“Enforcement of an injunction through a contempt proceeding must occur in the issuing jurisdiction because contempt is an affront to the court issuing the order.”
How later courts described this case
- “Enforcement of an injunction through a contempt proceeding must occur in the issuing jurisdiction because contempt is an affront to the court issuing the order.”
- “Under traditional principles of equity practice, courts have long imposed civil contempt sanctions to ‘coerce the defendant into compliance’ with an injunction or ‘compensate the complainant for losses’ stemming from the defendant’s noncompliance with an injunction.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 250428-U
NOTICE
Decision filed 03/13/26. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0428 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
CLEOTHER TIDWELL, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Perry County.
)
v. ) No. 25-MR-9
)
A DR. CHAPMAN, D.D.S., ) Honorable
) James W. Campanella,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOLLINGER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and Clarke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s pro se complaint/request for
injunction, because the circuit court correctly concluded that it did not have the
authority to step into the shoes of the federal court to remedy the alleged defiance
of the injunctive order in question, which was issued by the federal court.
¶2 Plaintiff, Cleother Tidwell, is presently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(PCC). He appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Perry County that dismissed his
complaint/request for injunction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On April 28, 2025, plaintiff filed a handwritten pro se complaint/request for injunction
(complaint). In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant, who is identified in the complaint
and accompanying documents only as “A Dr. Chapman D.D.S.,” was a dentist at PCC. Plaintiff
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alleged that defendant “willfully and intentionally defied” a preliminary injunction order (order)
from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois (federal court). A copy
of the order was attached to the complaint as an exhibit. The order, which is dated June 16, 2016,
states that a Dr. Asselmeier, and other unspecified defendants, are to provide plaintiff with
(1) “quarterly cleanings from a qualified dental hygienist, including scaling and root planing,”
(2) “adequate supplies and instruction to maintain his daily oral hygiene in his cell,” and (3) “an
anti-bacterial mouth wash that can be dispensed on a medication line” or “a salt-water rinse or
other appropriate substitute.”
¶5 Plaintiff alleged defendant violated the order because defendant “refused” to provide
plaintiff with “Listerine as ordered be given twice a day as the American Dental Association
suggested and the [federal court] ordered to be adequately followed and supplied.” Plaintiff alleged
defendant’s purported failure to comply with the order resulted in plaintiff “not receiving adequate
dental treatment as enunciated by the court.” Plaintiff further alleged defendant’s conduct was
“willful, malicious, and intentional,” and stated that he was suing defendant in defendant’s
personal capacity. The complaint included a request for a preliminary injunction, wherein plaintiff
asked the circuit court to order defendant “to increase the treatment to ‘twice daily’ instead of
allowing [defendant’s] cost-saving and retaliatory once-daily treatment.”
¶6 On the same date the complaint was filed, April 28, 2025, the circuit court entered an order
in which it dismissed the complaint on the court’s own motion. The circuit court stated that the
complaint attempted “to have this state circuit court mandatorily enjoin and enforce a federal court
order.” The circuit court added, “A state court has no such authority.”
¶7 On May 5, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. Therein, he stated that he
disagreed with the circuit court, because the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
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provided “collateral jurisdiction” to state courts “to enforce federal laws and prisoners’ federal
rights.” Plaintiff stated that he believed Illinois law provided for the same, but he did not cite any
cases to support his belief. Plaintiff further stated that he had “a ban issued” against him which
barred him from making any filings in the federal court “until 2027.” The circuit court denied
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. This timely appeal followed.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 In his brief on appeal, plaintiff reiterates the contentions he raised in his motion to
reconsider. He lists several cases that he claims support his contentions, but he does not analyze
any of those cases in any meaningful manner, instead providing only short quotes from each case.
Moreover, none of the cases listed by plaintiff concern the precise issue he argues “this appeal is
all about,” which he claims is “whether a state circuit court can enforce a federal injunction.”
Instead, the cases concern more broad questions about a state court’s concurrent or collateral
jurisdiction to consider federal claims, or claims related to federal rights, not whether a state court
may enforce an existing injunctive order from a federal court. Plaintiff alleges he attempted to find
cases directly on point, but that the limitations of the electronic research equipment he has access
to at PCC prevented him from doing so. Plaintiff asks this court to use its “own knowledge of the
law and interpretation of law to apply these quotes from [his cited cases] to the facts.”
¶ 10 We first note that it is axiomatic that this court is not a depository into which an appellant
such as plaintiff may dump the burden of argument and research. See, e.g., People v. Johnson,
2021 IL App (5th) 190515, ¶ 29. To the contrary, this court is entitled to have the issues on appeal
clearly defined, and to have pertinent authority cited and a coherent legal argument presented. Id.
However, because the issue presented in this case is straightforward, we will overlook the
deficiencies in plaintiff’s brief and will consider his claim.
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¶ 11 It is well established that “[c]ourts possess the inherent authority to enforce their own
injunctive decrees.” Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985). A federal
“injunctive order is an extraordinary writ, enforceable by the power of contempt.” Gunn v.
University Committee to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970). If a party to a federal
court’s injunctive order believes the order has been defied or violated, the allegedly aggrieved
party may seek a finding of contempt, and the federal court may punish defiance or violation of its
order with such a finding. See, e.g., Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,
438-39 (1976); see also Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554, 560 (2019) (“Under traditional
principles of equity practice, courts have long imposed civil contempt sanctions to ‘coerce the
defendant into compliance’ with an injunction or ‘compensate the complainant for losses’
stemming from the defendant’s noncompliance with an injunction.”).
¶ 12 However, it is equally well established that a party seeking a finding of contempt must
bring contempt proceedings, whether civil or criminal, in the court where the injunction was
issued, because that is the court that was allegedly defied by a contumacious act. See, e.g., Ex parte
Bradley, 74 U.S. 364, 372 (1868); see also MacKay, 763 F.2d at 716 (“Enforcement of an
injunction through a contempt proceeding must occur in the issuing jurisdiction because contempt
is an affront to the court issuing the order.”). Put another way, “[t]he civil contempt power is, at
its core, uniquely personal to each court.” Bruce v. Citigroup, Inc., 75 F.4th 297, 304 (2d Cir.
2023). Accordingly, a “theory of a free-wielding contempt authority, capable of exercise by one
court on behalf of another court, would ‘present the anomalous proceeding of one court taking
cognizance of an alleged contempt committed before and against another court, which possessed
ample powers, itself to take care of its own dignity and punish the offender.’ ” Id. (quoting Ex
parte Bradley, 74 U.S. at 372).
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¶ 13 In this case, plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendant “willfully and intentionally
defied” the order. In his request for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff asked the circuit court to
force defendant to comply with the order by ordering defendant “to increase the treatment to ‘twice
daily’ instead of allowing [defendant’s] cost-saving and retaliatory once-daily treatment.”
However, plaintiff has provided no legal authority—and this court is aware of none—that would
allow an Illinois circuit court to step into the shoes of the federal court to remedy the alleged
defiance of the order, particularly where there is no evidence that the federal court does not possess
“ample powers” to handle any defiance of its order on its own. Although plaintiff has alleged that
he is not permitted to make any filings in the federal court “until 2027,” he has not explained how
this circumstance, if true, in any way alters the analysis above. Plaintiff chose to seek injunctive
relief in the federal court, and pursuant to the precedent discussed above it is in that same court
that he must now pursue his remedy if he believes, as he alleges in the complaint, that defendant
has “defied” the order.
¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Perry County.
¶ 16 Affirmed.
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