Sequeiro v. Torrington

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Sequeiro v. Torrington

LUIS A. MONTIJO SEQUEIRO v. CITY OF

TORRINGTON ET AL.

(AC 48208)

Moll, Westbrook and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defen-

dants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of governmental immu-

nity. The plaintiff had been detained in the defendant town of Winchester by

the defendant W, a police officer with the Winchester Police Department, at

the request of a neighboring police department. The plaintiff was thereafter

transferred to the custody of police officers from the neighboring police

department and placed in a jail cell, where he was later injured when he

attempted suicide. He claimed, inter alia, that genuine issues of material

fact existed that precluded summary judgment. Held:

The plaintiff’s claim that genuine issues of material fact existed concern-

ing whether he was under the influence of drugs and whether he told the

police officers at the time of the transfer that he was suicidal was unavail-

ing, as these issues were immaterial to whether policies of the Winchester

Police Department gave rise to discretionary duties to which governmental

immunity applied.

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment on the defendants’

claims of governmental immunity, as the police department policies that

the plaintiff claimed gave rise to ministerial duties were discretionary, W’s

actions were not actionable because they bore no demonstrable relation to

the plaintiff’s injuries, and the court correctly determined that the plaintiff

had failed to prove that the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception

to governmental immunity applied.

Argued October 8, 2025—officially released March 17, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-

dants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain,

where Justin Waltzer was substituted as a defendant;

thereafter, the court, Welch, J., granted the motion

for summary judgment filed by the defendant town of

Winchester et al. and rendered judgment thereon, from

which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Noah J. Kores, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Sequeiro v. Torrington

Kristan M. Jakiela, with whom, on the brief, was

Katherine E. Rule, for the appellees (defendant town

of Winchester et al.).

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The plaintiff, Luis A. Montijo Sequeiro,

appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial

court in favor of the defendant town of Winchester and

one of its police officers, the defendant Justin Waltzer.1

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) genuine issues of

material fact exist precluding summary judgment and

(2) the court improperly determined that the counts of

the complaint against the defendants were barred by

governmental immunity. We affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

The following undisputed facts, as detailed by the trial

court in its memorandum of decision, are relevant. On the

morning of December 6, 2019, Torrington police officers

were dispatched to the plaintiff’s home in response to

a report of domestic violence. When Torrington police

officers arrived, the plaintiff’s wife informed them that

the plaintiff was traveling by taxi to Winsted to purchase

drugs and he intended to overdose. The Torrington Police

Department then notified the Winchester Police Depart-

ment that the plaintiff was a suspect in a domestic inci-

dent and intended to purchase enough drugs to overdose.

1

The city of Torrington and Anthony Pietrafesa, Michael Giordano,

Willie Quarles, William Bernabucci, Daniel Cyr, and John P. Joseph,

members of the Torrington Police Department, were also named in the

complaint as defendants (Torrington defendants). The original complaint

also named John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 as defendants, but the causes

of action against them were not included in the operative amended

complaint, as it was discovered that John Doe #1 was duplicative of

another individual already named as one of the Torrington defendants

and Waltzer was substituted for John Doe #2. The Torrington defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment as to the counts against them. The

court denied summary judgment in part (as to Bernabucci, Quarles, and

Joseph) and granted summary judgment in part (as to Cyr, Pietrafesa,

and Giordano). The Torrington defendants did not file an appeal from

the court’s partial grant of summary judgment as to the counts against

them. In this opinion, we refer to the town of Winchester and Waltzer

as the defendants.

Sequeiro v. Torrington

Winchester police officers, including Waltzer, located

the plaintiff at a house in Winsted and detained him. At

that time, the plaintiff did not possess drugs or drug

paraphernalia. He did not present to Waltzer in a man-

ner indicating that he had just taken drugs. The parties

dispute whether the plaintiff told Waltzer that he was

suicidal. Waltzer transported the plaintiff to another

location in Winchester where custody of the plaintiff

was transferred to Torrington police officers.

The plaintiff was transported to the Torrington Police

Department where he was processed and placed in a

jail cell that was equipped with a combination sink/toi-

let unit. That afternoon, the plaintiff climbed up the

combination sink/toilet and jumped headfirst toward

the floor. As a result of this act, the plaintiff sustained

serious injuries, including incomplete quadriplegia and

paralysis.

In 2021, the plaintiff commenced an action against

the defendants. In the operative July 6, 2023 complaint,

he alleged, inter alia, negligence against Waltzer in his

capacity as a Winchester police officer (count eight) and

indemnification against the town of Winchester, pur-

suant to General Statutes § 7-4652 (count nine).3 Both

counts stemmed from the plaintiff’s December 6, 2019

suicide attempt at the Torrington Police Department.

Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Waltzer breached

his duty of ordinary care in failing to identify the plain-

tiff as suicidal, to ensure that he was provided with a

psychological assessment or other necessary medical

2

General Statutes § 7-465 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any town . . .

shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality . . . all sums

which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability

imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded . . . for physical

damages to person . . . if the employee, at the time of the occurrence,

accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the

performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and

if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the

result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge

of such duty. . . .”

3

Counts one through seven alleged negligence against the city of Tor-

rington and several of its police officers. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

Sequeiro v. Torrington

care and to ensure that the Torrington Police Depart-

ment was going to provide the necessary care for a sui-

cidal inmate. The defendants filed an answer and special

defense, asserting the special defense of governmental

immunity.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment

as to the eighth and ninth counts of the complaint, argu-

ing that those counts were barred by the doctrine of

governmental immunity. Appended to that motion were,

inter alia, the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition, the

transcript of Waltzer’s deposition, and two policies of

the Winchester Police Department concerning respond-

ing to a person experiencing a mental health crisis. The

plaintiff filed an opposition, arguing that genuine issues

of material fact exist precluding summary judgment and

that the defendants were not entitled to governmen-

tal immunity. Appended to the plaintiff’s opposition

were, inter alia, Waltzer’s incident report as noted in a

computer aided dispatch system (incident report), and

Waltzer’s and the plaintiff’s depositions.

In a November 4, 2024 memorandum of decision, the

trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument

that the policies, procedures and/or practices of the Win-

chester Police Department regarding persons in custody

who are at risk of suicide gave rise to ministerial duties

for which no governmental immunity applies, concluding

instead that Waltzer was performing discretionary acts

for which he was entitled to governmental immunity.

This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth

as necessary.

We begin with the standard of review regarding a trial

court’s decision to grant summary judgment. “Practice

Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall

be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and

any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In decid-

ing a motion for summary judgment, the trial court

Sequeiro v. Torrington

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary

judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any

genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable

principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment

as a matter of law . . . and [if the movant satisfies his

burden] the party opposing such a motion must provide

an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding,

rather than issue-determination, is the key to the pro-

cedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of

fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. .

. . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact,

but rather to determine whether any such issues exist. .

. . Our review of the decision to grant a motion for sum-

mary judgment is plenary. . . . We therefore must decide

whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logically

correct and find support in the record.” (Internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn.

App. 216, 221–22, 131 A.3d 771 (2016).

We next turn to the well settled law regarding the

liability of municipalities. “The [common-law] doctrines

that determine the tort liability of municipal employees

are well established. . . . Generally, a municipal employee

is liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but

has a qualified immunity in the performance of govern-

mental acts. . . . Governmental acts are performed wholly

for the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory

or discretionary in nature. . . . The hallmark of a discre-

tionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment. .

. . In contrast, [a ministerial act] refers to a duty which

is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the

exercise of judgment or discretion. . . .

“Municipal officials are immunized from liability for

negligence arising out of their discretionary acts in part

because of the danger that a more expansive exposure to

liability would cramp the exercise of official discretion

beyond the limits desirable in our society. . . . Discretion-

ary act immunity reflects a value judgment that—despite

Sequeiro v. Torrington

injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in

having government officers and employees free to exer-

cise judgment and discretion in their official functions,

unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory

lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from impos-

ing liability for that injury. . . . In contrast, municipal

officers are not immune from liability for negligence

arising out of their ministerial acts, defined as acts to be

performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise

of judgment or discretion. . . . This is because society has

no analogous interest in permitting municipal officers

to exercise judgment in the performance of ministerial

acts. . . .

“The tort liability of a municipality has been codified in

§ 52-557n. Section 52-557n (a) (1) provides that [e]xcept

as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of

the state shall be liable for damages to person or property

caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such

political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent

thereof acting within the scope of his employment or offi-

cial duties. . . . Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, how-

ever, the same discretionary act immunity that applies

to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves

by providing that they will not be liable for damages

caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the

exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function

of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borelli v. Renaldi,

336 Conn. 1, 10–11, 243 A.3d 1064 (2020).

“For purposes of determining whether a duty is dis-

cretionary or ministerial, this court has recognized that

[t]here is a difference between laws that impose general

duties on officials and those that mandate a particular

response to specific conditions. . . . A ministerial act is

one which a person performs in a given state of facts,

in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of

legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his

own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of the

act being done. . . . In contrast, when an official has a

Sequeiro v. Torrington

general duty to perform a certain act, but there is no city

charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or

any other directive [requiring the government official

to act in a] prescribed manner, the duty is deemed dis-

cretionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe

v. Madison, 340 Conn. 1, 19–20, 262 A.3d 752 (2021).

With these general principles in mind, we turn to the

plaintiff’s claims on appeal.

I

The plaintiff first claims that summary judgment is

improper because genuine issues of material fact exist

concerning whether he was under the influence of drugs

and whether he told officers at the prisoner exchange

that he was suicidal. We are not persuaded.

“A material fact is a fact that will make a difference

in the result of the case.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Hassiem v. O & G Industries, Inc., 197 Conn.

App. 631, 636, 232 A.3d 1139, cert. denied, 335 Conn.

928, 235 A.3d 525 (2020). Although the issues raised

by the plaintiff may be material to the resolution of his

underlying negligence claims against the defendants,

the question before us is not whether Waltzer properly

exercised his duty of care but, rather, whether policies of

the Winchester Police Department gave rise to discretion-

ary duties to which governmental immunity applies or

whether the policies created ministerial duties to which

such immunity is inapplicable. With those questions in

mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s next claim.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly

rendered summary judgment because two policies of the

Winchester Police Department gave rise to ministerial

duties to which governmental immunity does not apply.

We are not persuaded.

“[I]t is firmly established that the operation of a police

department is a governmental function, and that acts

or omissions in connection therewith ordinarily do not

Sequeiro v. Torrington

give rise to liability on the part of the municipality. .

. . Indeed, this court has long recognized that it is not

in the public’s interest to [allow] a jury of laymen with

the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exer-

cise of a policeman’s discretionary professional duty.

Such discretion is no discretion at all. . . . [O]ur case

law underscores the considerable discretion inherent

in law enforcement’s response to an infinite array of

situations implicating public safety on a daily basis . .

. . Thus, as a general rule, [p]olice officers are protected

by discretionary act immunity when they perform the

typical functions of a police officer. . . .

“In accordance with these principles, our courts con-

sistently have held that to demonstrate the existence

of a ministerial duty on the part of a municipality and

its agents, a plaintiff ordinarily must point to some

statute, city charter provision, ordinance, regulation,

rule, policy, or other directive that, by its clear language,

compels a municipal employee to act in a prescribed man-

ner, without the exercise of judgment or discretion. . . .

Because the construction of any such provision, including

a municipal rule or regulation, presents a question of law

for the court . . . whether the provision creates a minis-

terial duty gives rise to a legal issue subject to plenary

review on appeal. Thus . . . [t]he ultimate determination

of whether . . . immunity applies is ordinarily a question

of law for the court . . . [unless] there are unresolved

factual issues material to the applicability of the defense

. . . [in which case] resolution of those factual issues is

properly left to the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Ventura v. East Haven, 330

Conn. 613, 630–32, 199 A.3d 1 (2019).

