Dunn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUBBOCK DIVISION

EDRICK JAMAR DUNN,

Institutional ID No. 01896519

Plaintiff,

v. No. 5:25-CV-00132-H

JIM BOB DARNELL, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Edrick Jamar Dunn, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this civil-rights

action in state court against former state-court District Judge Jim Bob Darnell, former

Lubbock County District Clerk Barbara Sucsy, and current Lubbock County District Clerk

Sara L Smith. Defendants Sucsy and Smith promptly filed a notice of removal under

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).1 Dkt. No. 1. Soon after removing this case, they filed a notice of

related cases, listing five earlier lawsuits that Plaintiff filed in this Court against the same

defendants and asserting the same or similar claims. Dkt. No. 6. All three defendants then

moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata and

because they are entitled to absolute and qualified immunity. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8. Additionally,

Defendants Sucsy and Smith assert that Plaintiff’s claims against them are subject to

dismissal for insufficient service, failure to state a claim, and as barred by the statute of

limitations. Dkt. No. 7.

1 Defendant Darnell consented to the removal. See Dkt. No. 1.

Plaintiff filed four responses to the motions to dismiss.2 Dkt. Nos. 10, 12, 14, 16. He

also filed an objection to the removal, Dkt. No. 20, a motion for appointment of counsel,

Dkt. No. 21, and three motions for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction,

Dkt. Nos. 17, 29, and 30. He also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.3 Defendants

Sucsy and Smith replied in support of their motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 23, and responded

to each of Plaintiff’s other requests, Dkt. Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33.

Now, as explained below, after reviewing the parties’ pleadings and the applicable

law, the Court finds that, among other defects, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata

and in any event, each of the defendants are entitled to immunity from suit. Thus, the

Court grants Defendants’ motions, Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, and dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint.

Likewise, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection to the removal of this case and denies

Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief and appointment of counsel. Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, 21,

29, and 30.

1. Background

A. Plaintiff’s claims and history

Plaintiff sues Defendants Darnell, Sucsy, and Smith for their alleged mishandling of

his state habeas case between 2017 and 2022. Dkt. No. 2 at 17. He asserts that Defendant

Judge Darnell disregarded an order from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals requiring

2 Plaintiff labels his first response, Dkt. No. 10, as a motion for summary judgment, but it does not

comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or the applicable local rules.

Moreover, because this case remains at the pleading stage and no scheduling order has issued, a

motion for summary judgment would be premature. Thus, the Court considers Plaintiff’s arguments

only in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

3Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is unnecessary here because the defendants paid the

filing fee upon removal. But in any event, as discussed below, Plaintiff is ineligible to proceed in

forma pauperis under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, the Court denies the

motion.

him to refer Plaintiff’s motion for recusal to a supervisory judge. Id. at 18–19. Then, he

asserts that Defendant Sucsy concealed the denial of his motion to recuse by not sending

him a copy of the order. And he contends that when he later attempted to purchase copies

from his habeas record, Defendant Smith sent him the wrong documents. Altogether,

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Darnell, Sucsy, and Smith conspired to violate his

constitutional rights and prevent him from obtaining the habeas relief to which he was

entitled. He seeks compensatory damages calculated at a rate of $50 per day, as well as

punitive damages and other monetary relief. He also seeks wide-ranging declaratory relief

and injunctive relief related to his state-court criminal proceedings and habeas proceedings.

Plaintiff expands on his requests for relief in his motions for temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction. Dkt. Nos. 17, 29, 30. In each motion, Plaintiff requests,

essentially, that he be released from prison and that the defendants—or at least Defendant

Darnell—be placed in jail. See id.

These claims are not new. Plaintiff has brought each of these claims in this Court

multiple times, and he has been unsuccessful each time. See Dunn v. Smith, No. 5:22-cv-178

(N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Dunn v. Sucsy, No. 5:22-cv-

190 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Dunn v. Darnell, No.

5:22-cv-191 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Dunn v.

Darnell, et al., No. 5:23-cv-140 (N.D. Tex. July 14, 2023) (dismissed under the three-strikes

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Dunn v. Darnell, et al., No. 5:23-cv-180 (N.D. Tex. Oct.

17, 2023) (dismissed under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). And, in

addition to his unsuccessful civil-rights cases, Plaintiff also raised these claims in an

unsuccessful habeas action before this Court. See Dunn v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 5:17-cv-

187 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2020) (denied and dismissed with prejudice).

B. Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal

Given this history, Plaintiff understandably objects to the removal of his complaint

and asks that the Court remand it to the state court. Dkt. No. 20. Defendants removed the

case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction because it predominantly raises a

“claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1441(c), 1331. “After removal, a case may be remanded to state court based on (1) lack

of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect.” Banda v. City of McAllen, Texas, No. 24-40508,

2025 WL 3094122, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). “The

removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal

was proper.” Id.

Plaintiff asserts that he believes the state court may be more amenable to his claims

because it did not dismiss the complaint before it was removed. Dkt. No. 20. And he

argues that the state court is capable of adjudicating his claims. Id. But he makes no

argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims—indeed, he reaffirms that he

believes the defendants have violated his constitutional and federal rights. See id. Nor does

he identify any other defect in the removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In other words, he

objects to the removal of his case because he would prefer to proceed in state court, but he

fails to make any argument that the removal was improper. Moreover, Defendants have

satisfied their burden to show that the Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s constitutional

claims and that the removal was proper. Thus, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled, and the

Court declines to remand the case to state court.

C. Defendants’ motions

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. All three defendants assert

that they are each entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged actions or omissions in the

adjudication of Plaintiff’s state habeas proceedings. Dkt. Nos. 7, 8. They also argue that

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. They contend that Plaintiff’s history here shows

that he has raised the same claims against the same defendants before, and his claims were

fully adjudicated in this Court.

In addition to these fatal defects, Sucsy and Smith assert that Plaintiff’s claims

against them are also subject to dismissal for insufficient service of process under Rule

12(b)(5) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 7. Specifically, Sucsy

and Smith contend that Plaintiff failed to properly serve them because he issued his own

citation instead of going through the clerk’s office, and he failed to deliver it to them

personally or to a designated agent for service. They also argue that Plaintiff’s claims are

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim for the same reasons as before, he has failed to

overcome their assertion of qualified immunity, and that in any event, his claims are now

time barred. Finally, Sucsy and Smith argue that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims must fail

because he complains about an isolated incident rather than a recurring pattern or custom.

In sum, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no right to bring these repetitive claims

against them again, and even if he did, his claims must fail for a number of reasons. Thus,

they ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint and all of his claims against them.

Plaintiff’s responses do little more than repeat his claims and insist they have merit. Dkt.

Nos. 14, 16.

2. Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in

the plaintiff’s favor. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). In

reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must generally examine

only the complaint and any attachments to the complaint. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). But a court may consider extrinsic documentary

evidence if (1) the document is attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss, (2) the

document is referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint, and (3) the document is “central” to the

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 498–99.

The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[T]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide

the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief–including factual allegations that when

assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503

F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, at 555)).

A claim is facially plausible when it asserts facts that allow the court “to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This determination is context-specific and requires the

court to draw upon its own experience and common sense. Id.

B. Res Judicata

Res judicata “insures the finality of judgments and thereby conserves judicial

resources and protects litigants from multiple lawsuits.” Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560

F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir.

1994)). “The preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment is controlled by federal res

judicata rules.” Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted). Those rules bar “the litigation of claims that either have been litigated or should

have been raised in an earlier suit.” Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571

(5th Cir. 2005).

In the Fifth Circuit, res judicata applies if four conditions are present: (1) the parties

in the subsequent action are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the prior action;

(2) the judgment in the prior case was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(3) there has been a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action

is involved in both suits. Id. Courts in this circuit use a “transactional test,” when

considering the fourth condition—“[t]he critical issue is whether the two suits are based on

the ‘same nucleus of operative facts.’” Chalmers v. City of Dall., No. 3:14-cv-36-N, 2014 WL

7174289, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2014) (quoting Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 571); see also

Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (“True res judicata

bars recovery when a party seeks to relitigate the same facts even when the party argues a

novel legal theory.” (citing Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 20 F.3d 663, 665

(5th Cir. 1994))).

