failure to state a claim—failure to overcome absolute judicial immunity.

C. Judge Daniel Dysart’s Motion to Dismiss Shall be Granted.

State appellate judge Daniel Dysart moves to dismiss Mr. Barker’s claims

against him on the grounds that such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

absolute judicial immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that the allegations

fail to state a claim for relief. In addition to taking issue with the removal of his

lawsuit to this Court, Mr. Barker opposes dismissal, arguing that he has proved

Judge Dysart’s defamatory conduct and “lies” and that “dismissal would give an

appearance of bias and prejudice.” Mr. Barker’s arguments are without merit.

Dismissal of his claims against Judge Dysart is warranted.

Placing Mr. Barker’s claims in the instant lawsuit in context, Mr. Barker

alleges that Judge Dysart wrote defamatory remarks about him in judicial opinions.

First, in the 2018 opinion of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Judge

Dysart wrote:

In the instant case, Mr. Barker was appointed four attorneys prior to

trial, and each time, he named them as a defendant in his civil lawsuit,

then moved for his or her dismissal under a claim of conflict of interest.

Mr. Barker then proceeded to create a conflict with every court-

appointed attorney by naming them in his lawsuit . . . we cannot

sanction such tactical maneuvers.10

Second, Mr. Barker challenges as false and defamatory the following statement

written by Judge Dysart during the course of Mr. Barker’s state civil lawsuit:

A review of the Complaint, as amended, reveals that the object of the

suit was a declaration that the Orleans Parish Public Defenders Office

(“OPDB”) was underfunded such that “ethical and effective assistance

of counsel” was not possible and seeking the appointment of private

counsel paid for by the OPDB.11

Mr. Barker thus focuses his claims for relief on Judge Dysart’s written assertions in

judicial opinions concerning Mr. Barker’s conduct vis-à-vis his appointed counsel in

his state court proceedings. Because Mr. Barker’s claims are barred by Eleventh

Amendment immunity and absolute judicial immunity, his claims against Judge

10 ECF No. 1-1; State v. Barker, 2017-0469 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/30/18), 317 So. 3d 422, 459-60.

11 ECF Nos. 1-1; 6-2.

Dysart must be dismissed. For any claims not subject to dismissal on these grounds,

Mr. Barker fails to state any plausible claim for relief.

1. Mr. Barker’s Official-Capacity Claims Are Barred by the

Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend

to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of

any Foreign State.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Unless a state consents to waive its immunity conferred by

this amendment, the state is immune from being sued for injunctive relief and money

damages in federal court. See Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-President Gov’t, 279

F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2002). Louisiana has not waived sovereign immunity within

the federal system. See id.; see also Holliday v. Bd. Of Supervisors of LSU Agr. &

Mech. Coll., 149 So. 3d 227, 229 (La. 2014). This means that Louisiana enjoys

immunity from suits in federal court and this immunity extends to suits brought

under state law and additionally extends to suits against state officials in their official

capacities, that is, when “the state is a real, substantial party in interest.” See

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984).

Eleventh Amendment immunity thus operates as a jurisdictional bar. In

accordance with the Eleventh Amendment, Louisiana, or a Louisiana state official

sued in his official capacity, is immune from any lawsuit seeking monetary damages

or equitable relief in federal courts by the state’s own citizens or citizens of another

state. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101-02. This immunity extends to state-court

judges. See, e.g., Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“Texas judges are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted

against them in their official capacities as state actors.”); Cain v. City of New Orleans,

281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646 (E.D. La. 2017) (Vance, J.) (observing that Eleventh

Amendment immunity would apply to a suit for retrospective relief against Orleans

Parish Criminal District Court judges), aff’d sub nom., Cain v. White, 937 F.3d 446

(5th Cir. 2019); Summers v. Louisiana, No. 13-4573, 2013 WL 3818560, at *4 (E.D.

La. July 22, 2013) (Africk, J.) (finding that “an official-capacity claim against [a

Louisiana judge] would in reality be a claim against the state itself, and any such

claims would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment”); Klein v. Medley, No. 25-1047,

2025 WL 2986694, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2025) (North, M.J.); Price v. Irons, No. 19-

11451, 2020 WL 1638376, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2020) (Vance, J.) (granting motion

to dismiss claims against state-court judge in his official and individual capacities).

