Altstatt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

BILLY JOE ALTSTATT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-22-811-D

)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS )

FOR OKLAHOMA COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Oklahoma

County Criminal Justice Authority [Doc. No. 128] and the Motion for Summary Judgment

of Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County and Brief in Support

[Doc. No. 130]. Plaintiff filed a response [Doc. No. 142], to which Defendants each replied

[Doc. Nos. 145, 147]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

A. Johnny Altstatt’s Detention and Incident

Johnny Altstatt was booked into the Oklahoma County Detention Center (the Jail)

on March 4, 2021, on one charge of second-degree burglary [Def. OCCJA UMF No. 11].

Because he was classified as a “minimum” security risk, Mr. Altstatt was originally housed

in general population cell number 4A-20. Id. at 11-12. But he was subsequently transferred

to the mental health observation floor cell number 12C-18 due to his suicidal ideations. Id.

On March 10, 2021, Joseph DeFreeze was booked into the Jail for malicious injury

or destruction of property. Id. at 13. He was originally classified as a “minimum” security

risk, but was assigned to the mental health observation floor the next day [Def. The Board

UMF Nos. 5, 17]. The following day, he was moved to cell number 12D-01. Id.

On March 15, 2021, at approximately 2:20 a.m., Detention Officer Corporal

Michael Alleman received a call from “camera ops”—the unit that monitors the cameras

in the Jail. Id. at 16. Corporal Alleman entered the 12 D block of cells but heard no

commotion. Id. at 17.

He then moved to cell number 12D-01 and, through the cell door window, he saw

Mr. DeFreeze on top of Mr. Altstatt repeatedly hitting him. Id. Corporal Alleman notified

the individuals at camera ops that there was an inmate-on-inmate incident occurring and

requested immediate assistance. Id. He then opened the food tray port and ordered Mr.

DeFreeze to stop. Id. Mr. DeFreeze stopped hitting Mr. Altstatt, said something to Corporal

Alleman, then resumed hitting Mr. Altstatt. Id. But Corporal Alleman could not open the

cell door until other officers arrived to assist. Id. When other officers finally arrived, the

cell was opened and Mr. DeFreeze was restrained. Id. Mr. Altstatt was taken to the hospital

in an ambulance. Id. He suffered multiple broken ribs, a lung injury, facial fractures, and

cuts that required intensive care [Doc. No. 142, at 2].

B. Jail Conditions and Staffing Issues

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice issued an investigative report on the Jail’s

conditions of confinement. Among other findings, the DOJ found “actual direct supervision

of detainees at the Jail is virtually non-existent. The facility is not adequately staffed to

maintain necessary supervision of detainees to secure their safety” [Doc. No. 142-1, at 4].

The report further noted that “[o]nly one or two detention officers are available to supervise

the large number of detainees as well as to conduct detainee sight checks.” Id.

The Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority (OCCJA) was created by Trust

Indenture [Def. The Board UMF No. 1]. It was granted authority to own, operate, and

manage Jail facilities for the benefit of Oklahoma County. Id. On July 1, 2020, the OCCJA

took over physical operations of the Oklahoma County Detention Center. Id.

The Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) conducts regular inspections of

the Jail. In February 2021, the OSDH Jail Inspection Division (JID) conducted an annual

inspection and investigation of the Jail [Doc. No. 142-2]. The JID found that the Jail was

not in substantial compliance with Oklahoma Jail Standards, OAC Title 310, Chapter 670.

The JID report cites to incidents of inmate deaths at the Jail and noted that the Jail staff did

not meet the standard that “[s]taff assignments shall provide for backup assistance for all

employees entering locations where inmates are confined.” Id. at 8. Further, it noted that

“tests of the emergency phone system showed that calls went unanswered when working,

and as confirmed by staff, some phone systems do not work.” Id.

In May 2021, the OCCJA employed the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) to

perform an assessment shortly after the incident between Mr. Altstatt and Mr. DeFreeze.

The report found that “[i]t was clear and convincing that the present level of staffing was

insufficient for a safe and secure [J]ail[,] . . . the [Jail] has had to reduce requirements

and/or cut corners to seek applicants and hires[, and] . . . the operational staff have

expressed concern that these new personnel lack the basic skills to be a detention officer”

[Doc. No. 142-3, at 17-18]. The report recommended that “[t]he [Jail] needs to move to a

direct supervision model as quickly as possible [and] . . . [i]n the meantime, there needs to

be every effort made to have constantly moving teams of, at least, two detention officers

entering pods and observing inmates in and out of cells day and especially at night.” Id. at

28.

