State v. Ingram

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-83

Filed 18 March 2026

Brunswick County, Nos. 21CR051242-090, 21CR051243-090, 21CR051244-090,

21CR051240-090, 21CR051241-090

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

THOMAS DAVIS INGRAM, JR.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 September 2023 by Judge C.

Ashley Gore in Brunswick County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24

February 2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson by Special Deputy Attorney General John F.

Oates, Jr., for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding by Assistant Appellate Defender David W.

Andrews, for the defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Thomas Davis Ingram, Jr. (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered after

the trial court found him guilty following a bench trial of fifteen counts of first-degree

sex offense with a child and fifteen counts of indecent liberties with a child. We affirm

in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing.

I. Background

Defendant was a member of the United States Marine Corps. He was stationed

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

at Beaufort, South Carolina when he met the complainant’s mother (“Mother”).

Mother lived with complainant, L.C., in Calabash. (pseudonym used to protect the

identity of minor). L.C. was born in 2004.

Defendant was transferred to Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. Defendant

and Mother began dating in the summer of 2010 and were married soon thereafter.

Defendant moved into Mother’s and L.C.’s home in 2011, and he commuted to Camp

Lejeune. While Mother worked, Defendant would drop off and pick up L.C.

Defendant would help L.C. with schoolwork, read her a story, and put her to bed.

L.C. alleged Defendant would get into bed with her and “spoon”, while

purportedly rubbing her vagina with his fingers. L.C. also alleged Defendant inserted

his fingers into her vagina on several occasions. L.C. further alleged Defendant

rubbed his penis against her back, rubbed her breasts, and touched her vagina, while

they were playing the Monopoly board game.

Defendant separated from Mother in 2014. Defendant continued to live in

Mother’s home in Calabash while the marriage broke down.

L.C. told her boyfriend about Defendant’s alleged abuses upon returning home

from a church retreat in Tennessee in 2019. L.C. told her boyfriend not to tell anyone.

L.C. also told her female friend about the alleged incidents and asked her not to tell

anyone.

L.C. was attending virtual school due to the COVID-19 pandemic on 22

January 2021. L.C. was upset and did not want to get out of her bed. Mother asked

-2-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

L.C. to tell her what was wrong. The same evening, L.C. told Mother about the

alleged abuses. Mother called 911. L.C. spoke with a deputy from the Brunswick

County Sheriff’s Office and was taken to a child advocacy center. Defendant was

arrested in March 2021.

Defendant was indicted with twenty-four counts of sex offense by an adult with

a child. Defendant’s appointed counsel, Dustin Sullivan, was allowed to withdraw on

10 November 2021. The court then appointed attorney Michael Ramos as counsel.

Defendant moved the court to discharge Ramos as his counsel and to proceed

pro se on 12 December 2022. The trial court conducted the following colloquy with

Defendant on 8 February 2023:

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I feel that due to the close

knit of all of the attorneys in this area, that I would have -

- I would not be allotted or given fair and unbiased

representation by any attorneys here. So if the Court sees

in its wisdom that counsel is needed, I ask that it be from

a different area than here.

THE COURT: Well, sir –

THE DEFENDANT: If not, then I wish to proceed pro se on

these matters on my own and have standby counsel.

THE COURT: Well -- you want standby counsel?

THE DEFENDANT: If I -- if the Court does not -- if the

Court wishes to not honor my request for counsel outside

of the Brunswick County area.

THE COURT: Well, tell me why you’re asking for counsel

outside the Brunswick County area.

THE DEFENDANT: Mr. Ramos is my second attorney in

-3-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

22 months. And I have voiced both to Mr. Ramos and to

Mr. Sullivan multiple times that I wish to go to trial with

my case.

...

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

THE DEFENDANT: Especially when Mr. Sullivan found

out when I received a specific written statement from the

prosecuting attorney, therefore, stating that by law --

under North Carolina law, General Statute 14-27.36, the

State was required to prove that a certain thing happened,

and the prosecution at the time, Mr. Glenn Emery,

specifically stated in a written piece of paper to Mr.

Sullivan that that incident happened. And therefore I have

spoken to both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Ramos in my request

to go to trial to have this proven. On top of that, both to

Mr. Ramos -- may I take this off, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You can.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. Both to Mr. Ramos and to

Mr. Sullivan, I have suggest that I believe this Court lacks

personal jurisdiction over me.

THE COURT: You’ve suggested that before. That ship has

sailed, Mr. Ingram. We’ve got personal jurisdiction.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, then the Court would not

mind here on the record now proving that to me. Under

law.

THE COURT: The Court doesn’t have to prove a thing, Mr.

Ingram.

THE DEFENDANT: Under law, under Hagans v. Lavine,

1974, law requires all administrative agencies to show

jurisdiction on the record. And because this Court failed to

properly extradite me in a procedure, I received no

-4-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

governor’s warrant of arrest, therefore your process of your

long-arm statute under the extradition clause is made

invalid. And this Court has no statutory authority over me

and no 14th Amendment due process, minimal contact.

THE COURT: Mr. Ingram, do you want an attorney

appointed to your case, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I request to proceed pro se,

and, if need be, have standby counsel.

THE COURT: All right. So you’re able to hear and

understand me; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you now under the influence of any

alcoholic beverages, drugs, narcotics, or other pills, Mr.

Ingram? I’m not asking you that to be flippant. I need to

ask some things on the record. Okay?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, sir. No, sir.

THE COURT: How old are you?

THE DEFENDANT: 42, sir.

THE COURT: Have you completed high school?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you complete college?

THE DEFENDANT: I completed some courses in college in

various on-line institutions but never completed.

THE COURT: All right. Again, I’m not trying to be funny.

Do you know how to read? Do you know how to write?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You do both of those things? That was your

handwriting on those motions; correct?

-5-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you can read just fine?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you suffer from any physical or mental

issues that impair you?

THE DEFENDANT: I have minor PTSD, minor TBI,

depression and anxiety from my deployments in

Afghanistan and Iraq.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE DEFENDANT: However, Mr. Ramos’ therapist,

Jennifer Sapia, completed an interview of me and looked at

my medical record, and when I spoke to her last year, she

said that I proceed very competent and very competent to

stand trial and proceed with this on my own.

THE COURT: Okay. So you don’t have any physical or

mental issues that impair your ability to represent

yourself?

THE DEFENDANT: The only physical issue I have is pH

plus chronic myeloid leukemia. But no, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Do you understand you have the

right to be represented by an attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: Do you understand that you may request a

lawyer be appointed for you, that you’ve done that in the

past, and that a lawyer will be appointed to you if you

cannot afford to pay for one?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: If you, in fact, decide to represent yourself -

- it sounds like that’s what you want to do -- you must follow

the same rules of evidence and procedure that a lawyer

-6-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

appearing in this Court must follow.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if you decide to

represent yourself, the Court will not give you legal advice

concerning defenses?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Jury instructions?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Or other legal issues that may be raised

during the trial?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that I have to act as an

impartial judge in your case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: In any case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that I will not be able to offer you legal

advice?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that I must treat you just as I would

treat a lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand you’re charged with –

-7-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- 21 counts of sexual offense with a child by

an adult? Those are –

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: -- B1 felonies; each one carries a possible

maximum punishment of life in prison without parole?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. However, I do not

understand the nature of each of those charges.

THE COURT: And that a minimum sentence on each of

those -- a minimum presumptive sentence is 192 months.

If you’re found guilty of one, it’s a minimum sentence of 192

months. And you have 21 of those.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

THE DEFENDANT: However, again, I’d like the record to

show that I do not understand the nature.

THE COURT: Okay. With all of this in mind, do you have

any questions about the charges other than you say you do

not understand the nature of the charges? And you’ve had

two lawyers; correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.

THE COURT: All right. Anything other than that?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you now waive your right to the

assistance of a lawyer and voluntarily and intelligently

decide to represent yourself in these cases?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: That’s what you wish to do?

-8-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, it is.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Thomas Davis Ingram, Jr.,

has been fully informed in open court of the charges against

him, the nature of and the statutory punishment for each

charge, and the nature of the proceeding against the

defendant, and his right to have counsel assigned by the

Court, and his right to have the assistance of counsel to

represent him in this action. I find that the defendant

comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings,

and the minimum and maximum range of punishments,

that he understands and appreciates the consequences of

his decision, and that the defendant has voluntarily,

knowingly, and intelligently elected in open court to be

tried in this action without the assistance of counsel.

