City of San Antonio v. Nadine Realme

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 24-0864

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City of San Antonio,

Petitioner,

v.

Nadine Realme,

Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

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Argued November 5, 2025

JUSTICE HAWKINS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Nadine Realme tripped and suffered an injury in a San Antonio

park while participating in a community Thanksgiving “fun run” known

as a turkey trot. She sued the City, claiming its negligent maintenance

of the park caused her injury. But according to Texas’s Recreational Use

Statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.002(f), the City is not liable

for ordinary negligence when a person “engages in recreation” on

government property. Is a holiday-themed community footrace

“recreation”? We hold that it is, and we reverse the contrary decision

below.

I

In the late 19th century, a local YMCA chapter in Buffalo, New

York, pioneered the now ubiquitous Thanksgiving community event

known today as a turkey trot. 1 This American holiday tradition sees

participants young and old, fit and slovenly, slim and stout gathering in

their communities to traverse a fixed distance at speeds ranging from a

casual stroll to a frenzied sprint. As the San Antonio Food Bank

describes it, the turkey trot is “a Thanksgiving tradition rooted in

gratitude, unity, and giving back” marked “by the energy of thousands

coming together.” SAN ANTONIO FOOD BANK, San Antonio Food Bank

Turkey Trot 5K, https://safoodbank.org/turkeytrot/. The turkey trot

fosters civic engagement, builds social cohesion, and honors President

George Washington’s entreaty that the Thanksgiving holiday serve as a

time for Americans to “all unite.” George Washington, Thanksgiving

Proclamation, 3 October 1789, reprinted by NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS

ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-

0091.

1See YMCA BUFFALO NIAGARA, YMCA Turkey Trot History,

https://www.ymcabn.org/ymca-turkey-trot/history; Michelle Kearns, The

History of the Buffalo Turkey Trot: America’s Oldest Footrace, VISIT BUFFALO

(Nov. 27, 2024), https://visitbuffalo.com/the-history-of-the-buffalo-turkey-trot-

americas-oldest-footrace/; Matthew Biddle, 121 Years of the YMCA Turkey

Trot, WESTERN NEW YORK HERITAGE (Nov. 21, 2016),

https://www.wnyheritage.org/content/121_years_of_the_ymca_turkey_trot/ind

ex.html.

2

Nadine Realme joined the November 2014 Turkey Trot 5K in San

Antonio to “have fun” while enjoying the City’s “beautiful” and

“gorgeous” scenery. But things did not go as she hoped. While following

the course through a public park, she tripped over a metal pole

fragment, fell, and broke her arm.

Realme sued the City for negligence and gross negligence.

Relevant here, the City argued that Realme’s negligence claim was

barred as a matter of law by the Recreational Use Statute, set out in

Chapter 75 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The City argued

that it gave Realme permission to use its park for “recreation,” thereby

immunizing itself from ordinary negligence claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE §§ 75.001(3), .002(f). The City observed that the

Recreational Use Statute includes a nonexhaustive list of examples of

“recreation,” and while a holiday fun run is not one of those examples, it

nevertheless falls under a statutory “catch-all” provision as an “activity

associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.” Id. § 75.001(3)(L).

Realme disagreed, arguing that she was not engaged in “recreation”

because she paid an entry fee for the race “in order to access the

premises and engage in the activity that member [sic] of the general

public could not engage in” and that walking, jogging, and running are

not “recreation” as the statute uses that term.

The trial court sided with Realme, and the court of appeals

affirmed. 716 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024). Although

the court of appeals acknowledged that “participating in an organized

footrace is recreation as that term is commonly defined,” id. at 826, it

set aside that ordinary meaning and held that the Recreational Use

3

Statute requires activities to be “associated with enjoying [nature or] the

outdoors,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Bellmead v. Torres,

89 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex. 2002)). From there, it reasoned that an

organized footrace “is a ‘celebration of organized human activity,’ not an

escape into nature.” Id. at 827 (quoting Univ. of Tex. at Arlington v.

