Opinion

Titan Capital ID, LLC v. Mendel

  • 2026 NY Slip Op 30943(U)
Court
New York Supreme Court, Kings County
Filed
Mar 10, 2026
Status
Unpublished
Author
Peter P. Sweeney
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.3%

The opinion

Titan Capital ID, LLC v Mendel

2026 NY Slip Op 30943(U)

March 10, 2026

Supreme Court, Kings County

Docket Number: Index No. 524272/2025

Judge: Peter P. Sweeney

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.

file:///LRB-ALB-FS1/Vol1/ecourts/Process/covers/NYSUP.5242722025.KINGS.001.LBLX000_TO.html[03/20/2026 3:46:01 PM]

FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 03/11/2026 11:24 AM INDEX NO. 524272/2025

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 46 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2026

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF KINGS, PART 73

------------------------------------------------.----------------------X

TITAN CAPITAL ID, LLC,

Decision and Order

Plaintiff, Motion Sequence 1 and 2

-against- Index No.: 524i;Glpo25

HENDEL MENACHEM MENDEL A/KIA MENDEL MENACHEM

All/KIA MENACHEM HENDEL,

Defendant.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------X

The following e-filed papers read herein: NYSCEF Doc. Nos.:

Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/

Petition/Cross Motion and

Affidavits (Affinnations) Annexed._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Opposing Affidavits (Affinnations)

Affidavits/ Affinnations in Reply _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Other Papers:

On February 25, 2022, plaintiff and defendant signed an Agreement of

Purchase and Sale for the sale of the subject premisel? for the sum of

$3,600,000, with a closing date to occur on or before June 2, 2022. Defendant

tendered a deposit in the amount of $360,000, but was unable to close at that

time. In May 2022 the agreement was amended to provide for a closing date of

August 2, 2022. Defendant had to pay another $360,000 as an additional

deposit and the purchase price was increased to $3,625,000. Defendant could

not close at that time either, and another amendment was signed in July 2022.

A third, fourth and fifth amendment were entered into, calling for additional

payments and an increase in price for the premises. A letter advising that time

was of the essence and plaintiff was ready to close was sent February 20, 2025,

1

[* 1] 1 of 4

FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 03/11/2026 11:24 AM INDEX NO. 524272/2025

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 46 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2026

and another one sent May 23, 2025 calling for a closing June 30, 2025.

Defendant failed to appear at the closing.

Plaintiff thereupon commenced this action for judgment declaring that

defendant was in default of the contract of sale and subsequent amendments

thereto, and declaring that all deposits and payments tendered were forfeited

in accordance with the contract and amendments. In addition, plaintiff sought

an injunction enjoining defendant from encumbering the premises, including

filing a notice of pendency.

In his answer, defendant's counsel asserts that plaintiff negotiated the

contract of sale and the amendments directly with defendant, not through

counsel. Further, it is alleged defendant was not versed in buying real estate,

was not fluent in English, and did not have funding to close, facts known to

plaintiff. Plaintiff should not be heard now to retain over $2,000,000 in deposits

and payments, causing defendant great injury. Defendant asserts he should be

permitted to close under the terms of the original contact of sale and otherwise

be refunded the full amount of the deposits and payments tendered.

In Motion Sequence 1, plaintiff moves for summary judgment awarding it

summary judgment declaring defendant in default of the contract of sale and

amendments thereto; declaring that the deposits and payments made by

defendant, totaling $2,420,000, should be the rightful property of plaintiff as

liquidated damages; and enjoining defendant from encumbering the subject

property. Plaintiff contends that where, as here, there is an unambiguous

contract to purchase real property and a defendant fails to close after a time of

the essence letter, summary judgment could be granted to the seller, and the

seller can keep the deposit paid as liquidated damages. Since defendant has

failed to raise a question of fact,- it is argued, plaintiff is entitled to summary

judgment.

Defendant cross-moves (Motion Sequence 2) for summary judgment on

his second counterclaim for specific performance under the terms of the

original contract. Plaintiff, it is argued, was aware that defendant was not a

sophisticated party, lacked experience or knowledge in real estate transactions

2·

[* 2] 2 of 4

FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 03/11/2026 11:24 AM INDEX NO. 524272/2025

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 46 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2026

and was not even fluent in English. Plaintiff negotiated agreements directly with

defendant, sent threatening communications, and extracted over half of the

initial purchase price from defendant. This is not, it is contended, a traditional

10% downpayment but a case where plaintiff extracted over $2,000,000, more

than 50% of the original purchase price. The enforceability of liquidated

damages is not absolute and should not be applied here, where doing so would

permit an extreme and unconscionable windfall to plaintiff.

Nevertheless, contends defendant, he is seeking summary judgment on

his second counterclaim for specific performance under the terms of the

original contract. That would be, defendant claims, the most straightforward

and equitable outcome in this case. A payoff letter is submitted showing that

defendant can get funding to close.

"Liquidated damages constitute the compensation which, the

parties have agreed, should be paid in order to satisfy any loss of injury flowing

from a breach of their contract" (Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v Puritan Farms 2 nd,

Inc., 41 NY2d 420, 423-424, (1977]). "On the other hand, liquidated damage

provisions will not be enforced if it is against public policy to do so and public

policy is firmly set against the imposition of penalties or forfeitures for which

there is no statutory authority" (Truck Rent-A-Center v Puritan Farms, supra). A

liquidated damages provision has its basis in the principle of just

compensation for loss, and liquidated damages that constitute a penalty

violate public policy and are unenforceable (see Trustees of Columbia Univ. in

the City of NYv D'Agostino Supermarkets, Inc., 36 NY3d 69, 75, 2020).

In the instant case, defendant contends that plaintiff bypassed

counsel to negotiate directly with non-English speaking defendant and seeks

to retain over 67% of the original purchase price which is nearly seven times the

standard 10% down payment typically upheld in real estate law in this State.

Accordingly, there are questions of fact as to the whether the liquidated

damages should constitute a forfeiture and an unenforceable penalty, and

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (MS 1) is denied.

3

[* 3] 3 of 4

FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 03/11/2026 11:24 AM INDEX NO. 524272/2025

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 46 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2026

Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment on its second

counterclaim (MS 2) is also denied. Procedurally, defendant's supporting

affirmation is missing the mandatory language of CPLR 2106. Substantively, "A

party seeking specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property is

required to establish not only that he or she was ready, willing, and able to close

on the scheduled closing date, but also that the other party was in default"

(Latora v Ferreira, 102 Ad2d 838, 839 [2d Dept 2013]; see Treasure Island of

Asbury Park Self-Storage, LLC v MBAR Realty, LLC, 216 AD3d 1200 [2d Dept.

2023]). Here, specific performance is not available for a party who defaulted

on a time of the essence real estate contract.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Motion Sequence 1 is denied because of issues of fact as

to whether the liquidated damages herein constitute an unenforceable penalty,

and it is

ORDERED that Motion Sequence 2 is denied since the moving party is not

entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.

Dated: March/~2026

Peter P. Sweeney, J.S.C.

~ ::a::

,--..

c:r- z

C)

% Cl)

·:z:,.

::r::, ..,.,n

_o

re:

f'l'lz

)> CJ~

C'") .

Q;) r-

n,

;;o

4 ,.:::'

::s::

0

[* 4] 4 of 4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.