The opinion
Filed 3/16/26 Weiss v. Google CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MAX WEISS, D085881
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
00021983-CU-BT-CTL)
GOOGLE LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Affirmed.
Max Weiss, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati and Amit Q. Gressel for Defendants
and Respondents.
Max Weiss filed suit in propria persona against Google LLC and its
parent company, Alphabet Inc. (collectively, Google). Weiss runs Max
Marketing Corp., doing business as Private Student Loan Assistance Center,
which Weiss advertised on Google’s search engine. According to Weiss’s
complaint, he began advertising on Google in 2015 and over the years Google
periodically suspended his advertisements for violating its policies related to
consumer finance and debt services. Weiss alleges these suspensions were
always resolved in his favor and his ads reinstated until May 2024, when
Google suspended his ads a final time. As he had in the past, Weiss
attempted to have the ads reinstated. When Google refused, Weiss filed the
underlying lawsuit.
Google responded to Weiss’s complaint with a demurrer, asserting
Weiss’s claims were barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA) (47 U.S.C. § 230; hereafter, section 230). The trial court
sustained the demurrer with leave to amend and Weiss filed an amended
complaint. Google demurred on the same grounds and this time the trial
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, again finding
section 230 barred Weiss’s claims.
On appeal from the subsequent judgment, Weiss, who remains self-
represented, asserts the trial court wrongly concluded his claims are barred
by section 230. He argues his claims are based on Google’s
mischaracterization of his advertisements and that by misclassifying his ads,
Google contributed to the content, bringing his claims outside the immunity
afforded by section 230. Google responds that the trial court’s ruling was
correct because Weiss’s claims are based solely on Google’s decision to exclude
Weiss’s content, activity that fits squarely within the protection of
section 230. As we explain, we agree with Google that the trial court
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correctly concluded Weiss’s claims are precluded by section 230 and affirm
the judgment.1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Private Student Loan Assistance is located in San Diego and operates a
website, privatestudentloanassistance.org. The facts in the record concerning
the business are sparse. The website states, “If you are one of those
individuals that are in default, collections, or are behind/can’t afford your
Private Student Loan payments, we can help you alleviate this debt and get
your life back on track.” It also tells visitors, “Tired of calls, threats, and
scare tactics from collections agencies? We understand your frustration and
have had great success in getting them to stop.” And, “If your Private
Student Loans are in default, collections or you are behind on payments,
chances are your credit has taken a major hit. That hit is not the end of the
world. We can explain why so give us a call.”
Weiss maintained an account with Google’s advertising service, which
he refers to as “Google Ads,” registered to the Max Marketing Corp. In the
operative complaint, Weiss asserts he has run ads on Google since 2015.
According to the complaint, beginning that year, Google alerted Weiss that
his company’s ads violated Google’s policies related to debt services and
credit. Weiss alleges that in 2021 Google suspended his ads on the grounds
of “ ‘unsubstantiated relationship with third parties or advertised brands as
1 As Google points out, Weiss, in pro per, cannot represent Max Marking
Corp. (See Caressa Camille, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101 [“As a general rule, it is well established in
California that a corporation cannot represent itself in a court of record either
in propria persona or through an officer or agent who is not an attorney.”])
Accordingly, to the extent the claims asserted in the operative complaint
belong to that corporation and not Weiss personally—which is not made clear
in the record before this court—affirmance of the order sustaining the
demurrer and subsequent judgment is appropriate on this ground as well.
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applicable.’ ” Thereafter, Weiss sent a letter to Google’s legal department,
and the ads were reinstated. The complaint asserts Weiss also added a
disclaimer to his website to prevent further suspensions of his ads, which
states: “We do not provide debt settlement/debt management services nor do
we provide any credit services, credit repair or offers relating to credit,
banking products and services, or any financial planning and management
services.”
The complaint asserts Weiss’s ads were suspended again in
September 2022. After attempting to resolve the complaint through Google’s
online procedures, Weiss sent another demand letter to its legal department.
The ads were reinstated in October 2022, only to be suspended again the
following month, prompting another demand letter and reinstatement of the
ads at the end of November 2022. According to Weiss’s complaint, the ads
were suspended and reinstated twice more, in April and December 2023. In
these instances, Google cited violation of its debt services/credit or consumer
finance policies as the basis for the suspensions.
Weiss asserts that on April 12, 2024, “most of [his] ads were ‘limited’
again due to the ‘Consumer Finance’ policy.” According to Weiss, this was in
error because the advertisements he ran did not violate Google’s policies, and
Google should not have removed or limited the ads. Weiss alleged he
attempted to have his ads reinstated through Google’s internal procedures
but was not successful.
On May 13, 2024, Weiss filed his initial complaint asserting claims he
labeled as business tort; abuse of power; business disparagement;
defamation, libel, or rumor spreading; tortious interference with prospective
business relations; misrepresentation; professional negligence; and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On July 15, 2024,
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Weiss filed an amended complaint, and Google responded with a demurrer.
The court sustained the demurrer, ruling Weiss’s claims were barred by
section 230.
Weiss filed another amended complaint, asserting the same claims
against Google. The claim for “business tort” stated that a “business tort …
is any wrongful act committed by or against a business that causes harm.”
Weiss alleged four business torts against Google, abuse of power; business
disparagement, defamation, libel or rumor spreading; tortious interference
with prospective business relations; and misrepresentation. The complaint
asserted “Google has all the power” and abused that power by “just say[ing]
to [Weiss] that [his] services fall under the policies without showing exactly”
how and “ignore[ing] the fact of the disclaimer on [Weiss’s] website.” Weiss
asserted Google engaged in “business disparagement, defamation, libel, or
rumor spreading” because its staff “has clearly made false statements … to …
Google” about Weiss’s business, which he again asserted did not violate
Google’s policies. The complaint stated Google tortiously interfered with
Weiss’s business both negligently and intentionally by disrupting potential
client relationships by preventing him from advertising on Google. The
complaint alleged Google engaged in “misrepresentation” by falsely claiming
Weiss’s advertisements violated its policies.
The complaint asserted Google engaged in professional negligence
because Google owed Weiss’s company a duty of care in professional dealings
that was breached by Google’s decision to suspend his advertisements. The
complaint also alleged that Google intentionally and negligently inflicted
emotional distress by preventing Weiss’s company from “getting new
business.” Finally, the amended complaint added an allegation that Weiss’s
claims were not barred by section 230 because Google Ads is not a publisher
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of internet content and Weiss did not sue Google for content posted by other
users, only content Weiss himself was attempting to post.
Google demurred to the amended complaint, again asserting Weiss’s
claims were barred by section 230. Weiss opposed the demurrer, arguing, as
he stated in the amended complaint, that section 230 did not apply to his
claims because he was suing Google not for third-party content, but based on
Google’s decision to remove his ads. Weiss also argued that because Google
had recently been found to hold a monopoly over search advertising,
section 230 did not apply. Google explained in its reply to the demurrer that
Weiss fundamentally misunderstood section 230, which barred Weiss’s claims
in their entirety. Google also asserted that Weiss’s claims were barred by its
terms of service and that Weiss otherwise failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
On February 14, 2025, the trial court issued its order finding Weiss’s
claims were barred by section 230. The court stated that Weiss was
attempting to hold Google “liable for improperly removing or barring
Plaintiff’s advertisements on Google’s website. However, … Plaintiff
improperly seeks to hold Google liable as a publisher of information. Plaintiff
seeks to challenge Google’s ability to publish, withdraw or take down content,
all of which is directly barred by Section 230 of the federal Communications
Decency Act (47 U. S. C. [§] 230).” The court also rejected Weiss’s argument
that “Google’s status as a dominant seller of advertising space on its
platform” created “an exception to section 230,” finding no legal authority to
support this assertion.
Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Google and
Weiss timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
“ ‘When reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we examine de novo whether
the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.’ [Citations.]
‘ “We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts
that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded.” [Citation.]
But we do not assume the truth of “contentions, deductions, or conclusions of
law.” ’ ” (Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 893, 906, as
modified on denial of rehg. (Apr. 2, 2024) (Wozniak).) “ ‘We liberally construe
the complaint “with a view to substantial justice between the parties,”
drawing “all reasonable inferences in favor of the asserted claims.” ’
[Citations.] ‘The plaintiff must demonstrate the court erroneously sustained
the demurrer and “must show the complaint alleges facts sufficient to
establish every element of each cause of action.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 907.)
“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, ‘we decide
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.
[Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on
the plaintiff.’ [Citation.] In the context of a demurrer on section 230
grounds, ‘when a plaintiff cannot allege enough facts to overcome Section 230
immunity, a plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.’ ” (Wozniak, supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 907.)
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II
Section 230
“Section 230 ‘ “immunizes providers of interactive computer services
against liability arising from content created by third parties.” ’ ” (Wozniak,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 907.) “Congress enacted section 230 ‘for two
basic policy reasons: to promote the free exchange of information and ideas
over the internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or
obscene material.’ ” (Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 534 (Hassell),
quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119,
1122.)
