Cuellar

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

March 05, 2026

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

. HOUSTON DIVISION

“JAIME MENDEZ CUELLAR, §

(TDCI # 00854843), §

§ .

Plaintiff, §

§

vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-26-790

§

ERIC GUERRERO, et al., §

§

Defendants. § .

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiff, Jaime Mendez Cuellar (TDCJ #00854843), is currently in the

custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions

Division. Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he filed a civil-rights complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Eric Guerrero, as Executive Director of TDCJ-CID;!

Grady Wallace, as Warden of the Jester III Unit; Major Alyce E. Hooper of the Jester

II Unit; Captain Jounissia N. Josian of the Jester [IJ Unit; and Sargeant James I.

Ekpo of the Jester IIJ Unit. (Dkt. 1). He contends that the defendants are illegally

keeping him imprisoned and that they have failed or refused to properly process his

grievances. (/d. at 3-4). .

'Cuellar’s complaint identifies Lori Davis as the Executive Director of TDCJ-CID.

Eric Guerrero has since been named Executive Director of TDCJ-CID. Under Rule 25(d)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Guerrero is automatically substituted as a party.

Because Cuellar is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must examine his

claims and dismiss his complaint, in whole or in part, if it determines that the action

is (1) “frivolous or malicious,” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After considering Cuellar’s complaint, the Court

concludes that this case must be dismissed for the reasons explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 2026, Cuellar filed a civil-rights complaint alleging that his

federal and state constitutional rights are being violated because he is illegally

imprisoned in a case of mistaken identity. (Dkt. 1). He contends that by using his

name in uppercase letters rather than a combination of uppercase and lowercase

letters, the defendants have misidentified him and are “stealing my capital interest.”

(Id. at 4).

Cuellar has attached to his complaint copies of grievances that he alleges he □

filed with TDCJ. (Dkt. 1-1, pp. 3-9). In these grievances, he alleges that he is a

“natural born private man” who has not entered into a contract with either the United

States or the State of Texas and therefore is not subject to their laws. (id.). He

contends that the defendants have either failed or refused to process these

grievances. (Id. at 1). He does not identify a specific constitutional provision or

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federal statute that has been violated by the failure to process his grievances, nor

does he identify any harm that he has suffered as a result.

As relief, he seeks his release from prison and money damages. (Dkt. 1, p.

4).

Il. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Cuellar brings his action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. “Section 1983 does not

create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for

violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t of Health,

126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443

U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez

v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (Sth Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The first element

recognizes that “state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff

‘under [§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right.” Nesmith v. Taylor, 715

F.2d 194, 195 (Sth Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The second element means that

generally only state actors—not private parties—can be liable for violations of civil

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rights. See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. of Nw. Miss. Reg’l Med. Ctr, 765 F.2d 1278, 1283

(Sth Cir. 1985).

B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

Cuellar’s action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (PLRA).

The PLRA requires the Court to examine the legal and factual basis of a prisoner’s

complaint and dismiss the case if it determines that the complaint “(i) is frivolous or

malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief be granted, or (iii) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 42 US.C. § 1997e(c).

A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Geiger

v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (Sth Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S.-25, 31-32 (1992)). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in

law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint

alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Siglar v.

Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (Sth Cir. 1997) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 327 (1989)). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the

plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged

are clearly baseless.” -Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (Sth Cir. 2013)

(cleaned up). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if

it does not contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)).

In conducting its screening review, the Court must construe all allegations

“liberally in favor of the plaintiff’ and must consider whether “with every doubt

resolved on [the plaintiffs] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.”

Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)

(cleaned up). But if the complaint does not state a claim for relief, it may be

dismissed, even before service on the defendants. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d

1116, 1119 (Sth Cir. 1986).

C. Pro Se Pleadings

Cuellar is proceeding pro se in this action. Courts construe pleadings filed by

pro se litigants under a less stringent standard of review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, “[a] document filed pro se

is ‘to be liberally construed.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this

liberal standard, pro se litigants must still “abide by the rules that govern the federal

courts.” E.E.O.C. vy. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). They must

“properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim

to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment

evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” Jd. (cleaned up).

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Il. DISCUSSION □

A. Sovereign Citizen Claims

To the extent that Cuellar is claiming that his imprisonment is

unconstitutional because it is based on mistaken identity, his allegations are

frivolous and fail to state a claim for relief.

Cuellar’s claims are based on the tenets of sovereign citizens. Sovereign

citizens are “a loose grouping of litigants, commentators, and tax protesters who

often take the position that they are not subject to state or federal statutes and

proceedings.” United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 746 n.5 (Sth Cir. 2016).

“Although no two pseudolegal practitioners are identical, they tend to share several

common beliefs, including that principles of contract law can be used to either

escape punishment for offenses or to generate unlimited fiscal liability in others.”

Samuel Barrows, Sovereigns, Freemen, and Desperate Souls: Towards A Rigorous

Understanding of Pseudolitigation Tactics in United States Courts, 62 B.C. L. Rev.

