Opinion

Monroe v. Cal. Public Employees' Retirement System

Court
California Court of Appeal
Filed
Mar 12, 2026
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.2%

The opinion

Filed 2/18/26; Certified for Publication 3/11/26 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RANDY MONROE, B345865

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

v. 24PSCP00069)

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC

EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT

SYSTEM,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.

Larry Watkins for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Renee Salazar and Preet Kaur for Defendant and Respondent.

___________________________________________

While under investigation for on-duty misconduct, parole agent

Randy Monroe (Monroe) applied for service retirement, pending a claim

for disability retirement. His application was accepted, and he was

thereafter found ineligible for disability retirement because his

departure was not related to a disability and occurred while he was

under investigation for misconduct. The CalPERS Board of

Administration affirmed the denial of his application because a

prerequisite for disability retirement was lacking: the right to return

to service. Monroe petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the

Board’s decision, which the trial court denied. We agree with the Board

and the trial court, and therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

1. Facts

Monroe was a parole agent with the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) between 2011 and 2022. In

2021, he was informed that he was being investigated for misconduct

related to his romantic involvement with a family member of a parolee

he supervised.

On August 10, 2021, Monroe contacted CalPERS about disability

retirement. The next day, he was served with a notice that he would be

interviewed about the alleged misconduct. That interview took place

on August 31, 2021.

On March 3, 2022, CalPERS received Monroe’s application for

service retirement pending disability retirement. Monroe claimed

disability of “neck, bilateral upper extremities” from “cumulative

occupational trauma.” On March 10, 2022, CalPERS processed

Monroe’s service retirement application, rendering him retired as of

March 1, 2022.

On March 23, 2022, Monroe was issued a notice of adverse action

(NOAA) stating he was going to be dismissed as a parole agent effective

April 1, 2022, based on misconduct including inexcusable neglect of

duty, dishonesty, and misuse of state property. Monroe requested and

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was granted a Skelly 1 hearing, which occurred on March 30, 2022, and

the parole administrator upheld the decision to dismiss him.

On April 8, 2022, the CDCR learned that Monroe had already

service retired, effective March 1, 2022. The same day, the regional

parole administrator sent a letter to Monroe acknowledging “receipt of

[his] retirement from employment with the [CDCR], effective” March 1,

2022, and stating her determination that his retirement was “ ‘under

unfavorable circumstances.’ ”

The CDCR then withdrew its notice of adverse action.

2. CalPERS determines Monroe is ineligible for disability

retirement

On May 13, 2022, CalPERS sent Monroe a notice that he was

ineligible for disability retirement because his employment ended for

reasons not related to a disabling medical condition.

On June 10, 2022, Monroe appealed the rejection of his disability

claim.

3. Administrative hearing

A hearing was held in August 2023 before the Office of

Administrative Hearings (OAH), and the administrative law judge

upheld CalPERS’s determination that Monroe is barred from applying

for disability retirement benefits.

4. Petition for writ of mandate and denial

Monroe then filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial

court, and the trial court agreed that Monroe was barred from applying

for disability retirement.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of review

Although we generally review the trial court’s administrative

mandamus decision for substantial evidence (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v.

Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058),

where, as here, the facts are undisputed and the appeal involves only

1 Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194.

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an issue of law, “we apply our independent judgment regarding the

action of the administrative agency” (Stermer v. Board of Dental

Examiners (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 128, 132).

2. Monroe’s service retirement was a complete severance

that rendered him ineligible for disability retirement

Disability retirement is available to state employees shown to be

“incapacitated physically or mentally for the performance of [their]

duties and . . . eligible to retire for disability.” (Gov. Code, §§ 21152,

21156; Martinez v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2019) 33

Cal.App.5th 1156, 1161 (Martinez).) “[D]isability retirement is only a

‘[t]emporary separation[ ] from . . . service.’ ” (Martinez, at p. 1174; Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 2, § 446; see Willis v. State of California (1994) 22

Cal.App.4th 287, 291 [“A disability retirement is not, by definition,

permanent”].)

A member who is terminated for cause generally loses the right

to claim disability benefits because “a complete severance” of the

employee-employer relationship “eliminat[es] a necessary requisite for

disability retirement—the potential reinstatement of [the] employment

relationship . . . if it . . . is determined that [the person] no longer is

disabled.” (Haywood v. American River Fire Protection Dist. (1998) 67

Cal.App.4th 1292, 1297.) Where “an employee is fired for cause and the

discharge is neither the ultimate result of a disabling medical condition

nor preemptive of an otherwise valid claim for disability retirement,

termination of the employment relationship renders the employee

ineligible for disability retirement.” (Ibid.)

Monroe’s service retirement while under investigation for

misconduct rendered him ineligible for disability retirement because it

“ ‘constituted a complete severance of the employer-employee

relationship,’ ” thereby extinguishing the possibility of reinstatement.

(Martinez, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174; see Collins v. County of

Los Angeles (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 594, 597 [a “resignation is in the

nature of a notice of . . . termination”].) In Vandergoot, the CalPERS

Board of Administration (Board) extended the reasoning in Haywood to

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an employee who settled a pending termination for cause by resigning.

(In the Matter of Application for Disability Retirement of Vandergoot

(2013) CalPERS Precedential Dec. No. 13–01 (Vandergoot).)

Vandergoot acknowledged that “bright line distinctions need not be

made” in determining when and under what circumstances a

resignation is made—what matters is that “it is no longer possible for

[the employee] to be reinstated under Government Code section 21193.”

(Vandergoot, at pp. 7–8.) Equally here, whether Monroe service retired

or was terminated for cause is immaterial. He departed under

unfavorable circumstances, with no right to return to his employment.

Monroe argues that the trial court erred in considering the

testimony of Teresa Lopez, a parole agent serving as “Assistant

Employee Relations Officer.” He fails to cite any law or parts of the

record to support this argument, and we decline to address it further.

(L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620 [an appellant who fails

to cite support for an argument waives it].)

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed. CalPERS is entitled to its

costs on appeal.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

5

Filed 3/11/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RANDY MONROE, B345865

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

v. 24PSCP00069)

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC ORDER CERITIFYING

EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT OPINION FOR

SYSTEM, PUBLICATION

Defendant and Respondent.

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on February 18,

2026, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good

cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in the

Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

LUI, P. J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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