FLATT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MICHAEL F., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25CV42

)

FRANK J. BISIGNANO, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant.1 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Michael F., brought this action pursuant to the

Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a

final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security

(the “Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental

Security Income (“SSI”). (Docket Entry 1.) The Commissioner has

filed the certified administrative record (Docket Entry 5 (cited

herein as “Tr. __”)), and both parties have submitted dispositive

briefs in accordance with Rule 5 of the Supplemental Rules for

Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Docket Entry 11

(Plaintiff’s Brief); Docket Entry 13 (Commissioner’s Brief); see

1 The United States Senate confirmed Frank J. Bisignano as the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration on May 6, 2025, and he took the oath of

office on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Frank J. Bisignano should substitute for Carolyn W. Colvin as the

defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit

by reason of the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

also Docket Entry 14 (Plaintiff’s Reply)). For the reasons that

follow, the Court will enter judgment for the Commissioner.2

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for SSI on September 1, 2020 (Tr. 208-14),

alleging a disability onset date of July 1, 2019 (see Tr. 208).3

Upon denial of that application initially (Tr. 101-09, 139-43) and

on reconsideration (Tr. 110-20, 145-47), Plaintiff requested a

hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

(Tr. 148). Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”)

attended the hearing. (Tr. 53-100.) The ALJ subsequently ruled

that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 28-

52.) The Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for

review (Tr. 15-20, 200-02, 340-42), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling

the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.

In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the

following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:

1. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since September 1, 2020, the application date.

. . .

2 On consent of the parties, “this case [wa]s referred to the

[undersigned] United States Magistrate Judge . . . to conduct all

proceedings . . ., to order the entry of judgment, and to conduct all post-

judgment proceedings []herein.” (Docket Entry 9 at 1.)

3 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of July 1, 2019, she

lacked eligibility for SSI benefits until her application date of September 1,

2020 (see Tr. 208). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.202 (explaining that a claimant remains

ineligible for SSI benefits until date he or she files SSI application); 20

C.F.R. § 416.501 (stating that a claimant may not receive SSI benefits for any

period that predates first month he or she satisfies eligibility requirements,

which cannot precede application date).

2

2. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:

depression; dissociative identity disorder; gender

dysphoria disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; and

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

. . .

3. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals

the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

. . .

4. . . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional

capacity to perform a full range of work at all

exertional levels but with the following nonexertional

limitations: [she] is limited to understanding,

remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, can

use judgment to make simple work-related decisions; and

can sustain concentration, attention, and pace sufficient

to carry out those simple instructions for two-hour

intervals over the course of an eight-hour work day; is

limited to jobs in which she could work in proximity to,

but not coordination with, co-workers and supervisors,

and can have only superficial contact with the public,

where “superficial” is defined to mean the contact is

incidental and not an essential function of the job.

However, she would be able to interact with others

sufficiently to complete a 30-day training period for

such an occupation. She is limited to work in a low

stress setting, which is defined to mean work involving:

no paced production requirements, such as on an assembly

line, where the worker does not control the pace of

production, occasional changes in the work setting or

routine, and no dealing with crisis situations as an

essential function of the job.

. . .

5. [Plaintiff] has no past relevant work.

. . .

9. Considering [Plaintiff]’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that [she] can perform.

3

. . .

10. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as

defined in the [] Act, since September 1, 2020, the date

the application was filed.

(Tr. 34-46 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations

omitted).)

II. DISCUSSION

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security

Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.

Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope

of [the Court’s] review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely

limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff has not established entitlement to relief under the

extremely limited review standard.

A. Standard of Review

“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”

Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead,

the Court “must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ if they are

supported by substantial evidence and were reached through

application of the correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Substantial

evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hunter v. Sullivan,

993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “It consists of more than a mere scintilla

4

of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro

v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted). “If there is evidence to justify a

refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there

is substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not

undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility

determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as

adopted by the Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal

brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence

allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is

disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the

[Commissioner] (or the ALJ).” Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether

[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the

claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and

was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”

Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that

“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving

a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),

and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

5

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).4 “To regularize the

adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration [(‘SSA’)]

has . . . detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-

vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant’s

age, education, and work experience in addition to [the claimant’s]

medical condition.” Id. “These regulations establish a

‘sequential evaluation process’ to determine whether a claimant is

disabled.” Id.

This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five

steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial

gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a

‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of

specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent

that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity

[(‘RFC’)] to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any

other work.” Albright v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 174

4 The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. The Disability

Insurance Benefits Program provides benefits to disabled persons who have

contributed to the program while employed. [SSI] provides benefits to indigent

disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . . for

determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant

here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations

omitted).

