Grieb

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

THOMAS GRIEB,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-265-KCD-NPM

v.

KEVIN RAMBOSK, IN HIS

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SHERIFF OF COLLIER COUNTY,

SEAN SWEENEY, IN HIS

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,

TATIANA ORTEGA, IN HER

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;

MICHAEL GARCIA, IN HIS

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY;

BRYANT MCDUFFIE, IN HIS

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; and

JOSHUA ROBINSON, IN HIS

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,

Defendant,

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Thomas Grieb remembers nothing of his booking at the Collier

County Jail. But surveillance cameras recorded the entire incident. What

began as a standard processing for a drunk driving arrest devolved into a

brawl when Grieb jerked his arm away from a deputy. In the thirty seconds

that followed, Grieb was taken to the ground and struck multiple times by

three deputies before being handcuffed. The encounter left Grieb with

significant injuries, including a fractured orbital bone.

Grieb now sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the deputies used

excessive force and failed to intervene. He also claims Sheriff Kevin Rambosk

is liable for the resulting damages. (Doc. 22.)1 The injuries here are

unsettling, and the question of excessive force is a close call. But under the

doctrine of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must surmount a high bar: he must

demonstrate that the officers violated a statutory or constitutional right that

was “clearly established” at the time of the conduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Because Grieb was actively resisting during the use of

force, and because no precedent clearly prohibits the specific force used in

that context, the deputies are entitled to immunity. As for Sheriff Rambosk,

he cannot be held responsible for this encounter because Grieb offers no

evidence that the deputies’ actions stemmed from any department-wide

policy or custom.

I. Background

Because Grieb remembers nothing of the incident that led to this

lawsuit, the story of what happened at the Collier County jail comes entirely

from surveillance video and the deputies’ unrebutted testimony.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

Grieb was taken to Collier County jail after his arrest for drunk

driving. (Doc. 69 §§ 13, 16; Doc. 93 44 13, 16.) While being booked, Grieb

jerked his arm away from Deputy Sean Sweeney’s grasp. In the same motion,

he cocked back his elbow:

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Sweeney responded by attempting to place Grieb in a headlock. But

Grieb seemingly twisted his body, and the two men tumbled to the floor:

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From there, the encounter escalated. Grieb landed backward and

grabbed hold of Sweeney’s tactical vest:

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Sweeney began striking Grieb in the face, while Deputies Tatiana

Ortega and Michael Garcia stepped in to help. Ortega struck Grieb’s torso

three times while struggling to pry his hand out for cuffing. Garcia, for his

part, punched Grieb’s legs twice while pinning them down. Three other

deputies—Matthew Parker, Bryant McDuffie, and Joshua Robinson—stood

nearby and watched the struggle unfold.

Roughly thirty seconds passed before Grieb was handcuffed and all

force ended. Sweeney, Ortega, and Garcia insist their actions were a response

to Grieb ignoring repeated commands to let go of Sweeney’s vest and produce

his hands. (Doc. 69-5 ¶¶ 9, 13; Doc. 69-8 at 39, 43-44; Doc. 69-9 at 58.) Grieb

does not dispute this and admits he remembers nothing from the incident.

(Doc. 69-1 at 44.)

Grieb ultimately suffered a “fractured orbital bone resulting in multiple

surgeries, vision loss, a broken nose, extensive dental damage, and a

traumatic brain injury.” (Doc. 79 ¶ 6.) He now sues the deputies under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to intervene. (Doc. 22 at Counts

II, III, IV, VII, VIII, IX.) He also seeks relief against Sheriff Rambosk under §

1983 and state law. (Id. at Counts I, V, VI.) Defendants all move for summary

judgment.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Smothers v. Childers, 159 F.4th 922, 930 (11th Cir. 2025).

“When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a judge is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Las Brisas Condo. Homes Condo.

Ass’n, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-41-KCD, 2023 WL

8978168, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2023). A genuine issue exists if a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See, e.g.,

Martinez v. GEICO Cas. Ins. Co., 152 F.4th 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2025). “And

a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law[.]” Gervin v. Florence, 139 F.4th 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2025).

The moving party “bears the initial burden to demonstrate the basis for

its motion, and must identify portions of the record which it believes

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Hornsby-

Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018). “The burden then

shifts to the non-moving party to rebut that showing by producing affidavits

or other relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.” Jones v.

UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012). In reviewing the

evidence, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s

favor. See Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).

