LOVEDAY SPRINGS v. KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE

03/17/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

November 13, 2025 Session

LOVEDAY SPRINGS ET AL. v. KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 1-219-22 E. Jerome Melson, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2025-00233-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

In this zoning matter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent

county and property development company and dismissed the petitioners’ declaratory

judgment action. The petitioners had challenged a sector plan amendment and rezoning as

illegal. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, the trial court specifically found that the

county zoning body maintained the authority under Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101

to impose conditions on the rezoning of the subject property. The petitioners have

appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Daniel A. Sanders, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Loveday Springs, Dawn

Close, and Margie Grace.

Michael W. Moyers, Knox County Law Director; Garrett P. Swartwood; and Taylor D.

Forrester, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Knox County, Tennessee, and Thunder

Mountain Properties, LLC.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 22, 2022, the petitioners—a homeowners’ association in Knox County,

Tennessee, known as Loveday Springs, and two of its members, Dawn Close and Margie

Grace (collectively, “Petitioners”)—filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Knox

County Circuit Court (“trial court”). They named as respondents Knox County and

Thunder Mountain Properties, LLC (“TMP”). In April 2021, TMP had purchased

approximately 159 acres of real property located at 8802 Sevierville Pike and Dry Hollow

Road in Knox County (“the Property”). As Petitioners described it in their complaint:

The Subject Property forms a horseshoe shape around an industrial area on

Valgro Road originally developed by the Camel Tent Manufacturing

Company in the 1930s. Approximately 64 acres of the Subject Property lying

generally to the north of Valgro Road is comprised of low-lying pastureland

with access to Sevierville Pike. The remaining 95 acres lying generally to

the south of Valgro Road is comprised of steep hillsides and lacks ready

access to any public road.

At the time of TMP’s purchase, the Property was designated a “rural” area under the

Knoxville-Farragut-Knox County Growth Policy Plan (“the Growth Plan”) and as

“agricultural” under both the Knoxville-Knox County General Plan 2033 (“the General

Plan”) and the Knox County Zoning Ordinance (“the Zoning Ordinance”). The Loveday

Springs neighborhood is located across Sevierville Pike from the Property.

In September 2021, TMP had applied to the Knoxville-Knox County Planning

Commission (“the Planning Commission”) requesting a general plan amendment and

rezoning for the 64 acres of pastureland from “agricultural” to “low density residential.”

In November 2021, TMP submitted a revised application requesting the same zoning

change for the other 95 acres of the Property. In December 2021, the Planning Commission

approved a general plan amending the 64-acre parcel to low density residential and the 95-

acre parcel to “rural residential” with approval of rezoning for the entire Property as

“planned residential.” According to the complaint, the Planning Commission’s approval

of the rezoning was subject to the following three conditions:

1. a maximum of 2.5 dwelling units per acre on the 64 acres of

pastureland,

2. a maximum of 1 dwelling unit per acre could be developed on the 95

acres of steep hillside, and

3. a total of 255 units on the total property with development

concentrated on the flatter part of the property.

(Internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted.)

The Knox County Commission (“County Commission”) heard TMP’s request

during two meetings, which were held in February and May of 2022. Several community

members spoke in opposition. On May 23, 2022, the County Commission met in a zoning

session to consider TMP’s sector plan amendment and rezoning request. In a transcript

-2-

incorporated into the trial court’s final judgment, the court set forth the undisputed facts

surrounding what Petitioners alleged to be an unlawful decision made during the May 2022

zoning session:

[O]n the 23rd day of May, 2022, the Knox County Commission heard

arguments for and against the required sector plan . . . the requested sector

plan amendments and rezoning for the subject property.

It is undisputed that various persons, as are reflected in the pages of

the transcript, spoke on behalf of the affected parties, including Mr. Taylor

D. Forrester speaking on behalf of TMP and Daniel A. Sanders speaking on

behalf of certain residents opposed—certain residents in the area of the

subject property opposed to the proposed amendments.