Williams, 459 S.W.3d 48, 54 (Tex. 2015) (plurality op.)). The “focus” of

the activity, it claimed, is “to move through that setting as quickly as

possible to reach the finish line,” a goal that is “antithetical” to

immersing oneself in the surroundings of nature. Id. As such, including

organized footraces within the statutory definition of recreation would

be “inconsistent with the plain language” of the statute. Id.

The court of appeals rejected the City’s argument (framed as an

application of the ejusdem generis interpretive canon) that a fun run

counts as “recreation” because it is sufficiently similar to the statute’s

enumerated activities—specifically, swimming, hiking, cycling, and

dog-walking. Id. at 828. The court reasoned: “The only commonality

between the statutorily enumerated activities upon which the City relies

and the 5K race in which Realme was participating at the time of her

injury is that they all involve people moving through an outdoor space.”

Id. The court noted the addition of dog-walking to the statute occurred

after the addition of Subsection (L), indicating the Legislature’s belief

that dog-walking, and “by extension, outdoor walking in general,” was

not already subsumed by Subsection (L). Id.

Finally, the court of appeals noted that Realme’s stated purpose

for participating in the race was “to eat turkey and have pies and drink

wine and have fun and eat without worr[ying] about calories” and to

4

capture “a social media picture of [herself] with a medal.” Id. at 829

(alterations in original). This evidence, it held, “defeats the City’s

position that it conclusively established that Realme entered the

premises to enjoy nature or the outdoors.” Id.

We granted the City’s petition for review to resolve persistent

confusion among the lower courts as to the proper application of the

Recreational Use Statute.

II

A

Concerned about a lack of available venues to accommodate

Americans’ growing appetite for recreation, in 1965 the Council of State

Governments promulgated a model statute States could adopt to limit

liability for landowners who open their land for recreational activities.

See The Council of State Governments, Public Recreation on Private

Lands: Limitations on Liability, 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGIS. 150, 150

(1965). At the time, less than a third of States had enacted some kind of

recreational-use legislation. Id. The Council noted the “growing

awareness of the need for additional recreational areas to serve the

general public” and suggested “that every reasonable encouragement

should be given to” those who offer their land for that purpose—by, for

example, relieving them of the burden of making the land safe. Id. 2

2 For more on the original policy considerations animating recreational-

use statutes, see generally Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Act, Pub. L.

No. 85-470, §§ 1, 6, 72 Stat. 238 (1958); OUTDOOR RECREATION RES. REV.

COMM’N, OUTDOOR RECREATION FOR AM.: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO

THE CONGRESS BY THE OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW

COMMISSION (1962).

5

Texas adopted its version of the Recreational Use Statute soon

after. The original version provided protection only to landowners who

opened their land “for purposes of hunting, fishing and/or camping.” Act

of May 29, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 677, § 1, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1551,

1551-52. But in 1981, the Legislature expanded the statute’s scope to

offer protection when a landowner “gives permission to another to enter

the premises for recreational purposes.” Act of May 30, 1981, 67th Leg.,

R.S., ch. 349, § 1, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 934, 934. It defined “recreational

purposes” through reference to a nonexhaustive list of examples:

“activities such as hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping,

picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing and

water sports.” Id. § 2. When the statute was codified at Chapter 75 of

the Civil Practice and Remedies Code in 1985, “recreational purposes”

was changed to simply “recreation,” although the enumerated activities

remained the same. Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1,

sec. 75.001(2), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3299.

In the subsequent decades, the statute underwent much

tinkering. In 1989, the Legislature added “cave exploration” to the

examples. Act of May 15, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 736, § 1, 1989 Tex.

Gen. Laws 3299, 3299. In 1995, in response to our decision in City of

Dallas v. Mitchell, 870 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. 1994), the Legislature

expanded the statute to reach governmental units. Act of May 26, 1995,

74th Leg., R.S., ch. 520, §§ 1-4, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3276, 3276. In 1997,

the Legislature expanded the examples list once again, this time adding

“bird-watching” and the catch-all provision “any other activity

associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.” Act of Apr. 24, 1997,

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75th Leg., R.S., ch. 56, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 123, 124. And in 2005,

the list grew again to include “off-road motorcycling and off-road

automobile driving and the use of all-terrain vehicles,” “bicycling and

mountain biking,” “disc golf,” and “on-leash and off-leash walking of

dogs.” Act of May 10, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 116, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen.

Laws 216, 216. Two years later, the example of “radio control flying and

related activities” was added. Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S.,

ch. 659, § 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1235, 1235.

In 2015, “recreational off-highway vehicles” was added to the

“pleasure driving” example. Act of May 27, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S.,

ch. 1071, § 1, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3705, 3705. And most recently, in

2019, the Legislature tacked on “rock climbing,” removed “all-terrain

vehicles,” and amended “recreational off-highway vehicles” to simply

“off-highway vehicles.” Act of May 22, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 740, § 1,

2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 2052, 2052; Act of May 24, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S.,

ch. 1233, § 2, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3557, 3557-58.

That brings us to the present. As it stands today, the Recreational

Use Statute provides, in relevant part:

[I]f a person enters premises owned, operated, or

maintained by a governmental unit and engages in

recreation on those premises, the governmental unit does

not owe to the person a greater degree of care than is owed

to a trespasser on the premises.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.002(f).

The “Definitions” section further provides:

“ Recreation” means an activity such as:

(A) hunting;

(B) fishing;

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(C) swimming;

(D) boating;

(E) camping;

(F) picnicking;

(G) hiking;

(H) pleasure driving, including off-road motorcycling and off-road

automobile driving and the use of off-highway vehicles;

(I) nature study, including bird-watching;

(J) cave exploration;

(K) waterskiing and other water sports;

(L) any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the

outdoors;

(M) bicycling and mountain biking;

(N) disc golf;

(O) on-leash and off-leash walking of dogs;

(P) radio control flying and related activities; or

(Q) rock climbing.

Id. § 75.001(3). 3

B

Our Court did not have occasion to interpret the statutory term

“recreation” until our 2002 decision in Torres. The plaintiff there had

been injured while swinging on a playground in a city-owned park.

Torres, 89 S.W.3d at 612. The Court held that swinging was “recreation”

because it is “certainly within the type of activity ‘associated with

enjoying . . . the outdoors.’ ” Id. at 615 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 75.001(3)(L)). One Justice dissented, arguing that swinging was

not “encompassed within the plain language of the Legislature’s

nonexhaustive list.” Id. at 617 (Hankinson, J., dissenting). Swinging, the

dissent argued, was unlike any of the enumerated activities, and it

3 Realme’s injury occurred in 2014. The statute’s post-2014

modifications do not materially impact this case.

8

therefore saw no “legislative intent to include sports facilities and

playgrounds.” Id. at 618.

We next grappled with the term “recreation” in 2015. Williams

presented the question of whether spectating at a high-school soccer

game inside a stadium counted as “recreation.” 459 S.W.3d at 49. We

answered “no,” but our fractured Court could not form a majority

opinion. The plurality noted that the statute’s use of the term

“recreation” was “more specific than the word’s ordinary meaning” and

that the ordinary meaning “would unquestionably include competitive

team sports and spectators within its scope.” Id. at 52. But the plurality

would have adopted a restrictive view of the “such as” clause, viewing it

as a limiting device rather than a mere nonexhaustive list of examples.

The plurality focused heavily on Subsection (L), relying on the

dictionary definitions of “nature” and “outdoors” to hold that the statute

encompassed only activities in which one “remove[s] oneself from human

habitation,” not ones that are a “celebration of organized human

activity.” Id. at 54. And because enjoyment of nature or the outdoors was

not “integral” to spectating at a sports competition, such activity did not

fall within the purview of the Recreational Use Statute. Id. at 55.

A two-Justice concurrence in the judgment would have held that

the relevant activity in determining whether the statute applied was not

spectating but “acquiring and signing a release form” for the plaintiff’s

child. Id. at 58 (Guzman, J., concurring). Another Justice, concurring in

the judgment, would have construed the statute narrowly because it

deprives the plaintiff of a common-law right and “appl[ied] it only to

cases that are ‘clearly within its purview.’ ” Id. at 62 (Boyd, J.,

9

concurring) (quoting Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.

1969)). The dissenting Justices would have held that competitive sports

fall under the statutory definition of “recreation” because “nothing in the

statute demonstrates legislative intent to single out and exclude

competitive sports from its reach.” Id. at 65 (Johnson, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).

A few months after we decided Williams, we confronted the

“materially indistinguishable” Lawson v. City of Diboll, 472 S.W.3d 667,

668 (Tex. 2015), another case involving an injured spectator. We held

that the spectator at a softball game was not engaged in recreation at

the time of injury. Id. at 669.

Next came University of Texas v. Garner, 595 S.W.3d 645 (Tex.

2019), until today our most recent effort to analyze “recreation.” There,

we held that the Recreational Use Statute applied when the plaintiff

entered a university-owned apartment complex “and engage[d] in

recreation on those premises.” Id. at 650 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 75.002(f)). We added that the plaintiff’s “subjective intent does

not control.” Id. at 650 n.4. Instead, whether an activity is recreation

involves an objective inquiry, and the fact that a plaintiff’s

idiosyncrasies might make some particular task enjoyable does not

necessarily make it “recreation.”

As these cases illustrate, Members of our Court have endorsed

varying and even conflicting approaches to construing the statutory

term “recreation.” So it is perhaps unsurprising that lower courts have

10

struggled not only to decide what activities count, but also how to

analyze that question. 4

III

The Recreational Use Statute forecloses a City’s ordinary

negligence liability if “a person . . . engages in recreation” on City

property. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.002(f). We first identify the

principles of statutory interpretation that guide our analysis. We then

apply those principles to conclude that a community fun run is

recreation. Finally, we diagnose the analytical errors that have led the

lower courts astray.

4 See, e.g., 716 S.W.3d at 827; Lubbock Cnty. Water Control &

Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Rodriguez, No. 07-23-00424-CV, 2024 WL 2949042,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 11, 2024, pet. dism’d) (holding that watching

fireworks was not recreation because it was not like “physical, hands-on

activities usually enjoyed outdoors”); City of Madisonville v. Hernandez,

No. 10-22-00151-CV, 2022 WL 17489755, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 7, 2022,

pet. denied) (“We do not believe that flying an aircraft focuses on an

‘appreciation of the natural world’ in the same way as hunting, fishing,

swimming, boating, and camping.” (quoting Lawson, 472 S.W.3d at 669));

Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Hou. v. Garcia, 346 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (concluding that playing sand

volleyball on an outdoor court was recreation under the statute because it is

the “type of activity ‘associated with enjoying . . . the outdoors’ ” (quoting

Torres, 89 S.W.3d at 615)); Sullivan v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-10-00223-CV,

2011 WL 1902018, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 19, 2011, pet. denied)

(“We believe there has to be . . . an activeness, a physical exertion, or

immersion in the physical elements of nature—that is essential to finding an

activity ‘associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors’ as the statute

intends.” (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.001(3)(L))); Sam Houston

State Univ. v. Anderson, No. 10-07-00403-CV, 2008 WL 4901233, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Waco Nov. 12, 2008, no pet.) (“Anderson’s sitting on bleachers at an

outdoor baseball stadium and watching baseball is within the type of activity

‘associated with enjoying . . . the outdoors’ and is a form of recreation under

section 75.001(3)(L).”), abrogated by Williams, 459 S.W.3d at 48.

11

A

“Statutory construction is a question of law for the court to

decide.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex.

2002) (citing Havlen v. McDougall, 22 S.W.3d 343, 345 (Tex. 2000), and

Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex. 1989)). We

begin, as always, with the text of the statute. See Pecos Cnty. Appraisal

Dist. v. Iraan-Sheffield Indep. Sch. Dist., 672 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tex.

2023).

“When construing a statute, our primary objective is to determine

the Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain

meaning of the words chosen.” In re Est. of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917

(Tex. 2007); see Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 739, 752 (Tex.

2023). Plain text, of course, is the “truest manifestation” of legislative

intent. Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d 551,

557 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson,

209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006)). In applying plain meaning, we do not

“second-guess the policy choices that inform our statutes or . . . weigh

the effectiveness of their results.” McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741,

748 (Tex. 2003).

“When the text unambiguously answers a question, our inquiry

ends,” Brown, 660 S.W.3d at 752, and we must honor its plain language.

After all, when faced with unambiguous language, the “ judicial inquiry

is complete.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)

(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). In many

cases, we do not need to deploy advanced interpretive tools because

“[w]hen a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, it is

12

inappropriate to resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids to

construe the language.” City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 626

(Tex. 2008). Canons of construction are unnecessary to construe a clear

statute; “only if we cannot discern legislative intent in the language of

the statute itself do we resort to canons of construction or other aids.”

Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628,

639 (Tex. 2010).

But when the text is fairly capable of multiple meanings, and it

is not clear from context which governs, we may look to various

secondary canons of construction. While canons of construction “can aid

interpretation,” BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519

S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tex. 2017), we emphasize that they “are no more than

rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation,”

Germain, 503 U.S. at 253. Courts should never apply canons to contort

statutory language or achieve absurd results divorced from common

sense. See Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Kidd, 997 S.W.2d 265, 274

(Tex. 1999). When courts resort to canons, they “must be applied with

judgment and discretion, and with careful regard to context.” ANTONIN

SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

LEGAL TEXTS 176 (2012).

One such canon—often invoked when interpreting the

Recreational Use Statute—is the “ancient interpretive principle” known

as ejusdem generis. Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204,

218 (2024). This canon provides that “where in a statute general words

follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons the

meaning of the general words will be restricted by the particular

13

designation in such statute.” Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Hanks,

137 S.W. 1120, 1124 (Tex. 1911). As we have long observed, “the

principle of ejusdem generis warns against expansive interpretations of

broad language that immediately follows narrow and specific terms, and

counsels us to construe the broad in light of the narrow.” Marks v. St.

Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Tex. 2010). When faced

with a list of specific items and a catch-all provision, courts should

“[c]onsider the listed elements, as well as the broad term at the end, and

ask what category would come into the reasonable person’s mind.”

READING LAW at 208; see Harrington, 603 U.S. at 217-18.

Regrettably, the canon of ejusdem generis “has sometimes been

applied with a rigidity that hampered rather than helped the search for

genuine textual meaning.” READING LAW at 211-12. When used

correctly, ejusdem generis can help courts understand unclear statutes;

when misused, it distorts the law and produces results inconsistent with

legislative intent. For this reason, courts should recognize that there are

simply times when “the canon does not apply”—including, for example,

when “the specifics do not fit into any kind of definable category.” Id. at

209.

B

Applying those principles, we turn to whether a community fun

run is “recreation.”

1

We begin with the statute’s “Definitions” section, which includes

an entry for “recreation.” That provision defines “recreation” only by

reference to examples. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.001(3);

14

supra Part II.A. Seventeen enumerated points follow, capturing at least

two dozen activities. The phrase “such as” is a clear indication that the

list is nonexhaustive. See Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent.

Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 547 (Tex. 2021); see also Williams, 459

S.W.3d at 64 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(“The recreational use statute specifies that the term ‘recreation’ means

activities ‘such as’ those it lists, clearly indicating legislative intent that

the list is non-exclusive.”). This nonexclusivity is underscored by the

definition’s “catch-all” provision. Under Subsection (L), “any other

activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors” qualifies as

recreation. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.001(3)(L).

We have recognized as a general matter that when “a statute

defines a term, a court is bound to construe that term by its statutory

definition only.” Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 318 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 311.011(b)). But we have grounded that observation in the Code

Construction Act, which provides: “Words and phrases that have

acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative

definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 311.011(b). The Recreational Use Statute’s list of unremarkable

examples does not bestow on the term “recreation” “a technical or

particular meaning” that requires us to disregard (much less depart

from) ordinary meaning. We have emphasized previously that “[e]ven

when a statute provides its own definition or explanation of a

term . . . we should not ignore altogether the common meaning of the

words being defined, unless the statutory text compels otherwise.”

Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 135

15

(Tex. 2019). That is, “[c]ourts should not consider the meaning of the

term to be defined in total isolation from its common usage.” In re Ford

Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. 2014). “Statutory definitions,” we

have long held, “must be interpreted in light of the ordinary meaning of

the word being defined.” Id.

Our approach in Creative Oil is instructive. There, we interpreted

the statutory term “matter of public concern” as it appears in the Texas

Citizens Participation Act. Creative Oil, 591 S.W.3d at 131. The statute

defines “matter of public concern” solely by reference to examples. Id.;

see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(7). We expressly rejected an

approach to the statute that would “ignore” the “common meaning” of

“matter of public concern,” and we refused to consider the list of

examples in “isolation” from “common usage.” Creative Oil, 591 S.W.3d

at 135. That is because “[t]he words following ‘includes’ are illustrative

of what is meant by ‘matter of public concern,’ but they do not purport

to supply a comprehensive definition of that phrase.” Id. at 134; see also

City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 453 (Tex.

2020) (noting that a list of examples “does shed light” on statutory

terms).

The same is true here. The Recreational Use Statute defines

“recreation” solely by reference to examples. Consistent with Creative

Oil, we must consider the “common meaning” of “recreation,” informed

but not artificially constrained by the “illustrative” examples. See 591

S.W.3d at 134-35. The examples “shed light,” City of Conroe, 602 S.W.3d

at 453, and “remove . . . doubt” as to the statutory scope, Ali v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 226 (2008). They serve as a type of

16

error-check, ensuring we give “recreation” a meaning neither unduly

broad nor narrow. See Harrington, 603 U.S. at 217 (“[W]hen a statute

sets out a list discussing ‘cars, trucks, motorcycles, or any other

vehicles,’ we appreciate that the catchall phrase may reach similar

landbound vehicles (perhaps including buses and camper vans), but it

does not reach dissimilar ‘vehicles’ (such as airplanes and

submarines).”).

Turning to common meaning, one authoritative dictionary

instructs that in this context, “recreation” means “a mode or means of

getting diversion or refreshment.” Recreation, WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1956). It is “diversion” or “play,” as distinct

from “toil.” Id.; see Recreation, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY (2002) (similar); Recreate, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (“to renew or enliven (as the spirits)

through the influence of pleasant surroundings; . . . to refresh after

wearying toil or anxiety usu[ally] by change or diversion”). Other

dictionaries concur. See Recreate, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d

ed. 1989) (“[t]o refresh or enliven (the mind, the spirits, a person) by

some pastime, amusement, occupation, aggregable news, etc.”);

Recreation, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“a

pleasurable exercise or employment”). These dictionary definitions

encompass “any form of play, amusement, or relaxation used for”

refreshment of body or mind, such as “games, sports, hobbies, reading,

walking, etc.” Recreation, WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY

DICTIONARY (1960); see Recreation, THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF

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THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987) (“a pastime, diversion, exercise, or

other resource affording relaxation and enjoyment”).

