The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
BRUCE A. BAZZETT,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 5:25-cv-115-TKW-MJF
JIMMY ROBERTS,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this section 1983
action against an employee of the City of Blountstown, Jimmy Roberts.
Plaintiff asserts that Roberts violated the Eighth Amendment when he
instructed Plaintiff to mow grass on a steep slope with a defective mower.
Because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible Eighth-
Amendment claim, the District Court should dismiss this civil action.
BACKGROUND
This civil action stems from an injury that Plaintiff suffered while
performing his prison work assignment.
In his original complaint, Plaintiff named two Defendants: the city
of Blountstown and one of its employees, Jimmy Roberts, in his official
capacity. Doc. 1. The undersigned conducted the statutorily-required
screening of the complaint. Because Plaintiff had failed to state an
official-capacity claim, the undersigned advised Plaintiff of the pleading
deficiencies and afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
complaint. Doc. 7.
Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Doc. 8. Plaintiff named
only Jimmy Roberts as a Defendant. Plaintiff asserts only an official-
capacity, Eighth-Amendment claim against Roberts. Id. at 2. In support
of his claim, Plaintiff alleges that on April 2, 2025, Plaintiff was assigned
to an off-site prison work assignment that entailed mowing the grass
along the roads in Blountstown, Florida. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6. Defendant ordered
Plaintiff to mow the grass on a hill behind a guardrail. Although Plaintiff
twice expressed concern about mowing on the slope.1 But Defendant
responded that it had been done before and ordered Plaintiff to continue
working. Id. ¶¶ 8–10.
While Plaintiff was mowing, the mower slid down the hill. Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff attempted to stop the mower’s descent by applying the parking
brake, but the parking brake was broken. Id. Plaintiff’s foot became stuck
1 Plaintiff does not elaborate what precisely he told Defendant.
between a wheel and the cutting deck of the mower. Id. ¶ 13. The mower
dragged Plaintiff down the hill. As a result, Plaintiff’s leg fractured in
three places. Id. ¶¶ 14, 22.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s safety by requiring Plaintiff to mow the steep hill with a
defective mower. Doc. 8 at 11. Plaintiff requests $75,000 in compensatory
damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. Id.
STANDARD
The District Court is required to review Plaintiff’s complaint,
identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma
pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim
upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). To
survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts only an official-capacity claim against Defendant.
While an individual-capacity suit “seeks to impose personal liability upon
a government official for actions he takes under color of state law,” official
capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)); Busby v. City of
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus, in a section 1983
action “a claim against a defendant in his official capacity is the same as
a claim against his employer.” Christman v. Saint Lucie Cnty. Fla., 509
F. App’x 878, 879 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala.,
520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is an
employee of the city of Blountstown, Florida. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim
against Defendant in his official capacity essentially is a claim against
the city of Blountstown.
“Prison work environments which compel inmates to perform
physical labor which is beyond their strength, endangers their lives, or
causes undue pain constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Howard v.
King, 707 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). To state a claim for deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, a plaintiff must allege
(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant’s deliberate
indifference to that risk; and (3) causation. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50
F.3d 1579, 1582 (11 Cir. 1995). A governmental entity, however, “is liable
under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a ‘moving force’ behind the
deprivation . . . ; thus, in an official capacity suit the entity's ‘policy or
custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Graham,
473 U.S. at 166 (citations omitted). In other words, to establish liability
against a state actor in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) the plaintiff’s constitutional right was violated; (2) there was a custom
or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional
right; and (3) the policy or custom caused the violation of the plaintiff’s
right. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95; McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283,
1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
A policy is “a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality,
or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be
acting on behalf of the municipality.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton,
117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff also may allege that that
a constitutional violation was caused by a custom, which is a “practice
that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law” or is a
“persistent and wide-spread practice.” Id. “A single incident would not be
so pervasive as to be a custom or practice.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335
F.3d 1326, 1330 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim because he fails to allege
that a custom or policy caused the Constitutional violation. Plaintiff fails
to allege any fact that would support an inference that the city of
Blountstown officially adopted a policy of requiring prisoners to perform
physical labor that endangers their lives or causes undue pain. Similarly,
Plaintiff fails to allege that Blountstown had a longstanding and
widespread practice of requiring prisoners to perform physical labor that
endangers their lives or causes undue pain. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that
on one occasion, he suffered an injury because his supervisor failed to
perceive a risk. This is insufficient to state an Eighth-Amendment claim.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief despite
the undersigned affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his
complaint, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the
District Court:
1. DISMISS pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915 this civil
action.
2. DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida on February 18, 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b). Objections to these proposed findings and
recommendations must be filed within fourteen days of
the date of the report and recommendation. A party
who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in an R&R waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule
3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.