Mukhtarov

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

AZIZ MUKHTAROV #A249-111-808 CASE NO. 1:25-CV-02127 SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

WARDEN LASALLE I C E PROCESSING MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

CENTER

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court are a Motion to Expedite and Motion to Stay Removal [doc. 17]

filed by petitioner Aziz Mukhtarov. Petitioner asks the court for an order prohibiting his

removal during the pendency of his habeas proceedings, noting that he has filed a Form I-

246 Application for Stay of Removal. In his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

petitioner states that his appeal of his removal order is pending before the Board of

Immigration Appeals. Doc. 16.

The court construes petitioner’s request for a stay as a motion for a temporary

restraining order. An applicant for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary

injunction must demonstrate each of the following: (1) a substantial likelihood that his

cause will succeed on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the

injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm that

the injunction might do to the opposing party, and (4) that granting the injunction will not

disserve the public interest. Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE Processing Ctr., 353

F.Supp.3d 518, 521 (W.D. La. 2018) (citing Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland,

637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981)). The decision of whether to grant or deny a TRO lies in the

district court's discretion. Moore v. Brown, 868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts should

deny such motions more often than not. Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523,

532 (E.D. La. 1999) (explaining that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief

and rarely issued.”); see also Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX LLC, 2025 WL

2429087, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (holding that the extraordinary relief under Rule 65 must

be “unequivocally show[n].”); Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“Only under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse the denial of a

preliminary injunction.”).

Petitioner has not shown sufficient likelihood of success on any of his claims to

warrant preliminary relief. In his habeas petition he asserts that (1) ICE violated the

Constitution and federal law by revoking his supervision without adequate process; (2) he

has not received an adequate opportunity to challenge the necessity of his continued

detention while his immigration case remains pending; (3) his removal will cause undue

hardship to his family; (4) his health has deteriorated due to poor living conditions and

medical care at the ICE facility where he is detained; and (5) detention has become

excessive and disproportionate to any civil immigration proceeding. Doc. 16, att. 1.

On the first and second claims, petitioner only offers his compliance under

supervision and the absence of any individualized determination that he was a flight risk

or a danger to the community. But an order of supervision may be revoked to enforce a

removal order. Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F.Supp.3d 689, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R.

§§ 241.4(l)(2)(iii), (iv)). The Fifth Circuit has held that mandatory detention of a noncitizen

pending removal is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), and that holding is binding on

this court. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Petitioner has

admitted that he is subject to a removal order. He therefore cannot show entitlement to a

bond hearing under the law of this circuit.

As for petitioner’s hardship and health arguments, courts have considered the

hardship to a detainee’s family in balancing the harms on a motion for preliminary

injunction. See Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley, 805 F.Supp.3d 1112, 1149–50 (D. Nev. 2025)

(citing Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017)). Petitioner’s own health

is also certainly a factor, if he can show a substantial threat of irreparable injury.1 But

neither these nor petitioner’s claims regarding the conditions of his confinement present

independent grounds for habeas relief. See Schipke v. Van Buren, 239 F. App’x 85, 85–86

(5th Cir. 2007) (“Allegations that challenge the fact or duration of confinement are properly

brought in habeas petitions, while allegations that challenge rules, customs, and procedures

affecting conditions of confinement are properly brought in civil rights actions.”). Finally,

to the extent petitioner is challenging the length of his detention, the Supreme Court has

held that “an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.

678, 701 (2001). Given his pending appeal, the record does not establish that continued

detention is presumptively unreasonable or that removal is unlikely.

1 Petitioner offers only vague allegations regarding the adequacy of food and medical care at the facility where he is

detained. Doc. 16, att. 1, p. 2.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to

Expedite [doc. 17] be GRANTED and that the Motion to Stay Removal [id.] be DENIED.

The matter is referred to the magistrate judge for consideration on an expedited briefing

schedule, to be determined at the magistrate judge’s discretion.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on the 3rd day of March, 2026.

< JAMES D. CAIN, JR. C .

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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