The dictionaries’ emphasis on “diversion” and “play,” as distinct

from “toil,” comports with the statutory examples. Each listed activity is

a form of “diversion” or “play” performed for the sake of its own

enjoyment or amusement. A holistic approach grounded in ordinary

meaning therefore compels the conclusion that the statute captures

other such diversions and forms of play, undertaken for refreshment

from the toils of life. That conclusion treats the statutory examples as

just that: examples. The Recreational Use Statute’s definitions section

does not require courts to blind themselves to ordinary meaning and

perform the inherently impossible task of deciding whether a given

activity is sufficiently similar to, say, disc golf. Cf. PGA Tour, Inc. v.

Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700-01 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting it is

“impossible” for courts to reliably pronounce the essential features of an

activity performed for amusement). Rather, it compels courts to apply

ordinary meaning. 5

5 We stand in good company in concluding that the statutory examples

are simply illustrations. As noted, many other states adopted some form of the

model recreational-use statute first proposed in the 1960s. Courts across our

nation have subsequently adopted the analytical approach we endorse today.

As our colleagues in California noted three decades ago, “the list of examples”

in California’s analogous recreational-use statute “does not effectively limit the

meaning of ‘recreational purpose.’ ” Ornelas v. Randolph, 847 P.2d 560, 564

(Cal. 1993). Other courts agree. See, e.g., Hegg v. United States, 817 F.2d 1328,

1330 (8th Cir. 1987) (agreeing with the lower court’s reasoning “that the list of

activities expressly mentioned [in Iowa’s recreational-use statute] as within

the statutory definition of ‘recreational purpose’ was intended to be illustrative

only, not complete and exclusive”); Schneider v. U.S.A., Acadia Nat’l Park, 760

F.2d 366, 368 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[T]he list [in Maine’s recreational-use statute]

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2

A community fun run is plainly a recreational activity. Its

devotees participate for enjoyment, frivolity, and amusement. They seek

diversion in an activity performed for its own sake to bring communities

together in celebration. The San Antonio Turkey Trot, with its tradition

of elaborate costumes and family-focused dynamic, is by nature

playful—the whole point is to do something fun in the community on

Thanksgiving. This whimsical, holiday-themed event is geared towards

everyone regardless of athletic talent or fitness. It bears the hallmarks

of recreation. Nothing in the illustrative list suggests that the

Legislature intended a narrower scope that would exclude a community

fun run. We therefore conclude that the Turkey Trot easily falls within

the Recreational Use Statute.

We emphasize that we reach this holding without any need to

shoehorn this particular activity into one of the statute’s illustrative

examples. We need not specify which features of fun runs align with the

elements of disc golf and rock climbing. Likewise, we need not decide

whether a community fun run is “any other activity associated with

does not purport to be complete, but is only illustrative.”); Kelly v. Hochberg,

243 P.3d 62, 66 (Or. 2010) (“As a reading of [Oregon’s recreational-use] statute

demonstrates, it does not actually define the term ‘recreational purposes,’ but,

rather, it illustrates what the term means by providing an open-ended list of

‘outdoor activities’ that are ‘included’ within the term ‘recreational

purposes.’ ”); cf. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 162

(2012) (“[T]he definition [in a Department of Labor regulation] is introduced

with the verb ‘includes’ instead of ‘means.’ This word choice is significant

because it makes clear that the examples enumerated in the text are intended

to be illustrative, not exhaustive.”); Warren v. White, 76 F.2d 764, 765 (5th Cir.

1935) (“[I]t is well settled that those things enumerated are merely by way of

illustration, and are in no sense exclusive.”).

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enjoying nature or the outdoors,” as the Subsection (L) catch-all puts it.

Overly granular inquiries into whether a particular activity sufficiently

relates to “the outdoors” misunderstand the statute and lead courts

astray, as we explain in more detail below.

Because Realme entered the City’s park and engaged in

“recreation,” her ordinary negligence claim fails as a matter of law. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.002(f).

C

We conclude our discussion by diagnosing the court of appeals’

primary analytical missteps.