“Section 230(c)(1), which is captioned ‘Treatment of publisher or
speaker,’ states: ‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.’ As relevant here, the statute also expressly
preempts any state law claims inconsistent with that provision: ‘No cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or
local law that is inconsistent with this section.’ (§ 230(e)(3).) Read together
these two provisions ‘protect from liability (1) a provider or user of an
interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state
law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by
another information content provider.’ ” (Murphy v. Twitter, Inc. (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 12, 24 (Murphy).) “ ‘Accordingly, section 230 protects an
interactive computer service provider’s curation of content on its platform
from “ ‘ “claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s
role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise
of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
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publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” ’ ” ’ ”2 (Wozniak,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 908.)
“Two California Supreme Court cases, Hassell, supra, 5 Cal.5th 522
(plur. opn.) and Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33 (Barrett), have
addressed immunity under section 230, discussing at length statutory
interpretation and judicial construction of the statute. In both cases, our
high court concluded section 230 is to be construed broadly in favor of
immunity. (Hassell, at p. 544 (plur. opn.) [‘broad scope of section 230
immunity’ is underscored by ‘inclusive language’ of § 230(e)(3), which, ‘read
in connection with section 230(c)(1) and the rest of section 230, conveys an
intent to shield Internet intermediaries from the burdens associated with
defending against state law claims that treat them as the publisher or
speaker of third party content, and from compelled compliance with demands
for relief that, when viewed in the context of a plaintiff’s allegations,
similarly assign them the legal role and responsibilities of a publisher qua
publisher’]; Barrett, at p. 39 [immunity provisions within § 230 ‘have been
widely and consistently interpreted to confer broad immunity’].) California’s
appellate courts and federal courts have also generally interpreted section
2 “An ‘interactive computer service’ is defined in the statute as ‘any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.’
(§ 230, subd. (f)(2).) The statute also defines ‘information content provider’ as
‘any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.’ (§ 230 (f)(3).)” (Wozniak, supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 908.)
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230 to confer broad immunity on interactive computer services.3 (See Doe II
v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 572 [concluding a ‘general
consensus to interpret section 230 immunity broadly’ could be derived from
California and federal court cases]; Delfino [v. Agilent Technologies, Inc.
(2006)] 145 Cal.App.4th [790,] 804; accord, Doe v. MySpace Inc. (5th Cir.
2008) 528 F.3d 413, 418; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003)
339 F.3d 1119, 1123 [‘reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as
quite robust’]; but see Barnes [v. Yahoo!, Inc. (2009)] 570 F.3d [1096,] 1100
[text of § 230(c) ‘appears clear that neither this subsection nor any other
declares a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party
content’].)” (Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 24–25.)
III
Analysis
As the trial court concluded in sustaining the demurrer, Weiss’s claims
against Google satisfy all three conditions for immunity under section
230(c)(1). First, Google is an “interactive computer service” provider. Weiss
does not dispute that Google meets the statutory definition for this term and
there is no doubt that Google is an “information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users
to a computer server.” (§ 230(f)(2).)
Second, Weiss’s claims all seek to hold Google liable for its decision to
suspend his advertisements. As set forth in his briefing before this court and
the operative complaint, Weiss asserts Google mischaracterized his content
and used that mischaracterization to suspend his account for violating its
3 “Although federal precedents interpreting section 230 are not binding
upon this court, ‘where the decisions of the federal courts on a federal
question are “ ‘ “both numerous and consistent,” we should hesitate to reject
their authority.’ ” ’ ” (Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 907, fn. 5.)
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policies. This conduct forms the basis for every cause of action in the
operative complaint. Put simply, Weiss seeks to adjudicate Google’s
characterization of his business and its decision to suspend its ads. However,
this conduct, i.e., Google’s “refusal to allow certain content on its platform,” is
“typical publisher conduct protected by section 230” regardless of the reason
for that refusal. (Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 25.) As stated,
“lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.’ ” (Barrett, supra,
40 Cal.4th at p. 43; see also Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC
(9th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–1171 [“any activity that can be boiled
down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post
online is perforce immune under section 230”].) “Courts have found
immunity for interactive computer services under section 230 regardless of
whether the provider is alleged to have improperly removed objectionable
content or failed to remove such content.” (Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at
p. 27, fn. 5; Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1102, fn. 8 [it is
immaterial whether service provider’s exercise of publisher’s traditional
editorial functions “comes in the form of deciding what to publish in the first
place or what to remove among the published material”].)
Thus, even if Google’s characterization of Weiss’s advertisements does
not align with Weiss’s characterization, section 230 still affords Google
immunity from liability for its decision to suspend his content. As discussed,
section 230 affords broad immunity, and Weiss has not presented any legal
authority to support his claim that Google’s rationale for removing his
content undermines that immunity. (See Barrett, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 39
[immunity provisions within § 230 “have been widely and consistently
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interpreted to confer broad immunity”]; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608–609 [“it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a
trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on
an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment”].)
“The third prong is also satisfied here, because [Weiss’s] claims all
concern [Google’s] removal of or refusal to publish ‘information provided by
another information content provider.’ An ‘ “information content provider” ’
is defined as ‘any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service.’ (§ 230(f)(3).)” (Murphy, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 26.) The third prong is satisfied because all the content
Weiss claims Google wrongfully suspended was admittedly created by Weiss,
12
not Google.4 (See id. at p. 31 [“Courts have repeatedly determined that when
plaintiffs allege a platform has wrongfully ceased publishing their posts or
blocked content, that content constitutes ‘information provided by another
information content provider’ within the meaning of section 230(c)(1).”].)
Weiss argues his case is unlike prior cases affording internet service
providers section 230 immunity because those cases involve objectionable
content, such as the promotion of terrorism, and his case does not. In support
of this argument, he cites Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh (2023) 598 U.S. 471 and
Gonzalez v. Google LLC (2023) 598 U.S. 617. In these two cases, the
plaintiffs—victims of terrorist attacks and their loved ones—sought to hold
social media platforms liable for supporting, or aiding and abetting, the
terrorist acts. (Taamneh, at pp. 477–478; Gonzalez, at pp. 619–621.) Neither
case, however, addresses section 230 and Weiss provides no explanation of
how these cases support reversal here. (See Taamneh, at pp. 478, 497–498
4 In Murphy, which Weiss cites, an individual’s posts on Twitter were
taken down by the company for violating its “hateful conduct rules.”
(Murphy, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 17.) The individual brought suit,
asserting claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of
the Unfair Competition Law “based on allegations that Twitter’s actions
violated its user agreement with Murphy and hundreds of similarly situated
individuals. The trial court sustained Twitter’s demurrer to the complaint
without leave to amend, concluding Murphy’s suit was barred by” section
230. (Ibid.) The court rejected Murphy’s argument that her claims were
based on Twitter’s contractual promises, and not for its protected conduct as
a publisher. The court held “Murphy’s allegations that Twitter ‘enforced its
Hateful Conduct Policy in a discriminatory and targeted manner’ against
Murphy and others by removing her tweets and suspending her account
amount to attacks on Twitter’s interpretation and enforcement of its own
general policies rather than breach of a specific promise.” (Id. at pp. 29–30.)
Likewise, here, Weiss seeks to hold Google liable for its enforcement of its
own general policies, rather than a breach of a specific promise. Indeed, the
operative complaint states explicitly, “Google does not have contracts with its
customers.”
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[holding plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the social media companies
aided and abetted ISIS under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) because the plaintiffs could
not assert allegations the companies gave knowing and substantial
assistance]; Gonzalez, at p. 622 [following Taamneh to uphold dismissal of
claims for aiding and abetting terrorism and declining to consider the
application of § 230].)
Weiss’s other arguments are difficult to discern. He states without
further explanation or citation to legal authority that Google’s
mischaracterization of his advertisements equates to Google contributing to
the content, bringing the case outside the immunity of section 230. Weiss
also states that “Google’s AI or Automated flagging system is severely flawed.
It is not programmed correctly and makes mistakes. Yet, we don’t have laws
governing the growing or evolution of AI in any area, let alone for Google
Ads.” Weiss then asserts that because Google has been found to be a
monopoly it has no incentive to fix its system or improve its quality. Weiss
also lists his frustrations with Google’s customer service and his inability to
persuade them to reinstate his ads. He also asserts that Google has
permitted a competitor to his business to continue to run ads to his
disadvantage.
As an initial matter, we do not agree with Weiss’s assertions that his
allegations show Google contributed to the advertisements he created. To the
contrary, neither the complaint nor his briefing suggests Google participated
in the creation of his ads. Google’s determination that Weiss’s ads violated
its general policies is not equivalent to contributing to the ads’ content. In
addition, Weiss’s grievances and statements do not explain why reversal of
the trial court’s judgment is required. Although we are sympathetic to the
difficulties of pursuing a lawsuit as a self-represented litigant, this fact does
14
not relieve Weiss of the obligation to follow the rules of appellate procedure
and present reasoned arguments supported by relevant legal authority. (See
Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247 [self-represented
litigant “is not exempt from [appellate] rules because he is representing
himself on appeal in propria persona. Under the law, a party may choose to
act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated
like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys’ ”].) Weiss’s failure to explain how his
allegations bring his claims outside section 230 immunity requires
affirmance by this court. (See Wozniak, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 907.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded the costs of appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
KELETY, J.
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