It is also of record in this case, pursuant to the filings made herein,

that during consideration of the resolutions various individuals and

commissioners in addition to Mr. Forrester and Mr. Sanders, as well as Knox

County Deputy Law Director Michael Moyers, also spoke concerning those

requested amendments.

And that it is further of record in this case, as demonstrated by the

transcript and by the associated minutes of the Knox County Commission,

that Commissioner Carson Dailey commented on the residential, commercial

and public development in the area, including such things as a reference to

condominium and apartment developments in the area, continued expansion

of the commercial development at that intersection of Chapman Highway

and Governor John Sevier Highway and other matters.

It is, of course, noted in the minutes that Commissioner Schoonmaker,

as has been mentioned here this morning, moved to amend the zoning

classification for the subject property from agricultural to planned residential

at a density of up to 180 dwelling units on the lower portion of the subject

property and up to 77 dwelling units on the upper portion of the subject

property subject to the condition that the development of the 180 lots be

platted on the lower portion before development could commence on the

platting of the 77 lots on the upper portion of the subject property, and that

the removal of the condition recommended by the planning commission to

allow clustering of the density. That motion was seconded by Commissioner

Dailey and the Knox County Commission approved that motion—original

motion of Commissioner Schoonmaker’s by a vote of eight to three.

-3-

That action, it is urged in this case, is by the petitioners to be viewed

as one that was unlawful or illegal. That is to say not in—not pursuant to

authority given the Knox County Commission.

In their complaint, Petitioners requested a judgment declaring the County

Commission’s decision “illegal, arbitrary, capricious, and void on any grounds available

under law.” They specifically alleged that the County Commission’s decision violated the

General Plan and the Growth Plan and that it constituted illegal rezoning and a

misconstruction of applicable law. Petitioners asserted that TMP “desire[d] to develop a

residential subdivision on the Subject Property and the Petitioners desire[d] to prevent the

development or to limit the allowed population density.”

In August 2022, TMP and Knox County filed separate answers to the complaint,

asserting that Petitioners had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Knox County concomitantly filed the record from the County Commission decision,

including transcripts of the February and May 2022 meetings during which the

Commission had discussed TMP’s application.

On June 21, 2024, Knox County and TMP (collectively, “Respondents”) jointly

filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were “entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law upholding the legislative action of the County Commission.” On October 4,

2024, Petitioners filed a competing motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were

“entitled to judgment as a matter of law” because “there [was] no genuine issue of material

fact concerning whether the Knox County Commission acted illegally when it approved

the rezoning application at issue.” Petitioners specifically argued that the County

Commission did not have the authority to impose conditions on rezoning under Tennessee

Code Annotated § 13-7-101. The parties filed responses to the respective summary

judgment motions and briefed the issue of conditional zoning as had been requested by the

trial court in a scheduling order.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on January 17, 2025, granting

summary judgment in favor of Respondents and denying Petitioners’ summary judgment

motion. The court concluded that the County Commission had not acted illegally,

specifically determining that Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101(a) granted zoning

authority to the County Commission and that § 13-7-101(b) did not operate to disallow

conditional zoning within that authority. The court further concluded that a rational basis

existed for the County Commission’s legislative actions related to rezoning the Property

and amending the sector plan. Petitioners timely appealed.

II. Issue Presented

Petitioners present the following issue, which we have restated as follows:

-4-

Whether the trial court erred by declining to find that the County

Commission exceeded its statutory authority under Tennessee Code

Annotated § 13-7-101 when it conditionally rezoned the Property by

imposing parcel-specific conditions.