You’ve indicated that you would -- you want standby

counsel?

THE DEFENDANT: I would accept standby counsel. Yes,

Your Honor. However, I do believe that, because of the

relationship between Mr. Ramos and I, that -- he is correct,

it has deteriorated.

The trial court allowed Defendant to waive his right to counsel, discharged Ramos,

and appointed Ed Geddings as standby counsel. The grand jury returned superseding

indictments for eighteen counts of the statutory sex offense with a child by an adult

on 6 March 2023.

Defendant appeared before the trial court with his standby counsel, Geddings,

on 6 June 2023 and the trial court again addressed Defendant on his desire to

represent himself:

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Ingram, do you still wish to

proceed representing yourself?

THE DEFENDANT: That is correct, Your Honor.

-9-

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

THE COURT: Do you understand you have standby

counsel that’s been appointed to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think Mr. Geddings has come and talked

to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, he has. Multiple times.

THE COURT: All right. You’re able to hear and

understand me?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am.

THE COURT: Do you understand what you’re charged

with? I believe it’s –

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I understand.

THE COURT: -- 24 counts of first-degree sex offense –

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- with a child.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Those are all Class B1 felonies; is that

correct, Ms. Earley?

MS. EARLEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that all Class B1 felonies

carry a possible maximum punishment of life in prison

without parole?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you now under the influence of any

alcohol beverages, narcotics, or any other pills?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

- 10 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

THE COURT: How old are you, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: 42, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you completed high school?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you complete college?

THE DEFENDANT: Some. But never acquired a degree.

THE COURT: So you understand how to read?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You understand how to write?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you suffer from any physical or mental

issues that may impair you?

THE DEFENDANT: I have depression, PTSD, TPI, and

anxiety, but other than that no, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do those impair your ability to represent

yourself in your opinion?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand you have the right to be

represented by an attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that you may

request that a lawyer be appointed for you, and that a

lawyer will be appointed to you if you cannot afford to pay

for one?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: Do you understand that by you deciding to

- 11 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

represent yourself, you must follow the same Rules of

Evidence and procedure that a lawyer appearing in this

courtroom must follow?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that if you decide to

represent yourself, continue to move forward in

representing yourself, the Court will not give you legal

advice concerning defenses, jury instructions, or other legal

issues that might be raised during trial?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that I must act as an

impartial judge in this case, I will not be able to offer you

any legal advice, and I must treat you the same way I treat

a lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: With all of these things in mind, do you wish

to ask me any questions about what I've just said to you

regarding your right to represent yourself?

THE DEFENDANT: I thought we’ve taken care of this

before.

THE COURT: We have. But I want to make sure -- I want

to be crystal clear, Mr. Ingram, because your trial date is

fast approaching.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I understand that.

THE COURT: Do you have any other questions for me?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you’re continuing to waive your right to

the assistance of a lawyer, and you're voluntarily and

intelligently deciding to represent yourself in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I am.

- 12 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

Defendant had also previously filed a written request for a bench trial with the

trial court. The trial court denied this request. Defendant returned to the trial court

the next day on 7 June 2023 for a motions hearing. Defendant represented himself

at the hearing, with Geddings present as standby counsel, and asked the trial court

to reconsider denying his request for a bench trial:

THE COURT: All right. So you’re asking me to reconsider

my order; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That is correct, Your Honor. I am. I

am asking you to reconsider that order due to the fact that

I cannot find anywhere under the law library to help me

understand what with the jury instructions, and things

like that, I cannot find any jury instructions for North

Carolina in the law library; and, therefore, I believe due to

the fact that this – there’s only speculation and suspicion

that these crimes were committed, the only way that the

State would be able to get a conviction is through a jury.

Because a jury uses -- maybe have to be impartial, however

a jury uses their feelings as well.

THE COURT: Well, you understand that if the Court

allowed the waiver of a jury trial, Mr. Ingram, that one

person decides your fate at that point

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I do. However, I

understand that underneath the Court, prior precedence in

court cases also determine to help with law. And that

under the Court, it is the Judge must look at everything as

a matter of fact and under the law, and if they're only -- if

any substantial evidence, even though in view light most -

- in view light most favor of the State, it is still only conjure

-- conjuncture, unrelevant (verbatim) influence, suspicion,

or speculation is still present, then a motion to dismiss

automatically should be granted. And therefore under a

trial by court, that is all taken into consideration and

therefore the jury is left out of that decision. It all is

- 13 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

determined -- it all comes down to the actual facts and that

of law.

THE COURT: You understand that instead of 12 people

being the finders of fact, there's just one person being the

finder of fact?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In that scenario?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What is the State’s position as to whether or

not the State agrees or objects to defendant’s waiver of his

right to a jury trial? Does the State have a position?

[THE STATE]: I don’t have a position, Judge. I trust

whatever decision you make. And the State will move

forward with whatever decision you make.

THE COURT: Does the State stipulate to a bench trial?

[THE STATE]: Judge, we honestly do not have a position;

and if you want to order a bench trial, we have no objection.

I mean, from experience, the vast majority of defendants

want a jury trial.

THE COURT: Correct.

[THE STATE}: In these situations.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I speak?

THE COURT: You may.

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that the vast majority of

defendants request a jury trial. However, the vast majority

of defendants also are not proceeding pro se, they have

legal counsel, which are schooled and properly educated,

and know the proper ethics and instructions when it comes

to jury. I believe that a bench trial for me as proceeding

pro se and intending to want to proceed pro se is best easier

- 14 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

put on me and completion of -- and completion of the justice

of law.

[THE STATE]: Judge, I think this kind of goes back to

yesterday when you said the Judge can’t help him. The

Judge can’t tell him which evidence to put on, they can’t

tell him what’s objectionable, and again they can’t give him

any guidance on the law. As far as jury instructions go, the

pattern jury instructions, the Court has those.

THE DEFENDANT: I’m sorry, Your Honor. But again, I

can’t find anywhere that there’s jury instructions.

THE COURT: There are jury instructions, Mr. Ingram.

THE DEFENDANT: Again, Your Honor, I’ve asked for

legal material concerning jury instructions, concerning

case laws, concerning –

THE COURT: Well, that’s –

THE DEFENDANT: -- other things.

THE COURT: That’s not the State of North Carolina’s job

to provide you with jury instructions or to provide you with

case law.

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, Your Honor, but –

THE COURT: That’s something you can certainly ask your

standby counsel about.

THE DEFENDANT: And I did that now, Your Honor, but -

- however, I was told that I could request legal material

through the department -- through the -- sorry, through the

county Detention Center, and that they would get with the

State to provide that.

THE COURT: All right.

[THE STATE]: And Judge, just so -- I don’t know if -- this

case is scheduled September 25th. Obviously, that’s

supposed to be Judge Willey. I don’t know if you want to

- 15 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

table this motion to put it before him or if you want to make

the decision. Either way, the State is fine.

THE COURT: Well, if the State will stipulate to a bench

trial, I can make a decision today, [Mr. District Attorney],

but I’m not trying to pressure you.

[THE STATE]: I’ll stipulate to a bench trial. Sure.

THE COURT: And Mr. Ingram, you recall from yesterday

I went over with you what all your charges were?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I do.

THE COURT: And you recall me going over with you the

nature and the statutory punishment for each charge being

life in prison without parole?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand you would be the one

that would be participating in the selection of members of

the jury?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You understand that? You understand that

the jury verdict in each case -- I think there are 24 counts -

- would have to be unanimous?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you’re still requesting a waiver of a jury

trial and asking for a bench trial?

THE DEFENDANT: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You can be seated.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Will you swear Mr. Ingram, please, Madam

Clerk.

- 16 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

(Sworn as to waiver of a jury trial)

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Madam Sheriff, will you please hand this to

the defendant. I placed an X where you’re to sign, Mr.

Ingram. Mr. Geddings, as standby counsel, would you

mind signing that certification. I believe you've been

having conversations with Mr. Ingram at counsel table

regarding this. Have you, in fact, had those conversations?

MR. GEDDINGS: Yes, we have.

THE COURT: All right. And you can just write in “standby

counsel,” please. (Complied) (Bailiff approached the bench)

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. The Court consents

to the defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial by jury, and

the charge against the defendant shall proceed in

accordance with that waiver as otherwise required by law.

I’m allowing your motion for a bench trial, Mr. Ingram.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Defendant executed a signed waiver of jury trial. Attorney Geddings also

signed this waiver as standby counsel. Defendant was indicted by superseding

indictments for the twenty-four counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense with a

child by an adult and twenty-four counts of indecent liberties with a child on 21

August 2023.

Defendant was tried on the twenty-four counts of first-degree statutory sex

offense with a child by an adult and twenty-four counts of indecent liberties with a

child beginning on 26 September 2023. Prior to beginning the trial, the trial court

inquired into his 7 June 2023 waiver of a jury trial and Geddings being present as

- 17 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

standby counsel. Defendant represented himself during preliminary matters,

opening statements, and three of the State’s witnesses. On the second day of trial,

Defendant revoked his waiver of counsel. The trial court accepted Defendant’s

revocation and directed attorney Geddings to represent Defendant for the remainder

of trial.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found Defendant guilty of fifteen counts

of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult and fifteen counts of taking

indecent liberties with a child. The trial court found Defendant not guilty of nine

counts of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult and not guilty of nine

counts of taking indecent liberties with a child.

The trial court consolidated twelve counts of the statutory sexual offense with

a child by an adult and fifteen counts of the indecent liberties with a child into a

single judgment and sentenced Defendant as a prior record level I with 0 prior record

level points to an active sentence of 300 to 369 months. The remaining three counts

of statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult were consolidated into a separate

judgment and the trial court imposed an active sentence of 300 to 400 months, with

both sentences to run consecutively. Defendant appealed. The trial court made

appellate entries.

The Department of Adult Corrections notified the Clerk of Superior Court in

Brunswick County Defendant was improperly sentenced because the date of the

offenses were 1 January 2010.

- 18 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

Defendant returned to the trial court on 7 February 2024. The trial court

vacated the twelve counts of the statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult and

fifteen counts of the indecent liberties with a child judgment and resentenced

Defendant. Defendant was sentenced to an active sentence of 240 to 297 months for

the twelve statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult and fifteen counts of the

indecent liberties with a child. The trial court did not disturb the 300-to-400-month

active consecutive sentence for the three statutory sexual offense with a child by an

adult judgment.

II. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-

1444(a) (2025).

III. Issues

Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s request to

proceed pro se and in granting his request to waive a jury trial and to proceed to a

bench trial.

IV. Defendant’s Right to Counsel

Our Court has long held a defendant may waive his right to be represented by

counsel after being fully advised under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (2025), and a

knowing and voluntary waiver. This Court held in State v. Blakeney:

a defendant may voluntarily waive the right to be

represented by counsel and instead proceed pro se. Waiver

of the right to counsel and election to proceed pro se must

- 19 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

be expressed clearly and unequivocally. Once a defendant

clearly and unequivocally states that he wants to proceed

pro se, the trial court must determine whether the

defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives

the right to in-court representation by counsel. A trial

court’s inquiry will satisfy this constitutional requirement

if conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242.

245 N.C. App. 452, 459, 782 S.E.2d 88, 93 (2016). (internal citations, ellipses,

alterations, and quotation marks omitted).

A. Standard of Review

Whether a defendant was entitled to or has forfeited counsel is also reviewed

de novo. State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 318, 289 S.E.2d 335, 341-42 (1982) (citations

omitted); Blakeney, 245 N.C. App. at 459, 782 S.E.2d at 93.

B. Analysis

1. Waiver or right to Counsel

Both the Constitution of the United States and the North Carolina

Constitution recognize criminal defendants have a right to assistance of counsel. U.S.

Const. Amend. VI.; N.C. Const. Art I, §§ 19, 23; see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.

45, 66, 77 L. Ed. 158, 169 (1932); State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 611, 234 S.E.2d

742, 744 (1977) (citations omitted); State v. Montgomery, 138 N.C. App. 521, 524, 530

S.E.2d 66, 68 (2000). Criminal defendants also have the absolute right to waive

counsel, represent themselves, and handle their case without the assistance of

counsel. State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 670-71, 190 S.E.2d 164, 172 (1972); State v.

Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980).

- 20 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

2. Statutory Sex Offense of a Child by an Adult

Defendant argues the trial court violated his right to counsel by permitting

him to proceed pro se when he expressly stated he did not understand the nature of

charges for statutory sex offense of a child by an adult. Before a defendant is allowed

to waive the right to counsel, a trial court must conduct a statutorily-required

colloquy to determine that “constitutional and statutory safeguards are satisfied.”

State v. Moore, 362 N.C. 319, 322, 661 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2008) (citation omitted).

Courts “must determine whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily waives the right to in-court representation by counsel.” Id. (citation

omitted).

The procedure to waive counsel is codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (2025).

Courts may only enter an order to allow defendants to waive their right to counsel

after being satisfied the movant: (1) has been clearly advised of his rights to the

assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of appointed counsel when

he is so entitled; (2) understands and appreciates the consequences of the decision;

and, (3) comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of

permissible punishments. Id. (citation omitted). A “trial court must obtain a written

waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Thomas, 331 N.C. 671, 675, 417 S.E.2d 473,

476 (1992) (citation omitted).

The record indicates Defendant executed a written waiver of court-appointed

counsel on 8 February 2023 after the trial court had conducted a detailed colloquy

- 21 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

into Defendant’s present mental state, not being under the influence of any drugs or

intoxicants, understanding of the charge and its possible punishment, level of

education attained, right to appointed or retained counsel, right to represent himself,

and Defendant’s obligations and responsibilities if he decided to represent himself.

The transcript also reflects the trial court conducted a similar colloquy on 6 June

2023.

Written waivers of counsel, certified by the trial court, create a rebuttable

presumption the waiver was executed knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (2025). State v. Kinlock, 152 N.C. App. 84,

89, 566 S.E.2d 738, 741 (2002) (citation omitted), aff’d per curiam, 357 N.C. 48, 577

S.E.2d 620 (2003). “Once a written waiver of counsel is executed and certified by the

trial court, subsequent waivers or inquiries are not necessary before further

proceedings.” State v. Harper, 285 N.C. App. 507, 517, 877 S.E.2d 771, 780 (2022)

(citation omitted).

Defendant argues he did not understand the nature of the statutory sex offense

with a child by an adult. Defendant asserts during his colloquy on 8 February 2023,

when the trial court was informing him of the maximum sentence he was facing, he

twice stated he did not know the nature of the charges against him. The following is

taken from the transcript:

THE COURT: Do you understand you’re charged with –

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

- 22 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

THE COURT: -- 21 counts of sexual offense with a child by

an adult? Those are –

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

The trial court inquired into Defendant’s understanding of the seriousness of

the statutory sex offense with a child by an adult charges and Defendant expressly

stated he also understood the maximum and minimum punishment for the B1 felony

charges he was facing. Despite his posture he did not understand the nature of the

charges against him, he answered to the court he understood the charges and the

maximum and minimum sentences he was facing. Defendant then signed his waiver

of counsel which explicitly acknowledged he had been informed of the nature of the

charges and the statutory punishment for them.

The trial court further inquired on 6 June 2023 into Defendant’s waiver of

counsel, and he again answered the same questions in the affirmative, but without

the posture asserting he did not understand the nature of the charges against him.

Defendant also wrote a pro se motion to have his appointed counsel replaced on 7

October 2022, wherein he alleged “I strongly feel that because of the nature of the

alleged accusation against me[.]”

The trial court inquired into Defendant’s understanding of the seriousness of

the charges on at least two occasions. In both instances, Defendant acknowledged

his understanding. The trial court counseled Defendant twice on the seriousness of

the charges and the need for counsel. The trial court appointed standby counsel for

- 23 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

Defendant in light of the seriousness of the charges and his request for standby

counsel. At the second colloquy the trial court asked, “Do you have any other

questions for me? Defendant responded: “No, Your Honor.” The trial court continued:

“And you’re continuing to waive your right to the assistance of a lawyer, and you’re

voluntarily and intelligently deciding to represent yourself in this case?” Defendant

responded: “Yes, Your Honor, I am.” Defendant’s argument is overruled.

