LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Khanom

LaSalle Bank N.A. v Khanom

2026 NY Slip Op 30897(U)

March 13, 2026

Supreme Court, Kings County

Docket Number: Index No. 33618/2006

Judge: Carolyn Walker-Diallo

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.

file:///LRB-ALB-FS1/Vol1/ecourts/Process/covers/NYSUP.336182006.KINGS.001.LBLX000_TO.html[03/19/2026 3:45:53 PM]

FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 03/13/2026 03:42 PM INDEX NO. 33618/2006

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 150 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/13/2026

At an IAS Term, Part FRP4, of the

Supreme Court of the State of New

York, held in and for the County of

Kings, at the Courthouse at 320 Jay

Street, Brooklyn, New York on the 13th

day of March 2026.

PRESENT:

HON. CAROLYN WALKER-DIALLO, J.S.C.

--------------------------------------------------------------- X

LASALLE BANK N.A.,

Plaintiff, Index No.: 33618/2006

- against -

DECISION AND ORDER

SAIMA KHANOM, et al.,

Defendants.

--------------------------------------------------------------- X

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of these

Motions:

Papers Numbered

Motion, Affirmations in Support, and Exhibits NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 59-73

Affirmation in Opposition NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 90-1011

Affirmation in Reply NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 103-110

Motion, Affirmation in Support, and Exhibit NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 113-115

Affirmation in Opposition NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 118-128

Affirmation in Reply NYSCEF Doc. No. 131

Supplemental Affirmation in Reply NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 136-138

Motion Sequence #9 & 10

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order on these Motions is as follows:

Plaintiff moves for an order: (1) granting default judgment and an order of reference; and

(2) amending the caption. Saima Khanom, Lily Begum, and the John Doe defendants (collectively

“Defendants”) move for an order pursuant to CPLR 3025, 3212, and 3215, dismissing the action,

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Defendants’ amended affirmation in opposition supersedes the affirmation in opposition filed as NYSCEF Doc.

Nos. 77-88.

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or in the alternative, granting leave to serve and file an amended answer and to move for summary

judgment, and for tolling of interest. Both sides submit opposition and reply papers. For the

foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and Defendants’ motion is GRANTED to the

extent that interest will be tolled for Plaintiff’s delays in prosecuting this matter and is otherwise

DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action was commenced on November 3, 2006, to foreclose a mortgage executed by

Defendant Saima Khanom (“Defendant Khanom”) against the premises at 75 Nichols Avenue,

Brooklyn, New York 11208. Defendant Lily Begum (“Defendant Begum”) was also named a party

as record owner of the subject premises.

On February 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for default judgment and an

order of reference that the court did not consider. See Kings County Clerk’s Minutes. Thereafter,

by motion dated August 18, 2008, Plaintiff moved for the same relief. Id. On October 7, 2008,

Defendants’ counsel, Wilfred A. Callender, filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Defendant

Khanom. Id. On December 5, 2008, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Id. On February

10, 2009, Defendants filed an answer, which was rejected by Plaintiff as untimely. Id. The parties

were then referred for settlement conferences. On December 19, 2009, Plaintiff withdrew its

motion for default judgment and an order of reference. Id. Defendant Khanom moved by order to

show cause on January 8, 2010, to substitute Aubrey A. Rogers as counsel, which the court did not

consider. Id. Michele Hauser then filed a Substitution of Attorney on behalf of Defendant Khanom

on January 24, 2014, which was cosigned only by Defendant Khanom’s alleged agent. Id.

Thereafter, on May 12, 2014, the court entered a conditional order of dismissal pursuant to

CPLR 3216, and the action was dismissed on July 24, 2014 for non-compliance with the order. Id.

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On October 23, 2014, Plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal and restore the action, which was

granted by order of the Honorable Francois A. Rivera dated January 13, 2015. Id. The order also

directed Plaintiff to submit affidavits explaining the delay in prosecuting the matter. Defendants

opposed the motion. On April 30, 2015, the Honorable Francois A. Rivera dismissed the action

for Plaintiff’s failure to explain the eight-year delay in prosecution. Id. Plaintiff moved again for

the same relief on June 23, 2015, which was denied on August 11, 2015, for failure to attach a

copy of the dismissal order.

