LaFauci

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

STEPHANIE LAFAUCI,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-cv-00081

BOONE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’, Boone County Board of Education (“BCBOE”);

Anthony Tagliente; Jacob Jones; and Jeff Huffman (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to

Dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) For the reasons discussed herein, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from Plaintiff Stephanie LaFauci’s (“Plaintiff”) employment as a teacher

for BCBOE. Plaintiff was employed by BCBOE as a physical education teacher and girls'

volleyball and basketball coach from August 17, 2011, until her resignation in August of 2022,

and then was subsequently rehired in 2023. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 13.) On June 1, 2018, Plaintiff alleges

she engaged in protected activity when she made a complaint under Title IX regarding inequitable

treatment within BCBOE athletic programs. (Id. at ¶14.) Specifically, Plaintiff complained of

inequitable treatment between the girls' softball facility and the boys' baseball facility. (Id.)

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Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants began retaliating against her “almost immediately.” (Id. at

¶15.)

According to Plaintiff, the retaliation took the form of “limit[ing] the girls’ volleyball and

basketball teams that Plaintiff coached to only three for the entire season which consisted of more

than three away games,” limiting “the number of buses available to the girls’ volleyball and

basketball teams that Plaintiff coached,” and requiring Plaintiff “to submit a written plan as to how

her teams would travel to away games and how meals would be provided while none of the coaches

of the boys’ teams were required to do so.” (Id. at ¶15–20.)

On September 17, 2018, Plaintiff attended a meeting of BCBOE's board to raise concerns

about the bussing issues for her team and to obtain a copy of BCBOE’s transportation policy. (Id.

at ¶21.) Plaintiff claims that the Defendants retaliated against her again following this action.

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges she was required to submit lesson plans for her volleyball practices while

none of the coaches of the boys’ teams were required to do so. (Id at ¶22.)

Following Plaintiff’s Title IX complaint, the Department of Education initiated an

investigation, which led to a mediation on October 25, 2018. (Id. at ¶24–25.) Plaintiff alleges

Defendants subsequently failed to comply fully with the obligations imposed by the mediation

agreement, particularly with respect to improving the girls’ athletic facilities and fields. (Id. at

¶28–30.) Plaintiff further alleges that when the Department of Education was informed that

BCBOE had not complied, BCBOE believed that Plaintiff made a second separate Title IX

complaint. (Id. at ¶31.)

Plaintiff alleges that on August 19, 2019, BCBOE retaliated against her for making a Title

IX complaint by denying a field trip request. (Id. at ¶¶31–35.) Plaintiff also alleges that on

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October 1, 2019, she did not receive a state mandated pay increase for special education teachers.

(Id. at ¶36.) She claims that this failure to increase her compensation constituted further

retaliation for her Title IX activity. (Id.)

On May 24, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that a parent entered the athletic field and threatened

her. (Id. at ¶43.) Plaintiff claims she reported this incident to both Defendant Jones and

Defendant Tagliente. (Id. at ¶44.) Plaintiff claims that BCBOE previously enforced a policy

under which parents who threatened coaches were banned for one year from extracurricular

activities. (Id. at ¶45.) However, in this instance, the parent was permitted to continue attending

extracurricular activities. (Id. at ¶46.) Plaintiff maintains the Defendants’ failure to discipline

this parent was in retaliation against Plaintiff for her Title IX Complaint. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that during an employment evaluation in 2022, Defendant Jones failed to

finalize the evaluation with her in violation of state policy. (Id. at ¶48.) Plaintiff further contends

Defendant Jones provided false information about her without affording her an opportunity to rebut

the same in violation of state policy. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Jones’ conduct was due to

her gender and in retaliation for her Title IX Complaint. (Id.)

On or about July 1, 2022, Plaintiff applied for the Assistant Principal/Athletic Director at

Van High School within BCBOE. (Id. at ¶51.) Plaintiff alleges that a less qualified male

applicant was hired in retaliation for having made a Title IX complaint. (Id.) In August of 2022,

Plaintiff resigned her position with BCBOE due to the discrimination and retaliation she had faced

and took a position with Logan County Board of Education (“LCBOE”). (Id. at ¶54.) While at

LCBOE, Plaintiff claims Defendant Huffman was appointed Superintendent at LCBOE and

retaliated against Plaintiff for her Title IX Complaint by refusing to compensate her for her

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planning period. (Id. at ¶54.) In response Plaintiff engaged in an alleged protected activity by

filing a grievance on which she prevailed and obtained her back pay. (Id. at ¶55.)

