Shinn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KRISTY SHINN, : CIVIL NO. 1:23-cv-02097

:

Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)

:

v. :

:

PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL :

BOARDS ASSOCIATION, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction.

Kristy Shinn (“Shinn”) brings claims against her former employer, the

Pennsylvania School Boards Association (“PSBA”), pursuant to Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act

(“PHRA”). In her initial complaint, Shinn brought hostile-work-environment and

retaliation claims. The PSBA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (“first

motion to dismiss”), which we granted in part. Specifically, we concluded that

Shinn had not included sufficient factual allegations in her complaint to carry a

hostile work environment claim, so we dismissed that claim.

We also granted Shinn leave to file an amended complaint as to her hostile

work environment claim. Shinn filed an amended complaint with minimal

amendments—notably, she changed her hostile work environment claims to claims

for sex discrimination. The PSBA filed a motion to dismiss the amended

complaint (“pending motion to dismiss”). We will grant the pending motion to

dismiss in part because, as described further herein, we find that Shinn fails to state

a claim for sex discrimination. Because Shinn’s retaliation claim still states a

claim, as we previously explained in our opinion on the first motion to dismiss, we

will deny the motion to dismiss in all other respects.

II. Background and Procedural History.

A. Procedural History.1

On July 3, 2025, we issued an order granting in part and denying in part the

first motion to dismiss and a memorandum opinion explaining our decision

(“Opinion on the First Motion to Dismiss”). Docs. 30, 31. We granted the first

motion to dismiss insofar as it sought dismissal of Shinn’s hostile-work-

environment claims and denied it insofar as it sought dismissal of Shinn’s

retaliation claims. Id. In our Opinion on the First Motion to Dismiss, we wrote:

Here, in light of this liberal amendment standard, we will grant

Shinn leave to amend her complaint as to her hostile-work-

environment claims. If Shinn has additional allegations about

her workplace conditions that she believes rise to this level, she

should include them in an amended complaint.

1 Because we previously summarized the procedural history of this case up

to the point at which we resolved the first motion to dismiss, we will summarize

only the procedural history since that date. For a more robust procedural history,

refer to our opinion on the first motion to dismiss (doc. 30 at 2–3).

Doc. 30 at 23–24. Thus, Shinn’s retaliation claims survived the first motion to

dismiss, her hostile-work-environment claims did not, and Shinn could file an

amended complaint to amend her hostile-work-environment claims to attempt to

state a claim. See generally id.

On July 23, 2025, Shinn filed an amended complaint. Doc. 33. The

amended complaint is nearly identical to the initial complaint, with only the

following relevant2 changes:

(1) In the introduction section of the amended complaint, Shinn

states that she “contends that [the PSBA] subjected her to

discrimination due to her gender and sex, and retaliated against

her[,]” whereas in the introduction section of the initial

complaint Shinn stated that she “contends that [the PSBA]

subjected her to a hostile work environment due to sexual

harassment, failed to take appropriate remedial action to

address the sexual harassment, and retaliated against her[.]”

Compare doc. 33 ¶ 2 with doc. 1 ¶ 2.

(2) In the amended complaint, Shinn states, “By way of

background, Plaintiff is a biological female and identifies as the

same.” Doc. 33 ¶ 16. In the initial complaint Shinn did not

state same. See generally doc. 1.

(3) Count I and Count III in the amended complaint are

brought for “gender and sex discrimination” under Title VII and

the PHRA, respectively. Doc. 33 at 17, 19. In the initial

complaint, however, Count I and Count III bring hostile-work-

environment claims under Title VII and the PHRA,

respectively. Doc. 1 at 17, 20. The conclusory allegations

2 Shinn also updated the jurisdiction section of her amended complaint as

compared to her initial complaint. Compare doc. 33 with doc. 1. Our jurisdiction

is not in dispute, however, so we will not summarize those alterations.

setting forth the elements for each cause of action thus also

differ between the initial complaint and the amended complaint.

On August 5, 2025, the PHRA filed the pending motion to dismiss the

amended complaint, and on August 6, 2025, it filed a brief in support thereof.

Docs. 34, 35. After being granted an extension of time to do so, Shinn filed a brief

in opposition. Docs. 38, 40. The PHRA filed a reply brief on September 15, 2025.

Doc. 41. Thus, this motion is ripe for our consideration.

