COUNCIL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

BRANDON MICHAEL COUNCIL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:21-cv-00302-JPH-MKK

)

GINA SACCHETTI Dr., )

THOMAS J. WATSON Warden, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Brandon Council alleges that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his serious mental health needs while he was an inmate in the

Special Confinement Unit ("SCU") at United States Penitentiary – Terre Haute

("USP – Terre Haute"). Mr. Council and Defendants have each moved for

summary judgment. Dkts. [188], [194]. For the reasons below, Mr. Council's

motion is DENIED and the Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I.

Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,

instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to

consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the

basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986).

Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed,

the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the

record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion

can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in

the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, all reasonable

inferences are drawn in favor of the party against whom the motion at issue was

made. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Tripp v. Scholz,

872 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2017)). The existence of cross-motions for summary

judgment does not imply that there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J.

Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Loc. Union

150, AFL-CIO, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).

Mr. Council also filed a motion for "default judgment," arguing Defendants

failed to respond to his summary judgment motion. Defendants' motion for

summary judgment, however, responds to Mr. Council's arguments. And

regardless, "[e]ven where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary

judgment, the movant still has to show that summary judgment is proper given

the undisputed facts." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021)

(cleaned up).

Mr. Council's motion for "default judgment" is DENIED. Dkt. [205].

II.

Factual Background

A. Parties

In 2019, Mr. Council was sentenced to death after a jury found him guilty

of bank robbery resulting in death and using and carrying a firearm during and

in relation to a crime of violence in a manner causing death. See United States

v. Council, 77 F.4th 240 (4th Cir. 2023). Mr. Council's death sentence was later

commuted to a life sentence without the possibility of parole. See

https://www.justice.gov/pardon/media/1382291/dl?inline.

The SCU at USP – Terre Haute houses federal inmates who have been

sentenced to death. Dkt. 188-1 ¶ 5 (Watson declaration). Mr. Council appears

to remain housed at USP – Terre Haute in the SCU. See

https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited March 17, 2026).1

1 The current administration is attempting to move Mr. Council and others whose death

sentences were commuted to ADX – Florence, the Bureau of Prison's supermax prison

in Colorado. Mr. Council and others are pursuing a lawsuit to prevent such a move. See

At all times relevant to the allegations in Mr. Council's complaint, Thomas

Watson was the Complex Warden for the Federal Correctional Complex – Terre

Haute, which includes USP – Terre Haute, dkt. 188-1 ¶ 1, and Dr. Gina Sacchetti

was a staff psychologist at USP – Terre Haute, dkt. 188-6 ¶¶ 2, 6 (Sacchetti

declaration). Dr. Sacchetti previously served as the primary staff psychologist

between March 2021 and January 2023. Id.

B. Facts

The decision to house Mr. Council in the USP – Terre Haute SCU, as with

other federal death row inmates, was made by the Bureau of Prison's ("BOP")

Designation and Sentence Computation Center in Texas, not by USP – Terre

Haute officials. Dkt. 188-1 ¶ 6. USP – Terre Haute officials promulgate policies

governing SCU conditions and operations. Id. ¶ 8. Those policies were modified

during the COVID pandemic to reduce the risk of disease transmission. Id. ¶ 7.

Under applicable policies for the SCU, (1) a staff psychologist must perform

an initial psychological assessment within 14 days of an inmate's assignment to

the SCU; and (2) "mental status examinations" must occur every 30 days

thereafter; and (3) a staff psychologist should assist inmates with problems and

provide individual counseling as needed. Dkt. 188-2 at 8 ("Operation and

Security of the Special Confinement Unit (SCU)"). SCU inmates in "Phase I," the

Taylor et al. v. Trump et al., No. 1:25-cv-3742-TJK (D.D.C.). On February 11, 2026, the

District Court for the District of Columbia entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting

the transfer of Mr. Council and the other plaintiffs to ADX while that suit proceeds. Id.

at dkt. 70.

strictest security level, are allowed 5 hours a week out-of-cell recreation time and

access to the law library. Dkt. 188-2 at 10, 15.

On November 6, 2019, Mr. Council underwent a psychological intake

screening performed by a non-defendant. Dkt. 188-7 at 75-76 (Mr. Council's

psychology records). Although Mr. Council self-reported a prior episode of

suicidal thoughts when he was 11 or 12, he stated that he had never previously

been diagnosed with a mental illness as an adult or that he had received any

psychiatric medications. Id. at 75; dkt. 189 at 116. The psychologist gave Mr.

Council a "Care Level" of "CARE1-MH." Dkt. 188-7 at 76. This is the BOP's

lowest-level mental health designation. Dkt. 189 at 124.

USP – Terre Haute psychology staff perform weekly walkthroughs in the

SCU. Dkt. 189 at 121. Records related to Mr. Council reflect that Dr. Sacchetti

evaluated Mr. Council on January 12, 2022 (30-day SCU review), December 22,

2021 (at Mr. Council's request), December 8, 2021 (SCU review plus consultation

at Mr. Council's request), November 3, 2021 (SCU review), October 27, 2021 (at

Mr. Council's request), October 13, 2021 (at Mr. Council's request), October 6,

2021 (SCU review), September 22, 2021 (at Mr. Council's request), September 1,

2021 (SCU review), August 25, 2021 (at Mr. Council's request), August 4, 2021

(SCU review plus consultation at Mr. Council's request), July 7, 2021 (SCU

review), June 8, 2021 (SCU review), May 19, 2021 (SCU review plus consultation

at Mr. Council's request), April 7, 2021 (SCU review plus consultation at Mr.

Council's request), March 16, 2021 (at Mr. Council's request), and March 3, 2021

(SCU review plus consultation at Mr. Council's request). Dkt. 188-7 at 1-39.

During several visits with Dr. Sacchetti and other mental health providers,

Mr. Council stated that his conditions of confinement in the SCU amounted to

"torture" and cruel and unusual punishment and were causing him mental

health problems. See, e.g., id. at 33. Dr. Sacchetti advised Mr. Council to direct

his concerns about the conditions of his confinement, including the limited

amount of out-of-cell time, to other USP – Terre Haute staff. Id. Otherwise, she

attempted to provide Mr. Council with various psychological coping skills. Id.

Mr. Council also discussed with Dr. Sacchetti on several occasions the

possibility of his taking psychiatric medication. Dr. Sacchetti repeatedly

explained to Mr. Council that, as a psychologist and not a psychiatrist, she could

not prescribe medications. Dkt. 189 at 147-49. She more than once encouraged

Mr. Council instead to put in a sick call request to USP – Terre Haute Health

Services if he wished to explore taking medication. Dkt. 188-7 at 26, 14; dkt.

189 at 190-93.

On October 27, 2021, Dr. Sacchetti advised Mr. Council that he could

bring up the topic of possibly taking psychiatric medication when he had his

upcoming chronic care appointment with a physician. Dkt. 189 at 172-73.

During that appointment with Dr. William Wilson on November 5, 2021,

however, Mr. Council did not mention psychiatric medication. Id. at 201. During

his deposition, Mr. Council testified that he did not know at that time that he

could do so.2 Id. at 201.

2 Also, even though Mr. Council claims he later became aware that Dr. Wilson could

prescribe psychiatric medications, he has never asked Dr. Wilson to do so. Id. at 67.

Also in the fall of 2021, Dr. Sacchetti raised Mr. Council's concerns about

the SCU conditions of confinement to the USP – Terre Haute Chief Psychologist.

Dkt. 188-6 ¶ 12. And in December 2021, she contacted USP – Terre Haute

Health Services to make them aware of Mr. Council's request for psychiatric

medication.3 Id.; dkt. 188-7 at 4.

Besides Dr. Sacchetti, Mr. Council never sought or discussed obtaining

psychiatric medication with any psychological provider. See Dkt. 189 at 130,

151-52.

Mr. Council submitted grievances to Warden Watson about the SCU

conditions and the psychological harm they were causing him, but the

grievances did not result in any change in those conditions. Dkt. 195-1 at 4-5.

C. Procedural History

Mr. Council filed this action on August 2, 2021. Dkt. 1. The Court screened

and dismissed the original complaint and gave Mr. Council the opportunity to

amend. Dkt. 10. Mr. Council filed an amended complaint, which the Court also

deemed subject to dismissal because he failed to sign it but gave him another

opportunity to amend. Dkts. 19, 20. On October 28, 2021, Mr. Council filed his

second amended complaint. Dkt. 21. Upon screening it, the Court concluded:

3 Mr. Council asserts Dr. Sacchetti must be lying about these discussions, and/or that

any documentation indicating a discussion took place must be a forgery. See dkt. 199

at 13-15. Mr. Council has no personal knowledge or evidence, however, to support this

speculation. He notes that the designated medical records do not contain a cross-

reference from medical staff mentioning whether Dr. Sacchetti had talked to anyone

about his desire for psychiatric medication. The absence of such cross-documentation

does not contradict Dr. Sacchetti's sworn statement or the documentation in the

psychology records that she did have that discussion.

Liberally construed, the second amended complaint

states a claim against Warden Watson and Dr. Sacchetti

for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

Specifically, the second amended complaint alleges that

prolonged solitary confinement has aggravated Mr.

Council's mental health issues, that these defendants

are aware of those issues, but that they have not taken

steps within their authority to alleviate those issues—

such as removing him from solitary confinement,

reporting the effect of solitary confinement on his

mental health, or ensuring that he be evaluated for

medication by a psychiatrist.

Dkt. 23 at 3.

Mr. Council filed a third amended complaint seeking $100 million in

damages. Dkt. 101 at 7. The Court screened the third amended complaint and

concluded, "Mr. Council's Eighth Amendment damages claims alleging deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need shall proceed against Warden Watson and

Dr. Sacchetti in their individual capacities under the theory set forth in Bivens

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971) and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)." Dkt. 100 at 6.

On June 13, 2023, this action was stayed while Mr. Council pursued a

direct appeal of his convictions and sentence. Dkt. 119. On October 29, 2024,

the stay was lifted after the Supreme Court denied certiorari from the Fourth

Circuit's affirmance of Mr. Council's convictions and sentence, thus ending the

direct appeal process. Dkt. 149.

On May 1, 2025, Mr. Council filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt.

194. On May 2, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt.

188.

III.

Discussion

Mr. Council presents two categories of claims: (1) the conditions of

confinement in the Terre Haute – USP SCU were damaging to Mr. Council's

mental health and Defendants' failure to change those conditions or move Mr.

Council out of the SCU violated the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the mental

health treatment he received in the SCU was inadequate and amounted to

deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

A. Conditions of Confinement

Defendants argue that Mr. Council's claim based on his placement in the

SCU adversely impacting his mental health cannot proceed under Bivens. Mr.

Council's only response is that this Court allowed Bivens claims to proceed at

screening. See dkt. 199 at 7. But screening orders are not final orders, and the

Court may reconsider them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See

Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court concludes that

Mr. Council's claim based on allegations that placement in the SCU adversely

impacted his mental health cannot proceed under Bivens.

There is no Congressional authority to award damages against federal

officials who violate the Constitution while acting under color of federal law.

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017). Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held in

Bivens that district courts have the implied authority to award damages against

federal officials for unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. 403 U.S. at 397. That implied authority was extended twice: first,

to actions alleging gender discrimination in federal employment in violation of

the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979); and second,

to actions alleging deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980).

But these "three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—represent the only

instances in which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under

the Constitution itself." Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 131.

In the past four decades, the Court has declined to create any new contexts

for Bivens claims. Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1799-1800 (2022) (listing

cases). Expanding Bivens to a new context is a "disfavored judicial activity."

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 135.

To determine whether a Bivens remedy is available to a plaintiff suing a

federal actor, the Court makes a two-step inquiry. First, it asks whether the claim

presents a new Bivens context by determining whether "the case is different in a

meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme Court]."

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139. Second, if the claim presents a new Bivens context, the

Court then asks whether there are any special factors that counsel hesitation

about extending a damages remedy to the new context. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at

1803.

1. "New Context"

Carlson extended a Bivens remedy to the context of an Eighth Amendment

claim based on deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. However, "[a]

claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional

provision as a claim in a case in which a damages remedy was previously

recognized." Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020).

A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the

rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at

issue; the generality or specificity of the official action;

the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer

should respond to the problem or emergency to be

confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under

which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive

intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other

branches; or the presence of potential special factors

that previous Bivens cases did not consider.

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140.

In Ziglar, the Supreme Court held that Fifth Amendment due process

claims by suspected terrorist detainees alleging they were subjected to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement bore "little resemblance" to the

claims in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson, and therefore presented a "new context".

Since then, several courts have applied Ziglar to foreclose Bivens conditions of

confinement claims arising under the Eighth Amendment, including claims

related to prolonged placement in solitary confinement. See, e.g., Cohen v.

