Rodriguez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RICARDO REYES RODRIGUEZ, ) Case No. 4:26-cv-0333

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER

)

JERRY GREENE, in his official capacity as )

the Sheriff of the Mahoning County Jail, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

) AND ORDER

Respondents. )

Petitioner Ricardo Reyes Rodriguez filed on February 10, 2026, a petition for writ of

habeas corpus by a person in federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). ECF 1, 3.

The Petition named Jerry Greene, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Mahoning County Jail,

and Kevin Raycraft, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Detroit Field

Office, U.S. ICE (collectively, “Respondents”) as the appropriate custodians. Petitioner has been

in ICE custody since on or about December 27, 2025, at Mahoning County Jail. ECF 3, ¶¶ 1, 15;

see also ECF 3-1. He now moves this Court to order his release from detention because his

detention without the possibility of a valid, particularized bond hearing is unconstitutional.

Respondents, in turn, argue that Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing because he is subject

to a mandatory detention statute.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time judges have been asked to confront this issue.

Indeed, well over 400 district court judges across this country have evaluated the legality and

constitutionality of the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) new mass detention policy

(“DHS Policy”).1 Of those hundreds of judges, nearly all of them have ruled against the DHS

Policy, including this Court in previous habeas corpus cases in the past few months. See Enrique

Leon Macias v. Kevin Raycraft, Case No. 4:25-cv-2642, 2025 WL 3525262 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 9,

2025). This Court sees no reason to reverse itself, nor any reason to depart from the well-reasoned

analysis supported by the majority—regardless of the preclusive effect of Bautista II. And for the

sake of completeness, the Court also takes this opportunity to more wholly spell out the statutory

analysis that was omitted in its previous decision.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Ricardo Reyes Rodriguez is a native and citizen of Mexico. ECF 3, ¶ 15. He

states that he entered the United States sometime in 2004 at an unknown location. Conversely,

Respondents state that Petitioner first entered the United States at some unknown time (but prior

to March 31, 1999) and location. ECF 6 at 1-2. Regardless of which of these assertions is correct,

the relevant takeaway is that Petitioner has been in the country for at least twenty years.2 On

December 27, 2025, Petitioner was detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)

pursuant to a Form I-200 Administrative Arrest Warrant. He has been continuously detained in the

sixty-five days since then, up to the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

1 This number is accurate as of February 27, 2026. For a regularly updated list of district court decisions regarding the

DHS policy, see https://www.politico.com/news/2026/02/18/trump-judges-immigration-detention-00784614.

2 It is somewhat confusing what timeline for continuous presence, or lack thereof, in the United States Respondents

allege for Petitioner. Respondents allege that Petitioner was granted voluntary departure by an Immigration Judge on

October 15, 2002, and subsequently self-deported to Mexico on January 3, 2003. ECF 6 at 2. The Response then states

only that Petitioner was “arrested by Painesville Police Department” on September 11, 2025. Id. However, the ICE

Form I-213 narrative, supplied by Respondents with their Response, alleges that Petitioner was arrested for failure to

appear on December 18, 2006. ECF 6-1 at 3. Presumably, Petitioner was physically present in the United States for

this arrest to have occurred (and likely some additional period of time beforehand), and Respondents have not alleged

that Petitioner was deported, voluntarily or not, at any subsequent time leading up to the instant litigation. Thus, at the

absolute shortest, Petitioner has been in country continuously for approximately twenty years.

The same day of his arrest, ICE provided Petitioner with a Form I-862 Notice to Appear

(“NTA”), requiring his presence before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on February 10, 2026. ECF

3-1. The NTA alleged that Petitioner was “an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired

passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality.” Id. at 4.

Accordingly, the NTA charged Petitioner with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who entered the United States without being admitted or paroled,

and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as someone who is not in possession of a valid unexpired

immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document

required by this chapter. ECF 3-2 at 4. Notably, the NTA does not identify Petitioner as an

“arriving alien.” Rather, the NTA acknowledges that Petitioner is “an alien present in the United

States who has not been admitted or paroled.” Id. at 1; see also ECF 7 at 1.

Petitioner asserts that he has not been provided with a custody redetermination hearing,

also known as a bond redetermination hearing.3 Despite not having a hearing, on January 22, 2026,

an IJ issued an order denying Petitioner bond because “this Court does not have the authority to

redetermine bond in this case.” ECF 6-2 at 1. The IJ explains in her written decision, inter alia,

that Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), was binding on her and deprived

her of jurisdiction over Petitioner’s bond proceedings. Hurtado is a September 2025 Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision purporting to find that, as a matter of law, all aliens present

in the United States without admission may only be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),

3 The hearing before the IJ is a redetermination hearing because the initial custody and bond determination is made

by a DHS official, typically the direct director. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (“After an initial custody determination

by the district director, including the setting of a bond, the respondent may, at any time before an order under 8 CFR

part 1240 becomes final, request amelioration of the conditions under which he or she may be released.”).

and never under section 1226(a).4 Therefore, Hurtado explains, an IJ “lack[s] authority to hear

bond requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.”

The IJ’s order further states that even “[i]f it were determined that this Court has the

authority to redetermine bond in this case, the Court would still deny bond as the Court finds that

the Respondent is a danger to the community and a flight risk.” Id. The IJ, though, does not identify

any specific or personalized reason for the assertion that Petitioner is a danger to the community

and/or a flight risk.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed the present petition on February 10, 2026—forty-five days after he had first

been detained by ICE, and nineteen days after the IJ denied bond for lack of jurisdiction. ECF 1,

3. He argues that his continued detention without a full evidentiary bond hearing is a violation of

the plain language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), relevant bond regulations

promulgated by ICE and its predecessors, and his right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment.

ECF 3, ¶¶ 59-70. Petitioner requests that this Court declare his detention unlawful and require

Respondents to immediately release him, id. at 18; alternatively, Petitioner requests this Court

require Respondents to provide him with a prompt bond hearing within five days of the order, ECF

7 at 8.

That same day, the Court issued a show cause order directing Respondents to submit a

filing explaining why the instant matter is meaningfully different that the posture in Leon Macias,

Case No. 4:25-cv-02642 (N.D. Ohio). In that show cause order, the Court observed that:

Like Mr. Leon Macias, Plaintiff has been in the United States for

more than two decades and has no criminal convictions other than

traffic citations. ECF 3, ¶¶ 49, 51. And like Mr. Leon Macias,

4 As explained infra, a key distinction between section 1225(b) and section 1226(a) is that individuals detained under

section 1225(b) are subject to mandatory detention, whereas detainees under section 1226(a) are subject to

discretionary detention and are entitled to a personalized bond hearing.

Plaintiff has been charged with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States

without being admitted or paroled, and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as someone who is not in possession of a valid

unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing

identification card, or other valid entry document required by this

chapter. ECF 3-2 at 4. And just like Mr. Leon Macias, ICE issued a

custody determination, without consideration of the merits of

Plaintiff’s particular situation, to continue Plaintiff’s detention

without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other

conditions. ECF 3, ¶¶ 15, 52. And like Mr. Leon Macias, Plaintiff

appears to be detained as part of the Department of Homeland

Security’s (“DHS”) relatively new policy of “consider[ing] anyone

inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—i.e., those who entered the

United States without admission or inspection— to be subject to

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to

be released on bond” (“DHS Policy”). Id., ¶¶ 3, 4.

ECF 4 at 1-2. In Leon Macias, the Court determined that petitioner was a member of the bond

eligible class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 3713987, at *32 (C.D.

Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (“Bautista II”), amending and superseding on reconsideration, Case No. 5:25-

fcv-1873, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), appeal docketed sub nom., Bautista v.

U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., Case No. 25-7958 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025). Given the significant

similarities between Mr. Leon Macias and Petitioner, it appeared that Petitioner is also a member

of the Bautista II class.

Respondents timely filed their Response on February 17, 2026. ECF 6. In their response,

Respondents did not contest the Court’s observation that, on the underlying facts, Petitioner would

appear to be included as a member of the Bautista II class. Instead, Respondents focused on the

legal elements of the instant litigation and argue that “[t]his Court should decline to provide

preclusive effect to Bautista [II].” Id. at 2. They specifically argue that Bautista II has no preclusive

effect outside the Central District of California and over custodians who are located outside that

district, that this Court should not give preclusive effect to a declaratory judgment that is on appeal,

and that according preclusive effect to Bautista II would contravene other principles of preclusion.

Respondents also note that the Fifth Circuit,5 since the issuance of Bautista II and Leon Macias,

has accepted the Government’s interpretation and application of section 1225(b). See Buenrostro-

Mendez v. Bondi, Case No. 25-20496, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026)

(holding that undocumented aliens like Petitioner are “applicants for admission” and subject to

mandatory detention under the plain language of section 1225(b)).

Petitioner filed his reply in support of his petitioner on February 23, 2026. ECF 7. The

matter is now ripe for ruling.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the

district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).

Section 2241 “is an affirmative grant of power to federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to

prisoners being held ‘in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’ ”

Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)). The fundamental

protections of habeas corpus also apply in the immigration context. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Indeed, the Supreme Court observed:

It is well established that certain constitutional protections

available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to

aliens outside of our geographic borders. But once an alien enters

the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process

Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including

aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary,

or permanent.

Id., 693 (citations omitted).

5 Respondents incorrectly assert that Buenrotro-Mendez is the first Circuit Court opinion in the country to address this

question. The Fifth Circuit may be the first Circuit Court to issue a full decision on the merits pertaining to the DHS

Policy, but it should be noted that, two months prior, the Seventh Circuit also weighed in on the matter by refusing to

stay a lower court decision blocking the DHS Policy pending appeal. See Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161

F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (preliminary ruling) (finding that analogous plaintiffs likely had the “better

argument”—that section 1226(a) applies— “[b]ased upon the text and structure of the two provisions”).

While the district courts’ habeas powers are somewhat limited in the immigration context,

see Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Congress stripped the courts of

jurisdiction to grant habeas relief” for challenges to removal orders), “[f]ederal courts have habeas

jurisdiction to examine the statutory and constitutional bases for an immigration detention

unrelated to a final order of removal,” Jiang Lu v. U.S. ICE, 22 F. Supp. 3d 839, 841 (N.D. Ohio

2014) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003)).

IV. DISCUSSION6

This Petition presents a narrow question: whether Petitioner’s detention is governed by

section 1225(b)(2)’s 7 mandatory detention provision or section 1226(a)’s discretionary bond

provision. Insisting that he should be treated as detained under section 1226(a), Petitioner argues

that the Due Process Clause under the Fifth Amendment protects his liberty interests, namely,

remaining free from custody during his removal proceedings. See ECF 3, ¶¶ 67-70. Respondents

retort that the statute requires Petitioner remain in custody without a bond hearing. See generally

ECF 6. Neither party suggests that any of the INA’s other mandatory detention provisions, see

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (providing for mandatory detention of immigrants accused or convicted of

certain crimes); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (providing for mandatory detention of certain asylum

seekers who have been present in the United States for fewer than two years), apply here.

