Terry Daum v. Captain Devlin, Sergeant Cross, and Corrections Officer C. Stickney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TERRY DAUM,

Plaintiff,

9:15-CV-1083

V. (DNH/DJS)

CAPTAIN DEVLIN, SERGEANT CROSS,

and CORRECTIONS OFFICER C. STICKNEY,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

TERRY DAUM

Plaintiff, pro se

97-A-1295

_| Attica Correctional Facility

Box 149

Attica, NY 14011

LETITIA JAMES MATTHEW GALLIGER, ESQ.

New York State Attorney General Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Defendants

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In this long running civil rights action, Plaintiff Terry Daum (“Plaintiff or

“Daum’”) alleges that Defendant Corrections Officer Chad Stickney (“Defendant

Stickney”) sexually abused and humiliated him during a pat-frisk that occurred at the

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Clinton Correctional Facility on April 4, 2014. Dkt. No. 30, Am. Compl., at 9 10-17.

Defendants Captain Devlin (“Defendant Devlin”) and Sergeant Cross (“Defendant

Cross”) were alleged to have observed that improper pat-frisk and failed to intervene. /d.

at 16 & 49. Presently, all Defendants have made a Motion for Summary Judgment

upon the renewed grounds that they are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

Dkt. No. 225; Dkt. No. 225-11, Defs.” Mem. of Law at pp. 6-8. Plaintiff has opposed the

Motion and has asked to rely upon his appellate papers, including a Reply Brief dated

March 8, 2023.' Dkt. No. 230. Plaintiff then submitted a supplement to his opposition

papers. Dkt. No. 231. Defendants have also submitted a Reply. Dkt. No. 234.

For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the Defendants’ Motion for

_,| Summary Judgment be granted and that the case be dismissed.

Il. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before the Court after its return from the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals. Daum v. Devlin, 2023 WL 4199066 (2d Cir. June 26, 2023). Plaintiff originally

commenced this multi-claim action in September 2015. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Part of the

Plaintiffs original claim related to the conduct of two pat-frisk searches conducted by

Defendant Stickney, first in the recreation yard at the Clinton Correctional Facility”, and

second in an interview room on B-block before Defendants Devlin and Cross later that

! That request is granted. However, and as noted hereafter, the present Motion is one for Summary Judgment where

the Court considers the established facts, and not a motion to dismiss or initial review where the Court accepts the

non-conclusory allegations contained in the Complaint.

2 Clinton Correctional Facility is a maximum security level facility for males. https://doces.ny.gov/location/clinton-

correctional-facility

2.

evening. See generally Compl. & Amend. Compl. The Second Circuit in its decision

summarized the Plaintiffs allegations regarding the improper search as follows:

At the time of the alleged incidents, Daum was an inmate at Clinton

Correctional Facility in Dannemora, New York. Daum alleges that

correctional officers sexually abused him during two pat-frisks. First, after

setting off a metal detector, a correctional officer pat frisked Daum, which

allegedly involved the officer groping “plaintiff's genitals several times,”

“utiliz[ing] his hand to aggressively rub against plaintiff's rectum several

times (like a credit card swipe),” and “attempt[ing] to jam his finger tips

into plaintiff's rectum.” Am. Compl. 7 12. After Daum called his brother

about the incident, his brother called the facility to complain. Following his

brother’s complaint, Daum was allegedly taken from his cell and, before “at

least ten officers,” was subject to a second pat-frisk. Id. J 16. He allegedly

“experienced a credit-card swipe against his rectum” again.

Daum v. Devlin, 2023 WL 4199066, at *1.

Upon initial review, this Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment excessive

“Juse of force claim against Defendant Stickney and an Eighth Amendment failure to

protect claim against Defendant Delvin were sufficiently pled in the Complaint. Dkt. No.

