The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0511-24
OMAR PAGAN,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, and
LOOMIS ARMORED US, LLC,
Respondents.
________________________________
Submitted December 11, 2025 ‒ Decided March 17, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of
Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, Docket No. 295767.
Omar Pagan, self-represented appellant.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Board of Review (Sookie Bae-Park,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kendall J.
Collins, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Omar Pagan appeals from the August 28, 2024 final agency
decision of the Board of Review (Board), affirming the decision of the Appeal
Tribunal determining his ineligibility for unemployment benefits under the
Unemployment Compensation Law (UCL), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71, and
requiring him to refund $6,618 in benefits received prior to his ineligibility
determination. We affirm.
Pagan was employed as an armored truck driver with Loomis Armored
US, LLC, (Loomis) in Moonachie from August 2019 through July 23, 2021. On
June 1, 2021, he notified Loomis of his plan to relocate to Florida in July and
inquired about transferring to the Tampa branch. The New Jersey district
manager advised Pagan a decision regarding his transfer might not be made
before his relocation, as the final determination will be mad by the Tampa
branch manager.
According to the record, Pagan was required to interview with the Tampa
branch, but as of June 30, his interview and transfer approval had not occurred.
He submitted his resignation letter on July 6, which was accepted the same day.
Pagan last worked on July 22, called out sick on July 23, and relocated to Florida
on July 24, 2021.
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On July 25, Pagan filed for unemployment compensation, which
established a weekly benefit rate of $731. From July 31, 2021, through
November 13, 2021, Pagan received a total of $6,618 in unemployment benefits.
Thereafter, on August 5, 2021, the New Jersey district manager informed
Pagan by email his transfer was denied because he did not keep the branch
updated, had submitted a resignation letter and subsequently resigned, and did
not complete a full two weeks of work following his resignation letter.
Additionally, the Tampa branch manager denied Pagan's transfer and deemed
him ineligible for rehire.
In a November 2021 letter, Pagan was disqualified from unemployment
benefits as of July 25, 2021, due to his voluntary separation, which required a
refund of benefits paid. Pagan timely appealed the determination. Following a
telephone hearing on May 8, 2023, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the
disqualification under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), finding Pagan voluntarily left work
without good cause and was liable for a refund in the amount of $6,6618 for the
benefits received from July 31, 2021, through November 13, 2021. Pagan again
timely appealed. The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision requiring
a refund under N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d), based on the existing record, and adjusted
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the disqualification period to run from July 18, 2021, through November 13,
2021.
Pagan contends, for the first time on appeal, the Board erred in concluding
he voluntarily resigned; the disqualification was arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable; and he acted in good faith. It is well-settled that appellate courts
"will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial
court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the
questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern
matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229,
234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548
(App. Div. 1959)). Neither exception applies here. For the sake of
completeness, we address Pagan's argument to the extent necessary to provide
closure in this matter.
Our scope of review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited.
D.C. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 464 N.J. Super. 343, 352 (App.
Div. 2020); In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "We review a decision
made by an administrative agency entrusted to apply and enforce a statutory
scheme under an enhanced deferential standard." E. Bay Drywall, LLC v. Dep't
of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 251 N.J. 477, 493 (2022). Accordingly, "we will
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disturb an agency's adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision
is 'arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by substantial
credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Sullivan v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of
Lab., 471 N.J. Super. 147, 155-56 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Henry v. Rahway
State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
"[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment
compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come
to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather
whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Brady v.
Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Rev., 200 N.J.
Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "The [UCL] 'protects not only workers who
are involuntarily unemployed—those who are laid-off or terminated from their
jobs by their employers—but also those who voluntarily quit their jobs for good
cause attributable to their work.'" Ardan v. Bd. of Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 602 (2018)
(quoting Utley v. Bd. of Rev., 194 N.J. 534, 543-44 (2008)). Under N.J.S.A.
43:21-5(a), a claimant "shall" be disqualified "[f]or the week in which the
individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such
work, and for each week thereafter until the [claimant] becomes reemployed and
works eight weeks in employment."
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Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b), "'good cause attributable to such work'
means a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which . . . give[s]
the individual no choice but to leave the employment." See Brady, 152 N.J. at
214. Further, "a [r]elocation to another [state] for personal reasons" unrelated
to employment constitutes a voluntary separation from employment under
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(6). See Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 457-58 (1982).
Thus, a claimant bears the burden to establish good cause for leaving
attributable to the work; failure to do so results in a disqualification from
receiving benefits. Ardan, 231 N.J. at 602; N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). A claimant
also bears "[t]he burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious[,] or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the
administrative action." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (third
alteration in original) (quoting In re J.S., 431 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div.
2013)).
The record demonstrates Pagan resigned solely because he was relocating
to Florida. Contrary to his claim, Pagan's transfer was not approved, as he was
not interviewed by the Tampa branch before submitting his resignation on July
6, 2021. Substantial credible evidence supports the finding Pagan voluntarily
resigned: he reported to work on July 22, called out sick on July 23, and
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relocated on July 24. Pagan's "purely personal reason" for leaving employment
disqualifies him from receiving benefits. Brady, 152 N.J. at 213. Based on the
record, we discern no error in the Board's decision Pagan is ineligible for
unemployment benefits.
It is undisputed Pagan received $6,618 in unemployment benefits. Under
N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d), Pagan is required to make full repayment of
unemployment benefits received because he was disqualified. See Bannan v.
Bd. of Rev., 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Fischer v. Bd. of
Rev., 123 N.J. Super. 263, 266 (App. Div. 1973)).
Affirmed.
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