6 Respondents do not assert Petitioner has not satisfied any jurisdictional or exhaustion requirements. However, many

similar decisions throughout the Sixth Circuit do discuss these issues. Other courts in this district have analyzed

jurisdiction of remedies in similar circumstances, such as Leiva Lemus v. Lynch, Case no. 4:26-cv-203, 2026 WL

496731, at *2-5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2026). This Court incorporates its reasoning into this opinion and finds it has

jurisdiction over this habeas petition. Further, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative or prudential

exhaustion in this type of case. For the sake of completeness, the Court incorporates the analysis on exhaustion of

remedies from another court in this district, Echavarria Morales v. Noem, Case No. 3:25-cv-2691, 2026 WL 100583,

at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026), and the Court waives any exhaustion requirement for the same reasons.

7 Respondents do not ever plainly state which specific subsection of section 1225(b) they argue applies to Petitioner.

However, in discussing the applicability of Bautista II, Respondents note that petitioners in Bautista II “sought a

declaratory judgment that class members such as Petitioner were unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),

rather than § 1226(a).” ECF 6 at 2. Accordingly, this Court proceeds with the presumption that Respondents believe

section 1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner in this matter.

Accordingly, this Court limits its analysis to the potential preclusive effect of Bautista II, and

sections 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a).

A. Background on the DHS Policy

Some context is needed to understand Petitioner’s claim. The INA governs, inter alia, the

Government’s ability to detain inadmissible aliens by creating two broad categories. Section 235

of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, generally applies to “certain aliens seeking admission into the

country”; Section 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, applies to “certain aliens already in the country

pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)

(emphasis added in both). While there are a variety of differences between the two sections, the

most salient in this matter is that only aliens detained under section 1226(a) are entitled to receive

bond hearings at the outset of detention. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at

306.

For roughly the past thirty years, DHS has taken the position that “[d]espite being

applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly

referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond

redetermination” under section 1226. 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (interim

Immigration and Naturalization Service rule implementing recent amendments to the INA)).

However, on July 8, 2025, DHS issued a notice reversing that position and requiring “ICE

employees to consider anyone arrested in the United States and charged with being inadmissible

as an ‘applicant for admission’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Bautista v. Santacruz, Case No.

5:25-cv-1873, 2025 WL 3289861, at * 1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (“Bautista I”). “Under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), ‘applicants for admission’ are subject to mandatory detention for proceedings

under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) and not entitled to the due process protections found within § 1226(a).”

Id. The DHS Policy was subsequently extended to all IJs when the BIA issued Hurtado, ensuring

the DHS Policy was now binding precedent on IJs.

B. Applicability of Bautista

The same day Petitioner initiated this litigation, this Court ordered Respondents to submit

a filing explaining how the instant case was materially different from Leon Macias, where this

Court applied preclusive effect to Bautista II. Respondents filed a timely response, and raised three

main arguments against applying Bautista II to Petitioner.

1. Relevant Background

In several major cities with large immigrant populations, ICE has initiated roving patrols

intended to detain allegedly undocumented aliens. In June 2025, during an operation in Los

Angeles, ICE detained Lazaro Moldonado Bautista and numerous other aliens. See Bautista II,

2025 WL 3713987, at *1. Shortly thereafter, in July 2025, Bautista and his co-petitioners filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District Court for the Central

District of California. The petitioners alleged that the new DHS Policy violated the INA, the Fifth

Amendment Right to Due Process, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Not long

afterwards, the petitioners “amended their complaint to include class allegations and requests for

declaratory relief as to the legality of Respondents’ policies relating to denying bond hearings.”

Id., at *2.

On November 20, 2025, a district court in the United States District Court for the Central

District of California held that this new policy conflicted with the plain statutory language of the

INA and violated Due Process. Specifically, the district court held that “applicants for admission,”

as used in section 1225(a), refers only to those aliens who have not “lawful[ly entered] into the

United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Bautista I, 2025 WL

3289861, at *9 (emphasis in original) (quoting § 1101(a)(13)(A), which is the INA’s definition of

“applicants for admission”). Accordingly, “[i]ndividuals who have not been inspected and

authorized by an immigration officer lack the trait to be categorized as ‘applicants for

admission’ ” and must be afforded an individualized bond hearing under section 1226(a). Id.

Just a few days later, on November 25, 2025, that same district court certified a nationwide

class. Bautista II, 2025 WL 3713987, at *32. The Bautista II class is defined as follows:

Bond Eligible Class: All noncitizens in the United States without

lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States

without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon

arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department

of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.

Id. The class certification extended the Bautista I declaratory judgment that the new DHS policy

violated the INA and Due Process, and entitled all class members to the same declaratory relief

granted in Bautista I. Id. In essence, all class members must be treated under section 1226(a). The

court did not enter final judgment at this time, however.

On December 18, 2025, the district court issued an “Amended Order consolidating the

Court's Orders on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Class Certification, and Application for

Reconsideration or Clarification.” See Bautista II. Here, the district court addressed the limitations

of petitioners’ request for declaratory relief and request for habeas relief. In relevant part, the

district court noted:

The Court...notes Respondents’ argument that habeas is an adequate

remedy seems to misunderstand Petitioners’ requested clarification

and relief to sound only in habeas. To the extent Respondents take

issue with Petitioners’ habeas claims, the available relief is limited

to the named Petitioners who were detained and denied individual

bond hearings in violation of the INA.