On or after July 12, 2023, Plaintiff applied for the Assistant Principal/Athletic Director

position at Sherman High School, part of Defendant BCBOE. (Id. at ¶56.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Barnette and Linville hired a less qualified male applicant, discriminating against her

based on her gender and in retaliation for having filed a Title IX complaint. (Id. at ¶59.)

On or about August 1, 2023, Plaintiff applied and was hired for a position at Scott High

School, part of BCBOE. (Id. at ¶61.) On September 1, 2023, Plaintiff applied for a Child

Nutrition Director position with BCBOE. (Id. at ¶63.) Plaintiff claims that on or about October

2, 2023, BCBOE retaliated against her for filing a Title IX complaint by hiring a female candidate

for the Child Nutrition Director position who had been only an elementary school teacher with no

management or nutrition experience. (Id. at ¶65.)

In response to this alleged conduct, Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC (“Charge”) on

October 9, 2023, which was then transferred to the West Virginia Human Rights Commission

(“WVHRC”) on or about December 8, 2023. (ECF No. 10 at 6). EEOC notified BCBOE of

Plaintiff’s complaint on or about November 10, 2023. (ECF No. 1. 68.) On October 14, 2023,

Plaintiff asserts BCBOE retaliated against her for filing an EEOC complaint by suddenly and

without warning discontinuing use of Plaintiff’s business as an approved vendor for Defendant

BCBOE for a school fundraiser. (Id. at ¶69.) The EEOC and WVHRC issued a Notices of Right

to Sue on November 30, 2024 and January 8, 2025. (Id. at ¶74.)

Consequently, Plaintiff brought this suit against the Defendants. (See ECF No. 1) The

Complaint contains the following counts: (1) Count I – Gender Discrimination/Retaliation in

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Violation of Title VII; (2) Count II – Retaliation in Violation of Title IX; (3) Count III – EEOC

Retaliation; and (4) Count IV – Violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”).

(Id.)

Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss on April 28, 2025. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff

filed a response, (ECF No. 12), and the Defendants filed a reply, (ECF No. 13). As such, this

motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted tests the

legal sufficiency of a civil complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A plaintiff must allege sufficient

facts, which, if proven, would entitle him to relief under a cognizable legal claim. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007). A case should be dismissed if, viewing the

wellpleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Id. at 570. In applying this standard, a court must utilize a two-pronged approach.

First, it must separate the legal conclusions in the complaint from the factual allegations.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Second, assuming the truth of only the factual

allegations, the court must determine whether the plaintiff’s complaint permits a reasonable

inference that “the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Well-pleaded factual

allegations are required; labels, conclusions, and a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214

(4th Cir. 2016) (“Bare legal conclusions ‘are not entitled to the assumption of truth’ and are

insufficient to state a claim.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)). A plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations

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must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” thereby “nudg[ing] [the]

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may also seek dismissal based on an

applicable statute of limitations in certain circumstances. “Although a motion pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not an analysis of potential

defenses to the claims set forth therein, dismissal nevertheless is appropriate when the face of the

complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense.” Brooks v. City of

Winston–Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir.1996). See also Darden v. Cardinal Travel Ctr., 493

F.Supp.2d 773, 775 (W.D. Va.2007) (citing Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v.

Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir.1993)) (“[A] defense of the statute of limitations may be raised in

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where that defense appears clearly on the face of the complaint.”).

The requirement that a charge of discrimination be filed timely with the EEOC is similar

to a statute of limitations defense in that it is an affirmative defense subject to waiver, estoppel,

and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1133

(1982). Therefore, a defendant may seek dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where it asserts that

a plaintiff has failed to file a charge in a timely manner. Douglas v. Norton, 167 Fed.Appx. 698,

704–05 (10th Cir.2006).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Official Capacity Claims and Punitive Damages

i. Official Capacity Claims

The Court will begin with the official capacity claims. The Defendants move to dismiss

all claims against Defendants Anthony Tagliente, Jacob Jones, and Jeff Huffman, in

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their official capacities on the grounds they are duplicative of the claims against BCBOE. (ECF

No. 10 at 5.) The Court agrees.

“An official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against

the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Thus, in official-capacity suits, the

“real party in interest” is not the named official, but the entity that employs him; and the damages

sought to be recovered will not come from the pockets of the named official, but rather from the

treasury of the entity that employs him. Id. As such, suits against individuals in

their official capacities should be dismissed as duplicative when the entity that those individuals

serve is also named as a defendant. See Love–Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th

Cir.2004).

Here, Plaintiff has named BCBOE as a defendant, in addition to suing Tagliente, Jones,

and Huffman in both their individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Because an

official-capacity claim is functionally a claim against the government entity itself, permitting those

claims to proceed would amount to suing BCBOE twice in the same action.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Tagliente, Jones, and Huffman in their official

capacities are DISMISSED as duplicative of the claims asserted against BCBOE.

ii. Punitive Damages

The Defendants also argue that the claims against them for punitive damages should be

dismissed because West Virginia Code Section 29-12A-17 prohibits an award

of punitive damages against a municipality or political subdivision. (ECF No. 10 at 13.)

Plaintiff concedes that West Virginia law does, in fact, prohibit an award of punitive damages to

a municipality or political subdivision. (See ECF No. 12 at 9.) Accordingly, the Defendants'

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motion to dismiss the claims for punitive damages against BCBOE should be granted. However,

Plaintiff is not prohibited from recovering punitive damages against the Defendants in their

individual capacities. See P.A. v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:19-CV-00705, 2020 WL

4740481M *11 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 14, 2020) (holding that under the plain language of the statute,

it does not prohibit or otherwise limit punitive damages against employees of political

subdivisions.) (Johnston, J.); see also Huggins v. City of Westover Sanitary Sewer Bd., 712 S.E.2d

482 (W.Va. 2011).

Therefore, the claims for punitive damages against BCBOE are DISMISSED.

B. Timeliness

The Defendants argue that “many” of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, because they are

predicated on alleged discriminatory/retaliatory acts that occurred outside of the applicable

statutory windows and weren’t included in the Charge. (ECF No. 10 at 9.) As such, the

Defendants contend that the claims were not preserved by their “respective tolling provisions[.]”

(Id.) Notwithstanding the Defendants’ conflation of multiple distinct legal concepts, the Court

will disentangle those issues and address each in turn.

i. Title VII

First, the Defendants argue that some of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are time-barred because

they relate to incidents that occurred more than 300 days before Plaintiff’s filing of the Charge

with the EEOC. (See ECF No. 10 at 9.) The Court agrees.

Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC or, in a

“deferral” jurisdiction such as West Virginia, with an appropriate state or local agency, within a

specified time “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–

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5(e)(1), 2000e–5(f)(1); see Sloop v. Memorial Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 148 (4th Cir.

1999). Title VII establishes two possible limitation periods for filing a discrimination charge: the

basic limitations period is 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice but can be

extended to 300 days in a deferral state if state law proscribes the alleged employment practice

and the charge is first filed with a state deferral agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); see also

Whitaker v. Nash Cnty., 504 F. App'x 237, 240 (4th Cir. 2013). When a charge is filed with the

EEOC and referred to the appropriate state deferral agency, the 300-day period applies.

See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 111, 122–25 (1988).

Here, Plaintiff filed her Charge with the EEOC on October 9, 2023, which was then

transferred to the WVHRC on or about December 8, 2023. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) Applying the

300-day filing window, Plaintiff cannot prevail on any claim under Title VII based upon

misconduct alleged to have occurred before December 12, 2022. The pleadings establish that

Plaintiff alleged within her Charge that she applied to three positions in total that she was qualified

for yet not hired: (1) one position in October 2023, and (2) two other positions sometime in 2021

and 2022. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) Moreover, the Defendants allege that the Charge did not include

any of the allegations of discriminatory retaliation asserted in paragraphs 15–20 (occurring in

2018), 22 (2018), 32–38 (2019), 42–46 (2021), 47–48 (2022), and 54–55 (2022) of the Complaint.

(ECF No. 10 at 7.)1

1 The Defendants’ argument references allegations “not raised in the Charge of Discrimination.” (ECF No. 10 at 7.)

The Fourth Circuit has made it clear that only those discrimination claims stated in an administrative charge, those

reasonably related to the original charge, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original charge, may

be maintained in a subsequent lawsuit. See Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir.

1996). This is known as the exhaustion requirement. Id. However, this requirement is not jurisdictional but rather

a claim-processing rule. Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543 (2019). As such, failure to exhaust

administrative remedies operates as an affirmative defense that may be forfeited or waived if not timely asserted. Id.

at 549. Despite the administrative filing requirement, because the Defendants frame their arguments for dismissal

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Thus, Plaintiff’s only timely raised issue in the Charge is her allegation that she was

rejected from an open position in 2023. (Id. at 7.) 2 Accordingly, applying the October 9, 2023,

charge date, Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation/discrimination claim is time-barred with respect to all

alleged incidents occurring before December 12, 2022.3

ii. WVHRA

Plaintiff’s WVHRA claims are similarly untimely. A plaintiff making claims of

discrimination under the WVHRA with the WVHRC is required to file a complaint with the

WVHRC “within 365 days after the alleged act of discrimination.” Woodrum v. Thomas

Memorial Hosp. Foundation Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 538, 540 (S.D. W.Va. 1999). A plaintiff,

however, may also choose to file the complaint in a court instead of with the WVHRC. Id. If a

plaintiff chooses to do so, a two-year statute of limitations applies. Sesay v. Montgomery Ward

& Co., Inc., 937 F.Supp. 563, 566–67 (S.D. W.Va. 1996) (citations omitted). The plaintiff must

choose one of these two methods of bringing a claim under the WVHRA. Id. The statute of

limitations for employment discrimination cases brought to enforce rights under the WVHRA,

solely in terms of statutes of limitations and tolling, and do not expressly assert failure to exhaust, the Court confines

its analysis to the arguments presented.

2 Plaintiff also asserts a claim of EEOC retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203. (ECF No. 1, ¶84.) Claims of retaliation

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §12203 are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 12117 which provides “[t]he powers, remedies,

and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers,

remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to … to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability

in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning

employment.” (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not allege disability discrimination. Accordingly, this claim is

DISMISSED.

3 The Defendants claim that only “grounds … asserted in the charge remained protected by the applicable tolling

provisions.” (ECF No. 10 at 9.) However, the Defendants fail to reference any specific tolling provisions. Even

so, while it is true that Title VII claims may be tolled for a temporary period during the administrative process, that

only applies to timely claims. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 593 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that pending EEOC

determinations tolled a statute of limitations but noting that “it is not the mere filing of a claim that we hold equitably

tolls the statute, but rather an apparently favorable agency decision.”) Thus, in the absence of equitable tolling or

equitable estoppel, neither of which Plaintiff asserts, the mere filing of a charge does not revive claims that were

already untimely. See Lekas v. United Airlines, Inc., 282 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir.2002).

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including allegations of discrimination, begins to run from the date a plaintiff first learns of the

adverse employment decision. Metz v. E. Associated Coal, LLC, 239 W. Va. 157, 161, 799 S.E.2d

707, 710 (2017).

Here, Plaintiff filed her Charge with the EEOC on October 9, 2023, which was then

transferred to the WVHRC on or about December 8, 2023. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) Applying the

365-day filing period, any conduct occurring before December 8, 2022, is untimely as a matter of

law and thus DISMISSED.

iii. Title IX

Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claims are likewise untimely. The Defendants contend that

Plaintiff’s Title IX claims are timely to the extent they accrued no earlier than October 2, 2021.

(ECF No. 10 at 9.) In doing so, the Defendants are calculating the limitations period based on the

date Plaintiff filed her EEOC Charge, rather than from the date of filing this civil action. (Id.)

This calculation is incorrect.

