Mahueron

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

ALLIEANNA CHARLEYN MAHUERON, Case No. 2:22-cv-01549-MC

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.

BRAD CAIN; JAMIE MILLER; J.

WOODLAND; HEIDI STEWARD; DR.

GARTH GULICK; DR. WARREN

ROBERTS; LT. HOLLIE RUSSEL; SGT.

RESHEL BROWN; SGT. ERIC HOOD;

CPT. WILLIAM KING; CPT. CASEY

CLEAVER; SGT. SCOTT GILLUM; CO

WOOD; LT. CASILLOS; LT. PHILLIPS;

SGT. DENITA SHARP; CO LOGAN

SYMONS; and JOHN DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

______________________________________

MCSHANE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, a self-represented adult in custody (AIC) with the Oregon Department of

Corrections (ODOC), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that Defendants failed to

protect her from assault, provided inadequate medical treatment, and denied necessary medical

accommodations. Defendants now move for summary judgment. Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine

issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment, and Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The

moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine dispute of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once this initial burden is met, the

burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate through the production of probative

evidence that an issue of fact remains to be tried. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff,

the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 255 (1986). The Court

“does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determines whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).

“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587 (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

Because Plaintiff is self-represented, the Court construes her filings liberally. Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015).

However, Plaintiff is not relieved of the “obligation to show a genuine issue of material fact for

trial through the presentation of specific, admissible evidence.” Epling v. Komathy, No. CV 10-

5862-GAF (RNB), 2011 WL 13142131 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2011).

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

1. Failure to Protect

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Cain, Miller, Woodland, Steward, Russel, Brown, Hood,

King, Cleaver, Gillum, Wood, Casillos, Phillips, Sharp, and Symons (collectively referred to as

the Security Defendants), failed to protect her from assault by other AICs and exhibited

deliberate indifference to her safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to protect AICs from violence

or harm at the hands of other AICs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). A prison

official violates this duty when two requirements are met. Id. at 834. First, when objectively

viewed, the conditions of confinement must pose “a substantial risk of serious harm” to the AIC.

Id. Second, the official must be subjectively aware of the risk to the AIC and act with “deliberate

indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 834, 839-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). In

other words, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and “must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837;

Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009) (“It is well settled that ‘[d]eliberate

indifference occurs when [an] official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial

risk of serious harm.’”) (citation omitted).

Deliberate indifference is “something more than mere negligence” but “something less

than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will

result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A prison official’s deliberate indifference may be established

through an “inference from circumstantial evidence” or “from the very fact that the risk was

obvious.” Id. at 842.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that the Security Defendants failed to protect her

from assault on several occasions, beginning in September 2020 while Plaintiff was housed at

the Snake River Correctional Institution. See (Second) Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-43 (ECF No. 35).

Plaintiff further alleges that she was assaulted on at least three other occasions after this date and

the Security Defendants took no action to address the threat or to protect her from harm.

The record reflects that on September 4, 2020, another AIC hit Plaintiff from behind

with “closed fist blows,” and she responded by punching the other AIC as they struggled with

each other. King Decl. Ex. 3 at 39-40 (ECF No. 86). A correctional officer deployed pepper

spray before Plaintiff and the AIC were separated and taken to the disciplinary segregation unit

(DSU). Id. Plaintiff was charged with rule violations of Disobedience of an Order I and Inmate

Assault II, and those violations were dismissed upon a finding that the other AIC “unilaterally

attacked” Plaintiff. Id. Ex. 3 at 37-38.

On March 24, 2021, Plaintiff struck another AIC with closed fists and tried to knee the

AIC in the face as he put his hands up in a defensive position. Id. Ex. 3 at 33. Plaintiff admitted

the assault and stated that she lost her temper because the AIC had been harassing her. Id. Ex. 3

at 30. Plaintiff was found guilty of the rule violation of Assault III. Id.

On April 11, 2022, another AIC “unexpectedly” struck Plaintiff in the face with a closed

fist as they stood in the meal line. King Decl. Ex. 3 at 11. Plaintiff tried to get away, but the other

AIC followed and continued to strike Plaintiff, and they exchanged blows. Id. Ex. 3 at 11-13. An

officer ordered them to stop fighting, and they complied and were taken to special housing. Id.

Plaintiff was charged with violating the rule of Assault I and the charge was later dismissed. Id.

Afterward, Plaintiff refused to return to her housing unit because she was “threatened and

attacked in general population” and wanted to be transferred. Id. Ex. 3 at 8.

On March 27, 2024, Plaintiff was transferred to Oregon State Correctional Institution.

King Decl. Ex. 1 at 2. On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff approached another AIC and touched him in

the mid-section in a “sexually suggestive” manner, and in response, the other AIC struck

Plaintiff with a closed fist. Id. Ex. 3 at 1-4. Plaintiff was found to have committed the rule

violation of Sexual Harassment. Id. Ex. 3 at 1-2.

Plaintiff presents no evidence that any of the Security Defendants knew of and

disregarded a substantial risk to her safety with respect to these incidents. The record reflects that

Plaintiff was the aggressor in two of the four assaults, and no evidence creates an inference that

the Security Defendants knew that Plaintiff faced a risk of assault on September 4, 2020 or April

22, 2022 and failed to take appropriate action to prevent the risk. Although Plaintiff reported that

she felt unsafe after being assaulted, she did not provide specific information about threats to her

safety or identify the AICs who threatened her and posed a potential risk. King Decl. ¶ 12 & Ex.

