Sly

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

RODERICK SLY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:24-CV-00448-DGK

)

DOUGLAS COLLINS, SECRETARY, )

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

VETERANS AFFAIRS, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff Roderick Sly alleges claims for

discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation against Defendant Secretary of the

Department of Veterans Affairs for alleged actions at the Kansas City Veterans Affairs Medical

Center.

Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. ECF

No. 18. Finding that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that Defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court GRANTS the motion.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322–23 (1986). Material facts are those facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law,” and a genuine dispute over material facts is one “such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing a lack of a

genuine dispute as to any material fact, Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, and the Court views the

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that

party’s favor, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986).

But the nonmoving party “cannot simply rest on the allegations in [his] complaint.” Sherman v.

Collins, 158 F.4th 904, 907 (8th Cir. 2025). “Instead, he must substantiate his allegations with

sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere

speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Grant v. City of Blytheville, Arkansas, 841 F.3d 767, 770

(8th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

Undisputed Material Facts

The material, undisputed facts are as follows.1 Plaintiff Roderick Sly is a light-skinned

Black, African-American Male, 60, Disabled, who has engaged in protected activity. On July

17, 2022, Plaintiff was promoted from the position of Housekeeping Aid to Housekeeping Aid

Supervisor at the Kansas City Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“KCVAMC”) in Environmental

Management Service (“EMS”). EMS is responsible for housekeeping, janitorial, and sanitation

services at the KCVAMC. Plaintiff had worked at the KCVAMC for six years before the

promotion. Upon promotion, Plaintiff was subject to a one-year supervisory probationary period.

His first line supervisor was Jeremy Brown, and his second line supervisor was Dominique

1 The Court has limited the facts to those that are undisputed and material to the pending summary judgment motion.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); L.R. 56.1(a). The Court has excluded legal conclusions, argument

presented as fact, proposed facts which are duplicative of other proposed facts, and proposed facts which are not

admitted and not properly supported by the record or admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); L.R. 56.1(a).

The Court has included proposed material facts which have been improperly controverted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

L.R. 56.1(a).

The Court struck the majority if Plaintiff’s additional statement of facts, ECF No. 26, for failure to comply with the

Court’s orders and the Local Rules. ECF No. 31. As the Court notes below, even if the Court were to consider any

of Plaintiff’s stricken facts that were otherwise properly supported, its conclusions on the present motion would not

change.

Henderson. Brown is an African-America Male aged 47 at the relevant time, and Henderson is

an African-American Male aged 38 at the relevant time. Brown presented Plaintiff a

memorandum of Supervisory Expectations on July 29, 2022. Brown and Plaintiff signed the

memorandum.

On June 9, 2022, before Plaintiff’s promotion, Plaintiff authored a hostile work

environment complaint on behalf of his EMS Service Line against the EMS supervisors. The

complaint alleged: (1) Henderson and Brown were “in our department overnight in the guise of

evaluating third shift employees for two weeks, while both are present daily do (sic) not organize

an inspection of first and second shift;” (2) “Throughout the past two years, most employees are

unable to address management issues without discomfort and distrust;” (3) “Under current

management . . . there has been a revolving door of supervisors. In the last nine months, five

supervisors have resigned due to a lack of nonexistent leadership, which has resulted in an adverse

effect on EMS and all three tours of duty;” (4) “upper management has deliberately tried to set up

various employees to fail and have informed recent supervisors of those same actions;” (5) “This

environment has created completely unacceptable working conditions and is causing employees

mental stress, anxiety, depression, and conflict between all three tours of duty;” (6) “although there

was not any justification for management’s reasoning, third shift employees suspect that

previously written grievances filed against our department management ultimately resulted in

retaliation.” ECF No. 18-5 at 6; see id. at 1–4.

The VA issued a Fact Finding Report on August 17, 2022, that found insufficient evidence

to support the hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff also reported allegations of workplace

sexual harassment to his supervisors sometime in the weeks leading up to his promotion.

On December 16, 2022, about five months into Plaintiff’s supervisory probationary period,

Jeremy Brown issued Plaintiff a Written Counseling for failing to follow instructions. The

Counseling informed Plaintiff that he had not updated the stakeholder meeting calendar as

directed, had not completed a daily supervisor checklist as directed, and had not completed the

number of Walsh sanitation inspections he had been directed to complete.

On June 2, 2023, Henderson and Brown determined that Plaintiff failed to satisfactorily

complete his supervisory probationary period and demoted him to his previous role of

Housekeeping Aid, effective July 3, 2023. The demotion letter noted the following

conduct/performance deficiencies, some of which were raised in the December 16, 2022, Written

Counseling: Plaintiff’s (1) failure to upload his subordinates’ performance plan and release the

plan back to the employees electronically as directed (the “ePerformance plans”); (2) failure to

provide his supervisor with a list of his subordinates and the subordinates’ PIV badge deficiencies

by April 14, 2023, as directed; (3) apparent neglect of trash removal and cleaning supervision in

the Prosthetics Department; (4) failure to set up biweekly meetings with stakeholders and add the

meetings to stakeholders’ calendars as directed; (5) failure to have his subordinates sign the Code

of Conduct by April 5, 2023, as directed; (6) failure to complete the required number of weekly

Walsh inspections; (7) failure to obtain his subordinates’ uniform sizes to facilitate employee

adherence to the department’s uniform policy; and (8) failure to foster productive working

relationships. ECF No. 18-7 at 1–2. Brown and Henderson demoted two other employees

during the relevant time period. Both employees were black.

On June 9, 2023, a week after the demotion letter was issued, Plaintiff contacted facility

director Paula Roychaudhuri and an EEO Specialist raising issues with his work environment in

EMS. On June 12, 2023, Plaintiff requested reconsideration of his demotion. This request was

denied on June 26, 2023.

Plaintiff brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et seq.,2 for discrimination based on race, disability, sex, color, age, and engagement in protected

activity (Count I); hostile work environment based on race, disability, sex, color, age, and

engagement in protected activity (Count II); and retaliation (Count III).

Discussion

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation fail under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to

establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim because he does not provide evidence that

rises to the Eighth Circuit’s demanding standard for such a claim. Plaintiff argues he has

established prima facie cases for all his claims, and he can survive the McDonnell Douglas burden-

shifting framework on the discrimination and retaliation claims.

Before addressing these arguments, the Court must note a unifying deficiency in Plaintiff’s

briefing. Over the course of the last several years, Plaintiff’s counsel has appealed several cases

like this one to the Eighth Circuit. The plaintiffs in most of those cases also raised disparate

treatment/discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. The Eighth Circuit

routinely affirmed dismissal on the merits of claims because the plaintiffs’ claims fell well short

of the summary judgment standard. See Sherman v. Collins, 158 F.4th 904 (8th Cir. 2025);

Woods v. Collins, 150 F.4th 967 (8th Cir. 2025); Martinez-Medina v. Rollins, 144 F.4th 1091 (8th

Cir. 2025); Parker v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 129 F.4th 1104 (8th Cir. 2025); Hill v. McDonough,

No. 23-1797, 2024 WL 2890977 (8th Cir. June 10, 2024); Watson v. McDonough, 996 F.3d 850

(8th Cir. 2021).

2 The complaint also invokes the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., but, as explained in footnote 3 to this order, Plaintiff has not

administratively exhausted any claim related to these laws (e.g., failure to accommodate).

The Court relies on those decisions in its analysis below because they state the general law

that applies here, but they are also important because Plaintiff’s counsel employs the same

arguments and briefing tactics here that she used in those cases. In particular, many of her

arguments rely on bald assertions, speculation, and conclusory allegations rather than evidence.

So these decisions have controlling force on the merits issues addressed below. With that in

mind, the Court addresses each claim in turn.

I. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claim.

Assuming Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies on all claims,3 Defendant

argues that Plaintiff’s discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Plaintiff counters that he has satisfied

McDonnell Douglas.

Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework applies to a discrimination claim. Martinez-Medina, 144 F.4th at

3 The only claim accepted for administrative investigation was “Whether complainant was discriminated against based

on Race, Color, Sex, Age, Disability, and Reprisal when effective July 1, 2023, complainant was demoted from

Supervisor to Housekeeping Aide.” ECF No. 18-11 at 1. (All other references to the demotion effective date in the

record give “July 3, 2023.”) Defendant argues that the scope of Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims is

limited to the adverse action identified by this claim, namely, Plaintiff’s demotion. See Motion for Summary

Judgement, ECF No. 18 at 8–9. Defendant notes specifically that Plaintiff never amended his claims to include other

adverse actions—denial of reasonable accommodation and “[o]ther similar acts as set forth in the Background Facts

and Report of Investigation” (shift/schedule changes, occurrences relating to staff medical emergencies)—mentioned

in his complaint. See Complaint, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 45. Plaintiff only responds by asserting that the investigation

included questions about harassment because of Plaintiff’s prior hostile work environment complaint. ECF No. 22

at 2–4; see ECF No. 18 at 6. Though he does not say so explicitly, the Court assumes Plaintiff is arguing that his

hostile work environment claim has therefore been exhausted and is properly brought in this case. See Dorsey v.

Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 838 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he breadth of the civil suit is as broad as the scope

of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from the initial charge of discrimination.”)

(citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The Court assumes the discrimination, retaliation, and hostile

work environment claims brought here have been exhausted. Because Plaintiff points to nothing in the record and

makes no arguments concerning the other alleged adverse actions he mentions in his complaint, the Court finds they

have not been exhausted and does not consider them here. See Lindeman v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City, 899

F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding failure to accommodate claim not exhausted when it was not included in EEOC

Charge of Discrimination).

1096; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). “First, the plaintiff

has the burden of making a prima facie case of discrimination.” Heisler v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co., 931 F.3d 786, 794 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). That means she must prove: “(1) that

she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position and performed her

duties adequately; and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action under the circumstances

that would permit the court to infer that unlawful discrimination was involved.” Martinez-

Medina, 144 F.4th at 1096 (citation modified and quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiff makes

this showing, then the burden shifts to Defendant “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its adverse employment action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If Defendant

meets that burden, then Plaintiff must prove that “the proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “While the proof necessary to establish a prima face case is minimal,

[Plaintiff] must present more substantial evidence to establish pretext because evidence of pretext

. . . is viewed in light of the employer’s justification.” Mahler v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship,

931 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Despite this

shifting of the burden of production, the plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of

persuasion.” Heisler, 931 F.3d at 794.

Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim of discrimination because

he gives no evidence to support an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff counters that he has

satisfied all the elements for a prima facie case. Defendant also argues that even if Plaintiff could

establish a prima facie case, he cannot survive the final two steps of the McDonnell Douglas

framework. The Court agrees with Defendant.

Even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, he has not carried his burden under

McDonnell Douglas of producing evidence of pretext, which “is viewed in light of the employer’s

justification.” Mahler, 931 F.3d at 805. Defendant has made a compelling argument that

Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court need not address that

issue since Plaintiff cannot show pretext. Defendant has offered Plaintiff’s various alleged

failures to fulfill his supervisory duties as its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s

demotion. This showing satisfies Defendant’s burden under McDonnell Douglas and shifts the

burden back to Plaintiff to produce evidence that these proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are a

pretext for discrimination. Ryan v. Cap. Contractors, Inc., 679 F.3d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 2012)

(“[The Eighth Circuit has] consistently held that violating a company policy is a legitimate, non-

discriminatory rationale for terminating an employee.”); Cody v. Prairie Ethanol, LLC, 763 F.3d

992, 996 (8th Cir. 2014) (“This performance-related concern constitutes a legitimate, non-

discriminatory justification for discharging [the plaintiff]. Under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, the burden shifts back to [the plaintiff] to show a genuine dispute whether [the

defendant]’s justification is pretextual.”).

Plaintiff claims that a number of alleged failures of supervisory duty, which Defendant

gives as reasons for his demotion, “are provably false and therefore pretextual.” But that is not

the standard for proving pretext under McDonnell Douglas. “[E]ven if [Plaintiff] could show that

[Defendant]’s explanation for the demotion was false, his burden is higher than that—he must

show that [Defendant]’s decision was motivated by . . . discrimination.” Williams v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2020). “The employee may establish pretext either

by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or by

showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,” Martinez-Medina,

144 F.4th at 1096 (citation and quotation marks omitted), “because it has no basis in fact,”

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1047 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “A plaintiff may

make a sufficient showing of pretext by different means, including showing that an employer: (1)

failed to follow its own policies; (2) treated similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner;

and (3) made substantial changes over time in its proffered reason for an employment decision.”

Arnold v. Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. at Good Shepherd, LLC, 471 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 2006)

(citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031

(8th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant failed to follow its own policies or changed its

proffered reasons for demoting him, but he does argue disparate treatment. Plaintiff concedes

that some of the performance deficiencies given as grounds for his demotion are true, but he claims

other supervisors were treated differently than he was. To show that an employer treated

similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner, Plaintiff must show that the purported

“similarly-situated employees” are similarly-situated “in all relevant respects,” that is, they “must

have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the

same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Collins v. Kansas City

Missouri Pub. Sch. Dist., 92 F.4th 770, 772 (8th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). This is a

“rigorous” standard, id., and Plaintiff fails to meet it here.

With respect to the ePerformance plans and Code of Conduct signatures, Plaintiff asserts

(1) two other supervisors, Devin Mott and James Summers, were also late in uploading the

ePerformance plans but were not disciplined in any way; and (2) getting Code of Conduct

signatures was Mott and Summers’ responsibility, not Plaintiff’s, and they either accomplished the

task or were not disciplined for not doing so.4 According to Plaintiff’s opposition brief, Summers

is white and has not engaged in protected activity, Mott has not engaged in protected activity

4 Plaintiff’s briefing makes both assertions. See, e.g., ECF No. 21 at ¶ 22; ECF No. 22 at 11.

(Plaintiff does not identify Mott’s color or race), and neither Summers nor Mott is disabled.

Plaintiff offers no evidence that Summers and Mott answered to the same supervisors as he did or

were on a supervisory probationary period as he was during the relevant time. What Plaintiff has

asserted does not show these supervisors were similarly-situated to him in all relevant respects.

On the Walsh inspection reports, Plaintiff similarly asserts that certain other unidentified

supervisors failed to provide the required number of inspection reports but were not disciplined.

Here, Plaintiff offers even less evidence than with Summers and Mott and so likewise fails to show

that these “other supervisors” were similarly-situated to him in all relevant respects. None of

these other supervisors is a probative comparator.

Plaintiff claims that other alleged performance deficiencies are false. Again, Plaintiff’s

burden to show pretext goes beyond merely showing that Defendant’s explanation for the

demotion was false. Williams, 963 F.3d at 809. To show that Defendant’s proffered

explanations for its decision to demote Plaintiff have no basis in fact and should thus not be

believed because they are a pretext, Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s decision was motivated

by discrimination. See Sherman, 158 F.4th at 907–09; see also Parker, 129 F.4th at 1112.

Plaintiff fails to do so.

Plaintiff claims that the alleged performance deficiencies concerning the cleaning of the

prosthetics department, the uniform policy, the stakeholders’ calendar, and productive working

relationships are false. He offers no evidence, however, that Defendant’s demotion decision was

really motivated by discrimination. See Sherman, 158 F.4th at 907 (“The difficulty for Sherman

is that she doesn’t offer evidence that her race had anything to do with [the adverse employment

actions].”); id. at 908 (“She resorts to speculation and bald assertions of discrimination, and so a

reasonable jury could not find in her favor on this record.”).

Neither has Plaintiff even shown that Defendant’s explanations for why it demoted Plaintiff

have no basis in fact. Nothing in the record indicates anything more than possible mistakes by

Defendant concerning some of the alleged performance deficiencies, though even this is

questionable. As to these possible mistakes, Plaintiff offers no evidence to show that his

demotion was more likely due to his protected characteristics than to Defendant’s stated reasons.

Plaintiff’s demotion may not have been the best or even the fairest employment decision, but “[t]he

evidence must do more than raise doubts about the wisdom and fairness of the employer’s opinions

and actions—it must create a real issue as to the genuineness of the employer’s perceptions and

beliefs.” Rooney v. Rock-Tenn Converting Co., 878 F.3d 1111, 1118 (8th Cir. 2018). Moreover,

“[e]mployers are free to make employment decisions based upon mistaken evaluations, personal

conflicts between employees, or even unsound business practices.” Edmund v. MidAmerican

Energy Co., 299 F.3d 679, 685–86 (8th Cir. 2002). If Plaintiff has shown even this, he has

certainly shown no more. And even if the Court were to consider any of Plaintiff’s stricken facts

that were otherwise properly supported, the Court would come to the same conclusion.