Throughout 2022 and 2023, a Multicounty Grand Jury convened to investigate the

“repeat deficiencies” within the Jail. Among other findings, the grand jury report found

that “the former Chief Executive Officer of the [Jail] did not take proactive or effective

steps to curb significant death rate in the [J]ail [and] . . . believes that inadequate staffing,

funding surveillance, and training, coupled with poor law enforcement protocols, led to the

significant loss of life within the [J]ail” [Doc. No. 142-4, at 9].

Tiffany Carter was the Chief of Security at the Jail. She testified that when the trust

took over control of the Jail, her position became inconsistent—she notes confusing cross-

supervision and that she was often reassigned to various other duties other than those

assigned to her as a captain [Doc. No. 142-16, at 27-31]. Further, she testified that once the

Jail trust took over, there were more employees working the day shift than the night shift.

Id. at 32-33.

Greg Williams, the administrator of the Jail, testified regarding the staffing

shortages at the Jail [Doc. No. 142, at 19]. Specifically, he acknowledged that the Jail was

understaffed, and the less staff present the more dangerous the situation was. Id. He

explained that they did not have adequate staffing because they could not keep enough

employees. Id. at 20. Mr. Williams testified that a lack of funding did not cause the low

staffing numbers. Id. But he further testified that he asked the Board for more funding every

chance he could get and that he could not adequately perform his job due to a lack of

funding. Id.

Sue Ann Arnall, a former trustee for the OCCJA, testified about the lack of authority

given to the Jail trust to manage finances [Doc. No. 142, at 28]. She also testified as to the

decrease in the number of detention officers from June 2020 to April 2021. Id. at 29. Ms.

Arnall stated that she requested additional funding from the Board to address staffing,

maintenance, and operational issues, but was denied any assistance. Id. She further

acknowledged that the facility is not adequately staffed to safely secure the detainees—

similar to the findings in the DOJ’s letter from 2008. Id. at 30.

Finally, Corporal Alleman testified in his deposition that the Jail was dangerous

because of the low staffing levels. He further agreed with the findings in the assessment

conducted by the NIC.

STANDARD OF DECISION

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute is genuine if the facts and evidence are such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. All facts and reasonable

inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at 255. The

inquiry is whether the facts and evidence identified by the parties present “a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party

must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Framework—Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff, Billy Joe Altstatt, asserts claims on behalf of his brother, Johnny Altstatt,

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Mr. Altstatt’s rights were violated while detained at

the Jail. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Generally, a local government may not be held liable under § 1983 “for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, where a plaintiff seeks to hold a local governmental

entity liable under § 1983, he must also show that a municipal policy or custom “was the

‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate 1) an official

policy or custom; 2) causation; and 3) deliberate indifference. See Lucas v. Turn Key Health

Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1145 (10th Cir. 2023).

II. Underlying Constitutional Violation

The Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from

violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)

(quotation omitted). Indeed, “[h]aving incarcerated persons [with] demonstrated

proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having stripped them of

virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the

government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). Of course, the mere

fact that a prisoner suffered injury at the hands of another prisoner does not “translate[]

into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at

824. Rather, to prevail on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show “that he was

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and the defendant

acted with deliberate indifference, meaning the defendant “was aware of and disregarded

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable measures to abate

the risk.” Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 761 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and

citation omitted).

In its motion, the OCCJA argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish Mr. Altstatt

was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” See Lopez,

172 F.3d at 760. The OCCJA contends that claims arising from inmate-on-inmate violence

generally require evidence of one of the following: (1) evidence of direct threats to the

victim leading up to the violent incident; (2) evidence that the victim was particularly

vulnerable to attacks by other inmates because of some personal characteristic or

membership; or (3) evidence the assailant had a recent history of violent or disruptive

behavior [Def. Motion, at 16]. Further, the OCCJA asserts that Plaintiff has no evidence

of any of the above three things, and without any proof of notice of probable violence by

either Mr. DeFreeze or Mr. Altstatt, there cannot be deliberate indifference.