If Petitioners had requested classwide declaratory habeas relief,

such relief could extend only to members of the Bond Eligible Class

residing within this judicial district. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542

U.S. 426, 443 (2004) (concluding habeas jurisdiction lies “in only

one district: the district of confinement”). Therefore, all other

members of the Bond Eligible Class would not be afforded relief

under habeas. Indeed, that was the nature of this action anyway. The

Amended Class Complaint and briefings from Petitioners confirm

that habeas relief was sought only as to the named Petitioners.

Nowhere in the Amended Class Complaint or Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment do Petitioners seek habeas relief on a

nationwide level.

Id. at *14 (internal citations to the record omitted). Later in the order, when addressing the class

certification motion, the district court made clear:

This is not, however, an order by the Court to require Respondents

to provide habeas relief for all class members across the nation.

Rather, it extends the declaration of the unlawful nature of the DHS

Policy to the APA claim, which would thus require the Court to “set

aside” that policy. Vacatur, then, would render the very DHS Policy

upon which immigration judges (“IJs”) and the Executive Office for

Immigration Review have cited as grounds for its denial of bond

hearings a nullity.

[. . .]

Respondents argue Petitioners ultimately request “habeas relief,”

which is governed by the immediate custodian rule as well as

jurisdictional rules that require a habeas petition be filed within the

district of confinement. Respondents are correct about both rules,

but they fail to acknowledge that the certified class raises more than

just habeas relief.

Although Petitioners requested habeas relief for the Named

Plaintiffs, Petitioners’ requested classwide relief does not include

ordering nationwide habeas relief. . . . The Court readily admits that

federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. This Court's jurisdiction to

grant habeas relief is limited to those within the judicial district. See

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004) (concluding habeas

jurisdiction lies “in only one district: the district of confinement”).

In certifying the Bond Eligible Class, the Court only extends its

declaratory judgment regarding the illegality of the DHS Policy for

purposes of the APA claim. The Court cannot order nationwide

release or bond hearings for Bond Eligible class members,

especially so to those confined outside this judicial district.

Id. at *29-30 (internal citations to the record omitted). Finally, the district court entered final

judgment on the relevant claims addressed in Bautista II. The case was immediately appealed to

the Ninth Circuit, where the appeal remains pending as of the date of this Order.

2. Preclusive Effect

In their response, Respondents make three arguments against giving Bautista II preclusive

effect in the instant case: (1) that Bautista II has no preclusive effect outside the Central District

of California and over custodians who are located outside that district; (2) that this Court should

not give preclusive effect to a declaratory judgment that is on appeal; and (3) that according

preclusive effect to Bautista II would contravene other principles of preclusion.

To be clear, this Court agrees with Respondents, and the District Court for the Central

District of California, that habeas relief specifically is constrained to the district where each

petitioner is physically detained. See also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004)

(“jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement”); Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670,

672 (2025) (per curiam). It is uncontroverted that Petitioner is not being detained in the Central

District of California, but is detained in the Northern District of Ohio. This Court also agrees with

Respondents that a habeas petitioner must name the petitioner’s immediate custodian in order to

obtain relief. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 444. It is further uncontroverted that Petitioner’s immediate

custodian is not a named defendant in Bautista II.

Where this Court disagrees with Respondents, though, is that these differences alone are

sufficient to prevent any application of any part of the holding in Bautista II to this case.

Respondents argue that the declaratory relief accorded in Bautista II “at its core sounds in habeas.”

ECF 6 at 4. Because Petitioner’s “claims for relief necessarily imply the invalidity of [his]

confinement[],” Respondents argue that “[his] claims fall within the core of the writ of habeas

corpus and thus must be brough in habeas.” Id. at 2-3 (quoting J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 672); see also

id. at 3 (citing Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998), for the holding that a declaratory

judgment action is not appropriate to address the “validity of a defense the State may, or may not,

raise in a habeas proceeding” in part because “the underlying claim must be adjudicated in a federal

habeas proceeding”).

The Bautista II court made very clear that it was not entering any sort of habeas relief

classwide, acknowledging that affording “habeas relief on a nationwide level” might offend

Padilla's district-of-confinement rule. Bautista II, 2025 WL 3713987, at *14. It further

acknowledged that several statutory provisions limit trial judges' equitable authority to interfere

with immigration and removal proceedings under the guise of habeas. See, e.g., id. at *27

(discussing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e)(1)(A) and 1252(f)(1)); id. at *23 (discussing 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1252(e)(1)(B) and 1252(e)(3)(A)). Respondents may ultimately be correct in asserting these

jurisdictional questions. But “[t]he principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as

well as to other issues.” Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939). Supreme Court

precedent makes clear that if a jurisdictional question was itself “fully and fairly litigated by the

parties and finally determined in” the rendering forum, then that question is not subject to collateral

attack in a second forum. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963); see also Ramirez v. Smith,

Case No. 5:25-cv-186, 2026 WL 228778, at *5 n.7 (discussing how Padilla “is best read to state

a rule of venue, not subject-matter jurisdiction,” and therefore not necessarily dispositive of the

jurisdictional questions raised by Bautista II).

There is no question that the Bautista II court litigated and decided these jurisdictional

questions, including the ones raised here by Respondents. See Bautista, 2025 WL 371987, at *14,

*30 (concluding that Padilla does not foreclose jurisdiction to grant the declaratory relief entered).

Respondents here offer no reason to think the Government had anything less than a full opportunity

to litigate the matter in the Central District of California. “If anything, the Government had more

opportunity and ‘incentive to defend vigorously,’ Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,

330–31 (1979), in a lawsuit that threatened to culminate in a nationwide class judgment paired

with universal vacatur.” Ramirez, 2026 WL 228778, at *5. As such, questions about the

jurisdictional contours of habeas relief and the Bautista II decision do not preclude this Court from

giving Bautista II preclusive effect.