Title IX does not contain an express statute of limitations. Wilmink v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., 214 F. App'x 294, 296 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, courts should apply “the most closely

analogous statute of limitations under state law.” Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319,

323–24 (1989); Wolsky v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Rds., 1 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 1993). In this

case, the most analogous statute of limitations under state law is West Virginia's two-year personal

injury limitations period. See W. Va.Code § 55–2–12 (2000).

“Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement and no notice

provisions.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 247 (2009). As a result, the

filing of an EEOC charge is not a prerequisite to suit and does not, by itself, determine the

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limitations period for a Title IX claim. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454

(1975) (holding that a limitations period does not toll, and thus the statute of limitations continues

to run, on a claim that requires no administrative exhaustion while a plaintiff pursues

administrative remedies on other claims that do require exhaustion.)

Further, although the statute of limitations is defined by state law, the question of when a

cause of action accrues is one of federal law. Howell v. Cnty. Comm. of Hampshire County, No.

21-1023, 2022 WL 61428 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022). Accordingly, a

plaintiff's Title IX claim accrues when she has or should have “possession of the critical facts that

[s]he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122

(1979). “When the plaintiff becomes aware of these two facts, he is on inquiry notice and has a

duty to inquire about reasonably discoverable details.” Slaey v. Adams, No. 1:08cv354, 2008 WL

5377937 (E.D. Va. Dec. 23, 2008).

Thus, Plaintiff was required to file suit within two years of the accrual of each claim. Id.

Here, Plaintiff possessed the critical facts necessary to place her on notice of her injury as early as

2018, when she initially filed her Title IX complaint, and she alleges similar conduct spanning the

following five years. (See generally ECF No. 1, ¶¶15–70.) Plaintiff did not file this action until

February, 2025. (Id. at 1.) Therefore, any Title IX claims based on acts occurring before

February 2023 are DISMISSED as time barred.

iv. Continuing Violation Doctrine

Plaintiff does not dispute the applicability of the above-mentioned statutory limitation

periods. (See ECF No. 12 at 5.) Rather, she argues that the “continuing violation doctrine”

makes all of her claims timely. (Id.) In reply, Defendants argue that the continuing

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violation doctrine is inapplicable here because Plaintiff's claimed wrongs of discrimination and

retaliation are considered “discrete acts” for purposes of determining statute of limitations issues.

(ECF No. 13 at 3.) (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)). The

Court agrees.

The continuing violation doctrine does not operate as Plaintiff would have it apply.

Rather, as explained in Morgan and later cases, acts that allegedly happened to Plaintiff—the

denial of field trips, denial of pay increases, the failure to discipline a parent’s outburst, alleged

misconduct during an employment evaluation, and several failures to hire—are discrete acts, not

“continuing violations.” Id. With discrete acts, the statute of limitations begins to run when the

act occurs. Id. at 114 (“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer or

refusal to hire are easy to identify.”) (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff alleges acts of discrimination and retaliation beginning in 2018 after she

filed her initial Title IX complaint, as well as failures to hire in 2021, 2022, and 2023. (ECF No.

1, ¶¶15–70.) Each of these alleged actions constitutes a discrete employment decision. As

explained above, many of these acts occurred well outside the applicable limitations’ periods.

The continuing violation doctrine does not make them timely. See Stanley v. Trs. of Cal. St.

Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if

time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges[.]”) (citing Nat'l

R.R. Passenger Corp, 536 U.S. at 112–13). Moreover, the “continuing ill effects of an original

violation” do not constitute a continuing violation. A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d

342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011). Nor would subsequent failures to hire revive a time-barred failure to

hire. Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2004).

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning acts outside the applicable limitations’

periods are not saved by the continuing violation doctrine and may not proceed.

C. Failure to State a Claim

Lastly, the Defendants contend that the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for

retaliation or discrimination. (ECF No. 13 at 5.)

i. Title VII and the WVHRA

Plaintiff’s factual allegations are insufficient to support the claims asserted against the

Defendants. For example, Plaintiff purports to bring a claim that she was not hired because of

her sex in violation of Title VII and the WVHRA. (See generally ECF No. 1, ¶¶15–70.)