On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff moved a third time for the same relief. Id. By orders dated July

14, 2017 and October 3, 2017, the court ordered that Defendant be served a copy of the papers. Id.

On December 19, 2017, the Honorable Francois A. Rivera again denied the motion for failure to

attach a copy of the dismissal order. Id. Plaintiff then moved for this relief for the fourth and fifth

times on May 22, 2019 and December 16, 2019. Both motions were marked off for failure to

appear on the return dates. The action was then converted to e-filing. However, Defendants’

attorney, Michele Hauser, only opted into NYSCEF service on May 7, 2024.

Plaintiff then moved for a sixth time for this relief on June 4, 2021. See Motion to Vacate

Dismissal and Restore to Calendar dated June 4, 2021, NYSCEF Doc. No. 2. On November 18,

2022, the Honorable Francois A. Rivera issued an order directing Plaintiff to submit legible copies

of all orders. See Order of the Hon. Francois A. Rivera dated November 18, 2022, NYSCEF Doc.

No. 24. There is no indication that the motion and order were served on Defendants’ attorney. By

order dated July 27, 2023, the court then directed Plaintiff to submit supplemental papers itemizing

the orders. See Order of the Hon. Francois A. Rivera dated July 27, 2023, NYSCEF Doc. No. 34.

There is no indication that the order was served on Defendants’ attorney. Finally, on November 8,

2023, the Honorable Francois A. Rivera granted Plaintiff’s motion to restore the action, vacated

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the dismissal order, and restored the notices of pendency. See Order of the Hon. Francois A. Rivera

dated November 8, 2023, NYSCEF Doc. No. 53. Plaintiff served the notice of entry of this order

on Defendants’ attorney and Defendant Begum. See Notice of Entry dated November 16, 2023,

NYSCEF Doc. No. 56. The instant motion follows.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and an Order of Reference is DENIED.

It is well established that “[i]n a residential mortgage foreclosure action, a plaintiff

establishes its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by producing the mortgage

and the unpaid note, and evidence of the default.” Onewest Bank v. Wellington Roy Mahoney, 154

A.D.3d 770, 771 (2d Dep’t 2017); Loancare v. Firshing, 130 A.D.3d 787 (2d Dep’t 2015). “To

demonstrate the facts constituting the cause of action, the plaintiff need only submit sufficient

proof to enable a court to determine if the cause of action is viable.” Clarke v. Liberty Mut. Fire

Ins. Co., 150 A.D.3d 1192, 1194 (2d Dep’t 2017).

Further, “[w]here, as here, a foreclosure complaint is not verified, CPLR 3215 (f) states,

among other things, that upon any application for a judgment by default, proof of the facts

constituting the claim, the default, and the amount due are to be set forth in an affidavit ‘made by

the party.’” HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Betts, 67 A.D.3d 735, 736 (2d Dep’t 2009). “In this regard,

it should be kept in mind that a court does not have a mandatory, ministerial duty to grant a motion

for leave to enter a default judgment, and retains the discretionary obligation to determine whether

the movant has met the burden of stating a viable cause of action.” Paulus v. Christopher Vacirca,

Inc., 128 A.D.3d 116, 126 (2d Dep’t 2015).

“‘Upon any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original

parties unless the court directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted or

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joined in the action’ (CPLR 1018). ‘A motion for substitution may be made by the successors or

representatives of a party or by any party’ (CPLR 1021).” U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Duran, 174 A.D.3d

768, 769 (2d Dep’t 2019), citing CPLR 1018 and 1021.

Here, Plaintiff’s assertion that U.S. Bank should be substituted as the plaintiff in this action

as successor-in-interest is unsupported as it is premised upon assignment of the mortgage and

alleged evidence of possession of the note. While Plaintiff’s proffered records provide that the

mortgage was assigned from Bank of America to U.S. Bank, there is no evidence that the note

itself was transferred and that U.S. Bank is in possession. Therefore, the assignment is of no

import. See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Dellarmo, 94 A.D.3d 746 (2d Dep’t 2012).