Applying these settled authorities, Mr. Barker’s claims against a Louisiana

state court judge, Judge Dysart, in his official capacity is a suit against a state official

and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Mr. Barker’s official-capacity claims

against Judge Dysart shall be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

2. Mr. Barker’s Individual-Capacity Claims Are Barred by

Absolute Judicial Immunity.

In addition to seeking to recover monetary damages and equitable relief

against Judge Dysart in his official capacity, Mr. Barker ostensibly pursues relief

(including seeking monetary damages) against Judge Dysart in his individual

capacity. Considering Mr. Barker’s allegations, Judge Dysart is entitled to dismissal

of such claims given Judge Dysart’s entitlement to absolute judicial immunity.

The absolute judicial immunity principles set forth above apply equally to

state-court judges: judges enjoy absolute immunity from an action for damages for

acts performed in their judicial capacities, “‘even when such acts are ... alleged to

have been done maliciously or corruptly.’” McAfee v. 5th Cir. Judges, 884 F.2d 221,

222 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (“A judge

will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of authority[.]”)). Such “immunity can be overcome only

by showing that the actions complained of were nonjudicial in nature or by showing

that the actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Boyd v.

Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991)). To classify an act as judicial, courts generally balance these factors, which

are broadly construed in favor of immunity: (1) whether the act complained of is an

ordinary judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in a courtroom or appropriate

adjunct space such as judges’ chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around

a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit

to the judge in his official capacity. See Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th

Cir. 1985) (quotations, citation omitted).

Applying these factors, Judge Dysart clearly enjoys absolute judicial immunity

from Mr. Barker’s claims. Mr. Barker alleges that Judge Dysart wrote majority and

dissenting opinions for the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and within

those opinions made false and defamatory statements concerning Mr. Barker. Even

if written in error or maliciously, as Mr. Barker alleges, Judge Dysart enjoys absolute

immunity for these acts performed in his judicial capacity.

Mr. Barker does not allege that Judge Dysart acted beyond the state appellate

court’s jurisdiction.12 To the contrary, Mr. Barker specifically challenges as false and

defamatory assertions written in judicial opinions resolving issues presented for

resolution by Mr. Barker and other litigants. Writing opinions on issues presented in

cases for resolution is a clear function of judges. Mr. Barker’s contention that false

assertions within judicial opinions transforms a judicial act into one that is non-

judicial incorrect as a matter of law and fails to overcome absolute judicial immunity.

Accordingly, Judge Dysart’s motion to dismiss Mr. Barker’s individual capacity

claims is granted and such claims are dismissed with prejudice.

3. Mr. Barker Fails to Allege Entitlement to Injunctive or

Declaratory Relief.

“[F]ederal courts have no authority to direct state courts or their judicial

officers in the performance of their duties.” Johnson v. Bigelow, 239 F. App’x 865 (5th

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Barker fails to offer any factual predicate or

legal source for entitlement to injunctive or declaratory relief in his favor and against

Judge Dysart. Indeed, in challenging as defamatory written judicial opinions issued

years ago, it does not appear that he seeks (much less could he obtain) prospective

injunctive or declaratory relief. If these remedies even invoke the case or controversy

12 It is undisputed that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal had appellate jurisdiction over Mr.

Barker’s state court proceedings arising within the relevant geographical boundaries. See La. Const.

art. V, § 10.

requirement of Article III, he fails to state any plausible claim for these equitable

remedies. Cf. Adams, 764 F.2d at 299.

HiIl. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that United States’ motion! to dismiss is GRANTED.

Mr. Barker’s claims against the United States are hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Daniel Dysart’s motion™ to dismiss is

GRANTED. Mr. Barker’s claims against Daniel Dysart are hereby DISMISSED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 16th day of March, 2026.

Rie So

BRANDON 8. LONG ~?

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18 ECF No. 4.

14 ECF No. 6.

23