To do so, however, Plaintiff is “required to allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause

of action created by [Title VII] i.e., in this case, that the [defendant] ‘failed or refused to hire’ [her]

‘because of [her] ... sex[.]’” McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Dep't of Transp., State Highway

Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e– 2(a)(1)). The

requirements for Plaintiff to prove a violation of the WVHRA are the same. See Barefoot v.

Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 457 (1995) (holding an employment discrimination claim

under the WVHRA mirrors an identical claim under Title VII). Likewise, to state a retaliation

claim, a plaintiff must allege facts permitting an inference that she suffered materially adverse

employment action because of a protected activity. Strothers v. City of Laurel, Maryland, 895

F.3d 317, 327 (4th Cir. 2018).

Assertions, as here, of “a formulaic recitation of the elements” will not suffice. McCleary-

Evans, 780 F.3d at 585 (citations omitted). Plaintiff's assertions that the Defendants refused to

hire her for positions due to her gender, and in retaliation, fail to meet the basic pleading standard.

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(See ECF No. 1, ¶¶51; 59.) Plaintiff claims that less qualified applicants were hired to positions

she applied to. (Id.) This does not suffice, given that allegations that adverse actions took place

“despite experience” and “employer accolades” are insufficient to permit an inference of

discrimination or retaliation. See McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 586. As such, the complaint is

wholly lacking in factual content regarding the circumstances of the alleged failure to hire and are

thus insufficient to support a Title VII claim thereon. See id. (“While the allegation that non-

Black decisionmakers hired non-Black applicants instead of the plaintiff is consistent with

discrimination, it does not alone support a reasonable inference that the decisionmakers were

motivated by bias[;] [plaintiff] can only speculate that the persons hired were not better qualified,

or did not perform better during their interviews, or were not better suited based on experience and

personality for the positions.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII and WVHRA claims are DISMISSED.

ii. Title IX

Plaintiff’s Title IX claims are likewise insufficiently supported by factual allegations.

Courts in the Fourth Circuit generally evaluate Title IX employment discrimination claims under

the same analysis as Title VII. Reid v. James Madison Univ., 90 F.4th 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2024)

(citing Preston v. Comm. Ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994)).

Accordingly, the analysis for Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is nearly identical to the analysis of her

Title VII and WVHRA claim.

In support of her claim, Plaintiff alleges that various actions, including the denial of field

trips, denial of pay increases, the failure to discipline a parent’s outburst, alleged misconduct

during an evaluation, and several failures to hire were the result of discrimination and retaliation

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for filing a Title IX complaint. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶15–70.) These allegations are each conclusory

and need not be accepted as true by the Court. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is DISMISSED.

iii. Leave to Amend

The Defendants suggest that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

(See ECF No. 13 at 7.) However, “unless the grounds for dismissal clearly indicate that no

amendment in the complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case,” then dismissal without

prejudice is required with opportunity for plaintiff to seek leave to amend. See Goode v. Cent.

Virginia Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., Hancock v. Americo

Fin. Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 723 F. App'x 241, 242 (4th Cir. 2018) (dismissing appeal and

remanding case for amendment of complaint).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants are deficient because Plaintiff fails to plead

sufficient facts supporting the claims. As such, dismissal of those claims against the Defendants

must be without prejudice, and Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to amend the complaint or

to “stand on the complaint” as the circumstances may dictate. Goode, 807 F.3d at 629.

Accordingly, in the event Plaintiff seeks to pursue her claims against the Defendants in this Court,

Plaintiff must, within 21 days of the date of this order, file a motion for leave to amend the

complaint, accompanied by a proposed amended complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (ECF

No 9.) Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Anthony Tagliente, Jacob Jones, and Jeff Huffman

in their official capacities are DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against

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BCBOE is DISMISSED. Plaintiffs claims arising from acts occurring outside of the applicable

limitations’ periods under Title VII, the WVHRA, and Title IX are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's

remaining claims against Defendants Anthony Tagliente, Jacob Jones, and Jeff Huffman in their

individual capacities and against BCBOE are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff

is allowed 21 days from the date of this order to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint, in

accordance with the requirements set forth herein

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any

unrepresented party.

ENTER: March 17, 2026

GE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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