3 at 8, 14, 36.

Plaintiff suggests that her transgender status should have alerted the Security Defendants

that she faced a threat of harm. However, Plaintiff must produce evidence that each of the

Security Defendants knew of and deliberately disregarded threats of harm or assault, and she

presents no such evidence. Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not

violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.”).

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to establish deliberate indifference based on the failure to

protect, and summary judgment is granted on this claim.

2. Medical Treatment

Plaintiff next alleges that ODOC medical personnel failed to provide adequate medical

treatment for her serious heart and back conditions and exhibited deliberate indifference to her

health. (Second) Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-32.

Prison officials and physicians violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel

and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to an AIC’s serious medical

needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To sustain this claim, a plaintiff must

establish the existence of “a serious medical need” and show that the defendant’s “response to

the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “A

prison official acts with ‘deliberate indifference ... only if the [prison official] knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Prison officials may demonstrate deliberate indifference

by denying, delaying, or intentionally interfering with medical treatment, or by the manner in

which they provide medical treatment. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732,

744 (9th Cir. 2002). Where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay

must have led to “significant harm.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 746.

When Plaintiff entered ODOC custody 2016, she reported a history of cardiac issues,

including a heart rhythm disorder. Hitchcock Decl. ¶ 8(a) (ECF No. 85). From 2016 to 2018,

Plaintiff had annual echocardiograms to monitor her heart rhythm and a mitral valve issue. Id. In

August 2019, Plaintiff was diagnosed with acute onset congestive heart failure and mitral valve

regurgitation, and she underwent surgery for a mitral value replacement. Id. ¶ 8(b)-(d) & Ex. 21.

Plaintiff has had follow-up medical appointments with a cardiology specialist since that

procedure. Id. ¶ 8(e) & Exs. 21-22.

Plaintiff has also complained of back issues since 2016. The record reflects degenerative

changes to her spine, and Plaintiff has been treated with pain medication, additional imaging, and

given a low bunk restriction, a stair restriction, and a back brace. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9 & Exs. 2-18, 24. Dr.

Roberts and the Therapeutic Level of Care (TLC) Committee have also approved requested care for

Plaintiff on numerous occasions, including care for cardiac and urology issues and gender affirming

treatment. Id. Ex. 1.

On April 22, 2025, Plaintiff had an appointment at the OHSU Knight Cardiovascular

Institute to evaluate her heart condition for gender affirming surgery. Id. ¶ 8(f) & Ex. 23.

Plaintiff reported that she walks up to one mile daily, works in the kitchen, and “always keeps

moving.” Id. Ex. 23 at 1. Plaintiff has experienced “no history of recent cardiac events, no

dysrhythmia, no severe valvular heart disease, no current symptoms of unstable angina or

decompensated heart failure.” Id. Ex. 23 at 5.

On this record, Plaintiff fails to show that ODOC medical providers exhibited deliberate

indifference to her health and disregarded a known risk of harm. ODOC medical providers have

monitored her heart issues since she entered custody, and they referred Plaintiff to outside

cardiac specialists for a mitral valve replacement with appropriate follow-up evaluations. See

generally Hitchcock Decl. & Exs. Plaintiff has also received x-rays, medication, and appropriate

accommodations for her degenerative back condition. Id. More recently, Plaintiff complained of

no untreated health issues and reported an active lifestyle despite her incarceration. Id. Ex. 24.

Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care.

B. ADA and RA Claims

Finally, Plaintiff asserts claims of disability discrimination based on the denial of a

wedge therapy pillow and other unspecified accommodations. (Second) Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-27.

In April 2021, Plaintiff purchased a wedge pillow from the ADA office after obtaining

medical authorization. Main Decl. ¶¶ 4-6 & Ex. 1 (ECF No. 87). Medical orders for ADA

accommodations typically expire after one year, and Plaintiff’s authorization for the pillow

expired. Hitchcock Decl. ¶ 9; Saldivar Decl. ¶ 6 (ECF No. 88). In 2023 and 2024, Plaintiff

renewed her requests for a wedge pillow, and the requests were not approved because Plaintiff

did not have medical authorization. Id.

The ADA and RA prohibit public entities, including state prisons, from discriminating

against a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a); see

also Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998) (finding that “State

prisons fall squarely within the [ADA] definition of ‘public entity’”). To state a claim under the

ADA and RA, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is

otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of ODOC’s services, programs, or

activities; (3) she was excluded from participating in or denied the benefits of ODOC’s services,

programs, or activities, or she was otherwise discriminated against; and (4) such exclusion,

denial of benefits, or discrimination was because of her disability. McGary v. City of Portland,

386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d

1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999) (“There is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and

obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.”).

Plaintiff presents no evidence that she was denied a wedge pillow—or any other ODOC

service, program, or activity—because of her disabilities. Instead, Plaintiff’s request for a wedge

pillow was denied due to the lack of medical authorization. To the extent Plaintiff’s claims arise

from the alleged denial of medical care, she cannot sustain an ADA or RA claim on inadequate

medical treatment. Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The

ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”),

overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en

banc).

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 84, 90) are GRANTED and this

action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Any appeal of this Order or the Judgment dismissing this

action would be frivolous or not taken in good faith, and Plaintiff’s IFP status is HEREBY

REVOKED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 13th day of March, 2026.

s/ Michael J. McShane

MICHAEL J. MCSHANE

United States District Judge