The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PARKER JOHN SURBROOK, UNPUBLISHED
March 11, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:24 AM
v No. 375352
Court of Claims
MICHIGAN STATE POLICE, JOSEPH GASPER, LC No. 24-000068-MZ
and JAMES GRADY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this employment action alleging race discrimination and retaliation under the Elliott-
Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2102 et seq., plaintiff appeals as of right the Court of
Claims (COC) order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants Michigan State Police
(MSP), Joseph Gasper (Gasper),1 and James Grady (Grady)2 under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and
(10).3 On appeal, plaintiff alleges that the COC erred in granting summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10) and should have allowed plaintiff the opportunity to amend the complaint.
We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1
Joseph Gasper was the head of the Michigan State Police until he retired effective September
2023.
2
James Grady is the current director of the Michigan State Police.
3
In the original complaint, plaintiff also named the state of Michigan and many individual
defendants. After defendants moved for summary disposition and plaintiff answered, the parties
stipulated to limit the action to the three captioned defendants and to allow plaintiff to file an
amended complaint.
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On June 12, 2024, plaintiff filed his amended complaint identifying defendants, MSP,
Gasper, and Grady, and alleging race discrimination in violation of the ELCRA, (count I), and
retaliation in violation of ELCRA (count II). Specifically, plaintiff, a white male, alleged that he
joined the MSP in 2012, and became a member of the canine division in 2017. In 2019, plaintiff
was assigned his second canine partner, a German Shepherd named Knox. In October 2019,
Gasper, then head of MSP, reportedly addressed command officers and declared that MSP was
“way too white and way too male.” Additionally, plaintiff noted that, in 2020, there was a
movement for police reform and to defund law enforcement.
The complaint asserted that, on November 13, 2020, plaintiff and Knox were on duty as
part of the violent crimes task force when he learned of two black males exiting a liquor store and
entering a vehicle. The passenger was reportedly carrying a concealed firearm. Plaintiff attempted
to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle fled at an excessive speed, causing plaintiff to terminate
the pursuit. When another officer engaged in the pursuit, plaintiff rejoined the chase. After the
suspects’ vehicle crashed, the occupants fled on foot. Plaintiff commanded Knox to engage the
suspects. Knox was subduing the vehicle driver when the other on-scene officer repeatedly yelled,
“Gun!” Plaintiff ran to the suspects’ vehicle to remove the gun from the passenger’s area. In
accord with his training, plaintiff directed Knox to remain engaged with the driver until backup
officers arrived. Once backup arrived, plaintiff handcuffed the driver. Both suspects were taken
to the hospital because of injuries purportedly sustained in the crash.
Plaintiff claimed that the use of force, specifically the canine bite on the driver, was deemed
justified by two different officers. Nonetheless, a complaint was raised against plaintiff, and he
was later suspended and charged with assault with a dangerous weapon (namely his canine, Knox)
in March 2021. In August 2023, plaintiff was acquitted by a jury of the charge. In October 2023,
plaintiff claimed that MSP retaliated against him for the acquittal by recommending that he receive
10 days off without pay. Also, in November 2023, Grady allegedly informed a sergeant that
plaintiff’s actions were reflective of the 1960s civil rights movement when white police officers
committed acts of brutality on black citizens. Plaintiff alleged that he filed a notice of intent to
sue on November 22, 2023, with the COC. And when additional claims of retaliation accrued,
plaintiff filed a second notice of intent with the COC on May 31, 2024.
Plaintiff alleged that he was discriminated against premised on his race contrary to
ELCRA. Specifically, Gasper advised that MSP was “too white” and “too male.” Additionally,
Grady advised a sergeant that plaintiff’s actions with his canine were reflective of the acts of
violence committed against the black community in the 1960s. Plaintiff further asserted that
retaliation occurred under ELCRA. Particularly, after filing the notice of intent to sue with the
COC, defendants’ counsel asked plaintiff’s counsel to provide a settlement amount. After
complying, defendants advised that plaintiff was ordered back to work on December 18, 2023.