6

F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).5 A finding adverse to the

claimant at any of several points in the SEP forecloses an award

and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step determines

whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’

If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step

determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled. If not,

benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th

Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at

each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,

270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and

two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment

is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,

the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 179.6 Step four

then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the

claimant can perform past relevant work; if so, the claimant does

not qualify as disabled. See id. at 179-80. However, if the

5 “Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the

claimant. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the

[Commissioner] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).

6 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the

claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative

regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-

related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and

continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an

equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The

RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses

the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy

work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin

impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only

after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and

any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.

7

claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the

analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide

“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering

both [the claimant’s RFC] and [the claimant’s] vocational

capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust

to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the

Commissioner cannot carry its “evidentiary burden of proving that

[the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available in the

community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at

567.7

B. Assignment of Error

In Plaintiff’s first and only issue on review, she asserts

that “[t]he [ALJ] erred as a matter of law by failing to build a

logical bridge between the medical evidence of record and the RFC

determination that Plaintiff could tolerate increased social

contact during a training period compared to during a post-training

period.” (Docket Entry 11 at 6 (all-caps font and block formatting

omitted); see also Docket Entry 14 at 1-10.) More specifically,

Plaintiff maintains that, “[t]hrough the RFC, the ALJ expressly

f[ound] that Plaintiff could tolerate only superficial contact with

7 A claimant thus can establish disability via two paths through the SEP.

The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three

in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail

at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations

of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a

claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993

F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the

process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).

8

coworkers and supervisors and should be limited to working ‘in

proximity to, but not coordination with’ coworkers and

supervisors,” but also found that Plaintiff “‘would be able to

interact with others sufficiently to complete a 30-day training

period.’” (Docket Entry 11 at 8 (quoting Tr. 38) (emphasis in

original).) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he RFC, and the entirety

of the [ALJ’s] decision, is silent as to what level of interaction

[] Plaintiff might engage in with coworkers and supervisors during

her probationary period[,] . . . thereby leaving the Court to

perform guesswork in figuring out what the ALJ intended.” (Id.)

Plaintiff additionally argues that “the ALJ’s decision provides an

insufficient rationale for creating this training period exception”

(id. at 9) by relying on the fact that “‘[Plaintiff] has, in fact,

worked longer than 30 days in occupations requiring more extensive

social interaction’” (id. (quoting Tr. 41)). Plaintiff further

notes that none of the medical opinions of record “endorses or

suggests that Plaintiff’s limitations relating to social contact

would be less pronounced during a given period of employment.”

(Id. at 10 (citing Tr. 105, 107, 114, 118, 627, 651).)

In Plaintiff’s view, the ALJ’s above-described error “is not

harmless,” because “[t]he training period carveout significantly

expands the occupational base by allowing for augmented social

interaction at a stage of employment that, under [SSA] rulings and

vocational understanding, is considered essential to establishing

9

job retention and successful performance.” (Id. at 12; see also

id. at 13 (quoting Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir.

2020), for proposition that “[t]he ability to complete a

probationary period is tantamount to the ability to keep a job,

and . . . the ability to keep a job is a necessary prerequisite to

the ability to engage in substantial gainful activity”).)

Plaintiff further contends that, “[h]ad the VE been instructed to

assume consistent social limitations throughout the employment

period, including training, the job numbers may have materially

changed, or no jobs might have been identified.” (Id.)

Here, the ALJ found at steps two and three of the SEP that

Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused her to experience moderate

limitation in her ability to interact with others (see Tr. 36-37),

reasoning as follows:

In interacting with others, [Plaintiff] has a moderate

limitation. [She] has undergone periods of significant

depressive symptoms including two inpatient

hospitalizations for suicidal ideations shortly prior to

her protected filing date. More recent treatment notes

document significant improvement in

symptoms. [Consultative psychological examiner Ashley]

Phelps[, M.A., L.P.A., (“LPA Phelps”)] opined that

[Plaintiff] may have mild difficulty interacting

appropriately with peers and coworkers and responding

appropriately to supervision, based on her work

history. [Consultative psychological examiner Alexandria

Little] Westfall[, M.A., L.P.A., (“LPA Westfall”)] opined

that [Plaintiff] would also likely have significant

difficulties interacting with peers and coworkers and

responding appropriately to supervision. Both [state

10

agency psychological consultants] determined [Plaintiff]

had moderate limitations in this domain.

(Tr. 37.) In turn, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s moderate

difficulties in interacting with others resulted in RFC limitations

to “jobs in which [Plaintiff] could work in proximity to, but not

coordination with, co-workers and supervisors, [with] only

superficial contact with the public, where ‘superficial’ is defined

to mean the contact is incidental and not an essential function of

the job” (Tr. 38), but also found that Plaintiff “would be able to

interact with others sufficiently to complete a 30-day training

period for such an occupation” (id. (emphasis added)).

The ALJ thereafter provided the following explanation for

those limitations:

Given the evidence of some interpersonal difficulties,

the [ALJ] finds [Plaintiff] would be limited to jobs in

which she could work in proximity to, but not

coordination with, co-workers and supervisors, and can

have only superficial contact with the public, where

“superficial” is defined to mean the contact is

incidental and not an essential function of the job. The

[ALJ] finds it appropriate to limit the type of

interaction with co-workers and supervisors, as opposed

to the frequently [sic] of such interaction. However,

the evidence does not show that [Plaintiff]’s social

limitations would be so severe as to prevent her from

engaging in the necessary level of interaction required

to complete a 30-day training period for such an

occupation. It should be noted that [Plaintiff] has, in

fact, worked longer than 30 days in occupations requiring

more extensive social interaction. ....

Although [Plaintiff] has alleged greater limitations,

those allegations are not consistent with the treatment

records since the current application date, which reflect

symptoms that have been fairly well managed with limited,

conservative treatment. As well, the allegations are not

11

consistent with [Plaintiff]’s ability to work at least

part-time in jobs. Although [she] has reported some

difficulties in keeping some of those jobs, it is notable

that the jobs have mostly been significantly more

mentally demanding than the limitations set forth [in the

RFC]. Further, [t]he [ALJ] notes that while [Plaintiff]

reported having been fired from several jobs due to

interpersonal conflict ([Tr. 229-38, 338-39]), all but

two of those positions predated the alleged onset date.

That [Plaintiff] reportedly lost her customer service job

at Home Depot due to interpersonal conflict still does

not support the degree of social limitation alleged.

Rather, it warrants limiting the type of social

interaction the claimant would encounter ina job. It is

also notable that at the time of the hearing, [Plaintiff]

had been working for over a year at Subway, in a position

that involved extensive customer interaction ([Tr. 282]

and testimony).

(Tr. 41-42 (emphasis added) .)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions (see Docket Entry 11 at

6), the above-quoted evidence does build a logical bridge between

the evidence of record and the ALJ’s finding that, notwithstanding

greater interaction limitations generally, Plaintiff could interact

sufficiently with others to complete a 30-day training period (see

Tr. 38). As the language emphasized above makes clear, the ALJ

explained the training period carve-out in the RFC by noting that

1) Plaintiff had previously worked longer than 30 days in jobs that

required more extensive social interaction, 2) Plaintiff’s symptoms

remained fairly well managed on limited, conservative treatment

during the relevant period,® 3) all but two of the jobs Plaintiff

® The ALJ had earlier in the decision observed that 1) “a gap [existed] in

[Plaintiff]’s medical history [from her application date of September 1, 2020, ]

until late April of 2021” (Tr. 40), 2) on April 30, 2021, Emily Headrick, FNP,

“diagnosed [Plaintiff] with dissociative identity disorder, but deemed it stable

(continued...)

12

reported losing due to interpersonal conflict predated the relevant

period and all of them involved more extensive interaction than the

RFC permits, and 4) at the time of the ALJ’s hearing, Plaintiff had

worked for over year at Subway, which involved extensive

interaction with the public. (See Tr. 41-42.)° The ALJ, in

explaining the carve-out in the RFC for the 30-day training period,

thus pointed to “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support [her] conclusion.’” Biestek v.

Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co.

v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

Another district court in the Fourth Circuit has addressed a

Similar training period carve-out and found that the ALJ had

provided an adequate explanation:

The ALJ provided a reasonable explanation for allowing

[the p]llaintiff more than occasional contact with

® (...continued)

with no imminent safety concerns” (id.), 3) “[Plaintiff] began injectable

estrogen treatments on November 16, 2021[,]” and, “[a]fter the second injection,

[she] reported stable mood and being hopeful about change in treatment” (Tr. 41),

4)”[iJn April of 2022, [she] expressed interest in gender affirming surgery” and

“Thler depressive symptoms were significantly reduced in severity by self-report”

(id.), 5) “[i]n April of 2022, [she] began treatment at Take My Hand Therapy” and

“[t]reatment notes describe occasional anxiety and feelings of stress but were

notable for [her] reports of work activities” (id.), and 6) “[a]t a December 8,

2022 appointment with Jessica Rubio, FNP, [Plaintiff] was alert and cooperative,

with normal mood and affect, and normal attention span and concentration” (id.).

° At the hearing on September 16, 2022, Plaintiff testified that she had

worked at Subway since August 2021, with the exception of two and half months

when she worked at Home Depot before returning to Subway. (See Tr. 68.) She

further testified that her job at Subway involved opening and closing the store,

cleaning, preparing food, and ringing up customers (see Tr. 68-69), as well as

that she worked between 30 and 40 hours per week at that job (see Tr. 86).

Additionally, she testified her boss at Subway “treat[ed Plaintiff] pretty fair”

and “[wa]s actually one of the most respectful bosses that [Plaintiff had] had,”

as well as that “the store owner .. . [wa]s one of the nicest store owners

[Plaintiff had] ever had.” (Tr. 80-81.)

13

supervisors for the brief training period - noting that

it is logical that one would have more contact with a

supervisor when starting a new job, and that the medical

evidence demonstrated largely unremarkable findings,

including cooperative and normal behavior. It is

apparent that notwithstanding the occasional contact

limitation, the VE identified several jobs the

[o]laintiff could still perform, knowing that there is a

brief thirty-day period for training purposes, because he

identified unskilled jobs. In sum, the [court] is not

left to speculate how the ALJ included the provision that

the [p]llaintiff could tolerate more than occasional

cont[Jact during his training period, allowing for

meaningful judicial review.

Jess B. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:23CV7, 2023 WL 6457322, at *9 (S.D.W.

Va. Aug. 21, 2023) (unpublished) (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks omitted), recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6449442

(S.D.W. Va. Oct. 3, 2023) (unpublished) .!°

In fact, many other cases have found training period carve-

outs similar to the one at issue here permissible, where the ALJ

provided a sufficient explanation supported by substantial

evidence. See Bowen v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 3:25CV1142,

'° Plaintiff’s reliance on Sczepanski misses the mark. (See Docket Entry

ll at 7.) In that case, the VE testified that the jobs at issue required 90-day

probationary periods during which employers did not tolerate any absence. See

Scezepanski, 946 F.3d at 155. Because the RFC allowed one absence per month, the

court found that the ALJ erred by not resolving the conflict between the RFC’s

absence allowance and the VE’s testimony that employers would not tolerate

absence for the first 90 days. See id. The instant case involves neither a 90-

day probationary period, nor an RFC that allows one absence per month, and, thus,

Sczepanski does not aid Plaintiff’s cause. See Elizabeth L. F. v. Kijakazi, No.

2:22CV506, 2023 WL 3981441, at *3-4 (D. Utah June 13, 2023) (unpublished) (“[T]he

ALJ. . . limited [the p]laintiff to only occasionally interacting with

co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. [The p]laintiff alleges it is

unclear how she could learn any of the jobs identified by the VE[,] .. . because

she could not complete a probationary period of employment without more than

occasional contact. In support[, the p]laintiff cites to a case out of the Second

Circuit, Sczepanski ... . In Sczepanski, the ALJ determined that the RFC

included a limitation of being able to miss up to one day of work per month,

which specifically called into question whether that claimant could complete a

probationary period of employment. There is no such limitation here.”).

14

2026 WL 479071, at *22 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2026) (unpublished)

(“[S]ubstantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that [the

plaintiff] could perform work with more than occasional interaction

with supervisors during an initial training period. . . . This

case is distinguishable from . . . [cases] . . . [in which] the ALJ

provided no explanation for making a distinction between the

claimant’s abilities before and after a training period. Here, in

contrast, reading the ALJ’s decision as a whole and with common

sense, the ALJ adequately explained why [the plaintiff] could

tolerate more than occasional interaction with supervisors during

a brief training period. The ALJ noted that [the plaintiff] had

sustained [substantial gainful activity] for a portion of the

alleged disability period, and other work in the remaining

years. . . . [The court is] convinced that a reasonable mind might

accept th[at] evidence as adequate to support the ALJ’s conclusion

that [the plaintiff] can complete a brief training period — in a

job requiring no more than simple, routine tasks and simple

work-related decisions, and with no hourly productivity goals —

with more than occasional interaction with supervisors.” (emphasis

added)); Karrissa D. v. Bisignano, No. 24CV2685, 2025 WL 2936876,

at *4 (D. Minn. July 21, 2025) (unpublished) (“The ALJ built a

clear logical bridge between evidence in the record and his

conclusion that [the p]laintiff can have frequent contact with

supervisors and co-workers during a training period and occasional

15

contact outside that period. ... [The ALJ] . . . explain[ed]

that [the RFC’s training period carveout wa]s consistent with

records showing . . . a_work history that d[id] not show problems

getting along with others during initial work training periods, and

current work for Door Dash where she [wa]s required to deliver food

to customers without any reported problems interacting with

others. . . . It is reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that

working as a cashier or customer service representative involves

frequent interactions with others, and [the p]llaintiff’s testimony

that she can tolerate such full-time work for several months

supports the finding that she can maintain frequent interactions

during an initial 30-day training period. It is also reasonable

for the ALJ to conclude that [the p]laintiff’s work with Door Dash

requires some level of interaction with others, even if the level

of interaction is less than she experienced as a cashier or

customer service representative. . . . Even if another ALJ could

have weighed the evidence as [the p]laintiff wishes, her challenges

do not demonstrate the ALJ was outside the available zone of choice

in formulating this portion of the RFC.” (emphasis added) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted)); Reggie N. v. Kijakazi, No.

21CV63, 2023 WL 5277877, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2023)

(unpublished) (“[T]he ALJ found that . . . [the plaintiff] can

learn work duties from a supervisor (during introduction of

work/probationary period) and thereafter tolerate occasional

16

supervision following the introduction of tasks. . . . [The

plaintiff ] complain[s ] that the ALJ did not explain how [the

plaintiff] could interact with supervisors on an unlimited basis

during the probationary period given his difficulty with social

interaction. . . . The ALJ [] pointed to record evidence that

despite [the plaintiff’s] allegations, [he] had been and could be

successful in his interactions[, including] . . . medical records

describing [the plaintiff] as pleasant, cooperative, polite,

friendly, responsive, and engaged . . . . [The plaintiff] points

to no evidence that the ALJ overlooked, and no opinion calls for

greater restrictions than the RFC provides. Moreover, [the

plaintiff]’s providers rated him at most as moderately inhibited in

social interaction. There was no error here.” (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks and parenthetical citations omitted)).

Significantly, cases to the contrary do not hold that ALJs

cannot carve out interaction limitations for training periods;

rather, they merely hold that, under the facts of those cases, the

ALJs failed to provide an adequate explanation for the carve-out.

See, e.g., Leitz v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35356, 2023 WL 4342114, at *2

(9th Cir. July 5, 2023) (unpublished) (“In the ALJ’s RFC finding,

the ALJ held that [the plaintiff] can have brief, superficial

interaction with co-workers and the public; and can have occasional

interaction with supervisors (although additional time for training

is acceptable). [The plaintiff] argues that the parenthetical in

17

the ALJ’s assessment of [the plaintiff]’s RFC is a caveat not

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not explain the

evidentiary basis for his training-period caveat ... . Without

an explanation for the training-period caveat, the court is left to

speculate as to what evidence, if any, is the basis of the ALJ’s

reasoning and conclusion.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Peter 1T.S. v. Dudek, Civ. No. 22C3984, 2025 WL

964959, at *5-7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025) (unpublished) (“While the

RFC distinguishes [the c]Jlaimant’s ability to interact with

supervisors .. . during an introductory period, .. . there is no

evidence identified by the ALJ to support this distinction. The

does not explain why [the c]Jlaimant would be able to engage

with supervisors in a different manner during an introductory

period when compared to the limitations on [the c]llaimant’s ability

to engage with supervisors otherwise while working, as well as more

broadly with respect to coworkers and the public. The ALJ simply

asserts this as fact with nothing in the record to support it other

than her say-so. .. . It is certainly possible that, where

properly supported, an RFC could draw a distinction between a

claimant’s abilities during an introductory, probationary, or

training period, and the claimant’s abilities to perform job

requirements on a regular and ongoing basis.” (emphasis added));

Clarissa W.-J. v. O’Malley, No. 23CV729, 2024 WL 3541932, at *20

(D. Minn. July 10, 2024) (unpublished) (“[T]he ALJ did not

18

articulate any reason for the distinction in [the p]llaintiff’s

capacity to interact during a 30-day training period and outside of

that period. There may well be reasons why [the p]laintiff could

have the capacity to interact sufficiently to complete a 30-day

training period, but the [c]lourt cannot engage in post hoc

rationalizations to support that conclusion.” (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted)), recommendation adopted, 2024

WL 3540855 (D. Minn. July 25, 2024) (unpublished); Clampit v.

Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22CV1561, 2023 WL 2958158, at *6

(N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2023) (unpublished) (“[O]ther courts have

reversed where, as here, the ALJ does not provide an explanation

for making a distinction in abilities before and after a training

period. Nothing forbids the ALJ from making a distinction before

and after a training period. However, the ALJ’s opinion must

permit thle] reviewing court Lo follow [his]

reasoning . .. . Because the ALJ failed to explain his reasoning

or the evidence supporting his decision to make a distinction

between [the plaintiff]’s abilities before and after a training

period, remand is appropriate.” (collecting cases) (emphasis added)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), recommendation

adopted, 2023 WL 2956613 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2023) (unpublished);

Slate v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21CV298, 2022 WL 1046290, at *6 (D. Nev.

Apr. 6, 2022) (unpublished) (“[The] ALJ . . . did not explain why

he credited [the consultative psychological examiner’s] opinion

19

that [the p]aintiff could have only occasional interaction with

coworkers and supervisors and no interaction with the public, but

found [the p]laintiff was capable of frequent interaction with

supervisors and coworkers for up to a month during the training or

orientation period. The court finds [the] ALJ [] erred in failing

to address this conflict, and remand is appropriate on this basis.”

(emphasis added)).

Plaintiff additionally contends that “[t]he RFC, and the

entirety of the [ALJ’s] decision, is silent as to what level of

interaction [] Plaintiff might engage in with coworkers and

supervisors during her probationary period[,] . . . thereby leaving

the Court to perform guesswork in figuring out what the ALJ

intended.” (Docket Entry 11 at 8 (emphasis in original).) In that

regard, Plaintiff notes that “the [VE] was not asked whether

Plaintiff . . . could complete a training period” (id. at 11), and

that “[n]o testimony addressed whether the [s]tep [f]ive jobs cited

by the ALJ require a probationary or onboarding phase involving

more intense social functioning” (id. at 12).

As an initial matter, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the

sufficiency of the VE’s testimony to support the ALJ’s step five

finding that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national

economy that Plaintiff could perform, Plaintiff has forfeited such

a challenge in this Court. The ALJ’s dispositive hypothetical

question to the VE included that “[t]he individual is limited to

20

work in which she could work in proximity to but not coordination

with coworkers and supervisors” and that “the individual would

still be able to interact with other sufficiently to complete a _ 30

day training period for any such occupation” (Tr. 92 (emphasis

added))}, and the VE responded that three light-exertion jobs

(marker, routing clerk, and inspector/hand packager) and three

medium-exertion jobs (order picker, laundry worker II, and

industrial cleaner) accommodated those interaction limitations (see

Tr. 92-93).'1 Plaintiff’s hearing-level attorney subsequently

cross-examined the VE, but did not ask the VE 1) whether the jobs

she cited required a training period, 2) how long a training period

for each of those jobs would last, 3) how much interaction with

others a training period would require. (See Tr. 96-97.)

Under such circumstances, Plaintiff has forfeited her

challenge to the VE’s testimony. See Wyrock v. Commissioner of

Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:19CV1052, 2020 WL 1322846, at *3 (N.D. Ohio

Mar. 20, 2020) (unpublished) (“[The plaintiff] had an ability to

cross-examine [the] VE [] at the hearing, did cross-examine him at

the hearing, and failed to question him about [the plaintiff]’s

ability to complete a 30-day training period for the jobs [the VE]

identified. Thus, [the plaintiff] has waived or forfeited this

issue.”); Bunton v. Colvin, No. 1:10CV786, 2014 WL 639618, at *5

'l The ALJ ultimately found, at step five of the SEP, that Plaintiff could

perform two of the VE’s cited light jobs (marker and routing clerk) and one of

the medium jobs (industrial cleaner). (See Tr. 45.)

21

(M.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2014) (unpublished) (finding waiver of issue on

judicial review where the plaintiff “failed to mount any opposition

. . to the view that he retained the capacity to do the [jobs

proffered by the VE], despite . . . the opportunity . . . to

question the VE about . . . those positions”), recommendation

adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2014) (Schroeder, J).

Moreover, even if Plaintiff has not forfeited her challenge to

the VE’s testimony, the absence of VE testimony regarding whether

the jobs in question require training periods and, if so, the

expected duration and level of interaction of such periods, does

not render the VE’s testimony insufficient to support the ALJ’s

step five finding. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)

categorizes all three jobs adopted by the ALJ at step five as

having a Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) of 2, see DOT, No.

209.587-034 (“Marker”), 1991 WL 671802 (G.P.0O. 4th ed. 1991); DOT,

No. 222.587-038 (“Router”), 1991 WL 672123; DOT, No. 381.687-018

(“Cleaner, Industrial”), 1991 WL 673258, meaning that a worker can

learn the jobs through “anything beyond [a] short demonstration up

to and including 1 month,” DOT, App’x C (“Components of the

Definition Trailer”), § II (“Specific Vocational Preparation

(SVP)”), 1991 WL 688702; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.968 (a)

(explaining that “unskilled” work involves “little or no judgment

to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short

period of time”). Furthermore, the DOT rates the task of “[t]laking

22

[i]nstructions” for all three jobs adopted by the ALJ as “[n]ot

[s]ignificant.” DOT, No. 209.587-034 (“Marker”), 1991 WL 671802;

DOT, No. 222.587-038 (“Router”), 1991 WL 672123; DOT, No. 381.687-

018 (“Cleaner, Industrial”), 1991 WL 673258.

