Grant

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

CARL LEE GRANT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-04187-JEH

FURMANKE, et al.,

Defendants.

Merit Review Order

Plaintiff Carl Grant, proceeding pro se and civilly detained in the Rushville

Treatment and Detention Facility (“Rushville”) pursuant to the Illinois Sexually

Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, files a Second Amended

Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights.

(Doc. 16). This case is before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Plaintiff also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 17). The

“privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the

many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound

discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded

to them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). A

court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time” if the action is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been

paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court will grant leave to proceed in

forma pauperis only if Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint states a federal claim.

I

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A

claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Second Amended

Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing

them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United

States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II

Plaintiff files suit against Personal Property Coordinator A. Reische and

Security Therapy Aides Furmanek, Fackrell, Martinez, S. Allen, Tomlinson, Reich,

Joshua, Claascen, Donna, and Kindhart.

On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff was sitting at a table in the dayroom and

working on his Xbox game controller. Defendant Furmanek was walking around

the dayroom and watching Plaintiff. Defendant Furmanek informed her superior

that Plaintiff was doing something dangerous.

On March 26, 2025, Defendants Fackrell, Martinez, Allen, and Tomlinson

conducted a shakedown of Plaintiff’s room and “committed robbery” by

confiscating his electronics. (Doc. 16 at p. 5). Plaintiff alleges Defendants should be

arrested and charged for impersonating law enforcement officers.

Defendants Fackrell and Martinez called Plaintiff to a small room,

conducted a pat down, and questioned him about his plastic tweezers. Plaintiff

returned to his room, got the tweezers, and gave them to Defendant Fackrell.

Plaintiff alleges he received a search receipt for his tweezers, which were

wrongfully considered contraband. Plaintiff received an incident report for a

minor violation.

On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff received a major report for damage or misuse

of property or for contraband/unauthorized property. Plaintiff alleges this was

the second disciplinary report for the same incident.

On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff was called before the Behavior Committee.

Plaintiff admitted he worked on toy controllers. Plaintiff claims the facility does

not have the right to stop residents from having their personal property repaired.

Plaintiff claims the Behavior Committee had already been commanded what to

do, as Defendant Furmanek only harasses the black residents.

Plaintiff claims Defendant Reische, the Property Coordinator, held his

electronics for eight days during March Madness, which Plaintiff claims

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Reische

did not return his radios or his Xbox 360 game system.

On May 14, 2025, Defendants Reich, Joshua, Claasen, Donna, and Kindhart

conducted another shakedown of Plaintiff’s room and confiscated watch pins, an

emery board, remotes, pens, and electronics. Plaintiff’s property was returned to

him on May 16, 2025. Plaintiff received an incident report for contraband items,

including watch pins and an ink pen he chewed on to allegedly form a tool.

III

Plaintiff claims he was denied his electronics without due process or

justification. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits

states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. “To state a property loss claim under

the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of liberty or

property without due process of law. If the state provides an adequate remedy,

Plaintiff has no civil rights claim.” Cason v. Hare, No. 19-CV-00885-JPG, 2019 WL

6054823, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2019) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36

(1984)). “[T]he Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an adequate post-

deprivation remedy in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. Thus,

Plaintiff must pursue any claims for the loss of his property in the Illinois Court of

Claims.” Harbaugh v. Scott, No. 19-4240, 2020 WL 1917831, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 20,

2020) (quoting Cason, 2019 WL 6054823, at *2) (internal citations omitted); see also

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his constitutional rights by

“impersonating law enforcement officers,” conducting shakedowns of his room,

and confiscating his property. (Doc. 16 at p. 6). Shakedowns of residents’ rooms

occur routinely at Rushville, especially if a resident is suspected of having

contraband. See Morris v. Phillips, No. 09-CV-3221, 2012 WL 606747, at *2 (C.D. Ill.

Feb. 24, 2012); Powers v. Wilcoxen, No. 18-4059, 2020 WL 5103195, at *2 (C.D. Ill.

Aug. 14, 2020). Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by

conducting a shakedown on March 26, 2025 and May 14, 2025.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Furmanek harasses black residents at Rushville.

“The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals

against intentional, arbitrary discrimination by government officials.” Lauderdale

v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 909–10 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hayden ex

rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2014)). “To state

a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he: (1) is a member of a protected

class; (2) is otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class; (3)

suffered an adverse . . . action; [and] (4) was treated differently from members of

the unprotected class . . . .” McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 226 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir.

2000), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir.

2013); see also Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2006).

However, “isolated events that adversely affect individuals are not presumed to

be a violation of the equal protection clause.” Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104

(7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980)). As such,

a “mere inconsistency” in prison management “may not in itself constitute a

cognizable equal protection claim.” Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir.

1982) (quoting Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir. 1978)). A plaintiff must

“do more than establish a reasonable probability that he was the victim of an

erroneous decision; he [must] establish a reasonable likelihood that state officials

had purposefully and intentionally discriminated against him . . . .” Shango v.

Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff’s sparse and conclusory

allegations against Defendant Furmanek are insufficient to proceed on a

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

Although the Court has discretion to permit Plaintiff to file a third amended

complaint, it is unnecessary when, as here, the Court finds that any amendment to

the claims raised in Plaintiff’s pleading would be futile. Plaintiff has had multiple

opportunities to plead a cognizable claim based on these facts and has failed to do

so. Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1025 (7th Cir. 2013); see also

Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (“District courts,

nevertheless, ‘have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue

delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue

prejudice to the defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.’”) (quoting

Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)). Based on the dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma

pauperis is denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A for failure to state a federal claim upon which relief may be

granted. Any further amendment would be futile. The Clerk is directed to

enter judgment and close this case.

2) Based on the dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [17] is DENIED.

3) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal

with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the

issues Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the Court in determining

whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c);

see also Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that an

appellant should be allowed to submit a statement of the grounds for

appealing so that the district judge "can make a reasonable assessment of

the issue of good faith"); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)

(providing that a good-faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable person

could suppose . . . has some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff

does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee

regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: March 17, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge