Palma

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

HUGO TORRES PALMA, ]

]

Petitioner, ]

]

v. ] 7:26-cv-299-EGL-SGC

]

JORDAN POWELL et al., ]

]

Respondents. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On February 20, 2026, Petitioner Hugo Torres Palma filed a counseled

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. He also filed an

“emergency motion” for a temporary restraining order, or, in the alternative, for a

preliminary injunction. Doc. 4. The Court denied the motion, insofar as it sought a

temporary restraining order, because it did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65. Doc. 7. On March 6, 2026, the Court conducted a hearing on Palma’s

motion for a preliminary injunction and the merits of his petition. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(a)(2). The Court now DISMISSES respondents Jordan Powell, Todd Lyons,

Kristi Noem, Mellissa Harper, and Pamela Bondi because they do not have

immediate custody of Palma. And because it plainly appears from the petition that

Palma is not entitled to relief, the Court DENIES his habeas petition (Doc. 1) and

DENIES AS MOOT his motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 4).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Palma is a 42-year-old Mexican national who has been unlawfully present in

the United States continuously since 2000. See Doc. 1 at ¶23; Doc. 12-1 at 1.

On February 19, 2026, local police in Tallapoosa County, Alabama, arrested

Palma after a traffic stop. Doc. 1 at ¶33. He was initially booked into the Jackson

Gap municipal jail and, within several hours, was taken into custody by ICE and

transferred to the Pickens County Detention Center in Carrollton, Alabama. Id. at

¶34. Palma is currently detained at the Adams County Correctional Center in

Mississippi. See Doc. 12-2. He is scheduled to appear before an immigration judge

on March 12, 2026, at LaSalle Detention Facility in Louisiana, based on the

Department of Homeland Security’s allegations that he is an alien in the country

who lacks a valid entry document and who was never admitted or paroled into the

United States. Doc. 12-1 at 1, 3.

II. JURISDICTION

The habeas statute permits district courts to grant relief only “within their

respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Jurisdiction depends on the

petitioner’s location at the time of filing. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-

35, 443 (2004). A subsequent transfer after the petition is filed does not divest a

court of jurisdiction. See id. at 440-41 (discussing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304-

06 (1944)).

Palma was in custody at the Pickens County Detention Center in Carrollton,

Alabama, when he filed his petition. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶33-34; Doc. 12 at 12-13.

Because that facility lies within this district, the Court has jurisdiction over the

petition.

The proper respondent in a habeas action is “the person who has custody over”

the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. § 2242. The Supreme Court interprets that to mean the

petitioner’s “immediate custodian,” the official with day-to-day physical control

who can produce the petitioner if ordered. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 434-35, 441-42.

Respondents have demonstrated that the warden of the Adams County

Correctional Center in Mississippi currently has custody of Palma. See Doc. 12-2.

Jordan Powell, the Attorney General, and other “remote supervisory official[s],” are

not proper respondents because they lack immediate custody. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at

435-36.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES as improper respondents Jordan Powell,

Todd Lyons, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, and Mellissa Harper. The Court

SUBSTITUTES the warden of the Adams County Correctional facility as the proper

respondent.

III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Palma challenges his classification as an “applicant for admission” under

§ 1225(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Doc. 1 at ¶37. He contends

that his continued detention under that provision is unlawful and violates due

process, asking the Court to order his immediate and unconditional release. Id. at

¶¶129-30. And he wishes to bar the Government from restraining him again absent

five days’ advance notice and a filing justifying the restraint. Id. at ¶127. Although

Palma claims the right to a bond hearing under § 1226(a), he rejects that remedy as

inadequate because it would, in his view, merely legitimize an unlawful arrest. Id. at

¶52.

Resolving those claims requires a brief review of the INA’s statutory

framework.

Before 1996, the INA treated aliens differently depending on whether they

presented themselves at a port of entry or entered the United States without

inspection. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2026); Matter

of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-23 (BIA 2025); Hing Sum v. Holder,

602 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). “Entry” was defined as “any coming of

an alien into the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994). “An alien could

achieve ‘entry’ by physically crossing into United States territory regardless of

whether the alien crossed legally or evaded inspection.” Poveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

692 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2012). And “[w]hether an alien had ‘entered’

mattered because ‘important immigration provisions were keyed to an alien’s

“entry.”’” Id. (quoting Assa’ad v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.

2003)). Entry determined both the type of immigration proceeding that applied and

whether the alien would be detained while those proceedings were pending. Hing

Sum, 602 F.3d at 1099.

At the time, the INA “provided for two types of removal proceedings:

deportation hearings and exclusion hearings.” Hose v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 992, 994 (9th

Cir. 1999) (en banc). Aliens who arrived at a port of entry were placed in exclusion

proceedings and were “subject to mandatory detention until the conclusion of the

exclusion process and could not request release on bond,” whereas “aliens who

evaded inspection and were apprehended months or years later could seek release

on bond pending deportation proceedings.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 498.

The pre-1996 regime thus created a perverse result: it “afforded greater

procedural and substantive rights to aliens who bypassed entry procedures.” Id. at

498-99 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996) (“[I]llegal aliens who

have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and privileges in

immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present themselves for

inspection.”)). That “unintended and undesirable consequence” allowed aliens who

entered without inspection to “take advantage of the greater procedural and

substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,” unlike the aliens who had

“actually presented themselves to authorities for inspection.” Martinez v. U.S. Att’y

Gen., 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Hing Sum, 602 F.3d at 1100).

In 1996, however, “Congress changed its mind about how to treat aliens who

entered without admission, choosing to stop giving them the process afforded to

aliens who were lawfully admitted and instead treat them like aliens who never

entered.” Mejia Ayala v. Harper, No. 1:26-CV-204, 2026 WL 501113, at *2 (N.D.

Ala. Feb. 23, 2026). “[T]he 1996 Act … created an upheaval in immigration law.”

Poveda, 692 F.3d at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted). Among other things,

it sought to “ensure[] that all immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted,

regardless of their physical presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in

removal proceedings under the INA.” Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir.

2020) (en banc).

To that end, “Congress closed the entry loophole” with two acts passed in

1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Mejia Ayala,

2026 WL 501113, at *2.

With AEDPA, Congress provided the following regarding “removal of aliens

who entered the United States”:

Section 241 of the [INA] (8 U.S.C. 1251) is amended by adding at the

end of the following new subsection: (d) Notwithstanding any other

provision of this title, an alien found in the United States who has not

been admitted to the United States after inspection in accordance with

section 235 is deemed for purposes of this Act to be seeking entry and

admission to the United States and shall be subject to examination and

exclusion by the Attorney General under chapter 4. In the case of such

an alien the Attorney General shall provide by regulation an

opportunity for the alien to establish that the alien was so admitted.

Mejia Ayala, 2026 WL 501113, at *3 (quoting Pub. L. 104-132 § 414(a), (d)). With

this provision, “Congress ‘deemed’ persons who avoided the admission process ‘to

be seeking entry and admission to the United States’ and thus subjected them to the

same examination and exclusion procedure as aliens who never entered.” Id. This

provision never took effect because Congress then passed IIRIRA. See id. (citing

Pub. L. 104-128 § 308(d)(2)(D) (repealing AEDPA § 414)).

With IIRIRA, Congress “aimed to reduce [the] incongruity” created in the

pre-1996 version. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 499. In Mejia Ayala, this Court

noted some of the significant changes brought about with IIRIRA. One change was

replacing “the definition of ‘entry’ with a definition of the terms ‘admission’ and

‘admitted,’ which now mean ‘with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien

into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.’”

Mejia Ayala, 2026 WL 501113, at *3 (comparing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (1994)

with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2026)). In another example, IIRIRA “[m]oved the

provisions for deporting admitted aliens from 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1252 to 8 U.S.C. §§

1226-27, where they now reside next to the removal provision for un-admitted aliens

(i.e., applicants for admission), see 8 U.S.C. § 1225.” Id. Additionally, IIRIRA

rewrote 8 U.S.C. § 1225 “to govern the inspection and removal of aliens who are not

admitted to the United States.” Id. (citing Pub. L. 104-208 § 302). In other words,

immigration laws would no longer distinguish between aliens based on whether they

managed to evade detection and enter the country without permission. Instead, the

“pivotal factor in determining an alien’s status” is “whether or not the alien has been

lawfully admitted.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225. IIRIRA also eliminated the

exclusion/deportation dichotomy and consolidated both sets of proceedings into

“removal proceedings.” Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 223.

IIRIRA effected these changes through several provisions codified in § 1225

of Title 8:

Section 1225(a): Section 1225(a) codifies Congress’s decision to make lawful

“admission,” rather than physical entry, the touchstone for determining how aliens

not already lawfully admitted into the country would proceed through the

immigration process. The provision states that an alien “present in the United States”

who has “not been admitted,” or who “arrives in the United States,” whether or not

at a designated port of entry “shall be deemed … an applicant for admission.” 8

U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “All aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for

admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the

United States shall be inspected by immigration officers.” Id. at § 1225(a)(3). The

inspection by the immigration officer is designed to determine whether the alien may

be lawfully “admitted” to the country or, instead, must be referred to removal

proceedings.

Section 1225(b): The statute then divides applicants for admission into three

categories: (1) aliens encountered at the border or a porty of entry; (2) aliens not

admitted or paroled who cannot show two years’ continuous presence; and (3) all

other applicants for admission. Mejia Ayala, 2026 WL 501113, at *4. The third

“catch-all” category includes aliens like Palma, who entered without admission and

have remained in the country for more than two years. Id.

Section 1225(b) treats these categories differently. Applicants encountered at

the border or a port of entry, and those who entered without admission and have been

present for less than two years, are subject to expedited removal “without further

hearing or review,” unless they express a fear of persecution or seek asylum. 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). By contrast, an unadmitted alien who has been present in

the United States for more than two years “shall be detained for a proceeding” under

§ 1229a “if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A).

While § 1225(b)(2) does not allow for aliens to be released on bond, the INA

grants DHS discretion to exercise its parole authority to temporarily release an

applicant for admission, but “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian

reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole, however,

“shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.” Id. Moreover, when the

Secretary determines that “the purposes of such parole … have been served,” the

“alien shall … be returned to the custody from which he was paroled” and be “dealt

with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United

States.” Id.

Section 1226: IIRIRA also created a separate authority addressing the arrest,

detention, and release of aliens generally (not “applicants for admission”

specifically). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226. This provision governs the detention of aliens

who were admitted to the country but later become removable, for example,

“admitted aliens who overstay or violate the terms of their visas, engage in conduct

that renders them removable, or were improperly admitted.” Buenrostro-Mendez,

166 F.4th at 499; see also Mejia Ayala, 2026 WL 501113, at *4 (“Section 1226

broadly covers any ‘alien’ who is arrested and detained ‘on a warrant issued by the

Attorney General.’”).

The statute provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney general, an

alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be

removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Unlike for § 1225, detention

under § 1226 is generally discretionary; the alien “may” either “continue to [be]

detain[ed]” or “may” be released on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a)(1)-(2). In practice, DHS makes the initial custody determination. 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.1(d)(1). The alien may seek custody redetermination (a bond hearing) before

an immigration judge and may appeal an immigration judge’s custody determination

to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), (d), 1236.1(d)(1),

1003.19.

That “default rule” of discretionary detention does not apply to certain

criminal aliens. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018); see also 8

U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(E) (setting forth offenses rendering an alien ineligible for

bond). Section 1226(c) provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody”

and detain without bond certain classes of criminal aliens: those who are

inadmissible or deportable because the alien (1) “committed” certain offenses

outlined in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 and 1227; or (2) engaged in terrorism-related activities.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1); see Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 398-99 (2019). The

Executive must “issue a detainer” and “expeditiously take custody of” these aliens

after “the alien is released,” from federal, state, or local officials “without regard to

whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without

regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same

offense.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), (3). Such aliens may be released only if DHS

determines “that release of the alien from custody is necessary” to protect a witness

to a “major criminal activity” or a similar person, and then only if the alien “will not

pose a danger” to public safety and is not a flight risk. Id. § 1226(c)(4).

Congress recently amended § 1226(c) through the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L.

No. 119-1 § 139 Stat. 3 (2025), which additionally requires the Attorney General to

“take into custody” criminal aliens who (1) are inadmissible because they are

physically present in the United States without admission or parole (8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(A)), have committed a material misrepresentation or fraud, (id.

§ 1182(a)(6)(C)), or lack required documentation, (id. § 1182(a)(7)); and (2) are

“charged with, [] arrested for, [] convicted of, admit[] having committed, or admit[]

committing acts which constitute the essential elements of” certain listed offenses.

Id. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

In July 2025, DHS issued policy guidance providing that § 1225 “is the

applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for admission.”

Martinez v. Villegas, No. 1:25-CV-256-H, 2026 WL 114418, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan.

15, 2026) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) later adopted this approach. See id. (citing Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.

at 220).

Courts are divided over whether § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) governs detention

of an alien who entered without admission and later was apprehended in the interior.

Compare Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir.

2025), with Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494. Palma urges the Court to join those

holding that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to him, thereby making bond available

under § 1226(a). See Doc. 1 at ¶¶4, 6-7. The Court rejects Palma’s invitation and

joins other recent decisions of the Northern District applying § 1225(b)(2) to aliens

like him. See, e.g., Mejia Ayala, 2026 WL 501113, at *8; Martinez v. Powell, No.

7:26-CV-145-AMM-HNJ, Doc. 23, at 8 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2026) (“[T]his Court

analyzes the statutory interpretation question the same way the Fifth Circuit

analyzed it in Buenrostro-Mendez.”).

DISCUSSION

Palma’s petition presents four counts. He asserts that each justifies his

immediate and unconditional release, yet he ultimately bears the burden of proving

that his custody violates federal law. Whitfield v. U.S. Sec’y of State, 853 F. App’x

327, 329 (11th Cir. 2021); Martin v. Beto, 397 F.2d 741, 749 (5th Cir. 1968). The

Court addresses his arguments in turn.

I. Count 1: Unlawful Arrest

Palma contends his arrest and detention violate 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the

Fourth Amendment. Doc. 1 at ¶101. Relying on § 1226(a)’s warrant requirement, he

asserts that his arrest was warrantless and thus constituted an unreasonable seizure.