The heart of the error below lies in the court of appeals’ conclusion

that an activity cannot be “recreation” unless it can be fairly

characterized as one of the enumerated activities. The court embarked

on an extended analysis of abstract questions about whether fun runs

are “sufficiently connected to enjoyment of the natural world.” 716

S.W.3d at 827. For all the reasons explained above, we reject that

approach. The ejusdem generis canon does not require courts to chart

“cave exploration,” “waterskiing,” “disc golf,” “radio control flying,” and

the rest of the enumerated list on a scatterplot, determine a single line

of best fit, place the Turkey Trot on the scatterplot, and measure its

distance from the fit line. See READING LAW at 211-12 (warning against

applying the canon of ejusdem generis rigidly so that it “hamper[s]

rather than help[s] the search for genuine textual meaning”). Our

approach should be holistic, especially where, as here, the Legislature

frequently tacks on new and seemingly unrelated items to the ever-

growing list of statutory examples.

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We further reject the court of appeals’ suggestion that our

approach offends the surplusage canon. Cf. 716 S.W.3d at 828

(suggesting our approach “nullifies [the] Legislature’s decision to

enumerate activities”). It is of course generally true that when

construing a statute, we “giv[e] effect to each provision so that none is

rendered meaningless or mere surplusage.” TIC Energy & Chem., Inc.

v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016). But our approach does not

impermissibly render the statutory examples surplusage. As “[w]e have

repeatedly recognized, when faced with legal language that appears

repetitive or otherwise unnecessary, . . . drafters often include

redundant language to illustrate or emphasize their intent.” Ohio Cas.

Ins. Co. v. Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc., 703 S.W.3d 790, 796 (Tex. 2024)

(first alteration in original) (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,

642 S.W.3d 569, 582 (Tex. 2022)). That is, “redundancies may be used

for clarity, emphasis, or both.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490

S.W.3d 468, 477 (Tex. 2016). And they often reflect a legislature’s “ill-

conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach.”

READING LAW 176-77. For this reason, “a court may well prefer ordinary

meaning to an unusual meaning that will avoid surplusage.” Id. at 176.

That some of the statutory examples may be unnecessary or redundant

in light of the ordinary meaning of “recreation” does not require us to

abandon that ordinary meaning.

Finally, we note that many of the considerations apparently

animating the decision below—including the existence of an entry fee,

the “organized” nature of the event, the speed of the runners—do not

control. Cf. 716 S.W.3d at 826-28. Many recreational activities

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(including those on the list of examples) require expenditure of

resources, including entry fees. Many more involve some organization;

a recreational activity does not shed its recreational nature merely

because it is performed in a group according to a schedule. And a

granular analysis of the speed of a fun run exemplifies the overly myopic

parsing our opinion today disavows.

IV

Because the Recreational Use Statute immunizes the City to

Realme’s ordinary negligence claim, she can prevail only by showing

gross negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.002(f); Garner,

595 S.W.3d at 647 (“[T]he governmental unit owes [a] person [engaged

in recreation] only . . . the duty not to injure intentionally or through

gross negligence.”). The court of appeals expressly declined to consider

Realme’s gross-negligence claim. 716 S.W.3d at 830 (citing TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.1).

The City now asks us to hold in the first instance that Realme’s

gross-negligence claim fails as a matter of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4.

There may well be sound prudential reasons to do so as there is little

sense in needlessly prolonging litigation of a claim destined to fail.

Nevertheless, it bears repeating: We are a court of review, not of first

view. 1 Coventry Ct., LLC v. Downs of Hillcrest Residential Ass’n, Inc.,

___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 70832, at *3 (Tex. 2026). Where, as here,

the court of appeals has declined to consider an issue, this Court

typically declines to do so in the first instance. Mindful that “the law is

typically better served when the lower courts review a legal issue before

this Court does,” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 869-70

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(Tex. 2023), we leave analysis of Realme’s gross-negligence claim to the

court of appeals on remand.

V

We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment below and render

judgment for the City as to Realme’s ordinary negligence claim. We

remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

Kyle D. Hawkins

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: March 13, 2026

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