7. However, the Court concluded that the allegations of an Eighth Amendment violation

directly associated with the two pat-frisks were insufficient under established law. Jd. at

pp. 9-11 (‘In sum, the allegations in plaintiff's complaint are not sufficiently extreme,

repetitive, or severe to give rise to constitutional violation.”). As a result, Plaintiffs pat-

frisk claims were dismissed. Jd.

On September 20, 2016, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was accepted as the

operative pleading. Dkt. No. 29; Am. Compl. Upon review of the Amended Complaint,

the Court found that—in addition to the Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim

against Defendant Stickney and the Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against

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Defendants Devlin and Cross based on the excessive force incident, which were pled in

the original Complaint and had survived initial review—the following additional claims

pled in the Amended Complaint survived review and required a response by Defendants:

First Amendment retaliation claims again Defendants Delvin, Cross, and Stickney,

among other Defendants; and supervisory claims against Superintendent/Captain Steven

Racette. Dkt. No. 29.

Following Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of

Defendant Racette and various other Defendants, the case proceeded to trial in April of

2021 only in connection with Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant

Stickney for excessive use of force, Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Devlin

and Cross for their associated failure to intervene, and First Amendment claims against

Defendants Stickney, Devlin, and Cross for retaliation. Dkt. Nos. 97, 100, & 171-72. At

trial, the jury found in favor of Defendants on all counts. Dkt. Nos. 173 & 174.

On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that the District Court’s initial review

decision had misapplied the applicable Eighth Amendment standard articulated in

Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Crawford I’), which had been decided

shortly before the District Court’s decision, but after the pat-frisk searches in question in

the lawsuit. Daum v. Devlin, 2023 WL 4199066, at *1. The Circuit held:

Here, the district court dismissed Daum’s sexual-abuse claim for failure to

allege any improper purpose, repetitive or severe conduct, and any physical

injury as a result of the incidents. But to state an Eighth Amendment

sexual-abuse claim under Crawford I, Daum was not required to allege

physical injury or repetition. Moreover, Daum’s allegations about (1) the

short gap in time between his brother’s complaint and the second pat-frisk

and (2) the lack of any intervening incidents giving rise to suspicion permit

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a plausible inference that the second pat-frisk lacked a penological purpose

and was undertaken with the intent to humiliate.

Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). The Second Circuit directed

that the matter be remanded so that the qualified immunity defense could be addressed at

the District Court level. Jd. at *2. The case was then returned to the Northern District.

Thereafter, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on qualified immunity grounds,

which Plaintiff opposed. Dkt. Nos. 194, 196, & 197. A Report-Recommendation and

Order was issued by the undersigned on July 11, 2024, which recommended that the

District Court grant the Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity as to the first pat-

frisk search that occurred at or near the recreation yard as a result of the metal detector

being triggered, but deny the Motion as to the second search that occurred later in the

evening at or near the B-block interview room on the grounds that factual issues needed

to be developed through the discovery process regarding the need for that subsequent

search. Dkt. No. 204 at p. 12. That Report-Recommendation was adopted by the District

Court on August 15, 2024. Dkt. No. 206.

Discovery then ensued, including the production of prison policies, reports, and

the deposition of the Plaintiff. Upon the conclusion of that discovery process, Defendants

have now renewed their request to dismiss Plaintiff's final claim against them under the

doctrine of qualified immunity. As part of their Summary Judgment Motion, defense

counsel submitted a Statement of Material Facts. Dkt. No. 225-10. Plaintiff indicated

only limited objections to that Statement but has submitted a detailed response to the

Motion. Dkt. Nos. 230 & 231.

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I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is

appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party bears

the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with . . . affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue

of material fact. F.D.LC. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, and cannot rest merely on allegations

or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c); see also Scott v.

Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are

ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party

has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522,

525-26 (2d Cir. 1994). To that end, sworn statements are “more than mere conclusory

allegations subject to disregard . . . they are specific and detailed allegations of fact, made

under penalty of perjury, and should be treated as evidence in deciding a summary

judgment motion” and the credibility of such statements is better left to a trier of fact.

Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d at 289 (citations omitted).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all

ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora

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Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). “[T]he

trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully

limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not

to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not

extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d

1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, where a party is proceeding pro se, the court

must “read [his or her] supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the

strongest arguments that they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.

1994); see also Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, summary

judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational

_| tier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “shields government officials from civil damages liability

unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established

at the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)

(citation omitted). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Jd.

(internal quotation and alterations omitted). Qualified immunity attaches if “‘officers of

reasonable competence could disagree’ on the legality of the defendant’s actions.”

Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986)). In other words, qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all

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but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. at 341. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “This is not to say that an official action is protected

by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be

apparent.” Jd. (citations omitted).

To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear

foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be settled law, which

means it is dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases

of persuasive authority. It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-

existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough that every

reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the

plaintiff seeks to apply. Otherwise, the rule is not one that every reasonable

official would know. The clearly established standard also requires that the

legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular

circumstances before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that

it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted. This requires a high degree of specificity.

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

At the onset of this analysis, the Court assumes that the facts presented on the

Motion regarding the remaining pat-frisk search, if accepted as true and viewed in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiff, would be sufficient to indicate a violation of the

Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the standard

announced in Crawford I. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009). Asa

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result, the Court is left only to consider in this Motion the acts of the named Defendants

in light of the legal landscape that existed at the time of the subject event on April 4, 2014,

and whether a reasonable correctional official could have believed, in light of that

established law, that his or her conduct did violate clearly settled law. Critical to the

analysis, in the Court’s view, is the justification for performing the B-block pat-frisk

search at issue.

The Court’s prior Report-Recommendation and Order, dated July 11, 2024,

exhaustively reviewed applicable case law on this issue, and that analysis is incorporated

here. Dkt. No. 204. To briefly summarize, in 1997 the Second Circuit acknowledged

that sexual abuse of a prisoner by a corrections officer may in some circumstances violate

_| the prisoner’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Boddie v. Schnieder,

105 F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1997) (“There can be no doubt that severe or repetitive

sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer can be ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’

enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”). However, in Boddie, the Second

Circuit held that the “small number of incidents in which he allegedly was verbally

harassed, touched, and pressed against without his consent ... do not involve a harm of

” federal constitutional proportions.” Jd. at 861 (citations omitted).

That decision remained the guiding law in the Second Circuit until August 11,

2015, when the Circuit re-examined the issue in Crawford I, a case involving a pat-frisk

during which the plaintiff's penis was intentionally groped. Crawford I, 796 F.3d at 254.

In Crawford I, upon a de novo review of the district court’s dismissal of the claim, the

Second Circuit called into question the continued application of Boddie. Id. In particular,

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the Court noted that while there was no allegation of repetitive conduct, there was also no

penological interest that was being served by the defendant’s conduct. Jd. at 257-58.

(“There is no penological justification for checking to see if an inmate has an erection.”).

Further, the timing of the search (in the middle of a visit between one of the plaintiffs,

Corley, and his wife), together with the defendant’s statements, were sufficient to suggest

that the frisk was a pretext for sexual abuse.* Jd. The Circuit noted that contemporary

standards of decency had evolved since Boddie was decided 15 years earlier, and that the

outcome in Boddie may have been different if decided in 2015. Jd. at 259-60. In sum,

the Second Circuit noted that the application of Boddie “must change as the basic mores

of society change.” /d. at 260 (quotations omitted).

The Circuit then sent the matter back to the district court to determine if the

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. /d. at 261. Based upon Boddie, the

district court granted the immunity defense and the Second Circuit affirmed. Crawford

v. Cuomo, 721 F. App’x 57, 58 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Crawford IT’). The Second Circuit panel

in Crawford IT noted that the facts of Broddie and Crawford were “quite similar” and

found that:

A reasonable officer could therefore have believed that the sexual abuse

here alleged, even if it might violate state criminal law or subject him to tort

liability, did not violate the Eighth Amendment. At a minimum, any

constitutional distinction between this case and Boddie was not clearly

established in March 2011.