Because Plaintiff has offered no evidence connecting his demotion to discrimination based

on a protected characteristic, he has failed to show pretext under McDonnell Douglas, and

Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claim.

II. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s retaliation claim cannot survive summary judgment under the

McDonnell Douglas framework. Plaintiff responds that he has satisfied McDonnell Douglas.

To make a prima facie case for retaliation, Plaintiff must show: “(1) [he] engaged in

protected conduct; (2) a reasonable employee would have found [his] employer’s retaliatory action

materially adverse; and (3) the materially adverse action was causally linked to [his] protected

conduct.” Parker, 129 F.4th at 1114 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth

Circuit “generally requires more than a mere temporal connection in order to infer causation,” id.,

“and the inference vanishes altogether when the time gap between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action is measured in months.” Warren v. Nucor Corp., 150 F.4th 990, 998

(8th Cir. 2025) (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted). “The plaintiff in a retaliation

case must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that her protected conduct

was a determinative factor in a materially adverse employment action taken by the employer.”

Hervey v. Cnty. of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 722 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s protected activity, the filing of a hostile work environment complaint, occurred

on June 9, 2022. ECF No. 18-9 at 1; ECF No. 21 at ¶ 7. Plaintiff also claims he complained

about sexual harassment against some of the members of his shift around the same time. ECF

No. 26 at ¶ 13. An email from Auna Ricks to Plaintiff dated March 9, 2022, refers to sexual

harassment, ECF No. 21-1 at 138, and an email from EEO Specialist Shakiesha James to Plaintiff

dated July 5, 2022, seems to acknowledge allegations of harassment, ECF No. 21-1 at 133.

Plaintiff was promoted on July 17, 2022, not long after he engaged in protected activity.

The adverse employment action at issue here, Plaintiff’s demotion, was announced on June 2,

2023, and was effective July 3, 2023, roughly a year after he engaged in protected activity. On

June 9, 2023, a week after the demotion letter was issued, Plaintiff contacted facility director Paula

Roychaudhuri and an EEO Specialist raising issues with his work environment in EMS. On June

12, 2023, Plaintiff requested reconsideration of his demotion. This request was denied on June

26, 2023.

This sequence of events—protected activity, promotion, demotion, work environment

complaint, request for reconsideration, denial of request—and the passage of nearly a year between

the first protected activity and the demotion could not allow a reasonable jury to infer a causal

relationship between Plaintiff’s protected activity and his demotion. See Sherman, 158 F.4th at

909 (alleged adverse action eight months after protected activity “too long to create an inference

of an improper motive”; adverse action occurring before later protected activity means the later

protected activity “could not have caused” the adverse employment action). Moreover, Plaintiff

may not retroactively inject protected activity into his employment situation to create an inference

of retaliation by raising work environment concerns after his demotion and immediately before

requesting reconsideration. See Hervey, 527 F.3d at 723 (“The wisdom of th[e] rule [requiring

more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and adverse employment action] is

evident in a case such as this, where the employee was accused of insubordination before she

notified the employer of her protected activity. Insubordinate employees may not insulate

themselves from discipline by announcing an intention to claim discrimination just before the

employer takes action. Evidence that the employer had been concerned about a problem before

the employee engaged in the protected activity undercuts the significance of the temporal

proximity.” (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted)). Thus, Plaintiff fails to make a prima

facie case of retaliation.

And, as with his discrimination claim, even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case

of retaliation, he has not carried his burden under McDonnell Douglas of producing evidence of

pretext. The same analysis of Defendant’s proffered reasons for demoting Plaintiff in the

discrimination context applies to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and the Court will not repeat it here.

And, as with the discrimination claim, even if the Court were to consider any of Plaintiff’s stricken

facts that were otherwise properly supported, the Court would come to the same conclusion.

Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

III. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim.

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim is legally insufficient under

Eighth Circuit precedent. Plaintiff argues he has satisfied the Eighth Circuit standard.

To establish a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) [he] is a

member of the class of people protected by Title VII; (2) [he] was subject to unwelcome

harassment; (3) the harassment resulted from [his] membership in the protected class; and (4) the

harassment was severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of [his] employment.”

Parker, 129 F.4th at 1113 (citation modified and internal quotation marks omitted). “In

determining whether a work environment was sufficiently hostile or abusive, we examine the

totality of the circumstances, including whether the discriminatory conduct was frequent and

severe; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, as opposed to merely an offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work performance.”

Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Co-op., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2006). While any race

or age-based “harassment in the workplace is unreasonable and may, in turn, have the effect of

interfering with an employee’s performance,” Parker, 129 F.4th at 1113 (citation modified and

internal quotation marks omitted), Plaintiff must present evidence sufficient for “a reasonable jury”

to “find that the work environment was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment

and create an abusive working environment,” Sherman, 158 F.4th at 910 ((citation modified and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Such standards are demanding,” id., for “Title VII does not

impose a general civility code for the American workplace,” id. at 907 (citation and quotation

marks omitted).

Plaintiff makes allegations of both hostile work environment discrimination (42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(a)) and hostile work environment retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The Eighth

Circuit recognizes that, under Supreme Court precedent, “retaliation claims under Title VII [can]

be based on a hostile work environment and need not be based solely on discrete adverse

employment actions that affect the terms or conditions of employment.” Stewart v. Indep. Sch.

Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe

Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)). To establish a claim for hostile work environment

retaliation, Plaintiff must “show [he] experienced harassment so severe or pervasive as to

constitute a materially adverse action.” Mahler, 931 F.3d at 807. The issue of severity “involves

both objective and subjective components. It requires that the harassment be severe or pervasive

enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment and the victim must

subjectively believe her working conditions have been altered.” Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d

1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016) (alterations and citations omitted).

Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to establish that any harassment resulted from Plaintiff’s

membership in a protected class or that the harassment was severe enough to affect the terms,

conditions, or privileges of Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff argues he has presented sufficient

evidence of these elements to survive summary judgment.

Plaintiff alleges a number of incidents from both before and after his promotion and

demotion to support his claims for harassment. See ECF No. 22 at 6–8; 14–16. But Plaintiff

does not show that these allegedly retaliatory actions resulted from his membership in a protected

class. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff provides no evidence that his race, color, age, or disability

played any role in any of these actions. See Woods, 150 F.4th at 973 (“These points do not further

his claim because he offers little more than speculation and conjecture the incidents had anything

to do with race.”); see also Sherman, 158 F.4th at 907. And the only connection to his protected

activity is a vague temporal connection, which, as the Court has noted, cannot, without more,

support a Title VII claim. See Warren, 150 F.4th at 998; Parker, 129 F.4th at 1114. Moreover,

Plaintiff’s allegations are unsupported, conclusory, and speculative. This is not enough to make

a prima facie claim of either discriminatory or retaliatory harassment. See Sherman, 158 F.4th at

907 (“speculation and bald assertions of discrimination” not enough for reasonable jury to find for

plaintiff); Palesch, 233 F.3d at 567, 570 (“speculation and conjecture” not enough to establish a

connection between alleged mistreatment and animus; Plaintiff’s “general allegations and opinion

testimony will not suffice” to make a prima facie case for retaliation). Plaintiff does no more than

“recit[e] a list of actions that [his supervisors] took against [him], and clai[m] they were taken

because [of his protected characteristics].” Hervey, 527 F.3d at 722 (8th Cir. 2008). This is

insufficient.

Neither do these allegations rise to the Eighth Circuit’s demanding standard for workplace

harassment. “Allegations of a few isolated or sporadic incidents will not suffice.” Carpenter v.

Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 618 (8th Cir. 2007). “[The conduct] must be so

intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment.” Sherman, 158 F.4th

at 910 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff may subjectively believe his working

conditions had altered, but the evidence Plaintiff offers does not establish that there was

harassment severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work

environment. Plaintiff does not give evidence of the frequency or degree of these actions and

offers no admissible evidence of physical threat or humiliation. While the alleged lack of

communication with his supervisors may have interfered with Plaintiff’s work performance, he

provides no evidence to connect this lack of communication to his protected characteristics.

Under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s actions do not rise to the level of a

hostile work environment under Eighth Circuit law. Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie

case of hostile work environment, and even if he had, the Court has already rejected Plaintiff’s

arguments for pretext, and that analysis applies equally here. And, as with the other claims, even

if the Court were to consider any of Plaintiff’s stricken facts that were otherwise properly

supported, the Court would come to the same conclusion.

Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to all

claims, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 19, 2026 /s/ Greg Kays

GREG KAYS, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT