Morris

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 4:24-CV-166-BO-KS

MARCUS E. MORRIS, )

Plaintiff,

V. ORDER

TOWN OF SCOTLAND NECK,

NORTH CAROLINA )

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

[DE 19]. Plaintiff has responded [DE 21] and defendant has replied [DE 24]. A hearing was held

before the undersigned on August 26, 2025. In this posture, the motion is ripe for ruling. For the

following reasons, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Marcus Morris, an African American man, was employed as a police officer by

the Town of Scotland Neck from January 13, 2018, until October 15, 2024. [DE 9, § 4]. His

amended complaint [DE 9] alleges the following. In June 2021, plaintiff applied for a vacant

Sergeant position within the police department. /d. at 15. The Chief of Police, John Tippett, told

plaintiff he would have to complete a Sergeant’s exam and sit before a formal panel to be

considered for the position. /d. Plaintiff took the exam but never received his results and never

attended a formal interview. /d. at §§ 17-18.

After plaintiff expressed interest in the vacancy, Chief Tippett contacted a white, part-time

police officer named Gary Knight. /d. at § 19. Tippett told Knight he wanted him to return to full-

time work and, eventually, to assume the vacancy. /d. He also told Knight that plaintiff “wouldn’t

get the position and they needed to make it look like it didn’t have anything to do with race.” □□□

at § 20. Tippett assured Knight that regardless of his actual performance on the associated exam,

his results would outperform plaintiff’s results. /d. Tippett routinely used a racial epithet directed

at African Americans, both in this discussion and elsewhere, indicating—if not actually stating—

that his decision to install Knight instead of plaintiff was based on race. /d. at J] 20, 46.

In addition to being denied the promotion, Plaintiff received other inequitable treatment as

compared to white police officers from both Chief Tippett and Captain Tommy Parker. /d. at

22-24. Plaintiff had earned various certifications to work with drug-sniffing police dogs, and the

department had issued him a police dog. /d. at §§ 9-14. Nevertheless, plaintiff was not allowed to

receive K9 training. /d. at {{ 22-24. He also endured micromanagement of his paperwork. /d. In

June 2023, while performing his duties as a police officer, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle:

accident while pursuing a subject. /d at § 23. Tippett instituted a disciplinary action against

plaintiff but never informed plaintiff that he had been written up. /d. at 23, 44. The disciplinary

action was later determined unsubstantiated. /d. at { 23.

In August 2023, plaintiff attended a Scotland Neck town council closed session meeting to

elaborate on official complaints against Tippett and Parker. /d at § 25. Plaintiff and others

complained, generally, of Tippett’s and Parker’s corrupt practices, including falsifying time sheets,

involvement with known drug dealers, forbidding the execution of search warrants on select drug

dealers, and purchasing narcotics fo: Parker’s then-girlfriend. /d. at The Town did not conduct

any investigation into the corrupt practices. /d. at § 28. After appearing at this town council session,

plaintiff ‘was subject to more alleged retaliation. /d. He was written up for multiple unsubstantiate:d

disciplinary actions. /d. at J 29.

In October 2023, because of the ongoing mistreatment, plaintiff tendered a two-weeks’

notice to the Town manager, Thomas Everett. /d. at § 31. Everett agreed. /d. at § 32. Tippett, who

had been on a leave of absence at the time plaintiff tendered his resignation, returned immediately

and terminated plaintiff. /d. Plaintiff therefore would not receive any compensation for the two

additional weeks he intended to work. /d. After terminating plaintiff’s employment, Tippett

returned to administrative leave. /d. The Town left around thirty-six hours of plaintiff's work

unpaid. /d. at § 34.

Plaintiff sought employment with the Roanoke Rapids Police Department. /d. at § 37. He

was unable to begin work there, however, because of false reports the Town made to North

Carolina Training and Standards. /d. at § 45. The Town reported that plaintiff failed to return a rifle

to the department, failed to return and conduct a proper equipment inventory, failed to ensure that

his police dog received proper veterinarian treatment, and that plaintiff had been written up for the

car accident while chasing a criminal subject. /d. at §§ 40-43. Plaintiff’s first notice of these

disciplinary actions came from Captain Gordon Williams of Roanoke Rapids Police Department

in connection with his application. /d. at § 44. All write ups were determined “unfound” by North

Carolina Training and Standards. /d. at ¥ 39.

Plaintiff's complaint against the Town of Scotland Neck lists three causes of action:

(1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by deprivation of rights, failure to promote and discriminatory

termination based on race through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) Title VII retaliation, and (3) common law

wrongful discharge and violation of N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2.

DISCUSSION

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) allows for a party to

move for entry of judgment after the close of the pleadings stage, but early enough so as not to

delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Courts apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard when reviewing a motion

under Rule 12(c). Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 375 (4th

Cir. 2012). “Judgment on the pleadings is not properly granted unless the moving party has clearly

established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” United States v. Any & all Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458,

462 (8th Cir. 2000).