Respondents’ second argument also falls flat. It is clear that the “preclusive effect of a final

judgment persists even if the judgment in question remains on appeal.” Samayoa v. Smith, Case

No. 5:25-cv-190, 2026 WL 483243, at *3 (W.D. Ken. Feb. 20, 2026) (citing 18A Wright & Miller

§ 4433 & n.13 (3d ed., supp. Sept. 2025); see also Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,

398 (1981) (“A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from

relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”); Deposit Bank of Frankfort

v. Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 510–12 (1903). This is because “[a]

judgment merely voidable [] based upon an erroneous view of the law is not open to collateral

attack, but can be corrected only by a direct review.” Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316,

325 (1927); accord Moitie, 452 U.S. at 398–99; see also Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 200 (1932)

(“In every other forum the reasons for passing the decree are wholly immaterial. . . . It cannot be

attacked collaterally, and in every other court must be given full force and effect, irrespective of

the reasons upon which it is based.”) (quotation marks omitted).

Finally, Respondents make a variety of additional arguments that applying preclusive

effect to Bautista II would contravene other principles of preclusion. The first of these more minor

arguments is inapplicable, as it only matters “[t]o the extent this Court considers whether to

awarded ‘further’ relief than what the Bautista [II] court purported to grant to class members

outside the Central District of California” under 28 U.S.C. § 2202. ECF 6 at 6. However,

Petitioner’s habeas petition “[does not] ask this Court to enforce the Bautista [II] judgment, but

instead to order release notwithstanding the Government's purported rejection of that final, binding

ruling.” Samayoa, 2026 WL 483243, at * 6.

Respondents also raise the issue of applying issue preclusion against the Government. ECF

6 at 6. They contend that issue preclusion does not apply against the federal government “where

the party seeking to offensively use preclusion was not a party to the initial litigation.” Id. at 6-7

(citing United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984)). No one contests that Petitioner was

not a named party in the Bautista II litigation. Instead, Respondents characterize Petitioner as

“merely a member of a fundamentally flawed nationwide class.” Id. at 7. But for the reasons

discussed above, the correctness of the contours of the Bautista II class are not up for collateral

attack when it is uncontroverted that the Government had a full and fair opportunity to litigate (and

did, in fact, litigate) that exact issue in the previous litigation. And as a member of the Bautista II

class, Petitioner is entitled to use that judgment in offensive preclusion.

To be fair, this Court acknowledges that the two named Respondents in this case—Jerry

Greene and Kevin Raycraft—are not named respondents in the Bautista II proceedings. But

Respondents are simply Petitioner’s immediate custodians; that is, Respondents are at the “bottom

of the food chain” of custodianship. “There is privity between officers of the same government so

that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata

in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government.”

Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-3 (1940) (citing Tait v. W. Md. Ry.

Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933)). “The crucial point is whether or not in the earlier litigation the

representative of the United States had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of

the issue in controversy.” Id. at 403. The respondents in Bautista II include: DHS; the Executive

Office for Immigration Review; ICE; Todd Lyons, as Acting Director of ICE; DHS Secretary

Kristi Noem; and Pamela Bondi, as U.S. Attorney General. There can be no serious argument (nor

do Respondents attempt to argue here) that, as the agencies and officers at the “top of the food

chain,” respondents in Bautista II had ample authority to represent the interests of Respondents in

this matter. Indeed, “[w]here a suit binds the United States, it binds its subordinate officials.”

Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 403.

Respondents’ attempt to rely on the “existence of several inconsistent judgments from

district courts around the country” to counsel this Court against preclusion is also unpersuasive.

ECF 6 at 7-8 (citing, inter alia, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979), for

the proposition that “the existence of prior inconsistent judgments [are] indicium of unfairness of

applying issue preclusion”). But Respondents ignore the conclusion Parklane Hosiery arrives at

after considering the potential effect of inconsistent judgments on preclusion: “that the preferable

approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of

offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should

be applied.” Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331. This Court acknowledges that there are multiple

district courts, including some in the Sixth Circuit, that have either declined to grant preclusive

effect to Bautista II or agree with the Government’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). But, as

previously noted, the overwhelming weight of authority goes against this. Well over 90% of

district courts in this country have ruled against the Government in the interpretation of sections

1225(b) versus 1226(a)—the statutory interpretation question at the heart of the Bautista II

declaratory judgment. See Kyle Cheney (@kyledcheney), X (Feb. 27, 2026, at 14:14 ET),

https://x.com/kyledcheney/status/2027462439340499014?s=46 (noting, when updating Politico’s

running list of judges, see supra footnote 1, that 393 district court judges have ruled against the

Government while only thirty-three have ruled in favor). As already noted, this Court declines to

depart from the majority, of which it is already a part.

Finally, Respondents caution this Court that “it is doubtful that issue preclusion is ever

appropriate in the habeas context.” ECF 6 at 8. But this is beside the point. “Because this Court is

merely applying a binding civil judgment, not revisiting any issue in the context of postconviction

review, this argument, too, [does not] limit the effect of the declaration.” Ramirez, 2026 WL

228778, at *7; see also, supra (discussing the jurisdictional contours of habeas corpus and

declaratory relief).

In sum, this Court finds none of Respondents’ arguments persuasive, and thus still finds it

appropriate to find Petitioner is a member of the Bautista II class and to give that judgment

preclusive effect. But even if the Court found otherwise regarding Bautista II, the Court’s own

independent statutory analysis of the relevant detention statutes would dictate the same outcome.