Regarding the alleged note possession, Plaintiff’s affiant, Juliana Thurab of PHH Mortgage

Corporation (“PHH”), states “to date, Plaintiff has maintained possession of the original Note since

it was physically delivered on March 25, 2004, including the date of commencement of the action

on November 3, 2006. A true and correct copy of the original Note and Plaintiff’s business records,

confirming possession and delivery, are annexed hereto as Exhibit ‘B.’” The proffered record

contains the following entries: “10/27/23: Please provide the date the original note was received

by the plaintiff/custodian? Where was the note on 11.3.2006? Where is the note today,

10.27.2023?” and “10/30/23: Per review of Deutsche Bank, the custodian’s company records, the

original note was transferred in on 3/25/2004. Deutsche Bank had possession of the original note

on 11/3/2006. Per PHH records, PHH received the original note on 10/03/2015. PHH returned the

original note to Deutsche Bank on 03/02/2021, Deutsche Bank had possession of the original note

on 10/27/2023, the collateral file including the original note is currently held at Deutsche Bank

National Trust Company.” Affirmation of Indebtedness of Juliana Thurab (“Thurab Aff.”), dated

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February 6, 2024, Task Notes Printout, NYSCEF Doc. No. 61 at 1-2, 22. Following this entry, an

address is provided. Id.

“[T]o establish a foundation for the admission of a business record, the proponent of the

record must satisfy the requirements identified in the statute (see CPLR 4518[a]). First, the

proponent must establish that the record be made in the regular course of business—essentially,

that it reflect a routine, regularly conducted business activity, and that it be needed and relied on

in the performance of functions of the business. Second, the proponent must also demonstrate that

it be the regular course of such business to make the record . . . essentially, that the record be made

pursuant to established procedures for the routine, habitual, systematic making of such a record.

Third, the proponent must establish that the record be made at or about the time of the event being

recorded—essentially, that recollection be fairly accurate and the habit or routine of making the

entries assured.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Gordon, 171 A.D.3d 197, 205 (2d Dep’t 2019) (Internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Further, “[a]lthough [t]he foundation for admission of a business record usually is provided

by the testimony of the custodian, the author or some other witness familiar with the practices and

procedures of the particular business, it is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit,

that serves as proof of the matter asserted. Accordingly, [e]vidence of the contents of

business records is admissible only where the records themselves are introduced. Without their

introduction, a witness's testimony as to the contents of the records is inadmissible hearsay.” Id. at

205-206 (Internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Ms. Thurab’s statements and the proffered record are inadmissible hearsay and lack

probative value. First, Ms. Thurab’s statements are contradictory. She provides that Plaintiff is in

possession of the note in her affirmation. See Thurab Aff., NYSCEF Doc. No. 61 at 1-2. However,

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the proffered record provides that Deutsche Bank holds the note. See Task Notes Printout,

NYSCEF Doc. No. 61 at 22. No custodial agreement or other evidence is provided to demonstrate

any relationship between the entities here and Deutsche Bank. Second, the record annexed as the

Task Notes merely memorializes hearsay assertions from October 2023. The entrant(s) of the

records are not identified, and the information inputted appears to have been based on records not

provided. Third, no foundation is provided for the records referenced. Fourth, the records appear

to have been created solely in anticipation of litigation. See 76-82 St. Marks, LLC v. Gluck, 147

A.D.3d 1011, 1013 (2d Dep’t 2017), citing CPLR 4518 (a) (“the plaintiff failed to make a prima

facie case regarding its damages, since the summary chart of charges and payments made under

the lease was prepared solely in anticipation of litigation and should not have been received in

evidence, and the plaintiff failed to provide any underlying documents to establish the proper

charges and payments made”).

Finally, Ms. Thurab insufficiently substantiates her authority to act on behalf of Plaintiff

or U.S. Bank. Ms. Thurab is employed by PHH, “as servicer for Plaintiff as assignee of Bank of

America, National Association as successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as

Trustee as assignee of LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee.” See Thurab Aff., NYSCEF

Doc. No. 61. As Plaintiff’s agent, PHH must provide its authority to act on Plaintiff’s behalf. See

Citibank v. Herman, 215 A.D.3d 629 (2d Dep’t 2023). A copy of a Limited Power of Attorney

between PHH and U.S. Bank is annexed to Plaintiff’s motion papers in support. See Limited Power

of Attorney, NYSCEF Doc. No. 61 at 62. However, the Limited Power of Attorney provides that

this is in connection to “relating servicing agreements,” which are not annexed to the motion

papers. Therefore, Plaintiff and U.S. Bank fail to demonstrate the facts constituting the claim as

required by CPLR 3215 (f). Resultingly, the Affirmation of Indebtedness cannot be considered.