A

The first policy at issue is Winchester Police Depart-

ment General Order # 1.3.17, effective August 19, 2019

(order). The stated purpose of the order is “to provide

guidance to Winchester Police officers when responding

to or encountering persons experiencing a mental health

crisis.” Winchester Police Department, General Order #

Sequeiro v. Torrington

1.3.17 (August 19, 2019) p. 1. The order states that “[i]t

is the policy of the Winchester Police Department that

officers determine whether a person’s behavior is indica-

tive of a mental health crisis” and provides officers “with

guidance, techniques, response options, and resources

so that the situation may be resolved in as constructive,

safe, and humane a manner as possible.” Id. The order

provides details to assist officers in recognizing atypical

behavior and assessing risk, while noting that respond-

ing to situations involving persons reasonably believed

to be in crisis “necessitates an officer to make difficult

judgments about the mental state and intent of the indi-

vidual”; id.; and that “[c]ontext is crucial in the accurate

assessment of behavior. Officers should take into account

the totality of circumstances requiring their presence

and overall need for intervention.” Id., p. 3. The order

describes several courses of action that an officer may

take when responding to a person in crisis, including

providing mental health referral information, admission

to a mental health facility voluntarily or involuntarily, or

making an arrest. Id., pp. 3–5. The final part of the order,

concerning documentation, states in relevant part that

“[o]fficers will: 1. Document the incident with a report

narrative, regardless of whether or not the individual is

taken into custody. Where the individual is taken into

custody or referred to other agencies, officers should

detail the reasons why. . . .” Id., 5.

1

We first conclude that the order is discretionary. The

allegations in the complaint against Waltzer focus on

the manner in which Waltzer exercised his discretion,

arguing that he did so in a negligent manner. Specifi-

cally, the crux of the negligence count against Waltzer

alleges that he “was careless and negligent for: a. failing

to exercise a duty of ordinary care to identify that the

plaintiff was suicidal and to bring him to the hospital

for a psychological assessment or otherwise provide the

necessary medical care; b. transferring custody of [the

plaintiff] without ensuring the policy was followed and

Sequeiro v. Torrington

without ensuring that the Torrington Police Department

was going to provide the necessary care for a suicidal

inmate; and/or c. failing to obtain emergency psychiatric

treatment for [the plaintiff], a suicidal person, and this

placed the plaintiff in danger of imminent harm.”

The order provided Waltzer with discretion concerning

the assessment of suicide risk and possible responses to

persons in crisis. See Mills v. Solution, LLC, 138 Conn.

App. 40, 49, 50 A.3d 381 (summary judgment was proper

where defendants’ allegedly negligent acts or omissions

necessarily involved exercise of judgment, and, thus,

necessarily were discretionary in nature), cert. denied,

307 Conn. 928, 55 A.3d 570 (2012). The order states that

responding to situations involving persons in crisis neces-

sitates that officers “make difficult judgments about the

mental state and intent of the individual”; General Order

# 1.3.17, supra, p. 1; and states that officers should “take

into account the totality of the circumstances” when

assessing the need for intervention. Id., p. 3. The order

then provides multiple potential responses, including

arrest. The terms of the order expressly state that its

purpose is to “provide guidance” to officers responding

to persons experiencing a mental health crisis. Id., p.

1; see Doe v. Madison, supra, 340 Conn. 32 (“descrip-

tions of general practices or expectations that guide an

employee’s exercise of discretion do not create a ministe-

rial duty”). In sum, the order requires officers to exercise

judgment, which is “the hallmark of a discretionary act . .

. .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borelli v. Ren-

aldi, supra, 336 Conn. 10; see also Gordon v. Bridgeport

Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 179, 544 A.2d 1185

(1988) (“[t]he great weight of authority [holds] that

the operation of a police department is a discretionary

governmental function”).

2

The plaintiff argues that the portion of the order

concerning documentation gives rise to a ministerial

duty. By way of background, we note the following.

Waltzer’s incident report stated that the Torrington

Sequeiro v. Torrington

Police Department requested the Winchester Police

Department to make contact with the plaintiff, who was

a domestic violence suspect, and that the plaintiff had

made statements that he was going to “a drug dealer’s

place to get drugs to overdose,” that when the plaintiff

was detained he did not have any contraband or weap-

ons in his possession, and that the Winchester Police

Department detained him and turned him over to the

Torrington Police Department.

Although the order directs officers to document cer-

tain incidents in a particular manner, there is a more

fundamental question to be answered: whether a duty

exists at all in relation to such documentary require-

ments. Whether a duty4 exists is a question of law for

the court and the threshold inquiry is whether the spe-

cific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the

defendants.5 See Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315

4

The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are a duty,

a breach of that duty, causation, and actual injury. See, e.g., Jagger

v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 687 n.13, 849

A.2d 813 (2004).

Because there was no actual causation, there is no proximate causa-

tion. See, e.g., Malloy v. Colchester, 85 Conn. App. 627, 633, 858 A.2d

813 (“[b]ecause actual causation, in theory, is virtually limitless, the

legal construct of proximate cause serves to establish how far down the

causal continuum tortfeasors will be held liable for the consequences of

their actions” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 272

Conn. 907, 863 A.2d 698 (2004).

We, nonetheless, note that “[t]he question of proximate causation

generally belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a

factual issue [and it] becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of

a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is

room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined

by the trier as a matter of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Kumah v. Brown, 130 Conn. App. 343, 349, 23 A.3d 758 (2011). The

present case presents the rare circumstance wherein there is no room

for reasonable disagreement that Waltzer’s alleged failure to properly

include a narrative report of the incident in the computer database of

the Winchester Police Department, was not, as a matter of law, a sub-

stantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s attempted suicide when he was

in the custody of the Torrington Police Department.

5

The test for the existence of a legal duty is (1) whether an ordinary

person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew

or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature

Sequeiro v. Torrington

Conn. 320, 328, 107 A.3d 381 (2015). Foreseeability is

determined in the context of causation, which consists of

causation in fact (whether an injury would have occurred

but for an actor’s conduct) and proximate cause (whether

a defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in produc-

ing a plaintiff’s injury, or, in other words, whether the

harm that occurred was of the same general nature as the

foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence).

See id., 328–29.

As a matter of law, there is no causal connection

between the plaintiff’s attempted suicide at the Tor-

rington Police Department and Waltzer’s alleged failure

to write a narrative incident report in the electronic

database of the Winchester Police Department. There

were no allegations in the complaint that Torrington

police officers were privy to the contents of Waltzer’s

incident report or that Torrington police officers based

any of their actions or inactions on December 6, 2019,

concerning the plaintiff, on the contents of Waltzer’s

incident report. Moreover, it is undisputed that the

information contained in the incident report concerning

the alleged domestic incident and the plaintiff’s subse-

quent flight to Winsted to overdose was relayed by the

Torrington Police Department to the Winchester Police

Department. Because, as a matter of law, Waltzer’s

allegedly improper documentation of the incident bears

no demonstrable relation to the plaintiff’s injuries, it is

not actionable. See Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809,

833–34, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015) (if negligent act bears

no demonstrable relation to injury, it is not actionable).

3

Additionally, the plaintiff argues that Waltzer’s

alleged failure to follow the documentation require-

ment implies that he failed to follow any discretionary

of that suffered was likely to result and (2) whether, on the basis of a

public policy analysis, the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent

conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular

plaintiff in the case. Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320,

328–29, 107 A.3d 381 (2015).

Sequeiro v. Torrington

components of the order in any way. First, such an infer-

ence is purely speculative and, as such, is not sufficient

to overcome summary judgment. See Walker v. Hous-

ing Authority, 148 Conn. App. 591, 597, 85 A.3d 1230

(2014) (although inferences may be drawn on summary

judgment from underlying facts, nonmoving party may

not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to true

nature of facts to overcome summary judgment). Second,

whether Waltzer was negligent in the exercise of his

discretion under the order is not at issue. See Ventura v.

East Haven, supra, 330 Conn. 630–31 (it is not in pub-

lic’s interest to allow jury of laypersons to second-guess

exercise of police officer’s discretionary professional

duty). The proper inquiry is whether the order is dis-

cretionary in nature, and we have determined that it is.

4

The plaintiff further argues that, assuming the order

gave rise to discretionary duties, the court improperly

determined that the imminent harm to identifiable per-

sons exception to governmental immunity did not apply.

We disagree.

“[Our Supreme Court] has recognized an exception

to discretionary act immunity that allows for liability

when the circumstances make it apparent to the public

officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to

subject an identifiable person to imminent harm. . . . This

identifiable person-imminent harm exception has three

requirements: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable

victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent

that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to

that harm. . . . All three must be proven in order for the

exception to apply. . . . [T]he ultimate determination of

whether [governmental] immunity applies is ordinar-

ily a question of law for the court . . . [unless] there are

unresolved factual issues material to the applicability of

the defense . . . [where] resolution of those factual issues

is properly left to the jury.” (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Haynes v. Middletown, 314

Conn. 303, 312–13, 101 A.3d 249 (2014). The imminent

Sequeiro v. Torrington

harm exception is very limited. See Brooks v. Powers,

328 Conn. 256, 265, 178 A.3d 366 (2018).

The court rested its conclusion that the imminent harm

requirement of the exception was not met on its deter-

mination that, at the time the plaintiff was in Waltzer’s

custody and transferred to a Torrington police officer,

Willie Quarles, he was not in imminent harm. The court

reasoned that it is undisputed that the plaintiff had not

overdosed at that time or even consumed narcotics, and

that, notwithstanding anything the plaintiff may have

said regarding a prior intent to self-harm, he was not in

a position of imminent harm while handcuffed and in

the immediate supervision of Waltzer or the Torrington

police officer to whom Waltzer transferred him.

The plaintiff challenges these determinations of the

trial court. He argues that he was in imminent harm

because “[i]t was, in fact, disputed that he consumed

narcotics. [The plaintiff] testified that he did. The officers

testified that they did not observe any signs of intoxica-

tion. Further, he was in imminent harm because he was

suicidal and he took steps to act on his suicidal ideations.

He said he would overdose on drugs and die, and he went

to a drug den and consumed drugs.”

The plaintiff testified at his deposition that he pur-

chased “around $100” of crack cocaine and “smoke[d] a

little bit” of the crack cocaine and that the amount he

had consumed was less than the amount he ordinarily

used to get high. This is not inconsistent with Waltzer’s

deposition testimony that the plaintiff “[d]id not appear

to be under the influence of narcotics or any sort of drug

at the time,” that he “was not presenting as someone

who had taken anything,” and that he did not have any

drugs or drug paraphernalia on him. In fact, the plaintiff

stated in his deposition that, during his interactions with

Winchester police officers, he did not slur his speech

and he did not have difficulty with balance, although he

assumed that his pupils might have been dilated.

Sequeiro v. Torrington

When asked whether there was a concern that the

plaintiff should be evaluated by a mental health profes-

sional, Waltzer stated, “There was no concern. I mean,

it would be concerning to release him back to the drug

house, you know, if we were able to at least get him back

home. I don’t think he would be concerning based on the

conversation I had with him and based on the fact that he

wasn’t presenting as high or had drugs on his person.”

The plaintiff stated in his deposition that, while wait-

ing for the Torrington Police Department to arrive, he

smoked five or six cigarettes and did not attempt to harm

himself. The plaintiff confirmed in his deposition testi-

mony that, if Winchester police officers had not detained

him, he would have done more crack cocaine in order to

“get higher” because “[t]hat’s the point of doing crack.”

Waltzer stated in his deposition that he believed that the

plaintiff was “in good hands” with the Torrington Police

Department, which initially had notified the Winchester

Police Department of the plaintiff’s situation.

Even though the plaintiff made statements to his wife

concerning an intent to overdose, when he was found by

Winchester police officers, he had not overdosed and he

did not attempt to harm himself. He did not appear to be

under the influence of narcotics, only having consumed,

according to the plaintiff himself, “a little bit” of crack

cocaine, which was less than the amount he typically

consumed. Under these circumstances there may be a

question as to whether harm may reasonably be antici-

pated at some unspecified time in the future, but that is

not the proper standard for evaluating imminent harm.

“For purposes of determining whether a plaintiff was

subject to imminent harm, [i]mminent does not simply

mean a foreseeable event at some unspecified point in

the not too distant future. . . . Rather, the proper stan-

dard for determining whether a harm was imminent is

whether it was apparent to the municipal defendant that

the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that

the defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act

immediately to prevent the harm.” (Citations omitted;

emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Sequeiro v. Torrington

Doe v. New Haven, 214 Conn. App. 553, 580–81, 281

A.3d 480 (2022); see also Haynes v. Middletown, supra,

314 Conn. 314–15 n.6 (“[I]t is not enough to establish

that a harm may reasonably be anticipated. . . . Rather,

the risk of harm must be so great that the municipal

defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act imme-

diately to prevent it.” (Citation omitted; internal quo-

tation marks omitted.)). “For the harm to be deemed

imminent, the potential for harm must be sufficiently

immediate. . . . The risk of harm must be temporary and

of short duration. . . . Imminent harm excludes risks that

might occur, if at all, at some unspecified time in the

future.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates,

LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 275, 41 A.3d 1147 (2012).

At the time the plaintiff was handcuffed and handed

over to Torrington police officers, he had not overdosed,

and when he was transferred to the custody of the police

department that had initially notified the Winchester

Police Department of the plaintiff’s situation, he was

not at a risk of harm so great that Waltzer had a clear

and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent it.

Because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, as a matter

of law, that he was in imminent harm, we conclude that

the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff had

failed to prove that the imminent harm to identifiable

persons exception to governmental immunity applied.

B

The second policy at issue is an interoffice memoran-

dum sent via email from Sergeant Kevin Kinahan, to

“all officers,” dated November 17, 2010, concerning

“Attempted Suicides, Emotionally Disturbed Persons.”6

The memorandum states in relevant part that “[a]ll calls

for suicidal persons or persons who have made some

attempt at suicide, or have by word or action, suggested

that they want to commit some suicidal or other harmful

6

Although not evident from the terms of the email itself, it is undis-

puted that Kinahan was a sergeant with the Winchester Police Depart-

ment.

Sequeiro v. Torrington

act against themselves, or emotionally disturbed person

who requires our intervention, regardless of whether . . .

such person is taken into protective custody, voluntarily

brought to the hospital, or examined in the field by the

Northwest Mental Health Mobile Crisis Unit, need to be

cleared with an [a]ction 1. All details regarding state-

ments made by the suicidal or emotionally disturbed

person, conditions suggesting the potential for a sui-

cidal act . . . i.e. pills/drugs . . . found where the person

is treated or discovered, need to be documented. . . .”

(Footnote omitted.)

It is undisputed that Waltzer cleared the plaintiff

with an action 5, which is a rendered assistance report,

and not with an action 1. As reflected in his deposition

transcript, which was appended to the plaintiff’s opposi-

tion, Joshua Blass, a police officer with the Winchester

Police Department, explained that “[a]n action 1 is an

incident report” that includes “[n]ame, date, time, what

was discussed, whatever the circumstances were on the

case. What the action was at the end, what kind of action

did the officer take, witness statements, offender state-

ments.” Waltzer stated in his deposition that an action

1 is “an arrest or incident report. We prompt the officer

to report.” He further explained that an action 5 is to

“render assistance.” The deposition testimony of Blass

and Waltzer concerning the descriptions of action 1 and

action 5 responses is not disputed.

The court determined that the memorandum, which

was dated nine years prior to the order, conflicts with

the order, which is an official policy of the Winchester

Police Department and therefore supersedes the memo-

randum, which is not an official policy of the Winchester

Police Department. The court further determined that

the Winchester Police Department was called by the Tor-

rington Police Department to assist in finding, detaining,

and transferring the plaintiff to the Torrington Police

Department and was not called for a suicidal person

and, thus, even if the memorandum were a policy of the

Winchester Police Department that was not in conflict

Sequeiro v. Torrington

with or superseded by the order, the memorandum did

not apply such that Waltzer was required to clear the

plaintiff with an action 1 instead of an action 5.

The plaintiff argues that the court improperly deter-

mined that the order superseded the memorandum. He

also argues that the court improperly determined that,

even if the memorandum was not superseded, it did not

apply because Waltzer was assisting another agency.

Finally, he contends that the portion of the memorandum

requiring certain incidents to be cleared as an action 1

gave rise to a ministerial duty.

Even if we assume, when viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that the

memorandum is not superseded and that it applies, the

plaintiff cannot prevail on his argument for reasons simi-

lar to those stated in part I A 2 of this opinion. Simply

put, as a matter of law, there is no duty, or in other words,

no foreseeable causal connection between the plaintiff’s

attempted suicide at the Torrington Police Department

and Waltzer’s alleged failure to document the incident

as an action 1. Because, as a matter of law, Waltzer’s

allegedly improper documentation of the incident bears

no demonstrable relation to the plaintiff’s injuries, it is

not actionable. See Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 316 Conn.

833–34.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial

court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of

the defendants.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.