3. Discussion

A. Res Judicata

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. They contend

that Plaintiff’s history in this Court satisfies each of the four required conditions, and he is

precluded from attempting to relitigate the same issues against the same defendants.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the defendants here are identical to those named in his

prior suits. Nor does he refute that he raises the same claims—based on the same nucleus of

operative fact—as before. And he makes no argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction

when it adjudicated his earlier cases. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s prior

judgments were not final and have no preclusive effect. Dkt. No. 14 at 9–10; Dkt. No. 16 at

10. Specifically, he argues that because some of his cases were dismissed without prejudice,

he cannot be barred from refiling now. Id.

Plaintiff is correct that “dismissals without prejudice are not typically considered

decisions on the merits.” Pie Dev., L.L.C. v. Pie Carrier Holdings, Inc., 128 F.4th 657, 662 (5th

Cir. 2025). But when a plaintiff declines to amend after a dismissal without prejudice, “the

dismissal without prejudice converts to a dismissal with prejudice and constitutes a final

judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.” Id. “Res judicata applies when litigants

have either ‘failed to persuade a tribunal of the merit of their claims or ... [have] slept on

their rights.’” Id. (quoting Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 674 F.2d 379, 384–85 (5th Cir. 1982)).

Here, Plaintiff’s first federal lawsuit against Defendant Sucsy—in both her individual

and official capacities—was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. See Dunn v.

Sucsy, No. 5:22-cv-00190, at Dkt. Nos. 25, 26 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2023). Specifically, the

Court found that Plaintiff’s claims against Sucsy were barred by the statute of limitations,

and that in any event, his allegations failed to support a viable cause of action. See id. at

Dkt. No. 24. There can be no doubt that the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice

was a final judgment on the merits that precludes Plaintiff from relitigating his claims

against Defendant Sucsy. See Oreck Direct LLC, 560 F.3d at 401 (noting that a dismissal with

prejudice is generally considered a final adjudication on the merits for purposes of res

judicata) (citing Fernandez-Montez v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F2d. 278, 284 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993)).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff named Defendant Sucsy in two more lawsuits based on the same

facts and issues. See Nos. 5:23-cv-00140; 5:23-cv-00180. Each of those lawsuits was

dismissed without prejudice as barred under the three-strikes provision of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g).

Plaintiff also fully litigated his claims against Defendants Smith and Darnell. See

Dunn v. Smith, No. 5:22-cv-00178; Dunn v. Darnell, No. 5:22-cv-00191. In each of those

cases, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. No. 5:22-cv-00178 at Dkt.

No. 18; No. 5:22-cv-00191 at Dkt. No. 12. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff’s

allegations against Smith did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and his claims

against Darnell were untimely and barred by judicial immunity. See id. And the Court

noted that there was no indication that Plaintiff failed to plead his best case against each of

these defendants. Id. But given Plaintiff’s status as a self-represented prisoner, the Court

dismissed the two cases without prejudice “to allow Plaintiff to attempt to amend his

complaint within a reasonable time to try and cure the deficiencies in his pleadings.”

No. 5:22-cv-00191 at Dkt. No. 12 (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.

1998).

Plaintiff did not attempt to amend his pleadings in either case. Nor did he appeal the

dismissals. He tried to refile his claims twice in later lawsuits against all three defendants.

See Nos. 5:23-cv-00140; 5:23-cv-00180. But because of his history of frivolous filings, he

could not proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, and the cases were dismissed.

The record in Plaintiff’s earlier cases demonstrate that his claims against Defendants

Sucsy, Smith, and Darnell have all been fully—and finally—adjudicated by the Court.

Plaintiff pled his best case, but he repeatedly failed to persuade the Court that his claims had

merit. The Court gave Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings against

Defendants Smith and Darnell, but he declined to do so. Thus, the dismissal of those claims

operates with prejudice for purposes of res judicata. And because his claims are barred by

res judicata, Plaintiff cannot show a plausible entitlement to relief. Simply put, Plaintiff is

not entitled to keep relitigating the same issues against the same defendants in hopes of a

different result.

B. Absolute Immunity

Next, Defendants argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged

acts or omissions in processing and adjudicating Plaintiff’s state habeas case. Dkt. Nos. 7,

8.