C. Relevant Detention Statutes

As noted several times throughout this Order, the two statutes primarily at issue are

8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a). The distinction between these two statutes is critical.

As with any statutory analysis, this Court begins with the texts themselves. See Jimenez v.

Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“As with any question of statutory interpretation, our

analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.”). When interpreting statutes, courts “must

give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written.” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th

Cir. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In so doing, the courts “assign each word of the

statute its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning . . . , while keeping in mind that statutory

language has meaning only in context.” Id. (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

Finally, “[i]t is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole,

to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,

void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

Section 1226(a) states, in relevant part, “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an

alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant

for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is

not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a of this title.” An “applicant for admission” is “[a]n alien present in the United

States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

“Admission,” in turn, is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

Here, Respondents argue that all “applicants for admission” are also “seeking admission”

for the purposes of mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2). This interpretation, however,

would render the term “seeking admission” entirely superfluous of “applicant for admission.” See

United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) (“[E]very

clause and word of a statute should have meaning.”); see also Sumba v. Crowley, Case

No. 1:25-cv-13034, 2025 WL 3126512, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2025) (“[T]he [c]ourt rejects as

implausible the government's contention that two distinct terms in the same subparagraph—

‘applicant for admission’ and ‘an alien seeking admission’—somehow bear the same meaning

even though they are (obviously) different terms.” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, “this

presumption is ‘strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same

statutory scheme,’ as would be the case here.” Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

161 F.4th 1048, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (preliminary ruling) (quoting Marx v. Gen. Rev. Corp., 568

U.S. 371, 386 (2013)). This Court will not presume that Congress intended its words to be

redundant or superfluous. See TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 31 (directing courts to construe statutes as to

not render any word superfluous).

Respondents’ argued interpretation also ignores that “applicant for admission” is a term of

art specifically defined by the statute, whereas “seeking admission” is not. “When a statute

includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from a term’s

ordinary meaning.” Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149, 160 (2018) (quotations and

citation omitted); see also Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 2026 WL 323330, at *12 (Douglas, J.,

dissenting) (“Congress may . . . define a word or phrase [like ‘admission’] in a specialized way”

but “absent such [a definition], those whose lives are governed by law are entitled to rely on its

ordinary meaning, not left to speculate about hidden messages.” (citing Feliciano v. Dep’t of

Transp., 605 U.S. 38, 45 (2025))). Applying the ordinary meaning only to “seeking admission,”

the Court finds it significant that the term uses the present participle. This is because “[s]eeking”

“implies action[.]” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (N.D. Ohio 2025). This

is “something that is currently occurring, and in this instance, would most logically occur at the

border upon inspection.” Id.8 Broadening “seeking admission” to also encompass those aliens

already present in the country, as Respondents argue, would fail to give effect to Congress’ specific

choice to use the active term “seeking” when specifying those aliens covered by section

1225(b)(2). See Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (“Consistent with normal usage,

we have frequently looked to Congress’ choice of verb tense to ascertain a statute’s temporal

reach.”). Indeed, it would be difficult to say that aliens who have been present in the United States

for a considerable time without having been lawfully admitted, such as Petitioner here, are actively

“seeking admission.”

Further, Respondents’ argument contravenes the Supreme Court’s holding in Jennings.

There, the Court clearly and plainly held that section 1226(a) authorizes the government to detain

certain aliens “already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings,

583 U.S. at 289. The Supreme Court held that understanding in stark contrast with the application

8 On top of this, “[t]he statute also requires that an ‘examining immigration officer’ determine that the noncitizen is

‘seeking admission.’ ” Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 781. Indeed, this could not have, and did not, occur under

the circumstances of the instant case.

of section 1225(b). Compare id. at 287-88 (discussing the application of section 1225(b) to aliens

processed “at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry”), with id. at 288-89 (identifying the relevant

group as aliens already present in the United States before plainly stating that “[s]ection 1226

generally governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of aliens pending their

removal” (emphasis added)). No subsequent Supreme Court decision has purported to overturn

Jennings.

To the extent that Respondents argue that Congress may believe that Jennings was wrongly

decided and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of sections 1225(b) and 1226(a) are not what it

intended, Congress has been free to amend the law to correct that interpretation. Indeed, Congress

amended section 1226 just this past year with the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139

Stat 3, 3–4 (2025), when it added a mandatory detention provision to section 1226(c) regarding

aliens who have committed certain qualifying offenses. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). The relevant

language in sections 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a) did not change. Additionally, if section 1225(b)(2)

already mandated detention of all immigrants, “then it would be pointless for Congress to mandate

the detention of a subset of those unadmitted immigrants using the Laken Riley Act.” Morales

Chavez v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., Case No. 2025 WL 2187080, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2025).

No matter which way you look at it, Respondents’ interpretation of the statutes is

incompatible with their desired outcome. And “[u]nfortunately for Respondents, this Court is

bound to apply the statutes as they are written—not as Respondents wish they were written.” Lopez

Lopez v. Noem, Case No. 3:26-cv-128, 2026 WL 395202, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2026) (citing

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 403 (2024) (“Courts interpret statutes, no matter

the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory construction, not individual policy

preferences.”)).

Based on all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court finds that Petitioner is subject to

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), as Respondents argue.9 Thus,

Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing is unlawful, and he is entitled to habeas

relief.

D. Due Process

Separate and apart from the statutory analysis, Petitioner also raises an independent Due

Process claim. Indeed, “[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due

process of law in the context of removal proceedings. So, the detainees are entitled to notice and

opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case.” J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673 (quotation

marks and citations omitted). Specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that the Due Process

Clause protects against immigration detention that is not reasonably related to the legitimate

purpose of effectuating removal or protecting against danger and flight risk. See Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 690-91. And the Supreme Court has consistently held that non-punitive detention

violates the Constitution unless it is strictly limited, and, typically, accompanied by a prompt

individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the imprisonment serves the

government's legitimate goals. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987); Foucha

v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997). The only

exception to this line of Supreme Court cases is Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), where the

Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to the mandatory detention requirement of section

9 As a final aside, Respondents also argue that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez should counsel this

Court to hold in their favor. Not only is Buenrostro-Mendez not binding on this Court, but, respectfully, this Court

disagrees with the Fifth Circuit and other courts adopting the Government's interpretation for the reasons discussed

above. While, as Respondents note, this issue is currently pending before the Sixth Circuit, it has not yet been decided.

ECF 6 at 9 n.1. Absent any such controlling precedent, this Court declines to depart from its prior reasoning and from

the clear majority of courts across the country.

1226(c). Since Petitioner does not fall under the ambit of section 1226(c), Demore is clearly

distinguishable.

Like all other forms of immigration detention, the discretionary detention under section

1226(a) is constitutionally constrained by Due Process. Respondents observe that Petitioner

already had an IJ decide his bond redetermination request. ECF 6 at 2; see also ECF 6-2. This

Court is hesitant, however, to hold that the “hearing” held on January 22, 2026, in Petitioner’s case

comported with Due Process requirements, especially seeing as Petitioner notes that

“[n]o full evidentiary hearing . . . was conducted.” ECF 7 at 2. See also Azalyar v. Raycraft,

--- F.Supp.3d ---, 2026 WL 30741, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Ohio 2026) (also hesitating to deem an

analogous proceeding a “hearing” because “the IJ felt bound by agency guidance that petitioners

like Azalyar are not entitled to a true adversarial hearing with the opportunity to present arguments

and evidence”). Indeed, the IJ’s decision in Petitioner’s case contains zero reference to any record

or arguments put forth by either party. See ECF 6-2 at 1 (denying Petitioner’s bond redetermination

request exclusively on jurisdictional grounds, and referencing that, in the alternative, Petitioner is

“a danger to the community and a flight risk” without supplying any reasoning how the IJ came to

such a conclusion).

To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee's due process rights, courts apply

the three-part balancing test set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court

must weigh: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,

of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the United States' interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335.

1. Private Interest

The private interest at stake here “is the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in

being free from physical detention by one's own government.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,

529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (noting the same in the context of immigration

detention proceedings). Having lived in the United States for at least the past twenty years,

Petitioner indisputably has a significant private interest in his freedom from detention. Cf.

Ordonez-Lopez v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., Case No. EP-25-CV-470, 2025 WL

3123828, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2025) (“[N]oncitizens acquire a protectable liberty interest

when they spend years establishing a life in the interior of the United States, regardless of their

citizenship status.”).

2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

The second Matthews factor asks Courts to consider whether the challenged procedure

risks the erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s liberty. While, as Respondents note and as

discussed above, Petitioner did technically have a bond redetermination “hearing” on January 22,

2026, that proceeding was constitutionally deficient. As of the date of this Order, Petitioner has

not had a merits bond hearing, with counsel and the opportunity to present evidence. As also

discussed, civil immigration detention—the form of detention under section 1226(a)—must be

non-punitive in purpose and bear a reasonable relation to the statutory purposes of preventing

danger to the community and flight. That the IJ’s order contains the bare bones “magic words” for

detaining Petitioner is insufficient to satisfy this standard. Respondents also put forth no evidence

to support the IJ’s assertion. Accordingly, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty

interest is high.

3. Government Interest

The final Matthews factor concerns the Unites States' interest in the procedure, as well as

any financial or administrative burdens associated with permissible alternatives. Matthews,

424 U.S. at 335. The Court recognizes that the Government has legitimate interests in ensuring

that aliens appear for removal hearings and do not pose a danger to the community. However, a

“routine bond hearing” before an IJ presents “minimal” burdens to the United States. Hyppolite v.

Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2829511, at *15 (E.D. N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025). These procedures

are also already in place. Id. Further, Respondents will also have an opportunity to present their

case at any proper, personalized bond redetermination hearing, so there is no risk that requiring a

proper bond redetermination hearing will impede the Government’s interests. Therefore, “existing

statutory and regulatory safeguards adequately serve the governmental interest in promoting public

safety.” Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1190 (D. Minn. 2025).

All three Matthews factors favor Petitioner. Accordingly, Due Process entitles Petitioner

to an individualized bond hearing on the merits before a neutral IJ.

E. Remedy

Having established that Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to section 1226(a), rather

than section 1225(b)(2), and that his continued detention without a personalized bond hearing

violates Due Process, the Court now turns to fashioning the appropriate remedy in this matter. At

first glance, it would seem that all that is needed is for Petitioner to receive the proper,

individualized bond hearing that he is statutorily and constitutionally entitled to receive. However,

the necessary analysis for this element runs deeper.

In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that, while section 1226(a) does not mandate that the

Government bear a burden of clear and convincing evidence in immigration bond hearings, it

expressly declined to reach whether the Due Process Clause does. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312

(nothing that because the Court of Appeals “had no occasion to consider respondents’

constitutional arguments on their merits . . . we do not reach those arguments”). Circuit Courts are

split on this question. See Soto-Medina v. Lynch, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2026 WL 161002, at *5 n.2

(discussing how the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits have held that, at least for a first bond

hearing, the Government bears the burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence, but that the

Third and Fourth Circuits have assigned the burden of proof regarding danger to the community

and flight risk to the detainee); see also id. (noting that although “the Seventh and Tenth Circuits

have not taken up the issue, courts within those circuits have held that due process requires that

the government bear the burden of proof”). The Sixth Circuit has not had an opportunity to take

up this question.