905, 907 n.13 (2021) (cleaned up). Sovereign citizens often take the position that a

secret United States Treasury account was set up for each person at birth, thata

large sum of money was placed into it from some unidentified source, and that

“freemen” can pay their debts, including their debt to society from a criminal

conviction, by transferring the debt to this fictitious bond. See UNC School of

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Government, 4 Quick Guide to Sovereign Citizens, available at www.sog.unc.edu

(visited March 2, 2026).

But all of the courts that have addressed such claims have rejected them. See,

e.g., Watson v. Texas State Univ., 829 F. App’x 686, 686 (Sth Cir. 2020) (per

curiam) (denying relief on claims based on the “meritless legal theories associated

with the sovereign citizen movement”); United States v. Williams, 29 F Ath 1306,

1308 (11th Cir, 2022) (noting that courts have “repeatedly rejected” sovereign

citizens’ “theories of individual sovereignty, immunity from prosecution, and their

ilk”) (quoting United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2011));

United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (describing the

arguments of sovereign citizens as “meritless rhetoric”); United States v. Schmitt,

784 F.2d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting as “entirely frivolous” claims that the

courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant because he was a “Natural

Freeman” not subject to the law); Mason v. Anderson, Civil No. H-15-2952, 2016

WL 4398680, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2016) (“[C]ourts routinely dismiss

sovereign citizen claims.”); Stone v. Birmingham, No. 3:20-cv-2494-D (BT), 2021

WL 6802921, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) (collecting cases and noting that the

claims of sovereign citizens are routinely dismissed as “frivolous and without

merit”), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 326565 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,

2022). As a result of this uniform rejection, “[t]hese [sovereign citizen] teachings

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have never worked in a court of law—not a single time.” Wirsche v. Bank of Am.,

N.A., No. 7:13-cv-528, 2013 WL 6564657, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2013).

Cuellar’s complaint alleges that his imprisonment is based on mistaken

identity. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). He alleges that by keeping him imprisoned, the defendants

are “stealing my capital and interest” from a “constructive trust” that was created

when he was born. (/d.). His grievances cite to state and federal constitutions,

various state and federal statutes, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and an

unidentified Restatement. But neither the complaint nor its attachments identify

any violation of the Constitution or any federal law relevant to his claim that the

defendants have violated his civil rights. (Dkt. 1-1).

Cuellar’s allegations of mistaken identity are patently frivolous, and his claim

that he is falsely imprisoned is meritless. To the extent that he contends that the

defendants have violated his civil rights under the sovereign citizen theories of

liability, his action is dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

B. Grievance Processing Claim

Cuellar’s complaint could also be construed as asserting a claim that the

defendants have violated his civil rights by failing to process his grievances

concerning his allegedly illegal imprisonment. These allegations fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. .

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A prisoner “has no right to either the adequacy or the result of prison

administrative grievance procedures.” Jones v. Lumpkin, No. 23-40612, 2024 WL

1994279, at *2 (Sth Cir. May 6, 2024) (per curiam). That a grievance was not

investigated or resolved to an inmate’s satisfaction does not implicate

constitutionally protected rights. See Schwarzer v. Wainright, 810 F. App’x 358,

360 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995)); Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374 (holding that prisoners do not have a federally

protected liberty interest in having grievances resolved to their satisfaction);

Alexander v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 951 F.3d 236, 240 (Sth Cir. 2020) (per

curiam) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s claim that his

grievances were mishandled or improperly denied because prisoners have no due-

process rights in the inmate grievance process); Grogan v. Kumar, 873 F.3d 273,

280 (Sth Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is well established that prisoners have no due process

rights in the inmate grievance process.”); Mahogany v. Miller, 252 F. App’x 593,

595 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that a plaintiff had no actionable § 1983

claim based on prison officials’ failure to process: his grievances); Edmond v.

Martin, 100 F.3d 952, 1996 WL 625331, at 4 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding

that an inmate’s claim that the defendant’s failure to investigate his grievance

“raises no constitutional issue”). Further, the failure of prison officials to follow

prison policies or rules does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See

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McFaul vy. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 579 (Sth Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. Cain,

864 F.2d 1235, 1251-52 (Sth Cir. 1989)); Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 779

(5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] violation of prison.regulations in itself is not a constitutional

violation.”). Courts have therefore repeatedly dismissed lawsuits brought by

prisoners to challenge TDCJ’s administration of its grievance procedures, including

prison officials’ alleged failures to comply with TDCIJ’s policies and procedures

when processing grievances. See, e.g., Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (Sth

Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

To the extent that Cuellar’s complaint can be construed as claiming that the

. handling of his grievances violated his civil rights, he does not allege a violation of

federal law. His action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and

will be dismissed. □

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The civil-rights action filed by Jaime Mendez Cuellar, (Dkt. 1), is

DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. .

2. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot.

3. Final judgment will be separately entered.

4. This dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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The Clerk shall send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the

plaintiff. The Clerk shall also send a copy of this dismissal to the Three-Strikes List

Manager at the following email: Three Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on i Ware. 3 , 2026.

DAVID HITTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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