Jacobs, A. v. Brown, D.

J-S45032-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ANDRE JACOBS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

DELYAH BROWN, JANE DOE : No. 887 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Dated April 30, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):

2025-CV-3376

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 20, 2026

Andre Jacobs appeals pro se from the April 30, 2025 order, which denied

Jacobs’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissed, with

prejudice due to frivolity, his underlying complaint filed against defendants

Delyah Brown and Jane Doe. After our review, we affirm. Additionally, we

remind the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas Prothonotary of the

continuing obligations to both notify the parties of orders pursuant to law and

to enter notations in the docket pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil

Procedure 236(b).1

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We observe that the Prothonotary failed to notate in the trial court docket

that the required Rule 236 notice to the parties was provided for any order in

this case. See Pa.R.A.P. 236; see also Carr v. Michuk, 234 A.3d 797, 805

(Pa. Super. 2020) (noting order is not appealable until entered on docket with

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In his brief to this Court, Jacobs asserts that no judge reviewed his nine-

page complaint and that a prothonotary is without the power to rule that an

action is frivolous.2 See Appellant’s Brief, at 3. Further, Jacobs avers that he

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required notation that appropriate notice given under Rule 236 and parties’

receipt of notices of order do not alter formal date of order’s entry and

associated commencement of appeal period). Nevertheless, we may review

this appeal where remand for Rule 236 notice and the appropriate docket

notation would only delay our consideration of the claims raised in this appeal;

thus, in the interests of justice, we may consider done that which ought to

have been done and proceed to our review. See Vertical Res., Inc. v.

Bramlett, 837 A.2d 1193, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[I]n the interest of

judicial economy, we will regard as done what should have been done and

consider the [Rule 236] notice as having been mailed. The appeal is not

untimely, and it would be a waste of judicial resources to remand the matter

solely for the filing of a [Rule] 236 notice.”) (citation omitted). Although the

record deficiency does not prevent our review in this case, we emphasize to

the county Prothonotary the importance of providing the appropriate notice

and docket notation in all cases. See Carr, 234 A.3d at 805-06 (“A

prothonotary should make a notation that specifically states, for example,

‘Rule 236 notice provided on’ followed by the date the notice was given, in

order to comply with the notification mandate and procedural requirement of

Rule 236. Anything short of such a notation constitutes a failure by the

prothonotary to comply with the notification mandate and procedural

requirement of Rule 236, and is a breakdown in court operations.”).

2 Jacobs argues that the county Prothonotary, alone,

returned the complaint to [him] at least 3 times over a 2[-]month

period, without assigning a case number or a judge and, in at least

one instance, claim[ed] that [Jacobs] did not check a box on the

civil cover sheet that [he] did check. On April 30, 2025, the

Prothonotary deemed the case ‘frivolous’ and signed the dismissal

order under ‘Judge.’ On May 5, 2025, [Jacobs] filed a [n]otice of

[a]ppeal[.] Receiving no response, [Jacobs] filed another [n]otice

of [a]ppeal on June 7, 2025, this time to the Superior Court,

noting the difficulties being experienced in the [trial] court and

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has previously prevailed at trial on a defamation claim, wherein he proceeded

pro se, and that he “is fairly familiar with the pleading requirements of a

defamation claim and believes his complaint satisfies necessary pleading

requirements.” Id. Jacobs concludes that his

complaint was dismissed without ever being served to the

defendant[s]. No explanation is provided in the record for the

determination of frivolousness. No opportunity was provided to

cure alleged defects. If a case such as this is deemed frivolous,

this would open doors for any man or woman to launch public

slanderous attacks on any notable person, simply because their

romantic advances are rejected.[3] To have ones[’] business

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refusal to file the [n]otice. At no time did the [trial] court file an

“[o]pinion” or explanation of the determination of frivolousness.

Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

3 In his brief filed in this Court, but critically lacking from his complaint filed

in the trial court and certified to this Court for appeal, Jacobs alleges that

In May[] 2024, defendant Brown, [Jacobs]’s next door neighbor,

publicly launched an attack against [Jacobs] on social media[,]

accusing [him] of stealing her U.S. mail allegedly containing

“jewelry” for her son. [. . . Previously, Jacobs] briefly courted

[Brown,] but upon noticing some erratic behaviors[,] decided

against allowing the courtship to go any further but remained

cordial. [. . . Thereafter, the parties’ relationship] deteriorated

and, beyond slandering [Jacobs] online, defendant Brown began

trolling [Jacobs] and contacting all of his current and former

clients[,] making claims against [Jacobs] and, in at least one case,

messaging one of [Jacobs’s] clients[, accusing Jacobs of engaging

in a romantic relationship with] a woman who forwarded the

message to [Jacobs] and [with whom Jacobs was never actually

romantically involved[. Jacobs] has over 25,000 followers on

Facebook alone, and has created videos that have garnered over

20 million views and published 5 books that he promoted and sold

via social media daily. Because of this, [Jacobs] was officially

categorized by Facebook as a “content creator” and was paid

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destroyed for something so fickle and sanctioned by a court of law

is, indeed, a travesty.

Id. at 4. We disagree that Jacobs is entitled to relief.

We have set forth the following standard of review for challenges to a

court’s dismissal of a civil complaint pursuant to Rule 240:

Our review of a decision dismissing an action pursuant to [Rule]

240(j) is limited to a determination of whether the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights have been violated and whether the trial court

abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Rule 240

provides for a procedure by which a person who is without the

financial resources to pay the costs of litigation may proceed IFP.

The obligation of the trial court when a party seeks to proceed

under Rule 240 is as follows:

(j) If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or

proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a

petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court

prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action,

proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or

if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is

frivolous.

Pa.R.C.P. 240(j). A frivolous action or proceeding has been

defined as one that lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

Under Rule 240(j), an action is frivolous if, on its face, it does not

set forth a valid cause of action. As we review [the appellant’s]

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monthly by Facebook directly; it was his place of employment. [.

. .] Jacobs is a highly influential public figure and social media

influencer, and presented a legitimate case for defamation and

slander that should not have been dismissed as “frivolous” where

he alleged that the defendant maliciously went on Facebook and

other social sites accusing Jacobs of federal crimes, among other

things, including claims involving a child, all false and in retaliation

for Jacobs rejecting her sexual advances.

Appellant’s Brief, at 1-2. Nevertheless, we may not consider any of these

factual allegations as they are raised for the first time on appeal and are not

alleged in Jacobs’s complaint. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the

trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

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complaint for validity under Rule 240, we are mindful that a pro

se complaint should not be dismissed simply because it is not

artfully drafted.

Ocasio v. Prison Health Servs., 979 A.2d 352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2009) (case

citations and quotation marks omitted).

After our review of the record in this case, including Jacobs’s complaint,

we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion. See id. Indeed, here,

despite his claims that his complaint consists of nine well-pleaded pages,

Jacobs’s complaint is substantively limited to one single page that merely

identifies the parties, causes of action, and alleges original jurisdiction is

proper in the trial court.4 See Complaint, 4/25/25. As Jacobs’s complaint

fails to connect any facts or law applicable to his claimed causes of action,

which deficiency meets the definition of frivolity, the trial court’s dismissal is

appropriate.5 See Ocasio, 979 A.2d at 354 (“A frivolous action or proceeding

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4 Jacobs’s civil complaint, when viewed charitably as a collective of documents

as they appear in the certified record, consists of: (1) a civil complaint cover

sheet; (2) a single handwritten page identifying the parties, causes of action,

and an attempt at alleging jurisdiction in the trial court; (3) a one-page

petition to proceed IFP; (4) a three-page affidavit in connection with the IFP

petition; and (5) a one-page proposed order granting the IFP petition. See

Complaint, 4/25/25. Here, Jacobs, as the appellant, has the duty to ensure

the certified record, including the entirety of the complaint, is complete on

appeal. See Kessler v. Broder, 851 A.2d 944, 950 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(explaining that, “[I]t remains the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that a

complete record is produced for appeal. . . . The failure of the appellant to

ensure that the original record certified for appeal contains sufficient

information to conduct a proper review may constitute a waiver of the issues

sought to be examined.”) (citation omitted).

5 Jacobs alleges, incorrectly, that no trial judge ever reviewed his complaint

and that the Prothonotary wrongly acted alone in dismissing his complaint. In

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has been defined as one that lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

Under Rule 240(j), an action is frivolous if, on its face, it does not set forth a

valid cause of action.”); see also Pa.R.C.P. 240(j) (“If, simultaneous with the

commencement of an action [. . .], a party has filed a petition for leave to

proceed [IFP], the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the

action, [. . .] if [. . . the court] is satisfied that the action[. . .] is frivolous.”).

We emphasize that pro se litigants must comply with the law and they run the

risks of their self-representation. See Rich v. Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106, 1108

(Pa. Super. 2003) (“While this [C]ourt is willing to liberally construe materials

filed by a pro se litigant, we note that [the] appellant is not entitled to any

particular advantage because he lacks legal training. Further, any layperson

choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable

extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove

his undoing.”) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). As the trial

court correctly dismissed the complaint due to frivolousness, no relief is due.

We order that a copy of this decision is mailed to the attention of the

Prothonotary of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, directing

attention to the responsibilities set forth in footnote 1 of this decision.

Order affirmed.

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fact, the Honorable Jeffrey B. Engle’s signature, that of the assigned trial judge

in this case, appears: (1) at the end of the April 30 th order, dismissing the

complaint; and (2) at the end of the court’s opinion issued pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, requesting that this Court

affirm the dismissal order.

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J-S45032-25

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/20/2026

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