The BIA has found it reasonable to apply the standard set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8),

concerning the initial custody decision by an immigration officer upon arrest, to section 1226(a)

bond redetermination hearings, thereby placing “[t]he burden [] on the alien to show to the

satisfaction of the Immigration Judge that he or she merits release on bond.” In Re Guerra,

24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). However, a reliance on an agency regulation is not the same

as recognizing whether the Constitution or a statute mandates the burden of proof be allocated to

the detainee. Further, this Court is not required to give any deference to an agency interpretation

of a statute, see Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 413, and “the BIA lacks authority to review constitutional

challenges,” Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006).

Accordingly, this Court turns to other district courts in this circuit for guidance on this

question. One court in the Western District of Michigan observed:

In the context of the Due Process Clause, requiring a particular

“standard of proof ‘serves to allocate the risk of error between the

litigants’ and reflects the ‘relative importance attached to the

ultimate decision.’ ” German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Addington v.

Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)).

Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that “due

process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil

proceedings in which the ‘individual interests at stake ... are both

particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of

money.’ ” Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363, 116 S.Ct. 1373,

134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (alterations in original; emphasis added)

(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71

L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80,

112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (requiring clear and

convincing evidence to justify civil commitment because

“[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the

liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”). “The individual

should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error

when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater

than any possible harm to the state.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, 99

S.Ct. 1804. The Supreme Court, therefore, upheld the application of

the “clear and convincing” standard for civil commitment

proceedings because “the individual's interest in the outcome of a

civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due

process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more

substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

(emphasis added); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,

751, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (holding that pretrial

detention will be permitted under the Due Process Clause “[w]hen

the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an

arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual

or the community”).

Soto-Medina, 2026 WL 161002, at *6. Ultimately, the district court agreed with this reasoning and

assigned the burden of proof to the Government. Id. at *11 (“Due process requires that, to deny

bond, the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk

or danger to the community.”).

Another court here in the Northern District of Ohio similarly observed:

Many courts also place the burden on the Government to show by

clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen should remain in

detention. Hernandez-Ferndandez, 2025 WL 2976923, at *11

(collecting cases). The reasoning for this burden shift is because the

“alien's potential loss of liberty is so severe...he should not have to

share the risk of error equally.” Id. at *10 (quoting German Santos

v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir.

2020)).

E.V. v. Raycraft, Case No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 3122837, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2025).

Likewise, this court also agreed with this reasoning and assigned the Government the burden of

proving danger to the community or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence.

A district court in the Eastern District of Kentucky observed similarly:

While no controlling authority addresses the burden-of-proof

question, numerous courts have considered the question under

similar circumstances and have concluded that the government must

justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. See,

e.g., Black, 103 F.4th at 155-57; German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213;

Jarpa v. Mumford, 211 F. Supp. 3d 706, 721 (D. Md. 2016);

Haughton v. Crawford. 221 F. Supp. 3d 712 (E.D. Va. 2016). The

respondents do not identify any case law to the contrary.

[. . .]

Requiring detainees to prove that they are not a danger and are not

a flight risk after the government has already “enjoyed a

presumption that detention is necessary ... presents too great a risk

of an erroneous deprivation of liberty after a detention that has

already been unreasonably prolonged.” Black, 103 F.4th at 156. See

also Jarpa, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 721 (noting that the Supreme Court

“time and again has rejected laws that place on the individual the

burden of protecting his or her fundamental rights”).

M.T.B. v. Byers, Case No. 2:24-cv-028, 2024 WL 2881843, at *5 (E.D. Kentucky Aug. 20, 2024)

(emphasis in original).

These district courts in the Sixth Circuit are not alone, going back several years and

predating the current DHS Policy. See, e.g., Azalyar, 2026 WL 30741, at *5; Diaz-Calderon v.

Barr, Case No. 2:20-cv-11235, 2020 WL 5645191, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2020) (“At the

hearing [under section 1226(a)], Respondents must identify a statutory basis for Diaz's continued

detention and support their request by clear and convincing evidence.”).

This Court is persuaded by these district courts in the Sixth Circuit, as well as the majority

of other district and appellate courts around the country that have similarly held that the

Government must bear the burden by proof of clear and convincing evidence. Especially when

taking into account this Court’s analysis under Matthews, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled

to a bond hearing before a neutral IJ, where the Government must bear the burden of proving, by

clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is either a danger to the community or a flight risk.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby GRANTS Petitioner’s request for

habeas relief. The Court hereby ORDERS that Respondents shall either: (1) within five business

days of this order (i.e., 5:00 pm on Monday March 9, 2026), provide Petitioner with an

individualized bond hearing, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), before a different IJ than the one who

issued the detention order against Petitioner, at which the Government shall bear the burden of

proof by clear and convincing evidence of justifying Petitioner’s continued detention; or

(2) immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court FURTHER ORDERS Respondents

to file a status report within 48 hours of the bond hearing or Petitioner’s release, but no later than

3:00pm on March 11, 2026, certifying compliance with this Order. The status report shall inform

the Court whether a bond hearing was held and, if so, the outcome of that bond determination and,

if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2026

s/Dan Aaron Polster

United States District Judge