Trump, 2024 WL 20558 at *3 (2nd Cir. Jan. 2, 2024), cert. denied (declining to

extend Bivens to Eighth Amendment claim of unconstitutional conditions of

solitary confinement); Mammana v. Barben, 856 F. App'x 411, 414 (3d Cir. May

21, 2021) (Eighth Amendment allegation of "deliberate indifference" to prisoner's

welfare based on confinement in segregation bore "little resemblance" to

Carlson's medical deliberate indifference claim); Tate v. Harmon, 54 F.4th 839,

847 (4th Cir. 2022) (Eighth Amendment claim of unconstitutional conditions of

confinement in segregation unit was a Bivens "new context"); Sebolt v. Tyndall,

2021 WL 4948959 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2021) (inmate's claim of unconstitutional

conditions of confinement in USP – Terre Haute segregation unit presented new

Bivens context).

In DeBenedetto v. Salas, 2023 WL 6388127 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2023), the

plaintiff alleged that while placed in a segregation unit in a federal prison, he

"experienced significant mental health issues and his psychological condition

deteriorated." His lawsuit alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment rights by subjecting him "to prolonged solitary confinement despite

their knowledge of his serious mental illness and that the confinement

exacerbated his mental health issues . . . ." Id. at * 2. The court found that this

claim presented a new Bivens context, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that his

claim should proceed under Carlson. "While DeBenedetto's allegation about

prolonged solitary confinement might be construed as an attempt to raise a claim

for deliberate indifference to serious mental health problems, which is somewhat

similar to Carlson, the claim still presents a new context because DeBenedetto

does not allege that the conditions of his solitary confinement caused him to

receive inadequate medical care or that he was denied medical treatment." Id. at

* 6. In other words, the relevant "'mechanism of injury'" was the conditions of

confinement, not deliberate indifference to medical needs. Id. (quoting Cohen v.

United States, 640 F. Supp.3d 324, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), aff'd, 2024 WL 20558

(2nd Cir. 2024)).

The Court finds DeBenedetto's reasoning persuasive in concluding that

Mr. Council's claim presents a new Bivens context. A conditions-of-confinement

claim very often has as an underlying factor the psychological and/or mental

harm that such conditions cause an inmate. See Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d

612, 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that purely psychological injuries may

support an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement cause of action under

the Prison Litigation Reform Act for injunctive relief, nominal damages, and

punitive damages). Concluding that that a claim alleging that a prisoner has

suffered psychologically from conditions of confinement is identical to Carlson

would represent an expansion of Bivens. Mr. Council's claim essentially alleges

that being confined in the SCU is in and of itself an Eighth Amendment violation

and therefore presents a new Bivens context. Mr. Council's allegations that his

confinement in the SCU directly impacted his mental health does not change the

outcome.

2. "Special Factors"

In applying this factor, a district court "faces only one question: whether

there is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better suited to

weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed." Egbert,

142 S. Ct. at 1805 (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). Additionally, "a court may

not fashion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided, or has authorized

the Executive to provide, 'an alternative remedial structure.'" Id. at 1804 (quoting

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137). And this is true even if the individual plaintiff alleges

that he does not have access to the alternative remedy. Id. at 1807 ("whether a

given remedy is adequate is a legislative determination that must be left to

Congress, not the federal courts").

The BOP's administrative remedy process, 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq.,

provides inmates with the ability to seek formal review of any complaint related

to the conditions of their confinement. Additionally, in Ziglar, the Supreme Court

recognized the availability of injunctive relief to address conditions-of-

confinement claims such as Mr. Council's. 582 U.S. at 144. Indeed, a fellow

inmate, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, is pursuing class

action injunctive relief related to the USP – Terre Haute SCU conditions of

confinement. Kadamovas v. Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2:23-cv-00022-

MPB-MKK (S.D. Ind.). And to the extent injunctive relief cannot make Mr.

Council whole for any past injuries, the Federal Tort Claims Act allows for the

recovery of damages against the United States under certain circumstances

where federal agents, including prison officials, commit a state-law tort against

an inmate. Additionally, when Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act

in 1995, it did not expand the availability of Bivens actions against federal

officials. See Sargeant v. Barfield, 87 F.4th 358, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2023).

Furthermore, "[w]ith respect to . . . claims against . . . Executive Officials, it must

be noted that a Bivens action is not 'a proper vehicle for altering an entity's

policy.'" Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140 (quoting Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,

534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001)).

Here, Mr. Council is essentially trying to use a claim for money damages

to force a change in government policies related to placement in the SCU and the

conditions therein. There are ample reasons to conclude that "special factors"

would not warrant expanding Bivens into this context. Defendants are therefore

entitled to summary judgment with respect to Mr. Council's claims that his initial

and continuing placement in the SCU in and of itself violated the Eighth

Amendment.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Mr. Council's remaining claim is based on allegations that federal officials

were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs. Defendants

argue that this claim cannot proceed under Bivens because Mr. Council's alleged

medical needs are not comparably serious to those that existed in Carlson. The

Seventh Circuit recently explained, however, that claims generally may proceed

under Bivens/Carlson if they "arise from allegedly constitutionally inadequate

medical care in a federal prison . . . ." Watkins v. Mohan, 144 F.4th 926, 934 (7th

Cir. 2025). The fact that a particular plaintiff's inadequate medical care was not

related to a medical emergency does not place it outside Carlson. Id. at 935. The

Court concludes that Mr. Council's claim alleging deliberate indifference to his

mental health needs may proceed under Bivens and proceeds to address the

merits of Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Although this case arises under Bivens, the Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference standard is identical to the standard applied in state prisons for

cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 937-38 (noting for qualified

immunity purposes that federal prison medical and correctional staff "can

consult decades of circuit precedent applying the deliberate-indifference

standard" in state prisons and county jails, in addition to federal prisons).

"Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth Amendment when they

display deliberate indifference towards an objectively serious medical need."

Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021). "Thus, to prevail on a

deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show '(1) an objectively serious

medical condition to which (2) a [prison] official was deliberately, that is

subjectively, indifferent.'" Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.

2016)).

The Court assumes for purposes of the summary judgment motion that

Mr. Council's mental health condition was objectively serious. To avoid summary

judgment, then, the record must allow a reasonable jury to conclude that

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference—that is, that they "consciously

disregarded a serious risk to [Mr. Council]'s health." Dean v. Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 241 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Still, the alleged

seriousness (or not) of Mr. Council's mental health condition is relevant in

determining whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that condition.

Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or even objective

recklessness. Id. Rather, Mr. Council "must provide evidence that an official

actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm." Petties v. Carter,

836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016).

"Of course, medical professionals rarely admit that they deliberately opted

against the best course of treatment. So in many cases, deliberate indifference

must be inferred from the propriety of their actions." Dean, 18 F.4th at 241

(internal citations omitted).

The Seventh Circuit has held that deliberate indifference occurs when a

medical provider defendant:

• renders a treatment decision that departs so substantially

"'from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as

to demonstrate that'" it is not based on judgment at all. Petties,

836 F.3d at 729 (quoting Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 260 (7th

Cir. 1996)).

• refuses "to take instructions from a specialist." Id.

• persists "in a course of treatment known to be ineffective." Id. at

729–30.

• chooses "an 'easier and less efficacious treatment' without

exercising professional judgment." Id. at 730 (quoting Estelle,

429 U.S. at 104 n.10).

• effects "an inexplicable delay in treatment which serves no

penological interest." Id.

Here, Mr. Council does not challenge the quality of Dr. Sacchetti's

psychological care but alleges solely that she should have done more to help him

obtain a prescription for psychiatric medication. Mr. Council does not dispute

that Dr. Sacchetti repeatedly advised him that she could not prescribe such

medication and that if he wanted to try it, he would need to contact another

medical provider through USP – Terre Haute Health Services. And, despite that

knowledge, Mr. Council has never reached out to another medical provider

requesting a psychiatric medication prescription, with one possible very limited

exception.4 Furthermore, Mr. Council stated in his March 2025 deposition that

he does not think any such prescription would be of much use anyway because

his mental health problems stem from the SCU conditions of confinement. Mr.

Council also does not dispute that he had never taken psychiatric medication or

been diagnosed with a psychiatric illness before entering prison, nor that he was

given the lowest-possible mental health code under BOP policy. See dkt. 189 at

116, 124.

Mr. Council also claims Dr. Sacchetti was required to perform an "initial

psychological examination" upon him before another medical provider would or

could consider prescribing medication to him and she failed to do so. See, e.g.,

Dkt. 188-9 at 11. Although the record is clear that Dr. Sacchetti did repeatedly

evaluate him – at least once a month, as required by policy for the SCU, and

often more – he contends that these evaluations were insufficient to begin the

process of him being placed on psychiatric medication. He instead argues that

there should have been "testing," but designates no evidence regarding what type

of "test" or "tests" should have been done. Nor does he argue that Dr. Sacchetti's

evaluations were inadequate.

To prevail on a deliberate indifference medical care claim, "[i]t is not

enough that the plaintiff simply believes the treatment was ineffective or

disagrees with the doctor's chosen course of treatment. The challenged plan

4 In an interrogatory response, Mr. Council stated that he asked an "unknown nurse"

about receiving medication, but after she told him he needed to "put in a cop-out to the

Psychology department . . . I ended all attempts to acquire psychological medication."

Dkt. 188-9 at 11.

must deviate so substantially from accepted professional judgment that no

reasonable physician would reach the same judgment." Thomas v. Martina, 991

F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Mr. Council has designated no such

evidence here. Mr. Council is the nonmoving party, so he receives "the benefit

of conflicting evidence and reasonable inferences." Stockton v. Milwaukee County,

44 F.4th 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2022). That said, he must "produce evidence

sufficient to establish [the] element[s] essential to" his claim. Id. Here, Mr.

Council designates no evidence showing that Dr. Sacchetti should have done

something differently in responding to Mr. Council's requests for psychiatric

medication.

Last, Mr. Council challenges Dr. Sacchetti's sworn assertion, supported

by documentation in his psychology records, that she brought up his requests

for medication with the USP – Terre Haute medical staff. See dkts. 199 at 13-15

(Mr. Council's summary judgment response brief); 188-6 ¶ 12 (Sacchetti

declaration); dkt. 188-7 at 4 (psychology records). Mr. Council's challenges,

however, even if they are based on sworn assertions,5 are not based on personal

knowledge as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c)(4). "[A]lthough personal knowledge

may include reasonable inferences, those inferences must be grounded in

observation or other first-hand personal experience. They must not be flights of

fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions, or rumors about matters remote from

that experience." Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003) (cleaned

5 Mr. Council testified during his deposition that he did not believe Dr. Sacchetti spoke

with or contacted medical staff. Dkt. 189 at 177-78.

up). Mr. Council's challenges on this point are speculative and conclusory and

therefore insufficient to rebut Dr. Sacchetti's sworn declaration and the

corroborating psychology records. See White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837,

841 (7th Cir. 2016) (non-movant receives the "benefit of reasonable inferences

from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in his favor") (cleaned up).

In sum, the designated evidence shows that (1) Dr. Sacchetti repeatedly

advised Mr. Council that she could not prescribe psychiatric medication and that

he would need to discuss his desire for medication with medical staff; (2) Dr.

Sacchetti conducted numerous, regularly scheduled psychological evaluations

of Mr. Council and treated him in accordance with her training; (3) Dr. Sacchetti

brought up Mr. Council's desire for medication with USP – Terre Haute medical

staff; (4) Mr. Council never attempted to obtain psychiatric medication from a

qualified medical provider, despite acknowledging that he could have done so;

(5) it is unclear how serious Mr. Council's mental health issues were, especially

given his lack of a psychiatric illness diagnosis or ever having taken psychiatric

medication before entering prison and his assignment to the BOP's lowest-level

mental health code.

No reasonable jury could conclude, based on this designated evidence,

that Dr. Sacchetti was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Council's mental health

needs. And, because Dr. Sacchetti was not deliberately indifferent, it necessarily

follows that Warden Watson could not have been deliberately indifferent in his

role as a non-medical supervisory official.© See McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474,

483 (7t Cir. 2013) (non-medical prison official can rely on the expertise of

medical personnel unless there is evidence official was aware medical personnel

were mistreating or not treating an inmate). Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Mr. Council's deliberate indifference claims.

IV. Conclusion

Mr. Council's motions for summary judgment and for default judgment are

DENIED. Dkts. [194], [205]. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. Dkt. [188]. Final judgment consistent with this Order and the Court's

orders screening the second and third amended complaints, dkts. [23] and [100],

will issue separately.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/17/2026 Pas +

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

BRANDON MICHAEL COUNCIL

63961056

TERRE HAUTE - USP

TERRE HAUTE U.S. PENITENTIARY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

P.O. BOX 33

TERRE HAUTE, IN 47808

6 The Court need not address Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified

immunity on all of Mr. Council's claims.

21