3 Similarly, as to the other plaintiff, Crawford, the squeezing and fondling of his genitalia, together with the roaming

of the correctional officers’ hands and simultaneously taunting comments, was not done in pursuit of or in the course

of any legitimate duties. Crawford I, 796 F.3d at 258-59.

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Id. at 59. The Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ other arguments regarding out-of-district

cases, the evolving nature of the Eighth Amendment, and the development of legislative

protections. /d. at 59-60. In sum, the application of the Eighth Amendment standard to

the facts, especially in light of the previous Boddie decision, were not clearly established

in a sufficient degree, and therefore the corrections officers named as defendants in

Crawford were entitled to qualified immunity. /d.

As noted in this Court’s decision granting in part the Motion to Dismiss based

upon qualified immunity, there were issues that needed to be resolved regarding the

justification for the second search. Dkt. No. 204; Daum v. Devlin, 2024 WL 4133824, at

*5 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3823475

_| (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2024). Discovery has now clarified several issues. First, it is evident

that the Plaintiff was not under constant supervision between the time that he was at the

recreation yard for the first search, and the time of the commencement of the second

search. The first search occurred at approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 4, 2014. Dkt. No.

225-2, Pl.’s Dep. at pp. 25, 27, & 32-33. At that point Plaintiff made one or more calls

to his brother to complain about the nature of the pat-frisk search in the recreation yard

and Defendant Stickney’s actions. at pp. 33-34. He then stayed in the recreation yard

until approximately 9:45 p.m. /d. at pp. 27-37. He took a six-minute walk back to his

cell without escort and then was locked in that cell for a short period of time. /d. at pp.

35-39. During that time he removed certain items from his pocket, but not all of them.

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Id. at p. 57. He was then instructed to go downstairs to the galley area‘, a trip that he also

took unescorted. /d. at pp. 37-47.

When he arrived downstairs at B-block, Defendant Devlin was at the desk. Jd. at

p. 44. There were numerous officers present in that location because, as explained by

Plaintiff, B-block had heightened security at the time and there were extra officers dealing

with a group of inmates coming in. /d. at pp. 45-50. Plaintiff describes the scene as a

“mingle.” Jd. at pp. 48-51. He was then put in a pat-frisk position outside the office and

frisked. /d. at pp. 51-61. Plaintiff believes that Defendant Devlin would have been able

to see the search from his position at the desk but concedes that he does not know exactly

what Defendant Devlin saw. Jd. The search was conducted by Defendant Stickney. □□□

_| at p. 57. Plaintiff described in detail the search in B-block during his deposition, and in

some sense, it was less aggressive and intrusive than the previously dismissed search in

the recreation yard. /d. at pp. 57-60; see also Daum v. Devlin, 2024 WL 4133824, at *5.

However, the allegation is that Defendant Stickney ran his hand all the way up Plaintiff's

leg and performed a “credit card swipe,” and in doing so, used his knuckle to rub hard

and slow against Plaintiff's rectum. □□□

Plaintiff conceded that inmates get pat-frisk or searched for any number of reasons,

and that while most of the time it is in a situation where the incarcerated individual was

seen passing contraband or is going on a visit, there may be other reasons that are “beyond

my wisdom.” /d. at pp. 62-64. Defendants have now produced documentation and

+ Plaintiff originally believed that he was traveling to B-block for a work detail, but it turned out he was actually

asked to travel there for an interview by Defendant Devlin regarding Plaintiff’s complaint to his brother as to the

first search in the recreation yard. See Pl.’s Dep. at pp. 38-39.

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policies regarding the pat-frisk procedure applicable to facilities operated by the

Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) at the relevant time,

which require a pat-frisk search on inmates “[t]o be interviewed by Department officials.”