Id. He further asserts that his continued detention is “fruit of the poisonous tree” that

can be remedied only by immediate release. Id. at ¶103.

Section 1226(a) requires warrants for arrests. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

(authorizing arrest “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General”). But the

Constitution does not prohibit arrests made in violation of statute. See Virginia v.

Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78 (2008). The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless

arrests where the arresting officer possesses probable cause. See Andrews v.

Marshall, 845 F. App’x 849, 853 (11th Cir. 2021); D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56

(2018). Assuming that Palma’s arrest was warrantless, it may still have been

constitutional if the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that he

committed a crime in their presence or had committed a felony.

Regardless, habeas is not a vehicle to redress defects in an initial arrest; its

function is to determine whether the petitioner may lawfully remain in custody. See

U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 158 (1923). If lawful grounds for

detention exist, Palma is not entitled to release even if there were flaws in his original

arrest. Id.; see also, e.g., Buriev v. Warden, GEO, Broward Transitional Ctr., No.

25-CV-60459, 2025 WL 2763202, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2025) (“[A]n unlawful

arrest, by itself, doesn’t warrant release[.]”); Williams v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No.

5:17-CV-309, 2019 WL 2717202, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2019) (“[A] Fourth

Amendment violation during arrest does not by itself warrant habeas relief.”);

Abraham v. Wainwright, 407 F.2d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 1969) (“Even if, arguendo, [the

petitioner’s] arrest was illegal, that alone does not present grounds for habeas corpus

relief unless such arrest in some way deprived the petitioner of a fair trial.”).

Nor does the exclusionary rule operate to bar the Government from relying on

Palma’s illegal presence or identity in detaining him, even if his initial arrest was

unconstitutional. See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984). If

that lesser remedy is unavailable to Palma, the greater remedy of immediate release

is not available either.

Accordingly, Count 1 fails as a matter of law. The Court will DENY Count

1’s request for habeas relief.

II. Count 2: Unlawful Detention

Palma contends that he is entitled to habeas relief because he belongs to a

certified class of aliens who obtained declaratory relief and the remedy of vacatur in

Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, a case filed in the Central District of California.

Doc. 1 at ¶¶104-106. The Central District of California concluded that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2) does not apply to aliens apprehended within the interior years after their

unlawful entry. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873, 2025 WL 3289861

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). The court then certified a class of noncitizens present

without lawful status who (1) entered without inspection, (2) were not apprehended

upon arrival, and (3) were not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c),

1225(b)(1), or 1231 at the time of DHS’s initial custody determination. Bautista v.

Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).

The court purportedly vacated DHS’s policy of applying § 1225(b)(2) to applicants

for admission like Palma; rejected the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

which held that aliens who enter without admission are not entitled to bond hearings;

and purported to extend declaratory relief to the class. Id. Critically, however, the

Bautista court did not purport to grant habeas relief to class members outside the

Central District, as the court recognized that it lacked the jurisdiction to do so.

Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873, 2025 WL 3713987, at *30 (C.D. Cal.

Dec. 18, 2025) (“To the extent Petitioners seek habeas relief for class members in

immigration detention outside of this judicial district, the Court reiterates such an

action would be ultra vires; there is no habeas jurisdiction to do so.”), judgment

entered sub nom. Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873, 2025 WL

3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).

Palma certainly falls within the Bautista class.1 He entered the United States

without inspection, was not apprehended at the border, and has lived here

continuously for over two years, thus §§ 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), and 1231 do not apply

to him. See Doc. 1 at ¶23. The question is then whether the Court should apply

collateral estoppel and grant habeas relief on that ground.

1 This is assuming that the class certification was valid. It is unlikely that the Central District had

authority to certify the Bond Eligible Class, as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1) limits class actions

challenging the implementation of § 1225(b) to the District for the District of Columbia. See

Calderon Lopez v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-226, 2025 WL 3683918, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2025).

Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “is properly invoked ‘if

the issue in the subsequent proceeding is identical to the one involved in the prior

action, the issue was actually litigated, and the determination of the issue was

necessary in the prior action.’” Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d

663, 666 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381 (11th

Cir. 1982)). But even when that test is met, courts do not automatically apply

preclusion. “Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine,” and “[t]he offensive use of

collateral estoppel raises particular judicial concerns,” chief among them whether its

application is consistent with “fairness to both parties.” Id. An abuse of “discretion

will result if ‘there is a significant likelihood of substantial unfairness’ to the parties

if preclusion is applied.” Id. (quoting Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d

731, 734 (11th Cir. 1982)). Here, there are numerous reasons why applying collateral

estoppel would produce substantial unfairness to the government and conflict with

the doctrine’s equitable roots.

First, giving Bautista preclusive effect in this habeas proceeding would extend

the judgment beyond both its terms and lawful reach. The Bautista court understood

it lacked authority to grant nationwide habeas relief, and so it did not. Bautista, 2025

WL 3713987 at *30. It instead issued class-wide declaratory relief, reasoning that

such relief would not “interfere with the Government’s efforts to detain noncitizens

under [Section] 1225(b)(2)” because “a declaratory judgment … ‘is not ultimately

coercive.’” Id. at *18 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974)).2 But

treating that declaration as preclusive here would give it coercive effect. Rather than

exceed its jurisdiction by ordering nationwide habeas relief, the Bautista decision

would supply all the elements necessary for that relief and impose them indirectly

through other courts. The result would be nationwide habeas relief by another name.

But a district court’s habeas jurisdiction extends only to its borders. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(a). And “[w]hat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.” SFFA v.

Harvard, 600 U.S. 181, 230 (2023) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277,

325 (1866)). Equity does not permit, much less require, Palma’s jurisdictional end

run.

Second, while the Bautista court’s final judgment was in effect for a few

months, on March 6, 2026, the Ninth Circuit entered an administrative stay of the

order “insofar as the district court’s judgment extends beyond the Central District of

California.” See Maldonado Bautista v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-1044, Doc.

5.1 at 1 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026). Likewise, “[t]he district court’s February 18, 2026

order granting petitioners’ motion to enforce the judgment and vacating Matter of

Yajure Hurtado” has been stayed. Id. at 2. While “[t]he federal rule is that the

2 Interfering with 1225(b)’s enforcement would have violated the INA’s venue provision, which

limits challenges to § 1225(b)’s enforcement to the District for the District of Columbia. See 8

U.S.C. § 1252(e). To give the order preclusive effect would effectively allow the Central District’s

declaratory relief to operate as a de facto injunction against 1225(b)’s enforcement, thereby

violating § 1252(e).

pendency of an appeal does not suspend the operation of an otherwise final judgment

as res judicata or collateral estoppel,” Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493,

1498 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the judgment is currently not in effect as to Palma, see

Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 539 (2015) (“Unless a court issues a stay, a trial

court’s judgment … normally takes effect despite a pending appeal.”). Thus, it is

doubtful that collateral estoppel is available to him at all while the judgment is

stayed. And, at a minimum, it would be substantially unfair to deny the government

the benefit of the stay it has obtained by applying collateral estoppel now.

Of course, the stay may soon be lifted, at which point the judgment could

again take effect unless the Ninth Circuit reverses it. But that possibility merely

underscores the inequities of applying estoppel in this unique habeas context. If

Bautista is given preclusive effect while in effect, but not while stayed, the outcomes

of similar cases across the country will depend on chance: A petitioner who

unluckily files his habeas petition while the judgment is stayed would receive no

benefit from it. Yet if the stay lifts days later, an identically situated petitioner could

invoke the judgment to obtain relief. And if the Ninth Circuit later reverses the

district court’s decision, another petitioner would again be denied relief. And so on.

It is well established that an issue “actually litigated and determined by a valid and

final judgment” may be relitigated in a subsequent action between the parties where

“[t]he issue is one of law” and “a new determination is warranted … to avoid

inequitable administration of the laws.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§28(2); N. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, Ga., 989 F.2d 429,

435 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing exception to collateral estoppel). Applying that

exception is warranted here to avoid this bizarre and inequitable prospect.3 The Court

rejects Palma’s proposal to have one district court supply the rule of decision and 93

others supply the remedy. See Doc. 19 at 22 (“Bautista supplied the declaratory and

vacatur step, and this individual § 2241 proceeding provides the as-applied remedial

step.”).

Third, applying issue preclusion against the government would produce

another form of substantial unfairness because res judicata does not run against

habeas petitioners. Baynes v. Zenk, 215 F. App’x 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam). If it were applied against the government here, an asymmetry would arise.

Petitioners like Palma could align themselves with class actions challenging

government action, yet suffer no preclusive consequences in a later habeas action if

those suits failed. Thus, issue preclusion would give petitioners more bites at the

apple than the government. To avoid such “inequitable administration of the laws,”

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §28(2), the Court declines to give Bautista

3 Ordinarily, class-wide relief avoids such disparities because the fortunes of class members rise

and fall together with the judgment, typically through an injunction that applies uniformly to the

class and that might be stayed or reversed as to the class. But the Bautista court did not (and could

not) grant injunctive relief to the nationwide class.

preclusive effect. And if issue preclusion does not apply at all in habeas proceedings,

even when invoked against the government (and it might not4), then Palma cannot

invoke the doctrine for that reason.

Consequently, the Court will DENY Count 2’s request for habeas relief based

on Maldonado Bautista.

III. Count 3: Statutory Violation of the INA, Agency Regulations, and the

Accardi Doctrine

Palma argues that DHS violated the INA and binding agency regulations, and

thereby the Accardi doctrine, by denying him a bond hearing. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶107-

114. He insists he is not an “applicant for admission” because he has lived “deep

within the interior of the country” for years. Doc. 1 at ¶¶3, 57, 65.5 For the same

reason, he claims he is not “seeking admission,” id. at ¶¶58-66, and that the

discretionary bond provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) should govern his detention, id.

at ¶37.

This argument turns on the meaning of § 1225, and “[i]n ascertaining the plain

meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at

issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Household Credit

Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004). Section 1225(a)(1) provides that

4 See Pinkney v. Keane, 920 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a “federal court in a

habeas corpus proceeding is” not “necessarily bound by a state appellate court’s ruling in

petitioner’s favor on a matter of federal constitutional law”).

5 During a hearing on the petition, Palma’s counsel abandoned this claim and conceded that Palma

was, in fact, covered under 1225(a)(1)’s definition of an applicant for admission.

all aliens “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted or who arrive[]

in the United States” are deemed “applicant[s] for admission.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1). The INA defines “admission,” as the “lawful entry … into the United

States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A). That requires formal, lawful entry. Morales, 2026 WL 236307, at

*4. An alien who enters without inspection therefore remains an “applicant for

admission,” regardless of how long he has remained in the country or how far he has

traveled from the border. See Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2-3

(E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); Rojas v. Olson, 2025 WL 3033967, at *6, *8 (E.D. Wis.

Oct. 30, 2025).

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) directs that an immigration officer “shall” detain “an

alien who is an applicant for admission,” if the officer determines that the alien “is

not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Like subsection (a), subsection (b)(2) contains no exception based on the duration

of the alien’s presence in the United States or the depth of the alien’s incursion into

the country. That lack of exceptions is particularly noticeable given that other parts

of § 1225 do categorize certain aliens based on whether they are “arriving” or

whether they have “been physically present in the United States” for a period of

time. See id. §§ 1225(a)(2), (b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). But under § 1225(b)(2)(A), subject

only to limited statutory exceptions not relevant here, Congress required DHS to

detain all “applicant[s] for admission” who are not “clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted.”

Palma fits squarely within that rule. He was present in the United States, had

not been lawfully admitted, and does not fall within any of the exceptions to

§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Doc. 1 at ¶¶31-32. Nor has he established that he is “clearly and

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The statute

therefore treats him as an applicant for admission. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 166

F.4th at 502 (“Presence without admission deems [petitioners] to be applicants for

admission.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)).

Palma claims that even if he is an “applicant for admission,” he is not “an

alien seeking admission,” and thus is not covered by § 1225(b)(2)(A). He contends

that only “applicants for admission” who are actively attempting to gain lawful

admission are covered under § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision. See

Doc. 1 at ¶65; see also Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502 (rejecting same

argument). On that view, mandatory detention would apply only to aliens who are

both “applicants for admission” and affirmatively “seeking admission”—that is,

those presenting themselves for lawful entry and submitting to inspection by an

immigration officer. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502.

That reading cannot be squared with the statute’s text, context, or evident

purpose. As courts have recognized, the ordinary language of § 1225 draws no

meaningful distinction between “applying for” something and “seeking” it.

Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502. The statute’s terms, and the English language,

treat those concepts as interchangeable. See, e.g., Apply, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S

COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1996) (“To make an appeal or request”); Seek,

id. (“To ask for”); Matthew 7:7 (King James) (“Ask, and it shall be given you; seek,

and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you.”). Thus, “[t]he everyday

meaning of the statute’s terms confirms that being an ‘applicant for admission’ is

not a condition independent from ‘seeking admission.’” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166

F.4th at 502.

That explains why the statute expressly treats them interchangeably. Section

1225(a)(3) provides that “[a]ll aliens … who are applicants for admission or

otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States

shall be inspected by immigration officers.” And further, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)

states “[a]n applicant for admission may be required to state under oath any

information sought by an immigration officer regarding the purposes and intentions

of the applicant in seeking admission to the United States.” As Buenrostro-Mendez

explained, the phrase “or otherwise” indicates that “applicants for admission” are a

subset of those “seeking admission.” 166 F.4th at 503 (citing Villarreal v. R.J.

Johnson Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963-64 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (concluding

that the phrase “or otherwise” means “the first action is a subset of the second

action”); see also Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2019).

Put differently, an applicant for admission is “necessarily someone who is ‘seeking

admission.’” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 503. Once the applicant for admission

faces an “examining immigration officer,” he is necessarily “seeking admission,”

whether he has a colorable claim to lawfully remain in the country or not.

The contrary result makes no sense. In Palma’s view, aliens in immigration

proceedings who intend to remain in the country unlawfully have a right to bond that

is denied to those who are seeking to be present here lawfully. But those with no

claim to remaining in the country lawfully have less “reason for release pending

removal” than those who do. Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999).

And the government has more reason to detain aliens who have no argument against

their removal.

Palma’s reading thus creates serious statutory problems. Limiting

§ 1225(a)(3) to aliens actively presenting themselves for lawful entry would

effectively “eliminate the inspection requirement for aliens entering the country

unlawfully” and “would return to the pre-IIRIRA regime in which illegal entrants

receive favorable treatment compared to aliens lawfully undergoing admission

procedures.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 504. And it would be irreconcilable

with the law governing removal proceedings, as 8 U.S.C. § 1229a recognizes “only

two kinds of aliens—‘applicants for admission’ and those ‘lawfully present in the

United States pursuant to a prior admission.’” Morales, 2026 WL 236307, at *7

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)). Thus, “the only way [he] can avoid removal is if, as

‘an applicant for admission,’ he demonstrates he is entitled to be admitted and is not

otherwise inadmissible under [§] 1182.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B)).

There is no third category of aliens who are “applicants for admission” who are

somehow not seeking admission.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings confirms that reading. Under

§ 1225, the Court explained, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for

admission.’” 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). The Court further

observed that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United

States (‘applicants for admission’ in the language of the statute).” Id. at 297. That

description “suggests that when the Supreme Court described § 1225 as applying to

aliens ‘seeking admission,’ it understood that to mean aliens who, like the petitioners

here, are present in the United States without admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166

F.4th at 506.

Neither does applying § 1225(b) render § 1226(a) superfluous. Contra Doc. 1

at ¶¶68-70. The provisions operate in different spheres. Section 1226(a) governs

detention of aliens who have been admitted to the United States but later become

removable; for example, by overstaying their visas, committing a removable offense,

or obtaining admission through fraud. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 504-05. By

contrast, § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens who were never admitted and therefore

remain applicants for admission. Id. at 505 n.11.

That distinction reflects a common-sense legislative judgment. Congress

chose to extend additional procedural protections to aliens who entered the country

lawfully—protections it did not extend to those who entered unlawfully. Nothing in

the statute suggests Congress intended the opposite result, allowing unlawful

entrants to adversely possess protections not afforded to those who present

themselves at the border.

Palma’s reliance on the purported vacatur of DHS policies is similarly

unavailing. See Doc. 1 at 92. Even assuming DHS once afforded bond hearings to

aliens in Palma’s position, § 1225(b) forecloses that practice. See Buenrostro-

Mendez, 166 F.4th at 506 (“The text says what it says, regardless of the decisions of

prior Administrations. Years of consistent practice cannot vindicate an interpretation

that is inconsistent with a statute’s plain text.”) (citing Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S.

198, 204 (2018)). Section 1225 leaves no room for contrary policies; DHS cannot

be obligated to act unlawfully.

Palma entered the United States without inspection and has never been

admitted. See Doc. 1 at ¶31. An examining immigration officer accordingly charged

him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and determined that he was “not

clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” See Doc. 12-1. That

determination triggers § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention rule. Palma’s claim

to a bond hearing under § 1226(a) therefore rests on a misreading of the statute and

fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Count 3’s request for

habeas relief.

IV. Count 4: Fifth Amendment Violations (Procedural & Substantive Due

Process)

Palma argues his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantees of

substantive and procedural due process. Doc. 1 at ¶¶115-122. The Court addresses

each claim in turn.

A. Palma argues that his detention is substantively unconstitutional because it

is “arbitrary” and “serves no legitimate, non-punitive purpose.” Id. at ¶117. He

contends that civil immigration detention “is permissible only to prevent flight or

danger to the community,” and that because he is neither a flight risk nor a danger,

detention without an individualized assessment “bears no reasonable relation to any

legitimate government purpose” and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

Id. But that argument conflates the statutory release standards in § 1226 with

constitutional limits. Section 1226(c)(4) authorizes the Attorney General to release

a detained alien if, among other things, the alien poses no danger and will likely

appear for proceedings. It nowhere conditions detention on those findings, and the

availability of discretionary release is irrelevant to the constitutionality of mandatory

detention.

The Fifth Amendment requires the Government to provide due process before

depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S.

899, 909-10 (2024). Due process protects not only fair procedure but certain

“fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this

Nation’s history and tradition.” Id. at 910 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521

U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).

Aliens unlawfully present in the United States have no fundamental right to

move freely about the country. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens

(LULAC) v. Bredesen, No. 3:04-0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept.

28, 2004). Rather, the Supreme Court has “long recognized the power to expel or

exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s

political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.

787, 792 (1977). The Supreme Court thus “has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the

proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if

applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003). Though individuals

unlawfully present in the United States possess due process rights, those rights exist

within the bounds set by rule and statute, as “the through line of history is recognition

of the Government’s sovereign authority to set the terms governing the admission

and exclusion of noncitizens.” Munoz, 602 U.S. at 911-12. And the Supreme Court

has “recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid

aspect of the deportation process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. The Government may,

therefore, restrain aliens unlawfully present from enjoying the privileges and

liberties associated with lawful presence and citizenship pending deportation, such

as the right to be free from detention. See Fernandez-Fajardo v. I.N.S., 193 F. Supp.