III. Standard of Review

The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law; therefore,

our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Rye v. Women’s

Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); Dick Broad. Co. of

Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Kinsler v. Berkline,

LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tenn. 2010)). As such, this Court must “make a fresh

determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure have been satisfied.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. As our Supreme Court has

explained concerning the requirements for a movant to prevail on a motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56:

[W]hen the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the

moving party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively

negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by

demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment

stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. We

reiterate that a moving party seeking summary judgment by attacking the

nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than make a conclusory assertion

that summary judgment is appropriate on this basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule

56.03 requires the moving party to support its motion with “a separate

concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends

there is no genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to

be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph and supported by a specific

citation to the record.” Id. When such a motion is made, any party opposing

summary judgment must file a response to each fact set forth by the movant

in the manner provided in Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a motion for

summary judgment is made [and] . . . supported as provided in [Tennessee

Rule 56],” to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but must respond, and

by affidavits or one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, “set

forth specific facts” at the summary judgment stage “showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The nonmoving party “must

do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. [v. Zenith Radio Corp.], 475

U.S. [574,] 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 [(1986)]. The nonmoving

party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which

could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. If

-5-

a summary judgment motion is filed before adequate time for discovery has

been provided, the nonmoving party may seek a continuance to engage in

additional discovery as provided in Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after

adequate time for discovery has been provided, summary judgment should

be granted if the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage

is insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence the

nonmoving party comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on

hypothetical evidence that theoretically could be adduced, despite the

passage of discovery deadlines, at a future trial.

Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264-65. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, the trial

court must “state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion” for

summary judgment, and our Supreme Court has instructed that the trial court must state

these grounds “before it invites or requests the prevailing party to draft a proposed order.”

See Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tenn. 2014). “Whether the

nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a defendant—and whether or not the nonmoving party

bears the burden of proof at trial on the challenged claim or defense—at the summary

judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in

the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party.’”

TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 889 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Rye,

477 S.W.3d at 265).

Petitioners have raised an issue focusing on interpretation of Tennessee Code

Annotated § 13-7-101 (West April 16, 2012, to current). In conducting this analysis, we

adhere to the following longstanding principles of statutory construction:

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. Our

primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or

restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ.

Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative

enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and

purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General

Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722

(Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without

complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507

(Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language.

Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006).

It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader

statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v.

Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998).

Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but

“should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are consistent

-6-

and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196

(1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of

the act repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v.

City of Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also

must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments

at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926

(Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613-14 (Tenn. 2009).

IV. Authority of County Commission

Petitioners contend that the trial court erred by finding that the County Commission

acted within its authority under Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 when it imposed

conditional zoning on the Property. Respondents argue that the trial court properly found

that the County Commission was empowered to impose conditional zoning and correctly

determined that a rational basis existed for the Commission’s rezoning decision. Upon

careful review, we determine that the trial court did not err in determining that the County

Commission maintained the authority to conditionally rezone the Property.

Concerning appellate review of zoning decisions, our Supreme Court has explained:

Our county legislative bodies are vested with broad powers to enact

and to amend zoning regulations governing the use of land. T.C.A., §§ 13-

7-101–13-7-105. When a municipal governing body acts under its delegated

police powers either to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance, it acts in a

legislative capacity and the scope of judicial review of such action is quite

restricted. Davidson County v. Rogers, 184 Tenn. 327, 198 S.W.2d 812

(1947); Mobile Home City of Chattanooga v. Hamilton County, supra;

Barret v. Shelby County, Tenn. App., 619 S.W.2d 390 (1981).

“Legislative classification in a zoning law, ordinance or

resolution is valid if any possible reason can be conceived to

justify it.” State ex rel. SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. v.

Konigsberg, Tenn., 636 S.W.2d 430, 437 (1982).

Fallin v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 656 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn. 1983). As the Fallin

Court further explained:

Zoning is a legislative matter, and, as a general proposition, the

exercise of the zoning power should not be subjected to judicial interference

unless clearly necessary. In enacting or amending zoning legislation, the

local authorities are vested with broad discretion and, in cases where the

-7-

validity of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable, the court cannot substitute

its judgment for that of the legislative authority. If there is a rational or

justifiable basis for the enactment and it does not violate any state statute or

positive constitutional guaranty, the wisdom of the zoning regulation is a

matter exclusively for legislative determination.

In accordance with these principles, it has been stated that the courts

should not interfere with the exercise of the zoning power and hold a zoning

enactment invalid, unless the enactment, in whole or in relation to any

particular property, is shown to be clearly arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, or

welfare, or is plainly contrary to the zoning laws.

Id. at 342-43 (quoting 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 338 (1976)). See Keeton v.

City of Gatlinburg, 684 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that in reviewing a

municipal governing body’s zoning decisions, “[t]he court’s inquiry is limited as to

whether any rational basis exists for the legislative action and, if the issue is fairly

debatable, it must be permitted to stand as valid legislation”).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 concerns the grant of regulatory powers to

county legislative bodies and provides in pertinent part:

(a)(1) The county legislative body of any county is empowered, in

accordance with the conditions and the procedure specified in this

part, to regulate, in the portions of such county which lie outside of

municipal corporations, the location, height and size of buildings and

other structures, the percentage of lot which may be occupied, the

sizes of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density and

distribution of population, the uses of buildings and structures for

trade, industry, residence, recreation or other purposes, and the uses

of land for trade, industry, residence, recreation, agriculture, forestry,

soil conservation, water supply conservation or other purposes, and

identify areas where there are inadequate or nonexistent publicly or

privately owned and maintained services and facilities when the

planning commission has determined the services are necessary in

order for development to occur. . . .

***

(b) The chief legislative body of any county having a population of not

less than two hundred eighty-seven thousand seven hundred (287,700)

nor greater than two hundred eighty-seven thousand eight hundred

(287,800), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent

-8-

federal census, is further authorized and empowered to rezone

properties conditionally or based upon contract, where the agreed

conditions are designed to ameliorate injuries created by the rezoning

to surrounding property interests or to county interests.

(Emphasis added.) Petitioners attached to their motion for summary judgment federal

census population figures for Tennessee’s counties, beginning with the 1980 census. The

trial court took judicial notice of these figures, and the parties agreed that the population

range set forth in § 13-7-101(b) of 287,700 to 287,800 applies to Hamilton County but does

not apply to Knox County.

It is undisputed that when the County Commission rezoned the Property, it engaged

in conditional zoning by imposing conditions specific to parcels within the Property. This

Court has previously defined conditional zoning in part by differentiating it from contract

zoning:

It is the use of governmental power as a bargaining chip that the [City

of Knoxville v.] Ambrister [263 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1953)] and Haymon [v.

City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)] courts

criticized as the unsavory aspect of contract zoning. When a government

negotiates in this manner it agrees to limit its right and duty to act on behalf

of the public. Rezoning is approved, not based upon the merit of the zone

change request nor because it is in the public interest, but because a deal has

been struck.

On the other hand, the mere unilateral imposition of conditions for

public benefit is quite different. In contract zoning the government entity

sacrifices its authority. In conditional zoning it exercises it. By imposing

conditions under which Homestead’s property could be rezoned,

Chattanooga did not bargain away its authority, but rather exercised it for

public safety reasons.

Citizens for Safety & Clean Air v. City of Clinton, 434 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2013) (quoting Benton v. City of Chattanooga, No. 808, 1988 WL 74608, at *2-3 (Tenn.

Ct. App. July 20, 1988)).

Petitioners argue that because § 13-7-101(b) authorizes contract and conditional

zoning for Hamilton County and any other county that may qualify under the population

range specified, it operates to prohibit contract and conditional zoning for counties with

populations not in that range. Respondents acknowledge that contract zoning has long

been disallowed in Tennessee unless specifically authorized. See Citizens for Safety &

Clean Air, 434 S.W.3d at 129; City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn.

1953) (“Contracts made for the purpose of unduly controlling or affecting official conduct

-9-

of the exercise of legislative, administrative and judicial functions, are plainly opposed to

public policy.” (quoting Whitley v. White, 140 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tenn. 1940))). However,

Respondents assert that conditional zoning has long been allowed in Tennessee and that

the General Assembly’s inclusion of conditional zoning in § 13-7-101(b) was simply in

furtherance of established law for all Tennessee counties.

The trial court made the following findings regarding the County Commission’s

authority under § 13-7-101 to conditionally zone the Property:

As has been mentioned, it is the contention of the petitioners that the

conditional zoning authority or conditional zoning action undertaken by the

Knox County Commission on the date as specified herein is not lawful and

is, and may be construed as a matter of law, to be illegal. Nevertheless the

petitioners are forced to concede and do readily concede to this court that

under TCA 13-7-101 there is a grant of zoning power statute that generally

does apply to a county legislative body and did so apply to Knox County at

all times material hereto. And, as such, [the] statute does recognize that the

county legislative power is empowered in accordance with the conditions and

the procedures specified in this part to regulate in the portions of such county

which lie outside of municipal corporations many things, that include by

reference to the verbiage of the statute, the location, height and size of

buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot which may be occupied,

the sizes of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density and distribution

of population, the uses of buildings and structures for trade, industry,

residence, recreation or other purposes, and the uses of land for trade . . .

industry, residence, recreation, agriculture, forestry, soil conservation, water

supply conservation or other purposes. And identified areas where there are

inadequate or nonexistent publicly or privately owned and maintained

services and facilities when the planning commission has determined the

services are necessary in order for development to occur.

Reading only that portion of the statute, the court as well as the parties

recognizes that the county legislative body of Knox County is empowered

with a great range and scope of authority as respects regulating the use of

land as in many different ways and varieties within its boundaries.

In respect of this matter, the court concludes that the decisional law

that has been cited reflective of an examination of the statutory language does

not, to the satisfaction of this court, demonstrate that there is any explicit,

judicial recognition that the use of conditional zoning within Tennessee is

disallowed, is illegal and/or is unlawful.

- 10 -

Upon thorough review of § 13-7-101 and other applicable authorities, we agree with the

trial court.

In describing “decisional law,” the trial court specifically referenced this Court’s

decision in O’Dell v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Johnson City, 910 S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1995). On appeal, Petitioners take issue with the trial court’s reliance on O’Dell and assert

that the O’Dell decision “should be limited or overruled.” In O’Dell, this Court affirmed

the trial court’s finding that rezoning of the property at issue had not constituted

“impermissible contract zoning.” O’Dell, 910 S.W.2d at 437. Petitioners do not challenge

the holding regarding contract zoning. However, the O’Dell Court quoted the trial court

with approval in finding that conditions imposed by the zoning authority had been

reasonable and were allowed under the law:

[U]nder the authority of the cases mentioned, the Court cannot find any

illegal contract zoning. The City’s imposition of conditions as a requirement

of rezoning were reasonable and were a valid exercise of their police power

for the good of the general public. The conditions imposed were to regulate

traffic, [were] for the safety of the general public and [were] to provide a

buffer zone adjacent to Mountcastle Hills Subdivision. All of these

conditions are reasonable. And they’re reasonable considerations of a zoning

authority.

Id. at 441. We note that in O’Dell, this Court expressly stated that it “concur[red] in [the

trial court’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are made an appendix to this

opinion.” Id. at 437.

O’Dell was decided after the General Assembly amended § 13-7-201 in 1984 to add

subsection (b).1 See Benton v. City of Chattanooga, No. 808, 1988 WL 74608, at *2 (Tenn.

Ct. App. July 20, 1988). The “authority of the cases mentioned” above in O’Dell included

two cases decided before the enactment of subsection (b)—City of Knoxville v. Ambrister,

263 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1953), and Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1973)—and two cases decided afterward—Copeland v. City of Chattanooga

through Bd. of Comm’rs, 866 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), and Benton, 1988

WL 74608.

In Armbrister, our Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination that the

City of Knoxville was not entitled to a judgment declaring that a parcel of land had been

1

Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-201 (West April 16, 2012, to current) is a counterpoint to Tennessee

Code Annotated § 13-7-101 and addresses regulatory powers granted to municipalities. Subsection -201(b)

contains the same substantive language as subsection -101(b) and is applicable to municipalities located

within counties that have the same population range. For this reason, we determine that case law analyzing

§ 13-7-201(b) is applicable to § 13-7-101(b). The General Assembly amended § 13-7-101 to add subsection

(b) in 1985. See 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 44, § 1.

- 11 -

dedicated to the city by the defendant landowners upon determining that the purported

dedication constituted illegal contract zoning. Armbrister, 263 S.W.2d at 530-31. The

Armbrister Court thereby helped to establish that contract zoning is disallowed in

Tennessee but did not address conditional zoning. In Haymon, this Court affirmed the trial

court’s finding that a zoning ordinance was void that had been passed in consideration of

a covenant, also found to be void, between the City of Chattanooga and the plaintiff

apartment complex owners because the covenant constituted contract zoning. Haymon,

513 S.W.2d at 187. However, regarding conditional zoning, the Haymon Court stated:

“Nothing in this opinion is to be construed as holding that a planning commission, without

a covenant, cannot prescribe reasonable conditions for the benefit of the general public.”

Id. at 188 n.1.

This Court decided Benton four years after the 1984 amendment adding subsection

(b) to § 13-7-201. Because Chattanooga is located within Hamilton County, Benton (and

subsequently Copeland, as explained below) involved a municipality that fit within the

population parameters of § 13-7-201(b). The plaintiff in Benton had filed a declaratory

judgment action challenging a city rezoning ordinance and arguing that the ordinance was

illegal because it constituted contract zoning. Benton, 1988 WL 74608, at *1. On this

basis, the Benton plaintiff had challenged the constitutionality of § 13-7-201(b). Id. The

Benton trial court had upheld the ordinance upon finding that it “involve[d] only

conditional zoning.” Id. at *4. For this reason, the trial court had determined that it need

not address the constitutionality of § 13-7-201(b). Id. at *1. This Court affirmed the trial

court:

We hold the chancellor properly construed the facts to involve only

conditional zoning. Section 13-7-201(b) authorizes Chattanooga to engage

in conditional zoning. Since conditional zoning is consistent with Tennessee

law, the constitutionality of the provision need not be reached at this time.

However, as the chancellor duly noted, determination of the constitutionality

of § 13-7-201(b) would be proper in a case where contract zoning has taken

place.

Id. at *4 (emphasis added). In determining that conditional zoning was “consistent with

Tennessee law” and therefore did not raise a constitutionality issue regarding § 13-7-

201(b), the Benton Court cited the holdings in Armbrister and Haymon with approval. Id.

at *3-4 (citing Armbrister, 263 S.W.2d 528; Haymon, 513 S.W.2d 185).

This Court decided Copeland several years later, affirming the trial court’s finding

that the City of Chattanooga’s imposition of a condition (dedication of a right-of-way)

upon the defendant landowners’ rezoning request had been “a proper exercise of

government police power.” Copeland, 866 S.W.2d at 570. The Copeland Court cited

Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-201(b) and stated that the statute “authorizes the City

of Chattanooga to engage in conditional zoning which has been determined consistent with

- 12 -

Tennessee law.” Id. at 567 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Copeland Court

noted that the appellants had not asserted that the issue was “a matter of contract zoning,

requiring a determination of the constitutionality of T.C.A. § 13-7-201(b).” Id. at 567 n.4.

In other words, if the Copeland appellants had challenged the city’s actions on the basis of

contract zoning, the constitutionality of the statute would have been at issue because the

statute allows Hamilton County to engage in contract zoning, and contract zoning had

previously been held to be against public policy. However, the Copeland Court did not

find that the provision for conditional zoning in § 13-7-201(b) required a constitutional

analysis because it was already “consistent with Tennessee law.” Id.

Returning to the trial court’s reliance on O’Dell, Petitioners here argue that the

O’Dell decision was flawed because (1) the O’Dell plaintiff did not directly challenge the

city zoning board’s authority under statute; (2) the O’Dell Court relied on decisions

involving Chattanooga, which was covered by the population parameters of § 13-7-201(b)

when Johnson City was not; (3) the statement in O’Dell regarding conditions imposed by

the city as a valid exercise of police power was “dicta”; and (4) the decision included a

“peculiar caveat” questioning whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the zoning

decision. We do not find these arguments persuasive and will address each in turn.

First, although the O’Dell plaintiff did not challenge the city’s zoning authority

under the statute, he did challenge the validity of the city’s zoning ordinance, which

required the trial court and this Court to review the statute empowering the city with zoning

authority. Second, as noted above, the O’Dell Court analyzed case law predating the

General Assembly’s addition of § 13-7-201(b), particularly Haymon, 513 S.W.2d at 188

n.1, to establish that conditional zoning was already allowed in Tennessee when subsection

(b) was added to the statute. See O’Dell, 910 S.W.2d at 439. Third, we find the O’Dell

Court’s statement regarding the “imposition of conditions” as “a valid exercise of [the city

zoning body’s] police power” to be integral to the Court’s determination that the

conditional zoning at issue was allowed. See id., 910 S.W.2d at 441. Fourth, contrary to

Petitioners’ argument, we do not find that the question of standing undercut the Court’s

holding in O’Dell; instead, the Court determined that if the zoning at issue had been a

contract, the plaintiff would have been a party to that contract and may have lacked

standing to challenge its validity. See id. at 437. This statement undercut the plaintiff’s

argument, but it did not undercut the Court’s holding. Importantly, O’Dell is a reported

case of this Court with no negative history and with a holding that we determine to be

aligned with Tennessee precedent on conditional zoning. We decline to find the O’Dell

decision “unsound,” as Petitioners’ urge.

Despite the precedent explained above, Petitioners advance the position that because

§ 13-7-101(b) “separately and explicitly confers conditional zoning authority” on counties

meeting the population criteria of 287,700 to 287,800, “such authority is not implicitly

granted under subsection (a)” to other counties. In support, Petitioners rely on the canon

of statutory construction, expressio unis est exclusio alterius, which holds that “the

- 13 -

expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” See Northshore Corridor Assoc.

v. Knox Cnty., 633 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Rich v. Tenn. Bd. of

Med. Exam’rs, 350 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tenn. 2011)). Petitioners assert that the General

Assembly’s use of the phrase, “further authorized and empowered,” in subsection -101(b)

means that any stated authority or power following that phrase—namely, “to rezone

properties conditionally or based upon contract”—is illegal because it is not “implicitly

granted” by subsection -101(a).

In Northshore Corridor, this Court affirmed the trial court’s application of expressio

unis est exclusio alterius to interpretation of a zoning ordinance to hold that “the absence

of public utilities as a permitted use in the PR [planned residential] zone when such were

expressly permitted in other residential zones indicated that public utilities had been

expressly excluded from the PR zone.” Northshore Corridor, 633 S.W.3d at 580. Here,

rather than examining a list of uses prescribed in a zoning ordinance, we are confronted

with the broad authority granted to county legislative bodies by subsection -101(a) to

regulate the uses of land within their purview. Given the longstanding precedent

establishing that conditional zoning is within this authority, we are not persuaded that the

mention of conditional zoning in subsection -101(b) precludes counties not identified by

subsection -101(b) from engaging in conditional zoning.2

Petitioners further argue that the zoning statutory scheme supports their position

that the County Commission exceeded its authority by imposing parcel-specific conditions.

They cite the requirement provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-102 (West June

13, 2008, to current) that “regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings

throughout any such district”; the requirement provided in Tennessee Code Annotated §

13-7-119(a) (West June 1, 2009, to current) that county zoning bodies must compile zoning

ordinances “so as to be able to provide any member of the public with a current zoning

ordinance and map”; and the requirements delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-

7-105 (West March 8, 2016, to current) for amendment of ordinances. Petitioners argue

that because Respondents imposed conditions on the Property during County Commission

meetings, members of the public would have to search meeting minutes to know what

2

Apparently as an alternative argument, Respondents posit that the General Assembly included conditional

zoning in § 13-7-101(b) because both the conditional and contract zoning allowed by the subsection involve

“agreed conditions,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-101(b), as opposed to the “unilateral imposition of

conditions” by a county that has been held to be consistent with Tennessee law, see Citizens for Safety &

Clean Air, 434 S.W.3d at 129 (quoting Benton, 1988 WL 74608, at *3). In support, Respondents argue that

the “series qualifier canon” operates to apply the entire clause beginning with “where” at the end of § 13-

7-101(b) (“where the agreed conditions are designed to ameliorate injuries created by the rezoning to

surrounding property interests or to county interests”) to both “conditionally” and “based upon contract”

preceding the clause. See READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 147 (Thomson/West

2012) (“When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a

prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.”). Given that “conditionally” and

“based upon contract” are not nouns or verbs in a series, we do not find this to be a viable application of

the series qualifier canon.

- 14 -

conditions were imposed. Petitioners thereby posit that Respondents’ actions in imposing

parcel-specific conditions and a lack of transparency in imposing the conditions were

against the overall zoning statutory scheme.

Respondents counter that Petitioners have waived any issue regarding whether

Respondents improperly amended the Zoning Ordinance because they failed to raise the

issue at the trial court level. Respondents also posit that the imposition of unilateral

conditions does not equate to amending a zoning ordinance as contemplated by § 13-7-

105. In reply, Petitioners insist that their argument regarding the statutory scheme is all

part of one issue: whether the County Commission exceeded its authority. We note that

Petitioners’ statement of the issue on appeal is specific to the County Commission’s

authority under § 13-7-101 and that Petitioners do not allege that the language of § 13-7-

101 is ambiguous. See In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d at 614 (“It is only when a statute

is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the

legislation, or other sources.”). Moreover, having determined that the County Commission

maintained the authority under § 13-7-101 to impose conditions when rezoning the

Property, we find Petitioners’ arguments regarding the broader statutory scheme to be

unavailing.

Finally, Petitioners do not argue that the trial court erred by finding that the County

Commission maintained a rational basis for the subject zoning decision. Instead, they

assert that the court erred by applying the rational basis standard of review based on their

contention that the County Commission did not have authority to impose conditions. We

have concluded that the County Commission maintained this authority. As to the rational

basis for the County Commission’s decision, the trial court specifically determined that

“there was an extensive consideration of factors relating to the public welfare that underlay

the decision of the Knox County Commission to approve the rezoning with the

conditions[.]” Upon thorough review of the record, we agree that the County

Commission’s decision to rezone the Property with the conditions imposed was predicated

on a rational basis. See, e.g., Fallin, 656 S.W.2d at 343-44 (“We are unable to conclude

that the legislative classification represented by the amendatory resolution of the Knox

County Board of Commissioners is without any rational basis; we consider that the issue

is fairly debatable and, therefore, that we must permit it to stand as valid legislation.”).

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We remand this

case to the trial court for enforcement of the judgment and collection of costs below. Costs

on appeal are assessed to the appellants, Loveday Springs, Dawn Close, and Margie Grace.

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II______________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

- 15 -