Brown

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

ARTHUR BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-04233-JEH

TYRONE BAKER, et al.,

Defendants.

Merit Review Order

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at Hill

Correctional Center (“Hill”). (Doc. 1). This case is before the Court for a merit

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

I

In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true,

liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-

51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.

Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x 588,

589 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

II

Plaintiff files suit against Defendants Warden Tyrone Baker, Medical

Director Dr. Osmundson, and Nurse Practitioners Kramer and Shinn.

On May 2, 2024, Plaintiff fell out of his top bunk and was injured. Plaintiff

was transported to the hospital where he received fifteen stitches, a CT scan, and

other medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges the hospital physician stated a fall from

that height for a man of Plaintiff’s size could have cost him his life. Plaintiff claims

Defendant Warden Baker failed to ensure safe conditions of confinement.

On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff informed Defendant Kramer he was experiencing

headaches, dizziness, occasional blackouts, neck pain, and back pain and

requested antibiotics. Defendant Kramer allegedly sent Plaintiff back to his cell

without the antibiotic the hospital physician had prescribed or any pain

medication.

On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a medical request form, reported the

same symptoms, and requested antibiotics. Plaintiff also submitted a request form

to see a mental health professional because he was having nightmares and trouble

sleeping.

On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff received Tylenol from Nurse Casey, the Director

of Nurses. On May 12, 2024, Plaintiff told Nurse Casey the Tylenol was ineffective.

On May 14, 2024, Plaintiff noticed the skin was beginning to heal over his

stitches. Plaintiff’s job supervisor called the Health Care Unit (“HCU”). The same

day, Plaintiff was called to the HCU to have his stitches removed. Nurse Paula and

Defendant Kramer had to cut his skin to remove the stitches, which resulted in

pain and suffering. Plaintiff alleges his stitches were removed almost a week late,

and Defendants Dr. Osmundson, Kramer, and Shinn failed to provide for the

removal of his stitches in a timely manner.

While his stitches were being removed, Plaintiff told Defendant Kramer and

Nurse Paula he was experiencing headaches, dizziness, occasional blackouts, neck

pain, and back pain. Plaintiff received ibuprofen and Tylenol.

On May 29, 22024, Plaintiff submitted another medical request form and

reported the same symptoms. Plaintiff also submitted another mental health

request form.

On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff saw Defendant Kramer, who told Plaintiff

nothing could be done for a brain injury. Defendant Kramer referred Plaintiff to

Defendant Dr. Osmundson.

On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff saw Defendant Dr. Osmundson and reported

headaches, dizziness, and occasional blackouts. Defendant prescribed migraine

medication and ordered an x-ray. Ms. Rapp, a mental health professional,

informed Plaintiff she would refer him to the psychiatrist.

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff received an x-ray. Defendant Dr. Osmundson

reviewed the x-ray and ordered a new high contrast CT scan.

On October 22, 2024, Plaintiff was sent to an outside medical provider who

performed a regular CT scan instead of the high contrast CT scan.

III

It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is

actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516,

522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim of deliberate indifference contains both an objective

and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy

the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition

is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition

is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that

is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s

attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate

must demonstrate that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state

of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know of and disregard an

excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the

defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct

approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware

Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendants Dr. Osmundson and Kramer based on their alleged deliberate

indifference to the treatment of his injuries after his fall from the top bunk on May

2, 2024.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Nurse Practitioner Shinn.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Shinn failed to provide for the removal of his stitches

in a timely manner. (Doc. 1 at p. 8, ¶ 34). There is no other reference to Defendant

Shinn in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff does not allege that he informed Defendant

Shinn his skin was healing over the stitches or that she was responsible for

removing them. Defendant Shinn is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state

a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

Plaintiff’s allegations are also insufficient to state a claim against Defendant

Warden Baker. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Baker “violated [his] rights under the

Eighth Amendment by failing to secure safe conditions of confinement.” Id. at ¶

30. There is no other reference to Defendant Baker in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Plaintiff did not include any specific allegations to demonstrate that Defendant

Baker was personally involved in any constitutional deprivation. Vance v. Peters,

97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on

personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless

the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).

There is no respondeat superior under § 1983. In other words, Defendant Baker

cannot be liable based only on his supervisory role as Warden. Doe v. Purdue Univ.,

928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Defendant Baker is dismissed without prejudice

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

IV

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Request Counsel asking the Court to appoint an

attorney to represent him. (Doc. 4). “There is no right to court-appointed counsel

in federal civil litigation.” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007)). When evaluating a Motion to

Request Counsel, the Court must consider: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a

reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so;

and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to

litigate it himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655.

Plaintiff did not indicate what attempts he made to obtain counsel.

Demonstrating a reasonable effort to obtain representation typically requires

submitting letters from several attorneys declining assistance and copies of any

documents which show Plaintiff tried to find an attorney. See Olson, 750 F.3d at

711. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable attempt to secure his own lawyer.

Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong of Pruitt, the Court does not

address the second. Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED, with leave to renew. If Plaintiff renews his

motion, he is directed to attach copies of letters he sent to or received from

prospective counsel, list the attorneys or law firms he contacted, and indicate

whether he received a response.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to proceed on an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants Dr. Osmundson and Kramer based on their

alleged deliberate indifference to the treatment of his injuries following his fall

from the top bunk on May 2, 2024. Additional claims shall not be included in the

case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause

shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) Defendants Tyrone Baker and Shinn are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) and § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants Baker and

Shinn.

3) Plaintiff's Motion to Request Counsel [4] is DENIED.

4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff

to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed

before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of

service. If Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendants and will require

Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

6) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk

sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer

should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In

general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ position. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no

response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not

filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this

Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After

Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the

entity for whom Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendants’ current work address, or, if not known, Defendants’ forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendants’ counsel copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed

with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly

to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be

returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and

the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process

in more detail.

9) Defendants’ counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change

in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court

of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this

lawsuit, with prejudice.

11) Plaintiff shall be provided with a copy of all pertinent medical records

upon request.

12) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants’ counsel an

authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the

authorization to Defendants’ counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard

qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

13) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from

the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter

scheduling deadlines.

It is so ordered.

Entered: March 16, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge