Mosher

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BROOKE L. MOSHER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-2384-RJD

)

JENNIFER CLAYTON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:1

Plaintiff Brooke L. Mosher filed the instant lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking

monetary relief against Defendants Jennifer Clayton and Jacquelyn Austin, in their individual

capacities as social workers for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”)

for removing Plaintiff’s son, C.J. from his home and parents and eventually placing him under

DCFS’s protective custody. Following the threshold review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on the following claims:

Claim 1: Fourth Amendment claim of unlawful seizure against Defendants Austin

and Clayton, in their individual capacities, for removing Plaintiff’s minor

son from his home and parents and taking him into someone else’s

custody;

Claim 2: Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Austin and Clayton, in their

individual capacities, for continuing withholding of Plaintiff’s son C.J.

after Plaintiff had a completely negative drug test in October 2022;

Claim 3: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Defendants

Austin and Clayton, in their individual capacities, for repeatedly failing to

listen to Plaintiff’s admonitions regarding her son, falsely reporting that

Plaintiff was no longer interested in adhering to the Safety Plan and for

allowing the hearing regarding C.J.’s custody to go forward while Plaintiff

was in custody.

1 This matter has been assigned to the undersigned through the parties’ consent. (Doc. 33).

(Doc. 14).

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Stay Adoption

Proceedings (Doc. 96) and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 121). As explained

below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED, and Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

I. Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Stay Adoption Proceedings (Doc. 96)

Plaintiff filed an emergency motion asking this Court to stay C.J.’s adoption proceedings

that are pending in state court. (Doc. 96). Plaintiff concedes that her parental rights were terminated

in October 2024, in an ex parte state court hearing. (Id.). Defendants opposed the motion. (Doc.

111). Plaintiff was allowed to proceed in this case only on her constitutional claims seeking

monetary damages against Defendants in their individual capacities. She has not sought injunctive

relief. (Doc. 14, p. 1). “An injunction, like any ‘enforcement action,’ may be entered only against

a litigant, that is, a party that has been served and is under the jurisdiction of the district court.”

Maddox v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 528 F.App’x 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citation

omitted). Plaintiff’s motion requests that this Court stay all adoption proceedings related to the

October 2024 termination of her parental rights. However, Defendants are not parties to the

adoption proceedings, and DCFS, which is a party to the adoption proceedings, is not a party to

this dispute. Because Defendants cannot carry out the injunctive relief Plaintiff requests, the

motion is DENIED. The Court further notes that the domestic relations exception to federal

jurisdiction would bar the court from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief regarding the

termination of Plaintiff’s parental rights and C.J.’s adoption proceeding. Newman v. State of Ind.,

129 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The subject of domestic relations, including adoptions, is the

primary responsibility of the state courts, administering state law, rather than of the federal

courts”).

II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 121)

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 121). Plaintiff responded (Doc.

135), and Defendants replied (Doc. 141). Defendants included a Statement of Material Facts in

their Motion for Summary Judgment, with proper citation to the record, which Plaintiff failed to

deny. (Doc. 122, pp. 2-7; Doc. 135). Accordingly, Defendants’ factual allegations are being

deemed admitted. See SDIL-LR 56.1 (b) & (g).

Factual Background

On June 27, 2022, the DCFS child abuse and neglect hotline received a report regarding

four-year-old C.J., Plaintiff’s biological child. (Doc. 122, ¶ 1). The report alleged that Plaintiff, her

husband Wesley Mosher, and C.J. were transient and living in various hotels and that Plaintiff and

Wesley gave C.J. Xanax and cannabis to calm him down, sedate him, and get him to sleep. (Id.).

The report also stated that Plaintiff and Wesley were previously indicated for inadequate

supervision in May 2022 for leaving C.J. in a car while they went gambling, and that Plaintiff

refused services in that investigation. (Id.). Defendant Austin was the DCFS Child Protection

Investigator assigned to investigate the allegations of abuse and neglect against Plaintiff. (Doc.

122, ¶ 2). Defendant Clayton was a DCFS child abuse and neglect supervisor who supervised

Defendant Austin’s investigation against Plaintiff. (Doc. 122, ¶ 3).

The Child Protection Investigation

As part of the initial investigative process, on June 28, 2022, Defendant Austin went to the

address given as Plaintiff’s residence, which was actually the home of Debra Mosher, Wesley’s

step-mother. (Doc. 122, ¶ 4). Defendant Austin interviewed Debra, who advised that Plaintiff,

Wesley, and C.J. never lived at her address but used it because they were transient. (Id.). Debra

stated that she had concerns for the Plaintiff and C.J. relating to the family and Plaintiff’s and

Wesley’s alleged drug use. (Id.). On June 28, 2022, Defendant Austin also had a phone interview

with Jerald Mosher, Wesley’s father. Jerald advised he had concerns for C.J.’s stability and

nutrition, and that he suspected, but had not witnessed, Wesley use drugs. (Id.).

On July 1, 2022, Defendant Austin visited Debra’s house after Debra notified her that

Wesley, Brooke, and C.J. were there. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 6-7). Plaintiff advised Defendant Austin that

her family was transient and had been living in different hotels for the past year. (Doc. 122, ¶ 8).

Plaintiff denied giving C.J. cannabis or Xanax and denied any drug use, but an oral toxicology

screen conducted that day was presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (Id.). Plaintiff told

Austin that she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety, and she used to

take Seroquel and Zoloft but had not taken medication for eight years. (Id.). Plaintiff advised that

she had a doctor’s appointment the following week for an evaluation, but she was unable to provide

the name of the facility where the appointment was scheduled. (Id.). That same day, Defendant

Austin spoke to C.J., who stated he lived with his mother and father and felt safe with them. (Doc.

122, ¶ 9). C.J. also stated that his parents had given him some medicine to sleep, but he could not

provide additional information. (Id.). Austin also interviewed Wesley, who advised he recently

returned from Colorado, where he was on probation for two criminal offenses. (Doc. 122, ¶ 10).

Wesley denied using drugs, but his oral toxicology screen also returned presumptively positive for

methamphetamine. (Id.).

During the interviews on July 1, 2022, Plaintiff agreed to a safety plan that provided for

C.J. to stay with Terry and Dena Jones-Smith, Wesley’s mother and her wife, and for Plaintiff to

have supervised contact with C.J. (the “Safety Plan”). (Id.). Plaintiff’s agreement to the Safety

Plan acknowledged that it was voluntary. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 12-14). The Safety Plan provided that for

its termination, Brooke and Wesley had to complete drug tests with negative results for illicit drugs

or drugs not prescribed to them. (Doc. 122-2, ¶¶ 9-10).

On July 5, 2022, Plaintiff and Wesley took urine-based drug tests at the request of DCFS.

(Doc. 122, ¶ 16). Both Plaintiff and Wesley refused to take a hair follicle test. (Id.). The testing

facility reported that Plaintiff had difficulty following its test-taking procedures, and the facility

was concerned that Plaintiff took a urine sample into the bathroom, undermining the accuracy of

the results. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 16-17).

On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff verbally consented to the continuation of the Safety Plan and

signed a new safety plan on July 8, 2022 (the “Renewed Safety Plan”. (Doc. 122, ¶ 15). The

Renewed Safety Plan continued Plaintiff’s agreement to have C.J. remain in the home of Terry and

Dena and for Plaintiff to have supervised contact with C.J. (Id.).

During the investigation, Defendants Austin and Clayton learned that DCFS had

previously indicated Plaintiff and Wesley for inadequate supervision after leaving C.J. in a car to

gamble. (Doc. 122, ¶18). As a result of that incident, Plaintiff and Wesley were also charged with

child endangerment. Plaintiff had a substantiated report with Colorado Child Services. (Id.). On

July 14, 2022, Plaintiff advised Defendant Austin that she no longer agreed to the Safety Plan, at

which time Defendant Clayton decided to take protective custody of C.J. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 19-20).

Juvenile Court Proceedings

On July 15, 2022, the Madison County State’s Attorney filed a Juvenile Petition, Case No.

22-JA-145, in the Third Municipal Circuit in Madison County, Illinois alleging that C.J. was a

neglected minor whose environment was injurious due, in part, to Plaintiff’s untreated mental

health needs, Plaintiff’s substance abuse issues that impaired her ability to adequately care for him

and the lack of stable housing. (Doc. 122, ¶ 21). On July 18, 2022, the Court found there was

probable cause supporting the juvenile petition, that there was an “immediate and urgent necessity

to remove C.J. from his home,” and that leaving C.J. in the home environment would be contrary

to his health, safety, and welfare. (Doc. 122, ¶ 22; Doc. 135, pp. 18-21). The state court granted

temporary custody of C.J. to DCFS with the right to place C.J. (Id.).

Defendant Austin’s last contact with Plaintiff or C.J. was July 19, 2022. (Doc. 122, ¶ 22).

At a renewed temporary custody hearing on July 28, 2022, Plaintiff did not appear because she

was in custody. (Doc. 122, ¶ 25). The court again found probable cause for the petition and awarded

temporary custody to the DCFS Guardianship Administrator, with the power to place C.J. (Id.).

On August 3, 2022, Defendant Austin’s last involvement with this investigation was a transitional

visit with the private agency responsible for providing case management services to Plaintiff and

C.J. (Doc. 122, ¶ 26). On August 4, 2022, after the completion of the DCFS child abuse and neglect

investigation, DCFS informed Plaintiff she was indicated for child neglect. (Doc. 122, ¶ 27). In

October 2022, Plaintiff’s drug test was negative. (Doc. 135, p. 2). On December 14, 2022, the

Madison County State’s Attorneys’ Office filed an Amended Juvenile Petition, alleging that C.J.

was a neglected minor whose environment was injurious for the reasons set forth in the original

petition and amending the petition to add Plaintiff’s criminal convictions for retail theft and child

endangerment. (Doc. 122, ¶ 28). On December 19, 2022, the Court entered an order finding

Plaintiff unfit to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline C.J; C.J. was adjudicated

neglected and made a ward of the Court, with DCFS maintaining custody. (Doc. 122, ¶ 29). On

October 15, 2024, the state court entered an order terminating the Plaintiff’s parental rights, which

the Appellate Court of the Fifth District affirmed on January 15, 2025. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 34-35). On

March 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which

was denied. (Doc. 122, ¶ 37).

Discussion

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.

Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th

Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary

judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d

202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Est. of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740,

745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most

favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital,

Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013). However, the Court is not required

to consider materials that do not contain a proper citation to the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3);

Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that district courts “are

not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the

summary judgment motion before them”). The parties must support their factual allegations by

citing to admissible parts of the record, “including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)

& (c)(2). Affidavits or declarations that are “used to support or oppose a motion must be made on

personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant

is competent to testify on matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). A party’s failure “to properly

support an assertion of fact or . . . to properly address another party’s assertion of fact” can result

in the movant’s fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the Court lacks

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or, alternatively, the claims are barred by res

judicata. They also challenge Plaintiff’s claims on their merits and raise the affirmative defense of

absolute and qualified immunity. The Court will address each argument in turn.

a. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Because Defendants raise the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which is a “jurisdictional bar,” the

Court must first consider whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Gilbank

v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 764–66 (7th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.

Ct. 1167, 221 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2025) (citation omitted). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes

that district courts lack jurisdiction to conduct appellate review of state court judgments, because

Congress exclusively “vested” such authority at the federal level in the Supreme Court. Id. (citing

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Sykes v. Cook County Circuit Court Probate Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th

Cir. 2016)). The doctrine is named after Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149,

68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103

S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), the only cases in which the Supreme Court found the doctrine

applicable. Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 764–66. Its application, however, is “guided by the Supreme

Court’s authoritative restatement of the doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).” Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 764–66.

There, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the doctrine to bar federal jurisdiction only in the

“limited circumstances” when the following four elements are satisfied: (a) the federal plaintiff is

a state-court loser, (b) the state-court judgment became final before the federal proceedings began,

(c) the state-court judgment caused the alleged injury underlying the federal claim, and (d) the

federal claim invites the district court “to review and reject” the state-court judgment. Id. The

doctrine should be “applied on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87;

Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2011)).

Because the Court finds that the fourth element of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not

satisfied in this case, discussion of the remaining elements is not necessary.2 The Seventh Circuit

has clarified that the “review and rejection” requirement of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires

the district court to compare the relief that the plaintiff seeks in the federal action with the relief

granted by the state judgment.3 Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 792 (Kirsch, J.). The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine will bar the Court’s jurisdiction only when the plaintiff seeks to “overturn” or “undo” the

state court judgment. Id. It is rare, “though not impossible,” that the “review and rejection” prong

will be satisfied where the plaintiff’s federal action only seeks monetary damages but challenges

a state court judgment that did not sound in monetary terms. Id.

For instance, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to suits seeking monetary

damages for fraud in state custody proceedings when the plaintiff did not seek to set aside the state

judgment. Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 793 (Kirsch, J.) (citing Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 663 (7th

2 Defendants’ motion not only does not analyze each separate element of the doctrine but also lumps together all three

claims Plaintiff raises in this action, thus failing to engage in the nuanced analysis required under the Supreme Court’s

and Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence.

3 Judge Kirsch’s concurrent opinion in Gilbank on the “review and rejection” element of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

was joined by five judges, rendering it the majority opinion of the en banc court on that issue. See Gilbank, 111 F.4th

at 760.

Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2014)). More recently,

in Gilbank, the Seventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar federal

jurisdiction over a mother’s civil rights claims for damages for an injury inflicted by a state court’s

temporary award of her minor daughter’s custody to her father. Id. at 798 (Kirsch, J.). The court

explained that the mother’s request for monetary relief in the federal action did not invite the

federal court to “review and reject” the state court judgment because, inter alia, an award of

monetary damages would “not undo the custody determination.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed in this case only on her request for monetary relief

against Defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. 14, pp. 1). The Court has denied Plaintiff’s

attempts to seek injunctive and declaratory relief that would interfere with the state court

proceedings.4 (Doc. 80, pp. 2-6). Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars

jurisdiction because “Plaintiff asks the Court to address claims for which the requested relief would

necessarily require a finding that the state court had wrongly decided the issue.” (Doc. 122, p. 11).

Not quite. Defendants point to the state court orders placing C.J. into DCFS custody, granting

temporary custody of C.J. to DCFS, changing the permanency goal, and ultimately terminating

Plaintiff’s parental rights. None of these state court judgments sounded in monetary terms.

Comparing the requested relief in this case with the relief awarded in the state court judgments, as

the Seventh Circuit directs in Gilbank, the Court cannot find that awarding monetary damages for

the alleged constitutional violations would “overturn” or “undo” those state court judgments that

sound in equity. Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 798 (“awarding Gilbank damages could do nothing to the

custody judgment because . . . the judgment provided equitable relief that an award of damages

would not undo”). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar this Court’s jurisdiction

4 Plaintiff had attempted to raise claims for injunctive relief in other cases in this district (23-CV-1808 and 23-CV-

463), which were dismissed without prejudice at preliminary review of the Complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B).

over Plaintiff’s civil right claims for monetary relief.

b. Res Judicata

Defendants also raise the affirmative defense of res judicata (claim preclusion), arguing

that the Court cannot “relitigate decisions made by the circuit court or the court of appeals.” (Doc.

122, pp. 11-12). While Defendants reference res judicata, they also cite case law regarding

collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Yet, they fail to analyze the elements of either doctrine.5

Because Defendants have not adequately developed this argument in their brief, the Court will not

address the affirmative defense of claim preclusion. Issue preclusion, however, is discussed in the

Court’s analysis of the merits of Plaintiff’s claims to the extent applicable thereto.

c. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Substantive Due Process Rights

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ initial removal of C.J. from her custody and his continued

withholding after Plaintiff received a negative drug test in October 2022 were unlawful. In the

preliminary review of the Complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), Judge Yandle found that Plaintiff’s

allegations in the Complaint raised a Fourth Amendment Claim for unlawful seizure. (Doc. 14, pp.

7-8). Relying on the well-established principle that substantive due process “should not be called

upon when a specific constitutional provision protects the right allegedly infringed upon,” and

having found that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a Fourth Amendment Claim for C.J.’s unlawful

seizure, Judge Yandle concluded that the Complaint did not “state a definite substantive due

5 In Illinois, the res judicata doctrine applies when there is “(1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction, (2) the same cause of action, and (3) the same parties or their privies.” Bonnstetter v. City of

Chicago, 811 F.3d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). If those requirements are satisfied, “[t]he

bar to subsequent litigation ‘extends to what was actually decided in the first action, as well as those matters that

could have been decided in that suit.’” Baek v. Clausen, 886 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting River Park, Inc.

v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 302, 703 N.E.2d 883, 889 (1998)). Issue preclusion, on the other hand,

under Illinois law requires that: (1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical to issues presented for

adjudication in the current proceeding; (2) there be a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom

estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior action.” Kalush v. Deluxe Corp., 171 F.3d 489,

493 (7th Cir.1999). Weaver, 305 F.3d at 669, disapproved on different grounds by Gilbank, 111 F.4th 754.

process claim.” (Id. (citing Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

claim for C.J.’s initial seizure and the continuation of his withholding because Plaintiff is not

proceeding in this case as C.J.’s next friend, and C.J. was the only individual seized. The Court

agrees. While C.J. could bring a constitutional claim under the Fourth Amendment for his initial

seizure and the continued withholding, Plaintiff, who was not the individual seized, can only

prevail under substantive due process for interference with a familial relationship. See Hernandez

ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 474 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that in this context, the

seized child has a Fourth Amendment claim, while his or her parents have a substantive due

process claim for interference with familial relationship); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 518 n.23

(7th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh'g (May 15, 2003) (holding that a child’s constitutional

claim grounded on his seizure is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than

substantive due process unless it is alleged that the seizure “coincided with other conduct

amounting to an interference with the parent-child relationship”). The Court, however, must

further examine whether Plaintiff can prevail in her substantive due process claim.6

The Seventh Circuit has long recognized that substantive due process of the Fourteenth

Amendment encompasses the “right to familial integrity in the context of action by child protective

services.” Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 788 (quoting Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 233 (7th Cir. 2017)).

That right, however, is not unlimited and “must be weighed against the state’s interest in protecting

children from harm.” Id. Caseworkers may lawfully take a child into protective custody or

otherwise interfere with familial integrity when there is “some definite and articulable evidence

6 The preliminary review of the Complaint concluded that Plaintiff did not “state a definite substantive due process

claim,” only because it had found that Plaintiff had asserted a Fourth Amendment claim on the same grounds. (Doc.

14, pp. 7-8). Because, based on the developed record, Plaintiff cannot prevail on a Fourth Amendment claim for C.J.’s

unlawful seizure, analysis of her claims under substantive due process is necessary.

giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of past or imminent danger of abuse.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282, 291 (7th Cir. 2012)). “Reasonable

suspicion” requires that the state actors have “more than a hunch but less than probable cause.” Id.

i. C.J.’s Initial Removal from his Parents and Placing into Someone Else’s Custody

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s substantive due

process claim for C.J.’s initial seizure because the state court granted temporary custody of C.J. to

DCFS, finding that there was “an immediate and urgent necessity to remove C.J. from his home.”

(Doc. 122, pp. 5-6, Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 22, 25, 29, 32; Doc. 113-4, pp. 100-122; Doc.

123-1, pp. 200-204; Doc. 124, pp. 124-127; 129-133). In the Complaint, Plaintiff had alleged that

C.J.’s seizure was unlawful because “there was no indicia of abuse or potential immediate threat

of abuse, given that the call to DCFS was made for extortion purposes, and that C.J. was healthy

and happy at the time of his removal.” (Doc. 14, p. 6). In her response to the motion, Plaintiff

further challenged the Safety Plan pursuant to which C.J. was initially taken away from his parents

for being coercive and involuntary.

C.J.’s Removal on July 1, 2022, pursuant to the Safety Plan

Instead of immediately removing a child from his parents, the state may offer them the

option of a “safety plan.” Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 481. The safety plan may require that a child be

placed with other family members while an investigation into suspected abuse is pending. Id.

(citing Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006)). While safety plan restrictions are

typically “less extreme than removing the child from parental custody altogether, ... they may be

invasive enough to count as deprivations of liberty . . . .” Id. Because safety plans are the product

of consent, the Seventh Circuit has held that parents do not have a right to a hearing before being

offered that option. Id. (citing Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 761-62) (“hearings are required for deprivations

ordered over objection, not for steps authorized by consent.”). However, a child’s seizure pursuant

to a safety plan will violate substantive due process when the parent’s consent is obtained through

duress or other illegal means. Id. A safety plan will be a product of duress, for instance, when the

parents’ consent was obtained by “[e]xerting pressure to obtain a result to which the party applying

the pressure had no right.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 763). Thus, in

Hernandez, the court concluded that a social worker was not entitled to summary judgment for a

child’s initial seizure based on the execution of a safety plan, where at the time the safety plan was

presented, the social worker had no reasonable suspicion that the child had been abused or was in

imminent danger of abuse. Id. at 482; see also Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 763 (social workers’ threat to

take action that they had no legal authority to take was improper and violated familial rights).

Here, the record supports a finding that Defendant Austin had reasonable suspicion that

C.J. was abused or was in imminent danger of abuse when she offered the Safety Plan on July 1,

2022.7 Defendant Austin interviewed Plaintiff and Wesley on that day after having received a

report that they had given C.J. Xanax and cannabis to calm him down, sedate him, and get him to

sleep. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 1, 7-8, 10). The report further stated that Plaintiff and Wesley were previously

indicated for inadequate supervision in May 2022 for leaving C.J. in a car when they went to

gamble, and that Plaintiff refused services as part of that investigation. (Doc. 122, ¶ 1). C.J.

7 The state court’s finding that there was “an immediate and urgent necessity to remove C.J. from his home” at the

shelter care hearing on July 18, 2022, does not preclude this Court from determining whether Defendant Austin had a

reasonable suspicion that C.J. was abused or was in imminent danger of abuse on July 1, 2022, when she offered the

Safety Plan. Issue preclusion does not apply unless the issues are identical. See Weaver, 305 F.3d at 670. Here, the

state court addressed the necessity of C.J.’s removal more than two weeks after Defendant Austin offered Plaintiff the

Safety Plan, and after Plaintiff had lost interest in adhering to it. Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Austin

disregarded Plaintiff’s claims that the hotline report was made for the purpose of extortion and that Austin further

made false statements to the state court regarding Plaintiff’s intention to adhere to the Safety Plan. These are challenges

to the “integrity of the record” that establish reasonable suspicion rather than its sufficiency, and there is no indication

that the state court considered that issue. See Weaver, 305 F.3d at 669–70 (noting that while challenges concerning

“the sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause” were barred by collateral estoppel, challenges as to their

“integrity” were not).

confirmed that day that his parents had given him some medicine to help him sleep, but he was

unable to provide any further information. (Doc. 122, ¶ 9). Despite Plaintiff and Wesley denying

use of methamphetamines or other illicit drugs, their oral toxicology screen returned presumptive

positive for methamphetamine. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 8-9). Plaintiff also told Defendant Austin that her

family had been transient for the past year and that Plaintiff had untreated mental health issues.

Austin corroborated the report by conducting interviews with Wesley’s parents, who expressed

concerns about Plaintiff and Wesley’s drug use and about C.J. being malnourished. Based on the

totality of the circumstances, there was “definite and articulable evidence” giving rise to a

reasonable suspicion that C.J. was abused or in imminent danger of abuse on July 1, 2022, when

Defendant Austin offered the Safety Plan. See Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 788-89 (finding reasonable

suspicion of past or imminent danger of abuse where police officer and social worker performed

welfare check at mother’s apartment based on report of anonymous caller that mother and child

appeared to be living in garage during hot summer weather, mother acknowledged pending charge

for methamphetamine possession and history of drug abuse when they asked her to provide urine

sample, and she had just been arrested for possession of methamphetamine when they encountered

her later).

Plaintiff’s allegations that “there was no indicia of abuse or potential immediate threat of

abuse, given that the call to DCFS was made for extortion purposes, and that C.J. was healthy and

happy at the time of his removal” are unsubstantiated. (Doc. 14, p. 6). Plaintiff has not cited any

admissible corroborating evidence, such as discovery responses, declaration, or affidavit. (Doc.

135, pp. 2; 63-64). Plaintiff cites “Exhibit 8” in support of her allegation that the investigator failed

to disclose that the anonymous tip was made for extortion purposes, but that exhibit only contains

negative drug test results from October 2022. (Id.). Even if the anonymous report was made for

extortion purposes, the remaining evidence, including C.J.’s confirmation that he had received

medication for sleeping, the prior investigation for inadequate supervision, the presumptive

positive tests for methamphetamine, and the testimonies of Wesley’s father and stepmother

regarding concerns for C.J.’s malnutrition sufficed to support Defendant Austin’s reasonable

suspicion of past or imminent danger of abuse.

Also unsubstantiated are Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the Safety Plan was

coercive because Defendant Austin made false statements and forced her to sign it. (Doc. 135, pp.

2-3; 32-34). Plaintiff’s agreement to the Safety Plan acknowledged that it was voluntary and

provided that C.J. would stay with Wesley’s mother. (Doc. 122, ¶12). Plaintiff points to certain

excerpts of DCFS’s investigative record regarding the execution of the Safety Plan, which,

however, do not in any way support her allegations. (Doc. 135, pp. 2-3; 32-34). While Plaintiff

includes handwritten notes on those excerpts suggesting that Defendant Austin made false

statements and forced Plaintiff to sign the Safety Plan, those notes are not part of the admissible

record and therefore do not create a genuine dispute on the legality of the Safety Plan.8 Plaintiff’s

alternative argument that C.J.’s removal on July 1, 2022, was unlawful due to the lack of a warrant

also lacks merit. The record shows that C.J. was removed pursuant to the lawfully obtained Safety

Plan. No warrant was required under those circumstances. Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 481 (holding

that seizure of a child pursuant to a safety plan violates substantive due process only when the

parent’s consent is obtained through duress or other illegal means).

Because there is no genuine dispute that Defendants had a reasonable suspicion that C.J.

8 Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants continued to impose a “coercive safety plan despite Plaintiff’s compliance.”

(Doc. 135, ¶ 9). Plaintiff, however, cites the Visitation and Contact Plan dated August 15, 2022, after the state court

had already awarded temporary custody to DCFS. (Doc. 135, pp. 2, 37-42). Accordingly, that argument is not

relevant to the analysis of the legality of C.J.’s initial removal pursuant to the Safety Plan. (Doc. 135, ¶ 9). Likewise,

irrelevant to the legality of the Safety Plan is Plaintiff’s negative drug test in October 2022. (Doc. 135, ¶ 10).

had been abused or was in imminent danger of abuse at the time the Safety Plan was offered, the

Safety Plan was not coercive, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on that ground.

DCFS’s Taking of C.J. under Protective Custody on July 14, 2022, and the State Court’s

Award of Temporary Custody to DCFS on July 18, 2022

To the extent Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim for C.J.’s “initial removal” targets

the DCFS’s taking of C.J. under protective custody on July 14, 2022, and the state court’s decision

on July 18, 2022, to award temporary custody of C.J. to DCFS, Defendants are still entitled to

summary judgment. First, collateral estoppel bars this Court from reviewing the sufficiency of the

record on which the state court relied to find probable cause on July 18, 2022. Generally, collateral

estoppel prohibits the re-litigation of any settled issue that was necessary to a prior final judgment.

The Full Faith and Credit Statute mandates that this Court give judgments of Illinois courts the

preclusive effect they would have in Illinois’s state judicial system. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Mains v.

Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Illinois law, the “minimum requirements”

for application of collateral estoppel are the following: (1) the issue decided in the prior

adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question; (2) there was a final

judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is

asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Gumma v. White, 216 Ill.

2d 23, 833 N.E.2d 834, 843 (2005).

Here, on the July 18, 2022, temporary custody hearing, the state court found that there was

probable cause for the filing of the juvenile petition and that there was “an immediate and urgent

necessity to remove C.J. from his home.” (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 22, 25, 29, 32; Doc. 113-4, pp. 19-20).

Whether Defendants had reasonable suspicion of a past or imminent danger of abuse or neglect on

July 14, 2022, when they decided to take protective custody of C.J., was an issue “controlling and

material in the temporary custody order.” Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2002). The

state court decided this issue against the Plaintiff, who was a party in the state court juvenile

proceeding. Further, the state court’s finding of probable cause in support of DCFS’s juvenile

petition at the temporary custody hearing on July 18, 2022, was a final judgment on the merits. Id.

at 748-49 (holding that the state court’s temporary custody hearing was a final judgment on the

merits). The state court’s finding of probable cause necessarily encompassed a finding of the lower

threshold of reasonable suspicion. (Doc. 122, ¶ 22; Doc. 113-4, p. 19). Accordingly, collateral

estoppel applies in this case as to the sufficiency of the evidence on which the state court relied to

find probable cause supporting the juvenile petition. This includes Plaintiff’s claims that

Defendants improperly relied on Plaintiff’s Bond County case to establish probable cause because

that investigation found no safety threats, including no medical concerns. (Doc. 135, pp. 1-2).

On the other hand, collateral estoppel is likely inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims targeting

the “integrity” of the evidence on which the state court relied for finding probable cause because

there is no indication that the state court addressed that specific issue. See Weaver, 305 F.3d at

669–70 (noting that collateral estoppel did not bar challenges to the “integrity” of the evidence

that supported the state court’s finding of probable cause where there was no indication that the

state court had considered that specific issue). Plaintiff argues in her Complaint and in response to

the motion that Defendants did not disclose to the state court that the hotline report was made for

extortion purposes. But as explained above, Plaintiff does not cite any admissible corroborative

evidence. (Doc. 135, p. 3, 63-64). Likewise, Plaintiff failed to substantiate her allegations in the

Complaint that Defendants falsely represented to the state court that she was no longer interested

in adhering to the Safety Plan. (Doc. 14, p. 7; Doc. 135). Therefore, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment as to those claims, too.

ii. Continued Withholding of C.J. after Plaintiff had a Completely Negative Drug Test

in October 2022

Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that her

constitutional rights were violated by Defendants’ continued withholding of C.J. after Plaintiff had

a completely negative drug test in October 2022. Plaintiff argues that following her negative drug

test in October 2022, any probable cause or reasonable suspicion of abuse had dissipated. (Doc.

14, p. 6; Doc. 135, pp. 2-3). But Plaintiff cannot show Defendants’ personal involvement in the

DFCS’s decision to continue withholding C.J. after October 2022. Defendant Austin’s last

involvement with DCFS’s investigation of C.J.’s abuse and neglect was on August 3, 2022. (Doc.

141-1, p. 3; Doc. 122, ¶ 26). Defendant Clayton’s last involvement in this case was on August 1,

2022. (Doc. 141-1, p. 3; Doc. 122-3, pp. 109-110). Because there is no genuine dispute that

Defendants were not personally responsible for C.J.’s continued withholding after October 2022,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269,

273 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[an] individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or

participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation”).

d. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Rights

Defendants also argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s procedural due

process claims. The Fourteenth Amendment protects against the deprivation of constitutionally

protected interests without due process of law. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020. The right to familial

relations, as alleged by Plaintiff, is a protected liberty interest. Id. Both parental rights and a child’s

right to be nurtured by his parents cannot be denied “without an opportunity to be heard in a

meaningful way.” Id., citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d

18 (1976). The amount of due process required varies with the situation and is a “flexible” concept,

but, at minimum, due process “requires that government officials not misrepresent the facts in

order to obtain the removal of a child from his parents.” Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020. Further,

government officials may only remove a child from his home “without a pre-deprivation hearing

and court order if the official has probable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of

abuse.” Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 486. This requires a showing of exigent circumstances for the

child’s removal. Id. A probable cause to believe that the child was abused or neglected in the past

or is in a general danger of future abuse or neglect is insufficient. Id.

Defendants’ failure to listen to Plaintiff’s Admonitions and False Reporting

Plaintiff alleges that her procedural due process rights were violated because during

Defendants’ investigation and when DCFS decided to take protective custody of C.J., Defendants

repeatedly failed to listen to Plaintiff’s admonitions regarding C.J., Defendant Clayton once spoke

with Plaintiff and her husband but did not allow them to speak, and Defendants falsely reported

that Plaintiff was no longer interested in adhering to the Safety Plan. (Doc. 14, p. 7). However,

Plaintiff has not presented any admissible evidence to substantiate those allegations and create a

triable issue. Defendants established that they conducted an investigation including interviews

with Plaintiff, Wesley, and Wesley’s father and step-mother, on July 1, 2022, that Plaintiff

voluntarily agreed to the Safety Plan and to its renewal, and that on July 14, 2022, Plaintiff advised

Defendant Austin that she no longer agreed to the Safety Plan, at which time Defendant Clayton

decided to take protective custody of C.J. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 9-10; 19-20).9

Even assuming that Plaintiff had offered such evidence, the record shows that Plaintiff’s

due process rights were not violated. First, DCFS took custody of C.J. on Thursday, July 14, 2022,

and the state court held a post-deprivation hearing within two business days, on Monday, July 18,

9 While not raised in the Complaint, in her response, Plaintiff argued that the Safety Plan was coercive because

Defendant Austin made false statements and forced her to sign it. (Doc. 135, pp. 2-3; 32-34). This allegation also

implicates procedural due process. However, as explained above regarding Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights,

Plaintiff has failed to create a triable issue on that aspect.

2022. The record shows that Plaintiff attended that hearing, and Plaintiff has not alleged otherwise.

(Doc. 113-4, p. 19). There, the state court found there was “immediate and urgent necessity to

remove C.J. from his home and that leaving C.J. in the home environment would be contrary to

his health, safety and welfare.” (Doc. 122, ¶ 22; Doc. 135, pp. 18-21). The state court granted

temporary custody of C.J. to DCFS with the right to place C.J. (Id.). Because the state court found

in the post-deprivation hearing, in Plaintiff’s presence, that there were exigent circumstances for

C.J.’s removal, Defendant Clayton’s decision that DCFS take protective custody of C.J. did not

violate Plaintiff’s due process rights.

Ex parte temporary custody hearing on July 28, 2022

Plaintiff also claims that her due process rights were violated because Defendants

proceeded with the July 28, 2022, temporary custody hearing despite Plaintiff being absent due to

her being in custody. (Doc. 135, pp. 2-3). Defendants do not dispute that the state court held a

renewed temporary custody hearing on July 28, 2022, to which Plaintiff did not appear because

she was in custody. (Doc. 122, ¶ 25). That renewed temporary custody hearing was held after the

state court had already found on July 18, 2022, in Plaintiff’s presence, that there was an “immediate

and urgent necessity to remove C.J. from his home and that leaving C.J. in the home environment

would be contrary to his health, safety and welfare.” (Doc. 122, ¶ 22).

To the extent Defendants were personally responsible for the state court’s decision to

proceed with an ex parte renewed temporary custody hearing on July 28, 2022, this would qualify

as akin to prosecutorial “in-court conduct” that is protected under absolute immunity. In

Millspaugh v. County Department of Public Welfare, two mothers alleged that a social worker

violated their due process rights when they failed to notify the mothers of subsequent custody

hearings, proceeded on those hearings ex parte, failed to furnish the court with evidence favorable

to the mothers’ case, and continued to pursue the litigation even after it was clear that the mothers

were entitled to custody. 937 F.2d 1172-75 (7th Cir. 1991). The social worker had taken custody

of the children after applying for and obtaining a court order to do so. Id. at 1173–74. The Seventh

Circuit explained that social workers pursuing a child-custody case act like prosecutors and

witnesses and are thus protected by absolute immunity for their in-court conduct, including in ex

parte proceedings. Id. at 1175–76. Because Millspaugh is controlling and directly on point, the

Court finds that Defendants are absolutely immune from liability for any conduct they engaged in

during the renewed temporary custody hearing on July 28, 2022, which caused the state court to

proceed ex parte.

Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of any material facts, and Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims.

Conclusion

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Stay Adoption Proceedings (Doc. 96)

is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 121) is GRANTED. This

case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment

accordingly and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 9, 2026

s/ Reona J. Daly

Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge