The opinion
Filed 3/17/26 Manriquez-Gonzales v. Impact Logistics CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERT MANRIQUEZ-GONZALES D087141, D087142, D087143
et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super. Ct. Nos. CIVSB2404778,
v. CIVSB2408159, CIVSB2417326)
IMPACT LOGISTICS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of
San Bernardino County, Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., and Donald R. Alvarez,
Judges. Affirmed.
O’Hagan Meyer, Katherine C. Den Bleyker, and Tatyana Esmailian
for Defendant and Appellant.
Wilshire Law Firm, Benjamin H. Haber, Daniel J. Kramer,
Chase M. Stern, and Angela Leong for Plaintiff and Respondent Robert
Manriquez-Gonzales.
Lavi & Ebrahimian, Joseph Lavi, and Jordan D. Bello, for Plaintiff and
Respondent Marcus Munoz.
1
Impact Logistics, Inc. (Impact) appeals from three orders denying its
motions to compel arbitration of two separate employment class actions and
a Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) action (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)
brought against it by Robert Manriquez-Gonzales and Marcus Munoz
(collectively, plaintiffs), who each previously worked for Impact. Impact
argues the trial courts below should have compelled arbitration under the
terms of what it asserts is a valid arbitration agreement signed by each
plaintiff. We conclude that the courts correctly denied Impact’s motions
because the record supports their findings that Impact failed to carry its
ultimate burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate in all
three cases. We therefore affirm the orders.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Manriquez-Gonzales and Munoz worked as freight handlers for
Impact, a “labor provider” in the transportation industry headquartered in
Tennessee, with an office in Ontario, California.
A. Manriquez-Gonzales’s Onboarding
Manriquez-Gonzales worked for Impact from December 2019 to
November 2022. According to a declaration by Tara Mullins, a workers’
compensation claims coordinator who works for Impact in Mississippi, as part
of Manriquez-Gonzales’s first three onboarding processes in December 2019,
August 2020, and February 2021, he “was provided a Spanish version” of a
document titled “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” (Agreement) to
review and sign. She based this conclusion solely on her review of his
personnel file. Mullins’s declaration stated that Manriquez-Gonzales signed
and dated the Spanish version of the Agreement during those onboardings.
It also stated that he signed the English version of the Agreement in March
2020 after being provided a copy of the Spanish version to review.
Mullins’s declaration attached the English and Spanish versions of the
Agreement, along with separate signature pages, from Manriquez-Gonzales’s
personnel file “where [they were] placed in accordance with [Impact’s]
employment policies and practice.” In both versions of the Agreement, each
page is stamped with “Rev. 20240319” in the lower right corner. Each of the
four signature pages bears the signatures of “Robert Manriquez” and
“Angelina Dominguez,” who had the title of “HR Director.” Each of the
signature pages from December 2019, August 2020, and February 2021, is on
a page by itself stamped with a “Rev.” number beginning with “2019,” “2020,”
and “2020” respectively. The signature page dated March 2020 appears to be
on the same page as paragraph 14 of the English version of the Agreement,
3
but the bottom right corner of that signature page is stamped with a “Rev.”
number starting with “2020.”
Manriquez-Gonzales submitted a declaration stating that he did not
recognize, and had no recollection of receiving, the English and Spanish
versions of the Agreement attached to Mullins’s declaration. He stated that
he did not believe he “actually received or signed” the arbitration documents.
He “went through a quick onboarding process” where he was required to sign
various documents, but he did not receive copies of any of them. According to
his declaration, neither Mullins nor anyone at Impact ever explained to
Manriquez-Gonzales what he was being asked to sign.
B. Munoz’s Onboarding
Munoz worked for Impact from approximately March 2022 to
November 2023. According to a separate declaration by Mullins, based on
her review of Munoz’s personnel file, Munoz was provided with the Spanish
version of the Agreement during his onboarding in March 2020. Mullins’s
declaration attached the English and Spanish versions of the Agreement,
along with a separate signature page from Munoz’s personnel file “where it
was placed in accordance with [Impact’s] employment policies and practices.”
As with Manriquez-Gonzales’s file, the pages in both versions of the
Agreement are stamped with “Rev. 20240319” in the lower right corner.
The signature page is on its own page and bears the signatures of “Marcus
Munoz” and “Angelina Dominguez,” with the title of “HR Director.” The page
is stamped with “Rev. 20220207” in the bottom right corner.
Munoz submitted a declaration in which he stated that during his
orientation, a Hispanic male employee of Impact required him to sign and
complete six or seven documents in order to work there. He believed that the
page bearing his signature was one of those documents, but he expressed
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uncertainty about whether the pages of the Agreement were attached to his
signature page because of the differences in the stamped numbers.
C. Class Action and PAGA Lawsuits
In February 2024, Manriquez-Gonzales filed a class action complaint
against Impact for its alleged failure to pay minimum, straight time,
overtime, and timely final wages; failure to give meal and rest periods; failure
to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and failure to indemnify
employees for expenditures. Manriquez-Gonzales asserted these claims
under provisions of the Labor Code, including under PAGA and the unfair
competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
Munoz, represented by different counsel than Manriquez-Gonzales,
filed a class action in March 2024 alleging largely the same claims as
Manriquez-Gonzales, but he also filed a separate PAGA action in May 2024.
D. Motions to Compel Arbitration
Impact filed motions to compel arbitration under the Agreement in
each of the three cases, attaching declarations from Mullins and Impact’s
counsel. Impact argued, among other things, that the agreements between
Impact and plaintiffs were valid and enforceable, encompassed each of the
claims asserted by plaintiffs, and required arbitration of those claims on an
individual basis.
Manriquez-Gonzales and Munoz each opposed the motions and objected
to Mullins’s declarations and their attachments on several grounds including
hearsay, foundation, personal knowledge, and authentication. Munoz
specifically argued in his opposition that Impact failed to include a certified
English translation with the Spanish version of the Agreement attached to
5
Mullins’s declaration, in violation of California Rules of Court,1 rule
3.1110(g).
In reply, Impact submitted supplemental declarations from Mullins in
support of Impact’s motions to compel arbitration in Munoz’s cases. Mullins’s
supplemental declarations stated that she had been in her current position at
Impact for “nine and a half years” and that she is “knowledgeable about the
onboarding process for new and rehired employees” at Impact. The
declarations said that “per [Impact’s] policy and practice for onboarding
employees,” Munoz was provided a Spanish version of the Agreement to
review and sign in March 2022. Mullins stated in her supplemental
declarations that it is Impact’s “business practice to stamp a revision number
on the entirety of the new hire packet each time the packet (which contains
various onboarding documents for new and rehired employees” is updated.
However, neither [Impact’s] employee handbook nor the arbitration
agreement has been updated since at least 2019, and “both have remained
the same throughout the duration” of Munoz’s employment with Impact.
According to Mullins, the Agreement and Munoz’s signature page “both
belong to the same version of the document, despite the different revision
numbers, which was given to [Munoz] at the time of his onboarding.” She
also attached a certified English translation of the Spanish version of the
Agreement.
Judge Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., held hearings on Impact’s motions in
Manriquez-Gonzales’s and Munoz’s class action suits. Judge Donald R.
Alvarez held a hearing on Impact’s motion in Munoz’s PAGA suit. Both trial
court judges denied all of Impact’s motions and sustained most of plaintiffs’
1 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
6
objections to Mullins’s declarations, ruling that Impact had failed to meet its
burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.
Impact filed a motion for reconsideration in Manriquez-Gonzales’s case,
which Judge Schneider denied.2
2 Impact has not challenged the court’s denial of its motion for
reconsideration on appeal.
7
DISCUSSION
Impact argues on appeal that: (1) the trial courts erred in sustaining
objections to Mullins’s declarations; (2) plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
of producing evidence to dispute the existence of the arbitration agreements;
(3) even if plaintiffs presented adequate evidence to contest the agreements,
Impact met its burden of showing a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; and
(4) plaintiffs’ argument that they are exempted from federal arbitration law
has no merit. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the courts
below did not abuse their discretion in sustaining plaintiffs’ evidentiary
objections. We also conclude the courts committed no error in deciding that
Impact failed to carry its ultimate burden of proving the existence of
agreements to arbitrate. Given our conclusion, we need not and do not
address Impact’s arguments regarding federal arbitration law. Accordingly,
we affirm.
I
We first address the trial courts’ evidentiary rulings because a court’s
analysis of whether an arbitration agreement exists depends on the evidence
before it. “We review the superior court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion.” (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17
Cal.App.5th 245, 255.)
Impact asserts that Mullins had personal knowledge about the signing
of the Agreements even though she does not work in California and was not
present for plaintiffs’ onboardings. In support of its argument, Impact cites
unpublished superior court cases in which courts found arbitration
agreements were properly authenticated when the declaring witness was
“familiar with” or “privy to” the employer’s record-keeping and onboarding
processes. Impact also cites published cases recognizing that normal
8
procedures of document authentication need not apply for purposes of a
petition to compel arbitration, and that a witness need only be familiar with
the procedures followed to establish the business records exception. (See
Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062 (Espejo) [concluding that a declaration, detailing how
an electronic signature “could have only been placed on the signature pages”
by someone using the employee’s “unique user name and password,” was
sufficient to authenticate the arbitration agreement]; Jazayeri v. Mao (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 301, 322 (Jazayeri); Condee v. Longwood Management Corp.
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 (Condee).)
First, Impact’s reliance on Condee and Espejo is misplaced. Those
cases addressed the less stringent evidentiary standards that apply to a
petitioner’s initial burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written
agreement to arbitrate. (See Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1058–
1059 [describing Condee and cases following it as analyzing the petitioner’s
“initial burden” to make a prima facie showing of an agreement to arbitrate].)
As we discuss further below, the trial courts here based their decisions to
deny Impact’s motions on Impact’s failure to meet its ultimate burden of
proving a valid arbitration agreement, which requires admissible evidence.
(Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165–166
(Gamboa).)
Second, Impact’s reliance on unpublished superior court decisions is
improper under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a). (Foster v. Britton
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 920, 933, fn. 9; Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc.
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1298, fn. 5.) Unpublished superior court
decisions “do not have precedential value” (Pereira-Goodman v. Anderson
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 864, 872, fn. 5) and do not provide guidance to other
9
courts and litigants (Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3
Cal.4th 273, 282). “Indeed, persistent use of unpublished authority may be
cause for sanctions.” (People v. Williams (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529.)
We therefore disregard those cases and caution Impact’s counsel to comply
with rule 8.1115(a) in the future.
Third, Impact fails to identify, let alone apply, the abuse of discretion
standard in its arguments regarding the courts’ evidentiary rulings. “Failure
to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit.”
(Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 456, 465; see also Bates v. Rubio’s Restaurants, Inc. (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 [appellant who fails to address proper standard of
review “fail[s] to meet its burden to show reversible error”].)
Regardless of these omissions, we conclude the trial courts did not
abuse their discretion in sustaining plaintiffs’ objections. Although Mullins’s
initial declarations stated that all facts set forth therein are within her
personal knowledge, such “boilerplate” language “is not sufficient to establish
personal knowledge.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 169.) Personal
knowledge means a present recollection of an impression derived from the
exercise of the witness’s own senses. (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th
818, 831, fn. 12.) Mullins did not explain in her declarations how she
perceived the represented facts herself, and merely claiming to be
“knowledgeable regarding the company’s operations,” “knowledgeable about
the onboarding process,” and stating her job title, are not sufficient by
themselves to establish personal knowledge. (Gamboa, at p. 169.) This is
especially true given that according to Mullins’s own attestations, her
responsibilities as Impact’s workers’ compensation claims coordinator have
no apparent connection to Impact’s onboarding process. Other than her
10
workers’ compensation job title, she did not claim any personal involvement
in personnel matters or drafting or approving the different versions of the
arbitration agreements. Mullins’s only claim to “personal” knowledge was
that she had reviewed documents in plaintiffs’ personnel files. Her initial
declarations contain conclusory statements about how Impact conducts
onboarding, but there was no explanation for how Mullins knew about or
participated in the onboarding process, including how the Agreements were
actually presented to plaintiffs for signature.
Mullins’s supplemental declarations in Munoz’s cases did little to
bridge these gaps. Although she asserted in those declarations that she was
“knowledgeable about the onboarding process for new and rehired employees”
at Impact, Mullins failed to explain how she came to that knowledge. She
referenced an “administrator” who “administer[s]” the onboarding paperwork,
but did not identify who that is or why Mullins would have the personal
knowledge to attest to the administrator’s actions and processes. Her
supplemental declaration also stated that it is Impact’s “business practice to
stamp a revision number on the entirety of the new hire packet each time the
packet” is updated, but the declaration provides no context for how she would
know that, or what role she played in that process, if any. Nor did her
declaration explain how she would know that the onboarding documents had
not been updated “since at least 2019.” In these circumstances, we cannot
conclude the courts below abused their discretion in deciding that Mullins
lacked the personal knowledge necessary to authenticate the Agreements.
For similar reasons, we conclude the trial courts did not abuse their
discretion in sustaining plaintiffs’ hearsay and authentication objections to
the alleged arbitration agreements. A business record which would otherwise
constitute inadmissible hearsay is admissible to prove an act if: (1) the
11
writing was made in the regular course of the business; (2) the writing was
made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; (3) the custodian or
other qualified witness testifies to the identity of the record and its mode of
preparation; and (4) the sources of information on which the record is based
and method and time of the record’s preparation are such as to indicate the
record’s trustworthiness. (Evid. Code, § 1271; Taggart v. Super Seer Corp.
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1705–1706.) Mullins’s declarations fell short of
these requirements, in large part because they failed to establish she had
any personal knowledge about how the onboarding process was actually
conducted, let alone how and when the Agreements were written. As
Judge Schneider observed in his written ruling, “there is no indication that
the [Agreement] was made in the regular course of Impact’s business” or
“that the [Agreement] was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or
event; nor does Mullins attest to the document’s mode of preparation or how
the onboarding process works.”
Impact cites Jazayeri, a case in which the Court of Appeal held that a
witness “need not have been present at every transaction to establish the
business records exception; he or she need only be familiar with the
procedures followed[.]” (Jazayeri, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 322.) But
even though the business records witness in Jazayeri was not present for
every transaction, the court observed she was present “on nearly every
occasion” of the deliveries at issue in the case, she received the records
related to those deliveries in due course from their sources, her testimony
was supported by other testimony, and she was “clearly” familiar with the
business’s record-keeping procedures for the subject purchase orders. (Id. at
pp. 308, 320–323.) The court held that “[t]he key to establishing the
admissibility of a document made in the regular course of business is proof
12
that the person who wrote the information or provided it had knowledge of
the facts from personal observation.” (Id. at p. 322.) Here, as we have
discussed, Mullins’s declarations failed to show she had the requisite
knowledge from personal observation to serve as a business records witness.
Merely reading the personnel files is not sufficient to qualify them as
business records.
Lastly, Impact contends the court erred in sustaining Munoz’s
objection to the lack of a certified translation of the Spanish version of the
Agreement that Mullins attached to her first declaration. Impact’s opening
brief, however, cites only to unpublished superior court cases in support of its
argument, which is improper for the reasons we have noted. Impact also
makes no argument as to why the court abused its discretion in enforcing a
court rule which requires that motion exhibits “written in a foreign language
must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a
qualified interpreter.” (Rule 3.1110(g).) We therefore conclude that Impact
has forfeited this argument by failing to support it with citation to proper
authority. (See rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
Accordingly, we discern no grounds for reversing the trial courts’
evidentiary rulings.
II
We turn next to Impact’s argument that plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of producing evidence to dispute the existence of the arbitration
agreements, and that even if they had, Impact met its burden of showing a
valid agreement to arbitrate exists.
“A trial court must grant a petition to compel arbitration only if it
determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.”
(Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 583
13
(Brockman).) The trial court makes this determination using a summary
procedure in which “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the
affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.”
(Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)
“While public policy favors contractual arbitration of disputes,
arbitration is a matter of contract and a party who has not agreed to
arbitrate a controversy cannot be compelled to do so. Thus, a court, before
granting a petition to compel arbitration, must determine the factual issue of
the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. An arbitration
agreement is subject to the same rules of construction as any other contract.”
(Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 584–585 [cleaned up].)
“Although the burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to
prove the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the
burden of production may shift in a three-step process.” (Brockman, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 586, citing Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–
165.) “First, the moving party bears the burden of producing prima facie
evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy” by, for example,
“attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the
opposing party’s signature. At this step, a movant need not follow the normal
procedures of document authentication and need only allege the existence of
an agreement and support the allegation[.]” (Brockman, at p. 586 [cleaned
up].)
“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the
opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing
party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of
the agreement. [Citation.] The opposing party can do this in several ways.
14
For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under
penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the
agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the
agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “If the opposing
party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the
moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration
agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a
preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party.” (Id. at
pp. 165–166.)
“When, as here, the court’s order denying a motion to compel
arbitration is based on the court’s finding that the moving party failed to
carry its burden of proof with respect to the ultimate question of whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists, the question for the reviewing court is whether
that finding is erroneous as a matter of law. Specifically, the question
becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) uncontradicted and
unimpeached and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding. Unless
the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing party, we
presume the trial court found the party’s evidence lacks sufficient weight and
credibility to carry the burden of proof. We have no power on appeal to judge
the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. The appellate court
cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; it
must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in
support of the judgment. All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of
the respondent.” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588 [cleaned
up].) We also indulge “all intendments and presumptions” to support the
lower courts’ orders on matters as to which the record is silent. (Jameson v.
15
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) It is Impact’s burden to overcome the
presumption of correctness by demonstrating, based on the record on appeal,
error requiring reversal. (Id. at p. 609.) But it is “almost impossible” under
this standard for a petitioner like Impact to prevail on appeal by arguing the
evidence compels a ruling in its favor because we have no power to judge the
credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. (Fabian v. Renovate
America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067, quoting Patricia A. Murray
Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258, 270.)
Assuming without deciding that Impact produced prima facie evidence
of written agreements to arbitrate, we conclude that plaintiffs met their
burden of producing evidence to challenge the agreements’ authenticity.
Manriquez-Gonzales’s declaration stated that he did not recognize, and had
no recollection of receiving, either version of the Agreement. He also stated
he did not believe he “actually received or signed” the arbitration documents.
He attested that he “went through a quick onboarding process” where he was
required to sign various documents, but he did not receive copies of any of
them. These sworn statements, together with the discrepancies between
the version numbers of the signature pages and other pages of the alleged
agreements, were sufficient to shift the burden back to Impact to prove the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate. (See Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th
at p. 165.)
Although Munoz stated in his declaration that he believed he signed
the signature page attached to Mullins’s declaration, he also expressed
uncertainty about whether the Agreement was “part of the same document”
as the signature page, given the different revision numbers. Plaintiffs
pointed out that the “Rev.” stamps on their signature pages did not match
the number stamped onto both the English and Spanish versions of the
16
Agreement, which indicates they were separate documents. Unlike
Manriquez-Gonzales, Munoz only signed the Spanish version of the signature
page, and the Spanish version of the Agreement was properly ruled
inadmissible. Moreover, as Judge Schneider observed in his written ruling in
Munoz’s class action case, differences in length, formatting, and numbering
between the English and Spanish versions of the Agreement raised
additional questions about their authenticity and reliability. Judge Scheider
further noted that Mullins’s declarations did not explain when the
“20240319” stamp was placed on Munoz’s new hire packet, or why the
English and Spanish versions of the Agreement in Munoz’s personnel file
would have a revision stamp dated in 2024 if his onboarding paperwork was
completed in 2022.
Because plaintiffs met their burden of producing evidence to challenge
the authenticity of the Agreement, the burden properly shifted back to
Impact to establish a valid arbitration agreement with admissible evidence
by a preponderance of the evidence. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 165–166.) Given that we have concluded the trial courts did not err in
sustaining plaintiffs’ objections to the alleged arbitration agreements
themselves, Impact cannot meet its burden because there was no admissible
evidence of any agreement whatsoever. But even if the bodies of these
documents were admissible, given the inconsistencies and omissions in
Impact’s evidence and our limited function in reviewing the trial court’s
findings, we would still discern no grounds for reversal. Most of Mullins’s
statements were inadmissible for reasons we have explained, including her
conclusory assertions that the Agreement and signature pages “both belong
to the same version of the document, despite the different revision numbers.”
Without any admissible explanation for these discrepancies, the trial courts
17
reasonably concluded that Impact’s evidence did not have sufficient weight or
credibility to carry its burden of proving the existence of an arbitration
agreement. The courts were also entitled to accept the credibility of the
plaintiffs’ own declarations. We will not reweigh the evidence or the courts’
credibility determinations and cannot reject their findings as a matter of law
unless Impact’s evidence was unimpeached, uncontradicted, and “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support [the] finding[s].” (Brockman, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 587.) Because Impact has not shown those conditions exist
here, we affirm. We therefore need not and do not address Impact’s
arguments regarding federal arbitration law.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the trial courts denying Impact’s motions to compel
arbitration are affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their costs on
appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
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