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Plaintiff asserts a claim for deprivation of rights, failure to promote, and discriminatory

termination based on race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The same principals of municipal liability apply

to § 1981 and § 1983. Defendant opposes the § 1981 claim on the grounds that the acts of Chief

Tippett are not attributable to the defendant municipality. Under Monell v. New York City Dept. of

Soc. Servs., a local government can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its unconstitutional

policies. 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). Liability is limited, however, and is not available on a

respondeat superior theory. Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984).

Municipal liability results only ““when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in

four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation;

(2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through

an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that ‘manifest[s] deliberate

indifference to the rights of citizens’; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent

and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitedl). Plaintiff attempts

to establish liability based on the second theory—that Chief of Police Tippett was a final

policymaking authority with respect to his decision not to promote plaintiff.

“A ‘final policymaker’ for the purposes of municipal liability is someone who has ‘the

responsibility and authority to implement final municipal policy with respect to a particular course

of action.’” Nance v. City of Albemarle, 520 F. Supp. 3d 758, 776 (quoting Lytle, 326 F.3d at 471).

“(T]he identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law.” /d. (quoting City of St.

Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988)). An official does not have final policy making

authority if his or her acts “are subject to review or supervision by a municipal policymaker.”

Alexander v. City of Greensboro, 762 F. Supp. 2d 764, 783 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (citing Riddick v. Sch.

Bd., 238 F.3d 518, 523-24 (4th Cir. 2000)).

Defendant cites the Town of Scotland Neck Code of Ordinances, contending that they

reserve policymaking authority regarding employment decisions to other municipal officials than

the Chief of Police. The ordinances state:

The primary duties and responsibilities of the Town Administrator/Clerk are

presented as follows: (1) Appoints and removes town department heads with the

approval of the Town Board, and appoints and removes all other town employees.

Employees other than department heads shall be recommended by the appropriate

head of the department and approved by the Town Administrator/Clerk{.]

[DE 25-1]; Town of Scotland Neck Code of Ordinances § 30.15(B)-+{(B)(1). “The police shall be

responsible directly to the Mayor and the Board of Commissioners.” /d. at § 31.02. “The Chief of

Police, subject to the Board of Commissioners, shall have charge of the Police Department and

shall be responsible to the Board of Commissioners in seeing that the police officers faithfully

perform their duties.” /d. at § 31.05(A).

Defendant argues that the ordinances give the Town Clerk appointment power, and

therefore the ultimate policymaking authority over personnel decisions, while the police chief has

mere recommendation power for subordinates. [DE 20, p. 10]. Additionally, defendant notes the

“Chief is ‘subject to the Board of Commissioners’ (§ 31.05) and the police department is

‘responsible directly to the Mayor and Board of Commissioners’ (§ 31.02), demonstrating that his

authority is both derived from and constrained by superior municipal officials.” Jd.

Defendant’s argument resembles the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Greensboro Pro. Fire

Fighters Ass'n, Loc. 3157 v. City of Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962 (4th Cir. 1995). There, the Fourth

Circuit distinguished between policymaking and mere decision-making authority.

While it is true that Fire Chief Jones had the authority to select particular

individuals for promotion and even to design the procedures governing promotions

within his department, this authority did not include responsibility for establishing

substantive personnel policy governing the exercise of his authority. His power to

appoint and to establish procedures for making appointments was always subject to

the parameters established by the City. Appellants confuse the authority to make

final policy with the authority to make final implementing decisions.

Id. at 965-66 (emphasis in original). Because the Scotland Neck ordinances give Chief Tippett the

authority to design procedures by which candidates for promotion are selected and recommended

for installment by the Town Clerk, this language bears on the question of whether Tippett had final

policymaking authority in that respect—or whether as in Greensboro, the ability to design

candidate selection procedures was mere decision-making authority.

In Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, N. Carolina, 897 F.3d 538, 559 (4th Cir. 2018), the Fourth

Circuit distinguished Greensboro Pro. Fire Fighters Ass'n. The Greensboro ordinances expressly

reserved the power to “administer all personnel programs” to the city manager, and directed him

to “establish . .. such personnel rules, plans, and procedures necessary or desirable to implement

the provisions of this chapter and carry out the intent of the council.” Greensboro Pro. Fire

Fighters Ass'n, 64 F.3d at 965 (emphasis omitted). Indeed, the city had adopted personnel policies.

There was “no evidence in the record that the City Council or the City Manager had delegatecl any

of its policymaking authority with regard to employer-employee relations: to the Fire Chief.” Jd.