Dkt. No. 225-5 at p. 2. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was being interviewed by

Defendant Devlin. Dkt No. 230 at p. 4. The pat-frisk search includes a search by hand

of an inmate’s person or his or her clothes while the inmate is clothed. Dkt. No. 225-5 at

p. 2. It should be supervised. /d. at p. 1. As explained by Defendant Devlin, the pat-frisk

procedure requires the officer to reach high into the groin area. Dkt. No. 225-4.

Plaintiff makes certain additional arguments in connection with the alleged

impropriety of the second search. Plaintiff claims that, pursuant to DOCCS’ policies, a

wand metal detector is more suitable than a pat-frisk. See Dkt. No. 230 at p. 3. However,

the regulations specifically state that the use of a hand-held metal detector “is always

appropriate to supplement the pat-frisk.” Dkt. No. 225-5 at p. 2 (emphasis added). The

regulations do not in any way indicate that, in such circumstances, a pat-frisk should not

be performed.

Plaintiff argues that he should not have been allowed to proceed from his cell to

”) B-block for the interview unescorted, and that he has been informed by unnamed Clinton

Correctional Facility officers that inmate movements after 9:50 p.m. require “supervisor

escort with mechanical restraints.” Dkt. No. 230 at p. 3. No admissible evidence is

submitted in support of this claim. Nevertheless, in light of the undisputed fact that

Plaintiff was not escorted and was not restrained, the Court readily concludes that there

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was a legitimate justification for performing a pat-frisk search on the Plaintiff prior to his

interview with Defendant Devlin.

Plaintiff objects to the fact that his pat-frisk search was not supervised. Dkt. No.

230 at p. 3. On this Motion, however, the Court is accepting as true Plaintiff's argument

that Defendant Stickney performed the pat-frisk search and that Defendant Cross was

present at the time, Am. Compl. at 7 16, and simply considers the independent issue of

whether, assuming those facts, the Defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified

immunity. Further, according to the Plaintiff, Defendant Devlin would also have been

able to witness the search, id., and non-party Lieutenant Silver Gray was also present.

Pl.’s Dep. at p. 48.

Having determined that the pat-frisk search of Plaintiff on April 4, 2014 in the B-

block was warranted for institutional and safety reasons, the Court’s prior Report-

Recommendation, Dkt. No. 204, readily leads to the conclusion that the way the search

was conducted did not violate clearly established law as it existed at that time.

Plaintiff objects to the humiliating nature of the pat-frisk search, Dkt. No. 230 at

p. 4, and notes that the DOCCS directive at issue specifically states that such searches,

while being thorough, should be undertaken in a way that does “not offend the dignity of

the inmate being searched.” Dkt. No. 230 at p. 2; Dkt. No. 225-5 at p. 1. But as was

clear from Boddie and Crawford, pat-frisk searches that were highly objectionable to the

incarcerated individual did not necessarily violate Eighth Amendment standards

recognized at that time.

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Plaintiff further argues that the evolving nature of societal norms should have been

apparent before the April 4, 2014 search, and this should be enough to prevent this defense

from being raised. Dkt. No. 230 at pp. 5-6. However, qualified immunity is not

determined by predictions or a perceived general sense of the community, but rather on

the existing state of the law. Boddie was the law of the Circuit until August of 2015,

when Crawford was decided, and that fact is confirmed by Crawford IT. Here, the search

of Plaintiff in B-block occurred well before that critical date, and because the nature of

the search of Plaintiff was less objectionable and abusive than either Boddie or Crawford,

qualified immunity is certainly warranted. It also follows that, if the corrections officer

who conducted the search is entitled to qualified immunity upon the grounds that his

_| conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional law, then the supervisors who

may have observed that conduct are entitled to the same defense.

V. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED, that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment arising out

of the second pat-frisk search that occurred at or near B-block at Clinton Correctional

“ Facility on April 4, 2014, be GRANTED and that the case be DISMISSED; and it is

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-

Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)° days within

which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed

with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v.

Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,

892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIv. P. 72 & 6(a).

Dated: February 6, 2026

Albany, New York

Set

US-Magistrate Judge

5 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the

fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and

file objections. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

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