As the Court concluded in Plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit, Defendant Darnell is entitled to

absolute immunity for the performance of his judicial duties. See No. 5:22-cv-00191 at Dkt.

No. 12. Judges are absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 for acts taken in the

performance of their judicial functions. Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1995).

“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges

from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v.

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). The Supreme Court determined more than 150 years ago

that judges may not be sued for damages for any act taken within the performance of their

judicial functions. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). This immunity is absolute

and applies “however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its

consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Id.

Likewise, absolute immunity has been extended to officials who work in “quasi-

judicial” roles—such as court clerks who act in accordance with court orders, court rules, or

at a judge’s discretion. See Kibbey v. Collin Cnty. Det. Facility, No. 4:21-CV-799, 2023 WL

2541465, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2023) (collecting cases), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 4:21-CV-799, 2023 WL 2527858 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2023). Defendants Sucsy

and Smith assert that they are entitled absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for the performance

of their official duties as the Lubbock County District Clerk. They contend that Plaintiff has

not shown, and cannot show, that their alleged acts or omissions were not taken pursuant to

court rules, court order, or at a judge’s discretion.

The Court agrees. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendants Sucsy and Smith

acted in “conspiracy” with Judge Darnell to “transact[] business incorrectly.” Dkt. No. 16

at 7–8. In other words, he sues them for doing their jobs at the discretion of the judge.

Thus, the Court finds that they are entitled to the protection of absolute, quasi-judicial

immunity. And because Defendants Darnell, Sucsy, and Smith are immune from this suit,

Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim for relief against them.

C. Other Defects

In addition to res judicata and the defendants’ absolute immunity—each of which

alone warrants dismissal—Plaintiff’s claims suffer from a number of other fatal defects.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he properly served Defendants Sucsy or Smith with

legally sufficient process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). He created his own citation rather

than requesting clerk-issued citation, and, rather than personally serving either Sucsy or

Smith, he had his citation delivered to a third party who was not a designated agent for

service. Thus, as argued by Defendants Sucsy and Smith, Plaintiff’s claims against them are

subject to dismissal for insufficient service under Rule 12(b)(5). See Dkt. No. 7 at 12–13.

He also repeats his claims here with the same fatal defects that the Court noted

before. Most, if not all, of Plaintiff’s claims are time barred. And although he litters each

page with conclusory legal terms, he has wholly failed to allege sufficient facts to

demonstrate that any of these defendants violated his constitutional or federal rights. As a

result, he has failed to overcome Defendants Sucsy and Smith’s assertion of qualified

immunity.

Finally, he has failed to state a cognizable claim against the defendants in their

official capacities. See Dkt. No. 7 at 16–17; see also Dunn v. Sucsy, No. 5:22-cv-00190, Dkt.

No. 24 at 11 & n.10 (explaining that Plaintiff failed to establish a cognizable policy claim for

the purpose of municipal liability because he failed to state an underlying constitutional

violation).

4. Conclusion

For these reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. Plaintiff’s complaint

and all claims alleged within it are dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, the Court denies

Plaintiff’s requests for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.4 Dkt. Nos.

4A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order must establish the four

prerequisites for a restraining order, including (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of

17, 29, 30. And the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel as moot.

The Court denies all relief not expressly granted and any pending motions.

Dated February 6, 2026.

his case; (2) a substantial threat that the failure to grant an injunctive order will result in irreparable

injury; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunctive order might cause the

defendant; and (4) that the order will not be adverse to the public interest. Women’s Med Ctr. v. Bell,

248 F.3d 411, 418-20 (5th Cir. 2001); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d

1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979). A failure to prove any of the four elements will result in the denial of

injunctive relief. Enter. Int’l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th

Cir. 1985). The Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint and all claims within it. Thus, he cannot

demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Moreover, to the extent he seeks

release and attempts to challenge his state-court conviction, he cannot do so without first obtaining

permission from the Fifth Circuit to file a successive habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see

Moran v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 210, 211 (5th Cir. 1997). Finally, he is not entitled to criminally prosecute

Defendant Darnell or have him jailed. Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 655 (5th Cir. 2021)

(collecting cases); Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990).