But plaintiff ultimately was assigned to a civilian administrative position with the e-applications
unit, a unit for which he had no training. Additionally, plaintiff was essentially required to restart
the police officer certification process without any assistance from defendants. Thus, plaintiff
claimed to continue to experience retaliation as a result of his notice with the COC.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10) in lieu
of filing an answer to the amended complaint. Defendants claimed that plaintiff’s complaint
should be dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because he failed to comply with the notice
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provisions governing the COC as well as the three-year statute of limitations. Defendants further
alleged that dismissal was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) because plaintiff could
not satisfy the elements of his claims. Specifically, defendants noted that the decision to charge
plaintiff with assault with a dangerous weapon was made by the county prosecutor, and the district
court determined there was probable cause to support the elements of the offense. Further, the
circuit court denied the request to quash the charge. Defendants claimed that the comments made
by Gasper and Grady were stray remarks that did not support the claims of discrimination and
retaliation. Finally, it was asserted that plaintiff could not claim retaliation as a result of his
placement in an administrative position because plaintiff, not defendants, failed to take measures
to be recertified as a police officer.4
Plaintiff opposed the dispositive motion, asserting that his commands to Knox regarding
subduing the vehicle driver were consistent with his training. And two supervisors approved of
plaintiff’s use of force. Following a complaint, plaintiff was investigated, removed from the canine
unit, and charged with assault with a dangerous weapon. After a jury trial, plaintiff was acquitted
of the charge. Despite the acquittal, plaintiff alleged that defendants continued to retaliate against
him by suspending him for 10 days. And plaintiff was ordered to report to an administrative
civilian position for which he had no experience. Because of the ongoing retaliation, plaintiff
resigned from MSP. Plaintiff asserted that his notice and complaint were timely filed. He further
claimed that summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) was improper because he properly
pleaded his claims. Finally, plaintiff alleged that he presented sufficient evidence of Gasper and
Grady’s discrimination and retaliation against him in light of his race.5
In reply, defendants claimed that they were entitled to discipline plaintiff for impropriety.
And defendants were not responsible for plaintiff’s failure to be recertified and returned to work
as a state trooper. The onus was on plaintiff, not defendants, to complete the certification process
required under the Michigan Commission On Law Enforcement Standards (MCOLES), MCL
28.603 et seq.
4
Plaintiff contends that defendants failed to support their motion for summary disposition with
documentary evidence and abandoned their claims by citing little to no authority. But with the
motion, defendants submitted as exhibits: (1) the June 17, 2022 district court bindover ruling, (2)
the circuit court opinion denying plaintiff’s motion to quash, (3) the criminal case register of
actions, and (4) plaintiff’s May 31, 2024 notice of intent to sue.
5
With the response to the dispositive motion, plaintiff attached the notice of intent to file claim
against the state dated November 16, 2023, and the notice of intent dated May 31, 2024. Both of
these notices essentially raise the factual allegations contained in the amended complaint and in
the response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition. At the conclusion of the notice of
intent, it states, “I, Parker J. Surbrook, being first duly sworn, deposes and states under penalty of
perjury under the laws of the United States of America and the State of Michigan that the foregoing
is true and correct[.]” It did not state that it was premised on personal knowledge. See MCR
2.119(B)(1)(a) “If an affidavit is filed in . . . opposition to a motion it must: (a) be made on personal
knowledge. . . .”)
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The COC issued an opinion and order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. The opinion and order pertinently
stated:
For purposes of statutory limitation periods, a claim is deemed accrued
when each element of the claim, including damages, exists. Plaintiff alleges that
defendants suspended him indefinitely without pay on March 5, 2021, and his claim
of racial discrimination accrued on that date.
MCL 600.6431(1) and (3) of the COCA require a plaintiff to file a notice of
intent to file a claim against the state with the clerk of the [COC] within six months
of the event giving rise to the claim in a case of personal injury or property damage,
and within a year of the claim accruing for all other actions. Plaintiff’s
discrimination claims sound in personal injury, but giving plaintiff every
advantage, the Court will apply the one-year notice COCA notice [sic] period. Any
claim of discrimination connected to events culminating in plaintiff’s March 5,
2021 suspension had to be included in a notice of intent to file a claim by March 5,
2022. Plaintiff did not file his initial notice of intent until November 2023. Timely
notice is a condition precedent to filing suit in the [COC]. Absent this notice, the
jurisdiction of the [COC] is not triggered and the action must be dismissed.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s claims arising from the time period
before March 5, 2021.
These claims are also barred by the three-year statute of limitations
prescribed by MCL 600.5005(2). As noted, plaintiff’s claim of racial
discrimination accrued on March 5, 2021. To preserve his challenge to
discriminatory acts arising on or before March 6, 2021, plaintiff was required to
file his complaint by March 5, 2024. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on March
15, 2024, 10 days after the expiration of that period. This belated filing further
supports dismissal of plaintiff’s claims arising from the events leading up to his
March 5, 2021 suspension.
The events underlying plaintiff’s retaliation claim, however, did not begin
until after he filed his initial notice of intent. Defendants received timely notice of
those claims when plaintiff filed his lawsuit on March 15, 2024. Summary
disposition is not warranted for claims connected to these events under MCR
2.116(C)(7).
* * *
Plaintiff failed to state a viable claim of racial discrimination or retaliation
against defendant Gasper, supporting summary disposition of the claims against
him under MCR 2.116(C)(8). He also failed to overcome the evidence presented
by defendants, supporting summary disposition under (C)(10). The only allegation
against this defendant relates to a statement he made in 2019. Plaintiff does not
allege that Gasper played any role in his suspension or that Gasper’s 2019 statement
about the demographics of the MSP was in any way connected to his suspension
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and reassignment upon his return to work. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the
superior officers who reviewed the dash-cam footage or played a role in the
decision to investigate or suspend him shared Gasper’s thought. There must be
some connection between the statement and an outcome for the statement to have
relevance. That connection is absent in this case and the Court dismisses the claims
against defendant Gasper.
The Court now turns to plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination and
retaliation for alleged actions arising only after his jury-trial acquittal and carried
out by defendants MSP or Grady.
MCL 37.2202(1)(a) prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis
of race by “[f]ail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or recruit, discharge[ing], or otherwise
discriminat[ing] against an individual with respect to employment, compensation,
or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of . . . race. . . .” A
retaliation claim must be based on an employer’s retaliation against an employee
for engaging in a protected activity, such as opposing the employer’s violation of
the ELCRA. MCL 37.2701(a) specifically prohibits an employer from retaliating
or discriminating an employee who has “filed a complaint” under the ELCRA.
* * *
Plaintiff suggests that Grady provided direct evidence of discrimination
when he described to [Canine Sergeant David] Yount that the dash-cam footage of
plaintiff’s actions was reminiscent of police brutality against black protesters
during the 1960s civil rights movement. Arguably, there is a direct correlation
between Grady’s statement and racial animus. Grady compared plaintiff’s action
to the racist actions of white, male officers who employed violence against black
citizens. For purposes of this case, the Court will treat this statement as direct
evidence.
However, plaintiff failed to adequately allege and support that he was
qualified for the position of MSP trooper or that discrimination caused him to be
ineligible for a trooper position. Plaintiff was suspended from service on March 5,
2021, and did not return to work until December 19, 2023, 30 months or 2 ½ years
later. Plaintiff alleges that he “retained the position of trooper within the” MSP
throughout his suspension and should not have been required to be recertified
through the Michigan Commission of Law Enforcement Standards (MCOLES)
before retaking his position. This limitation of plaintiff’s duties upon his return to
work were not caused by any potential discriminatory or retaliatory animus by
defendants; MCOLES has the sole authority to license law enforcement officers
and plaintiff was not licensed at that time.
MCL 28.609(1) provides that the MCOLES act “applies to all law
enforcement officers” absent a handful of inapplicable exceptions and states that
the employment of law enforcement officers “is subject to the licensing
requirements and procedures” of the act. MCOLES alone sets standards for
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licensure and training, including for officers who experience a break in service. . .
. Plaintiff complains that the MSP provided no guidance on how to achieve
recertification through MCOLES, but this information is discoverable in the
statutes and administrative rules governing MCOLES and could be requested from
MCOLES directly. Simply put, defendants were not authorized to relicense or
recertify plaintiff and therefore cannot be liable for failing to do so. Summary
disposition is thereby warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
From this decision, plaintiff appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Girimonte v Liberty Mut Ins Co, 348 Mich App 768, 779; 19 NW3d 921 (2023). A motion for
summary disposition premised on MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.
Id. The moving party must identify and support the issues to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and other documentary evidence submitted with the motion must be examined. Pittsfield Charter
Twp v Washtenaw Co Treasurer, 338 Mich App 440, 449; 980 NW2d 119 (2021). Once the
moving party makes and supports its motion, the opposing party may not rest on mere allegations
or denials in the pleadings, but must submit documentary evidence setting forth specific facts to
demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Id.
A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. When
examining such a motion, the factual allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and
the motion is decided premised on the pleadings alone. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504
Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted
when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify
recovery.” Id.
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate in favor of a defendant if the
plaintiff’s claims are barred because of immunity granted by law. Milot v Dep’t of Transp, 318
Mich App 272, 275; 897 NW2d 248 (2016). The application of immunity presents a question of
law if reasonable minds could not differ on the legal effect of the facts. See id. at 275-276. “When
reviewing a motion for summary disposition premised on immunity, this Court examines the
affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence to determine whether the
moving party is entitled to immunity as a matter of law.” Forton v St Clair Co Public Guardian,
339 Mich App 73, 82; 981 NW2d 103 (2021).
A trial court’s decision regarding a motion to amend the pleadings is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Wolfenbarger v Wright, 336 Mich App 1, 14; 969 NW2d 518 (2021). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court selects an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
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Plaintiff contends that the COC erred in granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) and in failing to allow amendment of the complaint. We
disagree.6
The ELCRA recognizes and declares a civil right to include, “[t]he opportunity to obtain
employment, housing and other real estate, and the full and equal utilization of public
accommodations, public service, and educational facilities without discrimination because of
religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, heights, weight, familial status, or marital status[.]”
MCL 37.2102(1). The recognition of these civil rights set forth in the ELCRA are designed to
eliminate the prejudices and biases held against persons because of their membership in a particular
class and to dismantle the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.
Rouch World, LLC v Dep’t of Civil Rights, 510 Mich 398, 405; 987 NW2d 501 (2022). An
employer shall not “[f]ail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against
an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term condition, or privilege of
employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital
status.” MCL 37.2202(1)(a).
Discrimination cases may be established by direct evidence or by indirect or circumstantial
evidence. Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 469 Mich 124, 132; 666 NW2d 186 (2003).
Direct evidence is “evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful
discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Id. at 132-133
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Direct evidence of discrimination is a rare but sure
method of challenging the nature of an employer’s decision. Hecht v Nat’l Heritage Academies,
Inc, 499 Mich 586, 607; 886 NW2d 135 (2016). Circumstantially, a plaintiff can seek to prove
discrimination by demonstrating that the plaintiff was treated unequally when compared to a
similarly situated employee without the protected characteristic. Id. at 608. In ELCRA cases when
no direct evidence of impermissible bias is presented, a plaintiff must offer a rebuttable prima facie
case of discrimination. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462-463; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).
The plaintiff must present evidence that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was subjected
to adverse employment action, (3) he was qualified for the position, and (4) the job was given to
another person under facts giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 463.
If the plaintiff successfully demonstrates the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Dubey v Stroh
Brewery Co, 185 Mich App 561, 563; 462 NW2d 758 (1990). Once the defendant articulates a
legitimate reason for its action, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance
6
As an initial matter, we note that the COC granted summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims
premised on MCR 2.116(C)(7) except with regard to his post-acquittal claims. Plaintiff does not
challenge the holdings pertaining to the notice of the claim and the three-year statute of limitations.
When an appellant fails to challenge or dispute the basis of the trial court’s ruling, the appellate
court need not even consider granting the relief requested. Redmond v Heller, 332 Mich App 415,
449; 957 NW2d 357 (2020); Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 381; 689
NW2d 145 (2004). Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to relief under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
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of the evidence, that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was merely a pretext for
discrimination. Id.
Documentation offered in support of and in opposition to the dispositive motion must be
admissible as evidence. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Mere conclusory allegations that are devoid of detail are insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Quinto v Cross & Peters, Co, 451 Mich 358, 362, 371-372; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
When an opposing party provides mere conclusions without supporting his position with
underlying foundation, summary disposition in favor of the moving party is proper. See Rose v
Nat’l Auction Group, 466 Mich 453, 470; 646 NW2d 455 (2002). Affidavits must be premised on
personal knowledge and set forth with particularity facts that would be admissible as evidence.
SSC Assocs Ltd Partnership v General Retirement Sys, 192 Mich App 360, 364; 480 NW2d 275
(1991). See also MCR 2.119(B). And the trial court may only consider substantively admissible
evidence, meaning the substance of the evidence was plausibly admissible even if it was not
admissible in form. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App
362, 373; 775 NW2d 618 (2009).
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c).7 Generally,
hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it qualifies under an exception to the rules of evidence.
MRE 802; Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich 617, 626; 581 NW2d 696 (1998). A statement that is
an admission by a party-opponent is not hearsay. MRE 801(d)(2)(A). This evidentiary rule
“requires that the statement: (1) be offered against a party and (2) be the party’s own statement,
either in an individual or representative capacity.” Maiden, 461 Mich at 125 n 8.
Stray or isolated remarks do not generally constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
Krohn v Sedgwick James of Mich, Inc, 244 Mich App 289, 298-299; 624 NW2d 212 (2001). To
determine whether a comment is a stray remark, one must assess whether the remark was made by
a decision maker or the employer’s agent and uninvolved in the decision, whether the disputed
remarks were isolated or a pattern of biased comments, whether the remarks were made close to
the time of the challenged decision and whether the remark was ambiguous or reflective of
discriminatory bias. Id. at 292.