3. Indecent Liberties with a Minor

Defendant further argues he did not waive his right to counsel on the indecent

liberties charges. Defendant asserts his waivers of counsel on 8 February 2023 and

6 June 2023 never contemplated his later indecent liberties with a child charges, for

which he was indicted on 21 August 2023. He asserts a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §

15A-942 (2025), which requires the trial court to “verify that the defendant is aware

of his right to counsel, that the defendant has been given the opportunity to exercise

that right, and must take any action necessary to effectuate that right on behalf of

the defendant.”

Here, the transcript shows the trial court did not make any further inquiry of

Defendant’s right to counsel after the 21 August 2023 indictments for indecent

liberties with a child, other than noting Geddings being present at trial on a stand-

by basis. This Court has long held first-degree sex offense and indecent liberties with

a child are separate and distinct charges. See State v. Manley, 95 N.C. App. 213, 217,

381 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1989). Defendant’s earlier valid waivers of counsel for his first-

- 24 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

degree statutory sex offense with a child by an adult charges was not valid on the

later indicted separate and distinct indictments for indecent liberties with a child.

Defendant asserts if the indecent liberties charges are vacated, the statutory

sex offense with a child by an adult convictions must also be overturned, and he is

entitled to a new trial. Defendant cites State v. Anderson, 215 N.C. App. 169, 721

S.E.2d 233 (2011), aff’d per curiam, 365 N.C. 466, 722 S.E.2d 509 (2012), wherein a

defendant was awarded a new trial on both offenses when he was initially charged

with possession of cocaine and was later indicted for attaining the status of a habitual

felon. Id. at 169, 721 S.E.2d at 234. The defendant in Anderson first purported to

waive his right to counsel in district court, without a transcript of the colloquy. The

defendant was later indicted with attaining habitual felon status. Id. The defendant

executed a second purported waiver of counsel wherein all individuals of the court

session who wished to represent themselves were “directed to sit ‘in a box.’” Id. at

171, 721 S.E.2d at 235. The trial court then directed all individuals to come when

their name was called to sign a waiver of counsel and be told when their court date

was by the district attorney. Id. at 172, 721 S.E.2d at 235.

In Anderson, where during the initial waiver of counsel in district court on a

drug possession charge, prior to being indicted for attaining the status of a habitual

felon, this Court noted “As there is no transcript of [the d]efendant’s district court

appearance, we are unable to determine to what extent [the d]efendant was informed

of the charges against him and the potential punishment for those charges.” Id. at

- 25 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

171, 721 S.E.2d at 235. This Court held both were insufficient at the subsequent

trial.

Unlike in Anderson, where the defendant was awarded a new trial on both

charges because he never had a valid signed waiver on either charge, including the

first charge, here, Defendant had valid multiple informed waivers on his statutory

sex offense with a child by an adult charges. Those convictions remain undisturbed.

Id.

The trial court consolidated the convictions for first-degree statutory sex

offense with a child by an adult and the indecent liberties with a child into two

separate judgments. Defendant’s judgment for twelve counts of the statutory sexual

offense with a child by an adult and fifteen counts of the indecent liberties with a

child is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for resentencing on

the sex offense charges. See State v. Moore, 327 N.C. 378, 383-84, 345 S.E.2d 124,

128 (1990). Defendant’s convictions and judgment of 300 to 400 months for three

statutory sex offense with a child by an adult convictions remains undisturbed.

In light of our decision to vacate the indecent liberties convictions, we need not

reach Defendant’s remaining arguments concerning his waiver of a jury trial on his

indecent liberties with a child charges.

V. Conclusion

Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel on his first-

degree statutory sex offense with a child by an adult charges. Those convictions are

- 26 -

STATE V. INGRAM

Opinion of the Court

affirmed.

The trial court did not verify with Defendant his waiver of his right to counsel

on his subsequently-indicted indecent liberties with a child charges. The judgment

of the trial court on the twelve counts of the statutory sexual offense with a child by

an adult and fifteen counts of the indecent liberties with a child is vacated and this

cause is remanded solely for a new sentencing on the twelve counts of statutory sexual

offense with a child by an adult. Defendant’s judgment for the three counts of

statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult remains undisturbed. It is so

ordered.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; JUDGMENT VACATED AND

REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

Judges GRIFFIN and FLOOD concur.

- 27 -