The OCCJA presents an overly restrictive view of the relevant case law and

misconstrues Plaintiff’s claim. First, knowledge of specific threats or an inmate’s

individual risk is not necessarily required. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[I]t does not

matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it

matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or

because all prisoners in his situation faces such a risk.”); see also Tafoya v. Salazar, 516

F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The official’s knowledge of the risk need not be

knowledge of a substantial risk to a particular inmate, or knowledge of the particular

manner in which injury might occur.”); Lopez, 172 F.3d at 762 n.5 (“Even if Sheriff

LeMaster was unaware of the specific risk to appellant from his cellmates, this does not

relieve him from liability.”).

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants is largely premised on the argument “that the

conditions of confinement at the Jail caused serious and permanent injuries to Johnny

Altstatt and deprived him of his fundamental constitutional right to safety and bodily

integrity in pretrial custody” [Doc. No. at 3]. Plaintiff attributes this failure to Defendants’

longstanding history of understaffing the Jail and a systemic failure to address the known

problems. Accordingly, the assertion that Mr. Altstatt and Mr. DeFreeze did not have a

history of being violent with Jail staff or other detainees does not absolve Defendants of

liability.

Upon consideration of the summary judgment record, the Court finds that a

reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Altstatt’s constitutional rights were violated by a

systemic failure. Courts have held that a systemic failure can serve as the underlying

constitutional violation for purposes of Monell liability. See Lucas, 58 F.4th at 1144 (“[I]t

was error for the district court to not consider a systemic failure as the underlying

constitutional violation.”). “Because municipalities act through officers, ordinarily there

will be a municipal violation only where an individual officer commits a constitutional

violation.” Crowson v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020). However,

there is a limited exception to the individual action requirement “where the alleged

violation occurred as a result of multiple officials’ actions or inactions.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff has set forth evidence that severe understaffing and

underfunding at the Jail were longstanding and pervasive problems, known to the OCCJA

and Jail staff, and that the OCCJA knew that this posed excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate

violence. Additionally, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer that an

excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence—paired with severely low staffing levels—

would make it impossible for Jail staff to reasonably respond to inmate distress calls.

The OCCJA further argues that Plaintiff’s constitutional violation claim is not

consistent with § 1983 and violates the Tenth Amendment. Particularly, the OCCJA

contends that this Court should not follow Tenth Circuit precedent in Crowson v.

Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2020) and Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics,

LLC, 58 F.4th 1127 (10th Cir. 2023).

Turning first to Crowson, the OCCJA asserts that the Tenth Circuit incorrectly

dispensed with the first two elements required when asserting a claim under § 1983. On

the first element, the OCCJA argues that Crowson eradicated the need to establish that an

employee’s acts or omissions violated a constitutional right and replaced it with the

requirement that only negligence of multiple government employees occurred. Further,

the OCCJA contends that Crowson incorrectly eliminated the need to establish a causal

connection between a constitutional violation of an employee and policies and practices

of the municipality. The OCCJA next argues that Lucas expanded municipal liability to

include private contractors who are part of the medical care delivery system.

In support of its argument that this Court should not follow Tenth Circuit precedent,

the OCCJA cites the factors that the Supreme Court of the United States uses in

determining whether it should overrule its own precedent. The Court rejects the OCCJA’s

argument and abides by binding Tenth Circuit precedent.

Viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has demonstrated disputed material facts with respect to whether Mr. Altstatt

suffered an underlying constitutional violation.

III. Municipal Liability—OCCJA

As stated above, to establish municipal liability for a constitutional violation, a

plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an official policy or custom; (2) causation; and (3) deliberate

indifference. See Lucas, 58 F.4th at 1145 (10th Cir. 2023). Rather than address each of

these, the OCCJA lists three reasons why it is entitled to summary judgment: Plaintiff does

not have evidence of a custom, policy, or practice that violated Mr. Altstatt’s constitutional

rights; there was no failure to protect; and there was no systematic failure related to Mr.

Altstatt’s altercation with Mr. DeFreeze.

The OCCJA’s argument regarding the three elements of municipal liability is limited

to assertions that Plaintiff provides no proof of any inadequacy of staffing that would have

changed the incident complained of because there is no expert testimony, Plaintiff provides

no proof of additional funding, and Plaintiff provides no proof more staffing would have

changed the outcome.

Plaintiff provides deposition testimony and various reports all asserting that the Jail

was inadequately staffed. Specifically, the report from the Multicounty Grand Jury states

that “the former Chief Executive Officer of the [Jail] did not take proactive or effective

steps to curb significant death rate in the [J]ail [and] . . . believes that inadequate staffing,

funding surveillance, and training, coupled with poor law enforcement protocols, led to the

significant loss of life within the [J]ail” [Doc. No. 142-4, at 9]. Further, the NIC’s report

found “clear and convincing that the present level of staffing was insufficient for a safe and

secure [J]ail” [Doc. No. 142-3, at 17-18]. Plaintiff also provides considerable deposition

testimony from Ms. Carter, Mr. Williams, Ms. Arnall, and Mr. Alleman discussing the

understaffing of the Jail and its repercussions. This evidence rebuts the OCCJA’s assertions

that Plaintiff lacks proof on the three above-mentioned items.

Viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

a jury could conclude that a violation of a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights

is a plainly obvious consequence of the purported customs of understaffing and

underfunding, and that the OCCJA was deliberately indifferent to conditions at the Jail. For

these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Oklahoma County

Criminal Justice Authority [Doc. No. 128] is DENIED.

IV. Municipal Liability—Board of County Commissioners for Oklahoma

County (the Board)1

With respect to the Board, the Court has previously rejected the notion that the

Board cannot be held liable as a matter of law merely because the Jail is operated by the

sheriff or, in this case, the OCCJA. See Kauble v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Okla. ex rel.

Okla. Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., Case No. CIV-17-729-D, 2018 WL 912285, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla.

Feb. 15, 2018) (“Under Oklahoma law, a county is a suable entity that is sued through its

board of county commissioners. . . . [D]etermining a party’s responsibility for a policy that

leads to a federal rights violation involves a fact-specific inquiry, and although a county’s

sheriff has charge and custody of the Jail, the board of commissioners sets policies,

including fiscal policies, that may be implicated in a violation of a county inmate’s federal

rights.”).

Next, the Board argues that its only policy-adjacent role with the Jail was setting the

county budget and allocating funds. It further contends that the Board is obligated to

provide funding for other constitutional obligations, not just the Jail. Finally, it asserts that

the Board’s budgeting and funding process is complex and requires the input of many

different interests. Plaintiff provides ample deposition testimony from several individuals

who testified that the lack of funding and understaffing create an unsafe environment at the

1 The Board objects to the four reports Plaintiff submits with his response to the Board’s

motion for summary judgment. The Court finds that even absent the reports, Plaintiff has

raised genuine disputes of material fact ripe for jury determination through deposition

testimony alone. Further, the Court finds that the reports are relevant for the purpose of

establishing the Board’s knowledge of the understaffing and underfunding of the Jail.

Additionally, the Court believes the documents could be properly authenticated and

admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Jail. Specifically, Plaintiff provides deposition testimony from Ms. Carter, Mr. Williams,

Ms. Arnall, and Mr. Alleman who all testified regarding the understaffing of the Jail.

Further, several of these individuals testified as to the consequences of the Jail’s

understaffing, especially in terms of the safety of the detainees.

In viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the

Court finds that a reasonable jury could find the lack of funding was the result of the

Board’s failure to properly allocate sufficient funds to the Jail for it to be safely operated.

As stated above, to establish municipal liability for a constitutional violation, a

plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an official policy or custom; (2) causation; and (3) deliberate

indifference. See Lucas, 58 F.4th at 1145 (10th Cir. 2023).

a. Official Policy or Custom

An official policy or custom may take many forms, to include “a formal regulation

or policy statement, an informal custom that amounts to a widespread practice, decisions

of municipal employees with final policymaking authority, ratification by final

policymakers of the decisions of subordinates to whom authority was delegated, and the

deliberately indifferent failure to adequately train or supervise employees.” Hinkle v.

Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2017)).

The Board contends that “a ‘policy,’ for § 1983 purposes, is a specific directive

related to a specific topic that bears out a specific constitutional outcome” [Doc. No. 130,

at 24]. It argues that a generic municipal budget that is facially reasonable “is not a specific

directive related to a specific topic that bears out a specific constitutional outcome” [Doc.

No. 130, at 25]. Therefore, the Board contends Plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a

policy.

Plaintiff responds to the Board’s argument by contending that the longstanding

policy or custom of understaffing and underfunding the Jail and the failure of the Jail to

take reasonable steps to decrease inmate-on-inmate violence is evident. Specifically, he

points to the 2008 DOJ report, the OSDH report, the NIC report, and the Multicounty

Grand Jury report.

In pointing to the DOJ report, Plaintiff cites to several portions where the report

concluded that direct supervision of the detainees is virtually nonexistent and the facility

is not adequately staffed to ensure the safety of detainees. Further, he asserts that this report

shows the Board was aware of the issues the DOJ pointed out—including understaffing—

yet these issues were never resolved. Plaintiff also points to several deficiencies of the Jail

revealed in the three other reports.

Viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

a jury could conclude that the Board maintained an official policy or custom of

understaffing and underfunding the Jail.

b. Causation

“To establish the causation element, the challenged policy or practice must be

‘closely related to the violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected right.’” Schneider v.

City of Grand Junction Police Dept., 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

The Board asserts that Plaintiff’s claim requires the testimony of an expert witness

which Plaintiff fails to provide. It argues that Plaintiff’s claim requires “this Court and a

jury to bridge the gap between the 2020-2021 fiscal year budget and Mr. Altstatt’s late-in-

time injury with pure speculation” which cannot be done absent an expert witness [Doc.

No. 130, at 27]. Further, the Board argues that the funding process and funding decisions

are so complex that expert testimony is required.

In response, Plaintiff asserts that the instant incident was not isolated, rather it was

foreseeable and an inevitable consequence of long-standing policies of Defendants. He

points to deposition testimony from Corporal Alleman where he testified that he did not

immediately enter the cell where the altercation between Mr. DeFreeze and Mr. Altstatt

was occurring because there was not a second officer present. Plaintiff contends that this

illustrates the direct link between staffing policies and the failure to prevent the assault

because the conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Altstatt.

Upon careful consideration of the summary judgment record, the Court finds that a

reasonable jury could determine that the Board’s custom or policy was closely related to

Mr. Altstatt’s injuries.

c. Deliberate Indifference

Deliberate indifference in the municipal liability context “may be satisfied when the

[defendant] has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially

certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to

disregard the risk of harm.” Layton v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Okla. Cnty., 512 F. App’x

861, 871 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th

Cir. 1998) (“In the municipal liability context, deliberate indifference is an objective

standard which is satisfied if the risk is so obvious that the official should have known of

it.”). Although notice is typically established “by proving the existence of a pattern of

tortious conduct,” deliberate indifference may also be found “absent a pattern of

unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly

obvious consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.” Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307-08

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Board contends that Plaintiff has no evidence to point toward the Board’s state

of mind in approving and issuing the 2020-2021 fiscal year budget. Therefore, Mr. Altstatt

has no evidence to create a fact question as to whether the Board acted with deliberate

indifference.

In response, Plaintiff provides deposition testimony from Ms. Carter, Mr. Williams,

Ms. Arnall, and Mr. Alleman. Each individual testified about the history of unsafe

conditions at the Jail due to its understaffing and underfunding. For example, Ms. Arnall

specifically testified that “[t]he facility is not adequately staffed to maintain necessary

supervision of detainees to secure their safety” [Doc. No. 142, at 23]. Ms. Carter testified

that the more staff that is present, the safer it is for everyone at the Jail. Id. at 15.

Specifically, when asked in her deposition “[i]t is actually dangerous, isn’t it, when the staff

levels are that low,” she responded “[y]es.” Id. at 18. Mr. Williams testified that he asked

the Board for additional funding every chance he got because the funding authorized was

insufficient to meet the Jail’s needs. Id. at 20.

Viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

a jury could conclude that a violation of a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights

is a plainly obvious consequence of the purported customs of severely understaffing and

underfunding the Jail. For these reasons the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant

Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County and Brief in Support [Doc. No. 130]

is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Oklahoma County Criminal

Justice Authority [Doc. No. 128] is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Judgment of

Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County and Brief in Support

[Doc. No. 130] is also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16" day of March, 2026.

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TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI

Chief United States District Judge

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