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Nor can the underlying records annexed in support of Plaintiff’s prima facie burden be considered.

See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Tesoriero, 204 A.D.3d 1066, 1068 (2d Dep’t 2022) (“The limited power of

attorney submitted . . . restricted and conditioned its authority based on the terms of other

agreements which were not provided by the plaintiff. Thus, the limited power of attorney was

insufficient to demonstrate that Nationstar possessed the authority to act on behalf of the

plaintiff”).

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to establish its entitlement to judgment,

substitution of U.S. Bank in this action as the plaintiff, and U.S. Bank’s authority to intervene here.

See Citimortgage, Inc. v. Bredehorn, 160 A.D.3d 803, 804 (2d Dep’t 2018) (“The Supreme Court

improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion . . . to amend

the caption by substituting FNMA as the plaintiff . . . Although the plaintiff submitted evidence

that the mortgage was assigned to FNMA, there was no evidence in admissible form of an

assignment of the note or a transfer of possession of the note to FNMA”). Thus, Plaintiff’s motion

is DENIED.

II. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part.

Defendants are correct that Plaintiff’s protracted delays in prosecution render this action

subject to tolling of interest. Defendants unquestionably request this relief in the motion papers,

though such relief is not specified in the notice of motion. “It does not matter how a motion is

titled by an attorney. What matters is what the motion actually is in substance.” Citibank, N.A. v.

Kerszko, 203 A.D.3d 42, 55 (2d Dep’t 2022). Accordingly, this Court deems Defendants’ motion

as one seeking to toll interest.

“A foreclosure action is equitable in nature and triggers the equitable powers of the court.

Once equity is invoked, the court's power is as broad as equity and justice require. In an action of

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an equitable nature, the recovery of interest is within the court's discretion. The exercise of that

discretion will be governed by the particular facts in each case, including any wrongful conduct

by either party. Further, a tolling and cancellation of interest may also be warranted where there is

an unexplained delay in prosecution of a mortgage foreclosure action.” Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust

Co. v. Clark, 2026 NY Slip Op 01034 (2d Dep’t 2026) (Internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff was dilatory in prosecuting this action, which was commenced nearly 20

years ago. On its face, this action appears to be appropriate for tolling given the extensive

procedural history. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Defendants are not precluded from

challenging damages—here the amounts due—because of their default in answering or appearing.

See Paulus at 128 A.D.3d 126. However, as the parties have not briefed the extent of the tolling

of interest appropriate here, and the specific periods of time for which tolling is sought, further

briefing is appropriate.

As to Defendants’ request for dismissal and leave to amend their answer, this portion of

the motion is denied. “A defendant in default is not entitled to affirmative relief of a non-

jurisdictional nature absent vacatur[ ] of his or her default.” HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Saris, 2025

NY Slip Op 07287 (2d Dep’t 2025) (Internal quotation omitted). Here, Defendants do not dispute

being in default status, and do not seek to vacate the default in timely appearing or answering.

Additionally, the court already determined that the case was erroneously dismissed, which is the

law of the case.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and Defendants’ motion is GRANTED to the

extent that interest will be tolled for Plaintiff’s delays in prosecuting this matter and is otherwise

DENIED. Within thirty (30) days of upload of this order to NYSCEF, Plaintiff and Defendants

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shall submit supplemental affirmations addressing tolling of interest, including the specific periods

of time for which interest should be tolled. To the extent that any relief requested was not addressed

by the Court, it is hereby DENIED. Motion sequence 10 is adjourned for a status conference to be

held on April 28, 2026. Plaintiff shall serve notice of entry within ten (10) days of the upload of

the order to NYSCEF upon Defendants and all parties who have appeared in this action, with

parties not participating in e-filing to be noticed via first-class mail.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

ENTER:

_______________________________

Hon. Carolyn Walker-Diallo, J.S.C.

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