In the present case, plaintiff offered statements that purportedly reflected racial
discrimination. First, in 2019, Gasper reportedly told command officers that the MSP was “too
white” and “too male.” Plaintiff did not present an affidavit or deposition testimony from an
individual that directly heard Gasper’s comment. And even if we assume without deciding that
these statements constituted admissions by a party-opponent, MRE 801(d)(2)(A), plaintiff did not
address the factors to determine whether the statements should be deemed stray remarks or
reflected a pattern of bias. Analyzing the circumstances, Gasper’s comment was a stray remark.
Plaintiff failed to present evidence that a year after Gasper’s purported remark that he conducted
the investigation into plaintiff. Moreover, even if we assume that Gasper performed the
investigation into plaintiff’s canine incident, it was the prosecutor who had the discretion to charge
7
The Michigan Rules of Evidence were amended effective January 1, 2024. Our citation is to the
rule in effect at the time of the alleged statements.
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plaintiff with a crime. See People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 124; 879 NW2d 237 (2016).
Moreover, the comment by Gasper regarding the composition of the MSP reflected a position on
the gender and race of the then-current demographics of the MSP. Plaintiff did not present
evidence whether defendant MSP subsequently commenced recruitment efforts to reflect
community populations addressing gender or race or took discriminatory action to eliminate white
male police officers from MSP by contriving criminal charges against them and hiring nonwhite
police officers in their stead. Additionally, Gasper’s comment occurred before plaintiff’s
November 2020 use of the canine. In short, plaintiff failed to analyze the four factors, and in
applying that criteria, it cannot be concluded that Gasper’s comment constituted anything other
than a stray remark. Accordingly, the COC correctly determined that summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) of plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination was proper in light of the failure to
establish a prima facie case.
Plaintiff also raised a claim of retaliation in his complaint. With respect to retaliation
claims, MCL 37.2701 provides:
Two or more persons shall not conspire to, or a person shall not:
(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a
violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this act.
“[T]o establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff
must show (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was known by the defendant;
(3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” El-Khalil
v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 161; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Plaintiff asserts that he established a prima facie case of retaliation by filing his notice of
claim and subsequent complaint, that defendants became aware of the filings, and that they
retaliated against him through his placement into an administrative “secretarial” position rather
than returning him to the position of canine handler. Plaintiff contended that he offered evidence
to support the retaliation because Grady told another officer that plaintiff’s actions with his canine
were reflective of the abusive treatment of black citizens by white police officers in the 1960s.
Plaintiff did not present affidavits or deposition testimony from the individual that directly heard
these comments. Accordingly, even if we assume without deciding that this statement was not
hearsay as an admission by a party-opponent, MRE 801(d)(2)(A), plaintiff again did not analyze
the factors to address whether the statement should be deemed a stray remark or a reflection of a
pattern of bias.
Nonetheless, even if it was assumed without deciding that this statement was admissible
and constituted direct evidence of retaliation, plaintiff did not present evidence that he was
qualified to regain the position of trooper or canine handler. Because of the pending criminal
charge, plaintiff was suspended from performing as a police officer. And upon his acquittal,
defendants noted that plaintiff was required to comply with the certification standards of MCL
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28.609, to be employed as a law enforcement officer. In contrast, plaintiff alleged that defendants
did not give guidance regarding his return to his former position. However, MCL 28.609 provides
instruction regarding the steps for licensure, commencing with fingerprinting, MCL 28.609(1),
and directs the applicant to the promulgated rules for compliance, MCL 28.609(2). There is no
indication that defendants control the process for plaintiff’s licensing requirements. Accordingly,
the COC properly dismissed plaintiff’s retaliation claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Lastly, plaintiff contends that the COC erred by failing to grant him the opportunity to
amend his complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(5) (“If the grounds [for summary disposition] asserted
are based on subrule (C)(8), (9), or (10), the court shall give the parties an opportunity to amend
their pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before the court shows that
amendment would not be justified.”). We disagree.
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request to amend when the plaintiff
fails to offer a written amendment in accordance with MCR 2.118(A)(4) (“Amendments must be
filed in writing, dated, and numbered consecutively, and must comply with MCR 2.113. Unless
otherwise indicated, an amended pleading supersedes the former pleading.”). See Lown v JJ Eaton
Place, 235 Mich App 721, 726; 598 NW2d 633 (1999) (“[P]ursuant to MCR 2.118(A)(4),
amendments must be in writing. In the instant case, the request to amend was oral, and plaintiff
never offered any written amendments. Accordingly, because plaintiff did not comply with the
court rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to amend.”). Plaintiff
does not proffer what he would add to an amended complaint such that summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) was improper. The COC did not err by failing to provide plaintiff with the
opportunity to amend his complaint for a second time when he failed to submit a proposed
amended complaint in writing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
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