2d 877, 880 (M.D. La. 2001).

Palma’s argument that the Government must individually determine whether

he constitutes a danger to the community or a flight risk before continuing with his

detention would, in effect, require the Government to employ the least-restrictive

means to accomplish the removal of aliens. But the Supreme Court has rejected such

arguments, holding that “when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due

Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to

accomplish its goal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. And that mandatory detention does

not violate due process “for the limited period” of the aliens “removal proceedings.”

Id. at 531.

B. Palma next argues that his detention violates procedural due process. Doc.

1 at ¶118. Invoking the three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),

Palma contends that the time he has lived in the United States entitles him to

sufficient protected liberty interests that amount to requiring a bond hearing. Doc. 1

at ¶¶118-122.

This Court has rejected such claims before. See, e.g., Mejia Ayala, 2026 WL

501113, at *9-11; Martinez v. Powell, No. 7:26-CV-145-AMM-HNJ, Doc. 23 at 9-

10 (Feb. 25, 2026). Palma “is due no process beyond the process Congress gave

him,” and “Congress chose to withhold bond hearings from applicants for admission,

so the Fifth Amendment does too.” Mejia Ayala, 2026 WL 501113, at *11. At least

one of our sister courts agrees: “The Mathews test, while common, is not the only

tool for resolving procedural due process challenges.” Jandres-Ordonez v. Bondi,

No. 6:25-CV-084-H, 2026 WL 274493, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2026) (rejecting

procedural due process challenge). The Supreme Court has “never viewed Mathews

as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims.” Dusenbery v.

United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002); see also Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53

F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[The] Supreme Court when confronted with

constitutional challenges to immigration detention has not resolved them through

express application of Mathews.”). The Supreme Court applied the Mathews test to

a lawful permanent resident in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982). But

legal permanent residents “have ‘gain[ed] admission to our country and [have

begun] to develop the ties that go with permanent residence,’ meriting a level of due

process more analogous to that of a citizen.” Jandres-Ordonez, 2026 WL 274493, at

12 (quoting Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).

Palma is not a legal permanent resident; he was never lawfully admitted to the

United States. Doc. 1 at ¶31. He is an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1) and is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Because

Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under § 1225(b)(2)(A), detention during his

removal proceedings is a “constitutionally permissible part of that process.” Demore,

538 U.S. at 531.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not require Palma to have a bond hearing, and the

Supreme Court has recognized the constitutionality of detaining individuals during

the pendency of removal proceedings. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,

591 U.S. 103, 138-40 (2020) (holding that an alien never lawfully admitted “has

only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute,” and

that “the Due Process Clause provides nothing more”); see also Demore, 538 U.S.

at 523. “[A]n alien who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an ‘applicant

for admission.’” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

Again, the Supreme Court in Thuraissigiam held that “aliens who arrive at ports of

entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are

‘treated’ for due process purposes ‘as if stopped at the border.’” 591 U.S. at 139.

Because Palma was never lawfully admitted, the length of time he lived in the

United States has no bearing on the due process analysis under this binding

precedent. “As an ‘applicant for admission,’ [Palma] has ‘only those rights regarding

admission that Congress has provided by statute.’” Jandres-Ordonez, 2026 WL

274493, at *12 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140; citing Landon, 459 U.S. at

32). “With [§] 1225, Congress set the procedural rights afforded to aliens who are

present in the United States without admission.” Id. “[A]liens falling within the

scope of § 1225(b)(2) ‘shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding.’” Jennings, 583

U.S. at 297 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). The statute “mandate[s] detention

of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded” and says

nothing “whatsoever about bond hearings.” Id.; see also Kameron v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., No. 7:19-CV-16-WLS-MSH, 2020 WL 9460465, at *2 (M.D. Ga.

Mar. 27, 2020) (same, in analyzing § 1225(b), quoting Jennings).

Thus, mandatory detention of an applicant for admission such as Palma during

the pendency of his removal proceedings does not violate the due process clause,

because constitutional protections are built into those proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §

1229a; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (recognizing the constitutionality of

detention during removal proceedings). To that end, Congress has spoken as to the

due process given to aliens such as Palma. For these reasons, Palma’s due process

claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Count 4’s claim

for habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

Palma fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, the

Court DISMISSES Jordan Powell, Todd Lyons, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, and

Mellissa Harper; SUBSTITUTES the warden of the Adams County Correctional

facility as the proper respondent; DENIES Petitioner Hugo Torres Palma’s habeas

petition (Doc. 1) on the merits; and DENIES AS MOOT Palma’s corresponding

motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 4).

DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of March, 2026.

EDMUND G.LACOURJR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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