III. Discussion

Whether excessive force was used here is a close call. Grieb’s active

resistance—pulling his arm away and failing to produce his hands—allowed

the deputies to use force. See, e.g., Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Georgia, 69 F.4th

1277, 1303 (11th Cir. 2023). But his ensuing injuries are unsettling. In the

end, however, the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court

further concludes that Grieb’s § 1983 claim against Sheriff Rambosk fails,

and it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law

claims. Because the deputies and Sheriff Rambosk have moved for summary

judgment separately, the Court takes up each motion in turn.

a. The Deputies’ Motion for Summary Judgment

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who deprives

someone of their federally protected rights under color of state law.” King v.

Marceno, No. 2:24-CV-375-KCD-DNF, 2025 WL 3080544, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

Nov. 4, 2025). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides

that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. This clause “has been

construed to forbid the use of excessive force against pretrial detainees.”

Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1296 (11th Cir. 2022); see also Piazza v.

Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2019). So jailers who use, or fail

to intervene in the use of, excessive force may face liability under § 1983. See

Ireland, 53 F.4th at 1301 (“[A] claim for failure to intervene requires an act of

excessive force by the perpetrating officer in the first instance[.]”); Crocker v.

Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir. 2021).

Still, “[q]ualified immunity shields officials from [§ 1983] liability so

long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1239. We apply this doctrine individually, conducting an

independent analysis of each officer’s actions and omissions. Alcocer v. Mills,

906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). To trigger this protection, an official bears

the initial burden of showing that he was acting within his discretionary

authority. See, e.g., Settle v. Collier, 160 F.4th 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2025).

Grieb concedes that the deputies have met this threshold requirement.

So the burden shifts to him to show why qualified immunity does not apply.

See, e.g., Watkins v. Davis, 156 F.4th 1084, 1097 (11th Cir. 2025); Lewis v.

City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). To do so,

Grieb must demonstrate that the constitutional right the deputies violated

was “clearly established.” See Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1240; Ireland, 53 F.4th at

1297. He can satisfy that standard in one of three ways: “(1) [he] can identify

a qualifying case with indistinguishable facts, (2) [he] can rely on a broad

statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law, or (3) [he]

can show that the Officers’ behavior was so egregious that it was obvious a

constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case

law.” Watkins v. Davis, 156 F.4th 1084, 1097-98 (11th Cir. 2025).

Grieb does none of that. Let us start with Deputy Sweeney. As

mentioned, he repeatedly punched Grieb’s face during the struggle. Grieb

does not cite any caselaw holding that this degree of force on a resisting

detainee is unconstitutional. Nor does he argue that the force was so

obviously unlawful. He instead leans on a few broad principles.

First, he notes that a single strike can constitute excessive force and

that “all force must cease if compliance is granted.” (Doc. 79 at 17.) True. But

these concepts are tied to situations involving non-resistant or otherwise

subdued individuals. See Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App’x 696, 705 (11th Cir.

2020) (“[A]t the time the officer punched him, he was subdued, compliant,

and non-resistant.”); Piazza, 923 F.3d at 954 (concluding second taser shock

was excessive where detainee had become immobilized); Lee v. Ferraro, 284

F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e can discern no reason, let alone any

legitimate law enforcement need, for Officer Ferraro to have led Lee to the

back of her car and slammed her head against the trunk after she was

arrested and secured in handcuffs.”); Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1233

(11th Cir. 2000) (“[Plaintiff’s] evidence suggests the officers used excessive

force in beating Slicker even though he was handcuffed and did not resist,

attempt to flee, or struggle with the officers in any way.”).

Sweeney, on the other hand, only punched Grieb while he was actively

resisting by either pulling away or refusing to produce his hands. So the

principles Grieb cites do not quite fit. See H.M. v. Castoro, No. 23-10762, 2024

WL 4799480, at *4 (11th Cir. Nov. 15, 2024); McCroden v. Cnty. of Volusia,

724 F. App’x 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding broad principle “that

gratuitous use of force against” a non-resisting individual is excessive was

inapplicable where video showed plaintiff resisting); Ratlieff v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 748 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (rejecting plaintiff’s

reliance on broad principle involving materially different facts).

Grieb further highlights that officers cannot use force wholly

unnecessary to any legitimate law enforcement purpose. But “legitimate

interests—including the need to preserve internal order and discipline and

maintain institutional security—may at times require jail officers to use

force.” Piazza, 923 F.3d at 953; see also Baker v. Clements, 760 F. App’x 954,

957 (11th Cir. 2019); Crandle v. Sims, No. CA 16-0550-MU, 2020 WL

5239824, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 2, 2020). So this principle does not govern here

either. No matter how you slice it, Grieb has not shown how Sweeney

violated clearly established law. Sweeney is thus entitled to qualified

immunity.

Ditto for Deputies Ortega and Garcia. Ortega, as you will remember,

punched Grieb’s torso as she struggled to secure his arms. And Garcia pinned

down Grieb’s legs. Both deputies acted as Grieb actively resisted by refusing

to produce his hands. No broad principles or precedent Grieb cites applies to

these facts. Nor does he suggest Ortega’s force was so obviously

unconstitutional. So Ortega and Garcia are likewise entitled to qualified

immunity. See Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1061 (11th Cir. 2019);

Deppe v. Sovinski, No. 6:23-CV-1484-JSS-UAM, 2025 WL 523448, at *7 (M.D.

Fla. Feb. 18, 2025).

That leaves us with Deputies Parker, McDuffie, and Robinson. Grieb

contends they each failed to intervene while witnessing excessive force. But

since Grieb has not shown that the acting deputies violated clearly

established law, these failure-to-intervene claims necessarily fail too. See

Callwood v. Jones, 727 F. App’x 552, 560 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Because the law

does not clearly establish that Smith used excessive force, the other officers

had no duty to intervene.”); Nelson v. Lott, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1339–40

(N.D. Ala. 2018) (“[W]hen binding caselaw has not clearly established that a

police officer’s action was an unlawful use of excessive force, no other officer

present at the scene has a duty to intervene.”); Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d

1289, 1299 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that an observing officer was entitled

to qualified immunity because “there was no clearly established right being

violated for which [he] had a duty to intervene and protect”). Each deputy is

thus entitled to qualified immunity.

b. Sheriff Rambosk’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Sheriff Rambosk’s motion is also addressed in two parts: the § 1983

claim and the state-law claims.

i. § 1983

The federal claim against Sheriff Rambosk is, in substance, a claim

against the governmental entity he represents—the Collier County Sheriff’s

Office. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,

436 U.S. 658 (1978), municipal entities are “persons” within the scope of §

1983. They can be held liable for civil rights violations when plaintiffs show

“(1) that their constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality

had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that

constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”

Bridges v. Poe, 155 F.4th 1302, 1318 (11th Cir. 2025).

Grieb’s Monell claim rests on two distinct theories. First, he maintains

that Sheriff Rambosk’s inadequate training or supervision of his deputies

“amounted to . . . deliberate indifference” of detainee rights. (Doc. 22 ¶ 37.)

Sheriff Rambosk offers evidence that his deputies were properly trained.

(Doc. 70-12 at 62.) Grieb does not contest these facts and has apparently

abandoned this claim. (Doc. 78; Doc. 94 ¶ 56.) “There is no other way to read

this response but as conceding [Sheriff Rambosk’s] argument[.]” Dash v.

United States, No. 22-80015-CV, 2023 WL 3318968, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9,

2023). So summary judgment is proper on this theory.2

Second, Grieb alleges that a custom of using excessive force existed.

“[A] plaintiff may establish a policy or custom exists by showing a persistent

and wide-spread practice and the government’s actual or constructive

knowledge of that practice.” Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th

1118, 1131 (11th Cir. 2021). Grieb’s evidence falls far short of this bar.

While he trots out two previous incidents of excessive force at the

Collier County jail, “two incidents . . . are insufficient to establish a custom.”

Wakefield v. City of Pembroke Pines, 269 F. App’x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 2008);

see also Sheets v. Prummell, No. 2:24-CV-943-SPC-NPM, 2025 WL 1425460,

at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2025). What is more, both incidents occurred in

2007—roughly fifteen years before Grieb’s arrest—making them too remote

to support his claim. Khoury, 4 F.4th at 1132; Riegel v. Sch. Bd. of Lee Cnty.,

Fla., No. 2:23-CV-1133-JES-KCD, 2025 WL 1992798, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July

17, 2025) (“Evidence of . . . conduct too remote in time . . . will fall short [of

proving Monell liability.]”); Guzman v. City of Hialeah, No. 15-CV-23985,

2 Even without the concession, Grieb has failed to marshal the facts needed for a failure-to-

train claim. “For purposes of a failure to train theory, a plaintiff must ordinarily

demonstrate a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Guarda

v. City of Melbourne, Fla., No. 617CV756ORL37TBS, 2017 WL 3034071, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

July 18, 2017). As explained below, there is no such evidence here.

2017 WL 4324632, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2017). And lastly, both incidents

led to the termination of these officers. This suggests that excessive force was

shunned, not sanctioned. See Jackson v. Montesino, No. 08-80554-CIV, 2009

WL 1515511, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2009) (“[P]laintiff . . . adduces nothing

at all to indicate that any policy-setting official within the Department

tolerated or approved of, much less encouraged, [excessive force]. To the

contrary, Sheriff Bradshaw adduces evidence showing that officers who do

stray from the official protocol on use of force are disciplined, including

termination where appropriate.”).

Grieb also emphasizes that Sweeney struck other detainees, and he

could not remember how many times he had done so. But this admission is

not necessarily “evidence that these uses of force were excessive.” Tompkins-

Holmes v. Gualtieri, No. 8:17-CV-52-T-33AEP, 2018 WL 4568868, at *10

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2018). “Without more information or context, the court

cannot infer a custom condoning excessive force.” White v. City of

Birmingham, Ala., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1284 (N.D. Ala. 2015).

Finally, Grieb notes that other deputies mockingly equated Sweeney’s

name with using excessive force, which Sweeney leaned into. (Doc. 78 at 9.)

The Sheriff’s Office hardly tolerated this though. An internal affairs

investigation deemed Sweeny’s conduct unprofessional. And Sweeney

consequently had to meet with the Professional Responsibility Bureau. This

evidence undercuts the notion that excessive force “was so widespread as to

have acquired the force of law.” See Ludaway v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 245

F. App’x 949, 951-52 (11th Cir. 2007). In any event, Grieb has failed to offer

evidence that Sweeney’s prior conduct (to the extent it occurred) amounted to

excessive force. See Shehada v. Tavss, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1374 (S.D. Fla.

2013) (“The Plaintiff must present at least some evidence from which a

reasonable jury could infer that the complaints were meritorious.”); Poulin v.

Bush, 650 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1304 (M.D. Fla. 2023) (“Where a plaintiff relies

on a pattern of complaints of unconstitutional conduct to show a custom, the

complaints must have merit. The complaints must also concern factual

situations that are substantially similar to the case at hand.”).

At bottom, Grieb offers insufficient evidence to establish a custom or

policy of using excessive force. His Monell claim against Sheriff Rambosk

thus fails as a matter of law.

ii. The State-law claims

With the constitutional issues gone, only Grieb’s state-law claims

remain. “While no party addresses whether the Court should continue to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction,” the issue can be raised sua sponte. See

Oakes v. Collier Cnty., 515 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1217 (M.D. Fla. 2021).

District courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law

claims when they “arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact with a

substantial federal claim.” Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., Fla., 55 F.4th

863, 865 (11th Cir. 2022); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But after the federal

claims are gone, the “court ha[s] the discretion either to continue to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction” or not. Silas, 55 F.4th at 865. District courts are

generally “encouraged . . . to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as

here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Mergens v. Dreyfoos,

166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999).

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Grieb’s

remaining state-law claims since they “raise[] novel or complex issue[s] of

State law.” 28 U.S.C § 1367(c). “State courts, not federal courts, should be the

final arbiters of state law.” Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d

1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Lab’ys,

Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 540 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Federal courts are (and should be)

loath to wade into unchartered waters of state law, and should only do so

when absolutely necessary to the disposition of a case.”).

To be sure, the parties have already engaged in discovery, and judicial

economy often weighs against starting over. But dismissal here does not

mean returning to square one. The work the parties have done is not a sunk

cost. They can walk their depositions and document production across the

street to state court and pick up exactly where they left off. Thus, judicial

economy does not demand that this Court cling to a dispute that has lost its

federal reason for being here. The remaining claims are a matter of Florida

law between Florida parties. Comity dictates that Florida judges should have

the final say on it.

IV. Conclusion

In sum, Grieb fails to show why the deputies are not entitled to

qualified immunity. And he offers no evidence showing a custom or policy of

approving excessive force. The deputies’ motion for summary judgment (Doc.

69) is therefore GRANTED. Sheriff Rambosk’s motion (Doc. 70) is also

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, with counts V and VI

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter

judgment, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on January 29, 2026.

KyleC.Dudek

United States District Judge

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