The Fire Chief’s authority to design the procedures by which candidates were selected for

employment or promotion eligibility was constrained by the policies the town had imposed on

him. “Put differently, the fire chief's ‘power to appoint and to establish procedures for making

appointments was always subject to the parameters established by the City.” Zown of Mocksville,

897 F.3d 538, 559 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).

The Jown of Mocksville court recognized that a municipality should not avoid liability just

because it delegated policymaking authority. If a municipality could delegate authority to control

employment matters, reserve nominal oversight, and point to Greensboro Pro. Fire Fighters Ass’n

for the proposition that the delegee is a mere decision-maker, the municipality could avoid liability

in virtually every case. See Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d at 558 (citing City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988)). The Town of Mocksville court asked,

If [the alleged state actor] is not the final policymaker for the Town with respect to

personnel policy, and the Town has no personnel policies on the books, then who is

the final policymaker? And whose policies have governed the employment

relationship between the Town and its employees for the past several decades?

Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d at 558 (emphasis in original). Defendant does not point to any

Scotland Neck personnel policy controlling the Town Clerk and the Police Chief in their

employment decisions. If the Police Chief was not constrained by a town policy, the question is

whether the ordinances give the Town Clerk the authority to establish employment policies which

control the Police Chief.

Defendant’s assertion that “the Chief of Police merely has recommendation power for

subordinates” [DE 20, p. 10] ignores the Chief’s integral role in the appointment process. It is true,

no subordinate employee is appointed without the approval of the Town Clerk. But neither does a

candidate come before the Clerk for approval without the recommendation of the relevant

department head—here, the Chief of Police. § 30.15(B)(1). The ordinances’ scheme for appointing

police officers begins with the Chief, who—note the mandatory language—shall recommend the

candidate for appointment, the Chief’s subordination to the Board of Commissioners

notwithstanding. Jd. In other words, for a candidate to be employed, both the Chief of Police and

the Town Clerk must turn their keys.

Of course, the ordinance does imply a hierarchy between the Town Clerk and the Chief of

Police. The Chief’s power is to recommend a candidate, and the Clerk approves the candidate. The

Clerk’s power to review the Chief’s recommendations bears the likeness of final policymaking

authority. But this oversight is a one-way ratchet. While the Clerk can reject a candidate whom the

Chief recommends, the Clerk has no recourse to hire an employee without the Chief's

recommendation. In other words, the Chief is the only one with the power to determine the

processes by which employees are selected for promotion eligibility.

The distinction drawn in Greensboro Pro. Fire Fighters Ass’n between final policymaking

authority and mere decision-making authority is inapplicable in cases like this one, where the

Police Chief’s power to establish procedures for making appointments was not subject to any

parameters. See Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d at 559. Tippett established the procedures for

selecting promotion candidates without having to maneuver beneath the constraints of a policy set

by the Town Clerk, the town itself, or anyone else. This is enough, under the rule of Hunter v. Town

of Mocksville, to determine Chief Tippett had final policymaking authority with respect to the

procedures for selecting candidates for promotion or employment eligibility.

Finally, plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to support a plausible inference that defendant,

through the actions of Tippett, interfered with plaintiff's contractual interest in employment, that

the defendant intended to discriminate based on race, and that but for the plaintiff’srace, deferidarit

would not have interfered with his contractual interest. Therefore, plaintiff pleads facts sufficient

to state a claim under § 1981. See Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 305 (4th Cir. 2022).

II. Title VII

To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, plaintiff must allege “(1) that she engaged

in a protected activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and

(3) that there was a causal link between the two events.” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp.,

786 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2015). An employee engages in protected activity under both Title VII

and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when they oppose conduct that they reasonably believe constitutes race

discrimination. Crawford v. Metro. Gov t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009)

(“When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged

in...a form of employment discrimination, that communication virtually always constitutes the

employee’s opposition to the [discrimination]’’).

Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity when he attended the town council session to air

his complaints about Tippett. It is true, as defendant argues, that the complaint lists several topics

discussed at the meeting, and none of the listed complaints are related to a Title VII protected

category like race. The list of topics discussed at the meeting, however, does not purport to be

exclusive, and plaintiff later—more generally—alleges that he “complained to the Town board, his

supervisor’s supervisor, along with other officers, [of] Tippett and Parker’s conduct and

mistreatment.” [DE 9, 9 71]. Given the factual allegations of the complaint, the subject matter

allegedly discussed at the meeting plausibly includes plaintiffs opposition to race discrimination.

Plaintiff alleges that following his attendance at the town council meeting, he was

terminated because of his opposition to the discrimination. He sufficiently pled his Title VII claim.

If. Wrongful Discharge; Violation of Equal Employment Practices Act, N.C.G.S. § 143-22.2

Defendant argues that plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because

North Carolina law does not support a wrongful termination claim based on constructive discharge.

While plaintiff's allegation that he was forced to resign because of mistreatment resembles a

constructive discharge, plaintiff alleges that Chief Tippett returned and actually terminated his

employment. As alleged, when plaintiff left the job, it was because of a real termination, not a

constructive discharge. Plaintiff states a claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 19] is

DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this a 3 day of February 2026.

Le W. BOYLE ; ;

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JWDGE

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