B. Allegations in the Amended Complaint.

Shinn, a cisgender woman, began as “a Senior Manager of Professional

Development” at the PSBA on September 7, 2022. Doc. 33 ¶¶ 16, 17. Shinn’s

direct supervisor was William Smeltzer (“Smeltzer”), a white male and the

Director of Professional Development. Id. ¶ 18. On September 8, 2022, when

Shinn “dropped off her new hire paperwork with Dara Burke” (“Burke”), a white

female and the Associate Director of Employee Engagement, Shinn confirmed that

“although she is white-presenting, [she] identifies as Hispanic.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.

Shinn alleges that Smeltzer engaged in inappropriate behavior toward her

nearly from the beginning of her employment at the PSBA. Shinn describes the

following allegedly discriminatory and/or harassing interactions:

(1) During a one-on-one meeting in Smeltzer’s office with the

door shut, Smeltzer told Shinn about his and his wife’s decision

not to circumcise their baby boy who was recently born. Id. ¶¶

23–28.

(2) Smeltzer told Shinn “that they should be friends” and

invited Shinn to get a beer, an invitation that Shinn declined

because “they have a working relationship and not a

friendship.” Id. ¶¶ 29–32.

(3) During a meeting between Shinn, Smeltzer, and Nathalia

Griffith (“Nathalia”)3, a black female and the E-Learning

Manager at the PSBA, Smeltzer criticized Nathalia and Shinn’s

work product, including stating that “there aren’t enough white

men in some of the stuff we push out and it makes me

uncomfortable.” Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.

(4) Smeltzer allegedly treated Shinn and a woman with the

same role and responsibilities (Cytha Guynes, “Guynes”)

differently by looking at Guynes when speaking to both of

them, inviting Guynes to do member trainings instead of Shinn,

speaking to Shinn in a different tone, requiring Shinn to work

more hours than Guynes, and disapproving Shinn’s flex time

requests more often than he disapproved Guynes’s requests. Id.

¶¶ 35–41.

(5) On one occasion when Smeltzer was using Shinn’s

graphing calculator for work purposes, Smeltzer and Shinn

began discussing children texting on graphing calculators

during class, and Smeltzer said “80085[,]” the number sequence

“used by children to spell out ‘boobs.’” Id. ¶¶ 42–46.

(6) During another closed-door one-on-one meeting with

Shinn, Smeltzer informed Shinn he would be out of the office

for a vasectomy. Id. ¶¶ 48–50.

3 Below, we will introduce Christina Griffiths (“Christina”), the PSBA’s

Chief Operating Officer. We mean no disrespect to Nathalia Griffith and Christina

Griffiths by using their first names in this opinion; we simply intend to

differentiate between two individuals with similar last names who are both

involved in Shinn’s allegations.

(7) After his vasectomy, during meetings with Shinn Smeltzer

“constantly made comments about his vasectomy,” like “I wish

I could sit and be comfortable” and “I can’t cross my legs

because it hurts.” Id. ¶¶ 51–52.

(8) Smeltzer once “approved Guynes to work remotely due to

. . . weather[,]” but did not inform Nathalia4 and Shinn of the

option to work remotely, so they came into the office. Id. ¶ 54.

(9) During a “check-in” with Smeltzer, Shinn told him that

“she was not feeling appreciated or successful” so she “wanted

to celebrate the online course project when it is completed

because it has been harder to work on than it needed to be.” Id.

¶¶ 58–60. In response, Smeltzer told Shinn she should “not be

so truthful with other people in the office because they might

not take Shinn’s ‘transparency’ as well as he does.” Id. ¶ 61.

(10) While working remotely, Shinn noticed unusual changes

made by Smeltzer to work that she and Nathalia had completed,

but Smeltzer originally denied making the changes. Id. ¶¶ 69–

72. When Smeltzer later told Shinn about the updates he and

Megan Orehek (“Orehek”), the PSBA’s Senior Director of

Marketing and Communications, made to Shinn’s work, Shinn

told Smeltzer “she was constantly feeling unsuccessful and that

her work on the course was being undone without her

knowledge.” Id. ¶¶ 66, 73, 74. Smeltzer responded that he felt

like he was walking on eggshells and asked Shinn to talk to him

about what was making her feel stressed and uncomfortable. Id.

¶¶ 75, 76. In response, Shinn told him that she had been

instructed not to have one-on-one meetings with him. Id. ¶ 77.

Meanwhile, on January 20, 2023, Britta Barrickman (“Barrickman”), the

Chief Member Services Officer at the PSBA, told Shinn that the Professional

4 Within two weeks of this incident, during a meeting with Smeltzer,

Guynes, and Shinn, Nathalia told Smeltzer that she would no longer have private

meetings with him and would need a third person at all future meetings between

them. Doc. 33 ¶¶ 55–57.

Development Department, of which Shinn’s position was a part, was being

restructured. Id. ¶¶ 17, 62. Barrick said that Shinn would now report to

Barrickman instead of Smeltzer and that Shinn should only speak to Smeltzer

about work projects and day-to-day matters. Id. ¶ 63. She also told Shinn to not

discuss the reorganization with others at the PSBA because she did not want

rumors to be spread. Id. ¶ 64. On January 23, 2023, however, Megan Orehek

(“Orehek”), the PSBA’s Senior Director of Marketing and Communications (who

is three levels above Shinn in the organizational structure), asked Shinn about

Smeltzer. Id. ¶ 66. She asked Shinn “what was going on with [Smeltzer] and told

[Shinn] that she had not been told anything about it.” Id. Orehek told Shinn that

Shinn was in the “circle of trust” and that Orehek “had a meeting later to learn

more about it with Christina[,]” the PSBA’s Chief Operating Officer. Id. ¶ 67.

Shinn then told Orehek about the inappropriate comments that Smeltzer made and

that he was sabotaging Nathalia’s and Shinn’s work. Id. ¶ 68.

Later, after Shinn and Smeltzer had the above-described Zoom call in which

Smeltzer said he felt like he was walking on eggshells, Shinn asked Burke,

Associate Director of Employee Engagement, if they could talk. Id. ¶ 78. During

their phone call, Shinn told Burke that “Smeltzer had been sabotaging her work,”

that he made “sexually inappropriate and anti-female comments,” and “that she

feared retaliation for complaining about [] Smeltzer.” Id. ¶¶ 80, 81. Burke said that

“Smeltzer’s behavior was unacceptable” and that there were “things in motion to

address this issue.” Id. ¶ 82. During this call, Shinn also asked Burke if she could

report to someone else when her department was reorganized. Id. ¶ 83. After the

call, Shinn sent an email documenting their discussion about Smeltzer’s

inappropriate conduct. Id. ¶ 84.

On January 31, 2023, Shane Pagnotti (“Pagnotti”) was promoted to the

position of Senior Director of Board Services and Training” and became Shinn’s

direct supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 85, 86. After this was announced, Shinn met with Burke

and Christina in Burke’s office, where Burke told Shinn that Smeltzer was being

disciplined—specifically, Smeltzer lost flex schedule privileges5 and was required

to attend training. Id. ¶¶ 87–89. Then, Christina and Burke told Shinn “that she

had a reputation for gossiping” and based on Orehek’s report to Christina, Shinn

had spread information about Smeltzer in the office. Id. ¶ 90. Shinn told them that

she “felt safe talking to [] Orehek because she is a leader.” Id. ¶ 91. Shinn also

asked them for an example of her gossiping about Smeltzer, which they “could

not” provide. Id. ¶ 92. Nevertheless, Burke told Shinn that outside counsel had

advised them to terminate Shinn for insubordination, but “that they did not want to

fire [Shinn].” Id. ¶¶ 93, 94. Instead, they put Shinn “on a Performance

5 On February 1, 2023, Smeltzer was allowed to work from home, despite

what Shinn was told regarding his discipline. Doc. 33 ¶ 101.

Improvement Plan (“PIP”)” and revoked her remote work privileges. Id. ¶ 95.

Shinn told Burke and Christina that this was retaliation for her complaints about

Smeltzer’s inappropriate behavior, but Burke and Christina explained that the PIP

was “for talking to [] Orehek about [] Smeltzer’s inappropriate conduct.” Id. ¶¶ 96,

97. Burke and Christina told her that the PIP would be “open-ended.” Id. ¶ 99.

Although they told Shinn that they would follow up about the PIP the next day,

they did not do so. Id. ¶¶ 99, 100.

On February 10, 2023, after Pagnotti told Shinn via Slack message that “she

would not be receiving a performance review due to recent changes[,]” Shinn

asked Pagnotti “to go over the objective and dates for her PIP.” Id. ¶ 104. Pagnotti

replied that he was not aware that it was his role to review Shinn’s PIP with her

and she should “probably ask Burke[.]” Id. ¶ 105. Shinn then messaged Burke and

asked Burke to discuss her PIP. Id. ¶ 106. Burke said she had to talk to Christina,

and then on February 13, 2023, Burke told Shinn that Pagnotti and Barrickman

“were in the middle of reviewing job structures and that [Shinn] would have a

meeting once this review was completed.” Id. ¶ 108.

On February 24, 2023, Shinn emailed Burke a formal complaint of

retaliation against the PSBA. Id. ¶ 109. Burke acknowledged receipt of the

complaint in a letter on February 27, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 112, 113. In the letter, Burke

also stated that the PSBA would investigate Shinn’s complaint with outside

counsel and would not respond to Shinn’s requests (to restore her work-from-home

privileges, remove the PIP, and move Shinn’s desk away from Smeltzer’s office on

or before February 27, 2023) until the investigation was completed. Id. ¶¶ 111,

114. Shinn reiterated her requests on February 28, 2023, and sought relief

“immediately.” Id. ¶¶ 116–119.

“On March 14, 2023, Shinn sent Burke her resignation letter because the

PSBA had not restored Shinn’s work from home privileges or removed her PIP. Id.

¶ 120.

III. Pleading and Motion-to-Dismiss Standards.

In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When

reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[w]e must accept all factual

allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to

the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief

under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,

229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we “consider only the

complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as

undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these

documents.” Id. at 230.

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the

pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch.

Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769–70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). “Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by

Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s

claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required

than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other

words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.”

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has

to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true

and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’”

Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v.

Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a

complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to

dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A

court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff

has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more

than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint

entails a three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”

Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a

court should assume their veracity and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and

citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).

In sum, “[w]e accept as true all factual matters [the plaintiff] alleges, but this

complaint cannot survive unless the facts it recites are enough to state plausible

grounds for relief.” Beasley v. Howard, No. 20-1119, 2021 WL 4233947, at *2 (3d

Cir. Sept. 17, 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But “[a] claim that relies just on ‘conclusory

statements,’ or on ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action’ without

supporting factual allegations, does not establish plausible grounds for relief.” Id.

(quoting Fischbein v. Olson Rsch. Grp., Inc., 959 F.3d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 2020)).

IV. Discussion.

Shinn brings claims under both Title VII and the PHRA. We have federal

question jurisdiction over Shinn’s Title VII claims and supplemental jurisdiction

over Shinn’s state law PHRA claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. Generally, claims

under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with and analyzed under the same

framework as claims under Title VII. See e.g., Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc.,

808 F. 3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2015); (citing Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 175, 179, n.1

(3d Cir. 2009); Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006)).

We thus analyze Shinn’s PHRA and Title VII claims together below.

A. Sex Discrimination Claims.

The PSBA sets forth a variety of arguments why we should dismiss Shinn’s

sex discrimination claims. One such argument is that “Shinn’s gender

discrimination claim is deficient” because the complaint fails to allege facts that

satisfy two of the elements required to state a sex discrimination claim. Doc. 35 at

11. Specifically, the PSBA argues that Shinn has failed to allege that she “suffered

an adverse employment action” and “that such adverse action occurred under

‘circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination based

upon gender.’” Id. As to the adverse employment action element, the PSBA

repeats arguments from its first motion to dismiss that neither the PIP nor

revocation of her work-from-home privileges constitute an adverse action.6 See id.

at 9–12. The PSBA also argues that “[t]here are absolutely no allegations in the

6 In its reply brief, the PSBA claims that it is not asking the Court to

reconsider its prior ruling because of “the different analysis applicable to

determining adverse action in a discrimination claim versus a retaliation claim.”

Doc. 41 at 8. But in its brief in support the PSBA directly states that it

“respectfully asks that the Court reconsider” a portion of our analysis contained in

our Opinion on the First Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 35 at 15. Moreover, the PSBA

cites the same case law and even uses the same language in its brief in support of

the pending motion to dismiss as its brief in support of the first motion to dismiss.

Compare doc. 15 and doc. 35. Nevertheless, the PSBA does correctly note that

there are different standards applied to define adverse actions for retaliation claims

and to discrimination claims. Cf Raffaele v. Potter, No. 09-3622, 2012 WL 33035,

*8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2012) (“The standard for establishing a materially adverse

action for claims of retaliation differs from the standard for establishing an adverse

employment action that constitutes an act of discrimination under the ADEA or

Title VII. Unlike discrimination claims, the adverse action required for a

retaliation claim need not materially affect the terms and conditions of

employment.”) (citing Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006)).

We do not address this argument, however, because we find that Shinn has failed

to connect the alleged adverse actions to circumstances giving rise to an inference

that those actions were taken due to sex discrimination.

Amended Complaint that indicate any adverse actions cited by Shinn were taken

because Shinn identifies as female.” Doc. 35 at 18.

Shinn counterargues that her amended complaint “shows that [Shinn]

accuses [] Smeltzer of sexual comments, engaging in anti-female remarks,

discussing his son’s genitals, talking about breasts, remarking on his own

vasectomy, and subsequent revocation of privileges and poor treatment proximate

to [Shinn’s] own complaints and discomfort.” Doc. 40 at 23. Pivotally, Shinn

argues that “a reasonable analysis could surely support that [her] PIP, in very close

proximity to her complaint about [] Smeltzer and his discriminatory behavior in an

email to [] Burke on January 25, 2023, was the result of discrimination based on

gender.” Id. at 24.

At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case

of sex discrimination, Sparacino v. Scranton School Dist., NO. 3:23-CV-01726,

2025 WL 2524851, *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2025); in other words, a plaintiff must

“show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the

position she sought to retain; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of

intentional discrimination[,]” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157,

169 (3d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). To allege the fourth element, “the complaint may

either (1) allege that ‘similarly situated employees who . . . were not members of

the same protected class . . . were treated more favorably under similar

circumstances’ or (2) allege facts that ‘otherwise show[ ] a causal nexus between

[the employee’s] membership in a protected class and the adverse employment

action.’” Drummer v. Trustees of Univ. of Penn., 286 F.Supp.3d 674, 681 (E.D. Pa.

2017) (quoting Greene v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 557 Fed. Appx.

189, 195 (3d Cir. 2014) (itself citing Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789,

797 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003))) (alterations in original).

Here, Shinn does not allege anything as to similarly situated men who were

treated more favorably;7 thus, to proceed she must allege a causal nexus between

the alleged discrimination and the adverse employment action. Shinn does not

clarify what adverse employment action she faced as a result of the PSBA’s

alleged discrimination. See doc. 33 ¶ 129 (“Plaintiff suffered an adverse

employment action.”), ¶ 142 (“Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action.”).

Upon consideration of her amended complaint, however, we conclude that the

adverse employment actions she alleges that she experienced were that she was put

on a PIP and that her work-from-home privileges were revoked. Shinn does not,

however, connect these actions to the alleged discrimination she experienced. In

7 Although in her brief in opposition Shinn points out that “Smeltzer was

allowed to work from home while purportedly having had his privileges for that

revoked, while [Shinn] had those same privileges revoked while on a PIP for

complaining about [] Smeltzer[,]” she does not allege that she and Smeltzer were

similarly situated. Doc. 40 at 23–24.

her brief in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, Shinn argues that

Smeltzer’s actions give rise to an inference of discrimination. Doc. 40 at 23–24.

But Smeltzer was not involved in the decision to put Shinn on a PIP and to revoke

her work-from-home privileges. As alleged, his actions are too attenuated from the

alleged adverse employment actions to adequately allege a causal nexus between

the sex discrimination and the adverse employment actions. Accordingly, we

conclude that Shinn has failed to state a claim for sex discrimination.

B. Retaliation Claims.

As described above, we previously denied the PSBA’s first motion to

dismiss insofar as it sought dismissal of Shinn’s retaliation claims. See docs. 30,

31. And the amended complaint changes nothing as to those claims. Compare doc.

33 with doc. 1. Nevertheless, the PSBA again moves for dismissal of Shinn’s

retaliation claims. See docs. 34, 35. Because we have already ruled that Shinn’s

factual allegations are sufficient to support retaliation claims at this stage, it

appears that the PSBA seeks reconsideration of our previous decision. See also

doc. 38 at 14 (“PSBA respectfully asks this Court to revisit its analysis related to

work from home privileges found in its Memorandum Opinion”). Not only is this

request for reconsideration procedurally deficient, being brought within a motion

to dismiss an amended complaint, but also the PSBA’s argument for

reconsideration amounts to nothing more than mere disagreement with our

decision, Cf Petruzzi’s, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 983 F.Supp. 595, 611

(M.D. Pa. 1996). Accordingly, we will deny the PSBA’s pending motion to

dismiss as to Shinn’s retaliation claims.

VII. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reason, we grant in part and deny in part the pending

motion to dismiss (doc. 34). Specifically, we dismiss Shinn’s sex discrimination

claims. Thus, Shinn’s retaliation claims, brought under Title VII and the PHRA,

survive. An appropriate order will issue.

S/Susan E. Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

United States Magistrate Judge