Under such circumstances, the Court can meaningfully interpret

the ALJ’s training period carve-out as a finding that,

notwithstanding greater interaction limitations on a regular and

continuing basis, Plaintiff could tolerate the levels of

interaction required by any brief period of training to learn an

SVP 2 job that also entails “simple instructions,” “simple work-

related decisions,” and “a low stress setting,” defined to mean “no

paced production requirements,” “occasional changes in the work

setting or routine, and no dealing with crisis situations as an

essential function of the job” (Tr. 38). See Reggie N., 2023 WL

5277877, at *3-4 (“[T]he supervision the RFC[’s training period

carve-out] contemplates is inherently limited, as is the work

itself. Indeed, the RFC restricts [the plaintiff] to simple

instructions and tasks and no over-the-shoulder or intense

supervision, teamwork, or fast-paced production, among other

restrictions. It requires no leap of logic to deduce that the

associated teaching and learning curves are not grueling — a

conclusion bolstered by the unskilled nature and [SVP 2] score for

the jobs identified as suitable for [the plaintiff].” (emphasis

added) (internal parenthetical citations omitted)); Vargas v. Saul,

23

No. 1:19CV1858, 2020 WL 2468401, at *4, 9 (M.D. Pa. May 13, 2020)

(unpublished) (“Th[e VE’s] testimony[ that three SVP 2 jobs could

accommodate an RFC limiting the plaintiff to occasional interaction

with others] was entirely consistent with the [DOT’s] definitions

for th[o]se jobs, . . . whose training requirements are minimal and

consist of anything beyond [a] short demonstration up to and

including 1 month. These positions also only entailed Level 1 or

2 reasoning skills and merely required the worker to apply

commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved

written or oral instructions, or apply commonsense understanding to

carry out simple one-or two-step instructions. Moreover, according

to the [DOT,] taking instructions was not deemed a significant part

of the job functions of any of these jobs. In light of these

facts, . . . it cannot be said that the mere possibility that

initial training for these jobs might involve more than occasional

contact in the first weeks on the job wholly undermined the ALJ’s

decision in a material way which compels a remand of this case.”

(emphasis added) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted)).12

12 Significantly, other courts have affirmed training period carve-outs in

RFCs even where (A) those carve-outs did not specify the length of the training

period or the degree of interaction allowed during the training period, see,

e.g., Bowen, 2026 WL 479071, at *13, *22 (where ALJ found that, “[a]fter an

initial training period, [the plaintiff] can tolerate only occasional interaction

with supervisors,” the court found that, “reading the ALJ’s decision as a whole

and with common sense, the ALJ adequately explained why [the plaintiff] could

tolerate more than occasional interaction with supervisors during a brief

training period”); Mario G. v. O’Malley, No. 21CV472, 2024 WL 916234, at *7 (N.D.

Ill. Mar. 4, 2024) (unpublished) (“[The plaintiff] argu[es ] that [the ALJ] erred

(continued...)

24

Next, Plaintiff maintains that “[n]ot one of the[ medical]

opinions [of record] endorses or suggests that Plaintiff’s

limitations relating to social contact would be less pronounced

during a given period of employment.” (Docket Entry 11 at 10.) In

that regard, Plaintiff points out that the state agency

psychological consultants both “assessed Plaintiff as ‘moderately

limited’ in the ability to interact appropriately with the general

public, to accept instructions and respond appropriately to

criticism from supervisors, and to get along with coworkers or

peers” (id. at 9 (quoting Tr. 107, 118)) and opined that Plaintiff

“‘would perform best in a reduced social setting’” (id. (quoting

Tr. 108, 118)). In addition, Plaintiff notes that LPA Phelps

“opined that Plaintiff may have ‘mild difficulty interacting

12 (...continued)

in concluding that . . . [the plaintiff] could withstand interaction with a

supervisor during a training period, while still limiting him to occasional

interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the public

thereafter. . . . [C]ourts in this district have upheld RFCs allowing for

unlimited or typical levels of interaction during an introductory period and only

occasional work-related interactions thereafter. As such, the fact that the RFC

did not include any restrictions on interaction during the training period was

neither improper nor unusual, and there can be no remand on this basis.”

(emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), and (B) where

the VE did not provide testimony regarding the length or level of interaction of

any required training periods, see Littlejohn v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 22-4678, 2023

WL 4564548, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2023) (unpublished) (“The ALJ . . . could

not know exactly how long the training period would be for a specific job, or

what level of contact it would involve. However, the training requirements for

unskilled work can require anything beyond a short demonstration up to and

including 1 month. For this reason, [the] ALJ[] assumed that a 30-day training

period was a possibility. What is meaningful is that [the] ALJ . . . concluded

that, even if 30 days of training was required, this would not undermine [the

plaintiff]’s ability to perform the job, provided that the job was limited to

only occasional interaction with a supervisor after the initial training period.

The [court] is persuaded that the approach taken by [cases finding no conflict

between a limitation to occasional interaction and a brief training period that

could require more interaction] is realistic, in the absence of any specific

evidence that a claimant could not complete a 30-day training period.” (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted)).

25

appropriately with peers and coworkers and responding appropriately

to supervision’” (id. at 10 (quoting Tr. 627)), and that LPA

Westfall predicted “‘significant difficulties interacting with

peers and coworkers and responding appropriately to supervision’”

(id. (quoting Tr. 651)). According to Plaintiff, “[t]he ALJ

identifies no [] medical opinion to support the temporary lift of

Plaintiff’s social restrictions and, in fact, rejects portions of

the [s]tate agency psychological consultants’ opinions in favor of

the ALJ’s own opinion as to [] Plaintiff’s mental limitations.”

(Id. (citing Tr. 42) (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff thus

posits that “it is improper for [the] ALJ to render an opinion as

to [Plaintiff]’s functional limitations without the assistance of

and citation to a medical opinion.” (Id. at 10-11.)

Plaintiff’s argument fails, because “the ALJ labored under no

obligation to fashion an RFC that exactly matched . . . the opinion

evidence,” Gilmore v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21CV420, 2022 WL 2869407, at

*8 (M.D.N.C. July 21, 2022) (unpublished), recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 3446133 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2022) (unpublished) (Biggs, J.).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has long

recognized that the RFC assessment constitutes an administrative

finding rather than a medical finding, see Felton–Miller v. Astrue,

459 F. App’x 226, 230–21 (4th Cir. 2011) (deeming RFC “an

administrative assessment made by the Commissioner based on all the

relevant evidence in the case record”), and, thus, “[t]he

26

determination of an individual’s RFC need not be based on a medical

opinion,” Town v. Astrue, No 3:12CV105, 2012 WL 6150836, at *4

(N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2012) (unpublished)). “Instead, an ALJ must

consider all relevant evidence in the record, including the

opinions of medical sources, and arrive at a determination of a

claimant’s RFC that is supported by substantial evidence.” Fruit

v. Colvin, No. 2:14CV7643, 2015 WL 1021309, at *22 (S.D.W. Va. Mar.

9, 2015) (unpublished).

Here, the ALJ found the opinions of the state agency

psychological consultants that Plaintiff could perform work “in a

reduced social setting . . . partly persuasive” (Tr. 42

(referencing Tr. 108, 118)), but noted that “[Plaintiff]’s mental

functional limitations [we]re better expressed as set forth in the

[RFC]” (id.). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument (see Docket

Entry 11 at 10), the ALJ did not reject the consultants’

interaction opinions; rather, the ALJ found that the RFC, which

contained much more specific interaction limitations than a

“reduced social setting” (compare Tr. 38, with Tr. 108, 118),

“better expressed” Plaintiff’s social limitations (Tr. 42).

With regard to the consultative psychological examiners, the

ALJ found LPA Phelps’s opinion overall “only partly persuasive”

(Tr. 42), and her opinion that Plaintiff “‘may have

difficulty’ . . . interacting with peers, co-workers and

supervisors [] vague and speculative, and based on a one-time exam”

27

(Tr. 43 (quoting Tr. 618)). The ALJ further noted that, “[t]o the

extent [Plaintiff] has some difficulties in . . . interacting with

peers, co-workers, and supervisors, those difficulties have been

taken into account in assessing [Plaintiff’s RFC], which

limits . . . the nature of social interaction [she] would be

expected to be able to tolerate.” (Id.) The ALJ next found LPA

Westfall’s opinions overall “not fully persuasive,” noting that

“the report at times gets [Plaintiff]’s first and last names wrong,

which suggest[s] the report was not carefully reviewed or edited.”

(Id. (citing Tr. 645, 650-51).) The ALJ further found that

“speculation as to the likelihood of difficulties . . . in

interacting with peers, coworkers, and supervisors are [sic] based

largely on [Plaintiff]’s subjective reports and findings on the

one-time examination, and are not otherwise well supported.” (Id.)

The ALJ noted in particular “that observations of [Plaintiff]’s

primary care and mental health providers in the visits before and

after this exam did not reflect findings or observations consistent

with those of [LPA] Westfall.” (Id. (citing Tr. 655-58, 771-86).)

Thus, as to those two competing interaction opinions, i.e., “mild”

(Tr. 618) versus “significant” (Tr. 651) difficulties in

interaction, “the ALJ’s decision reveals that she found

neither . . . fully persuasive and instead struck a balance between

those two opposing viewpoints,” Gilmore, 2022 WL 2869047, at *8,

and found Plaintiff could tolerate interaction during a brief,

28

initial training period and superficial interaction with others

thereafter (see Tr. 38). Accordingly, far from “‘substituting her

lay opinion’” for that medical opinion evidence (Docket Entry 11 at

11 (quoting Brown v. Colvin, No. 3:14CV4237, 2015 WL 6501547, at *9

(N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2015) (unpublished))), the ALJ’s evaluation of

the mental opinion evidence provides further support for the ALJ’s

determination that Plaintiff could “interact sufficiently to

complete a 30 day training period” (Tr. 38).

Put simply, Plaintiff’s first and only issue on review fails

as a matter of law.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision

finding no disability is AFFIRMED, and that this action is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

March 16, 2026

29