Hall

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

VICKEY ROBINSON HALL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-647-CLM

TALLADEGA HOUSING

AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant Talladega Housing Authority’s

(“THA”) motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement under 9

U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (see doc. 6). Plaintiff Vickey Robinson Hall first opposed the

motion by arguing that the entire arbitration agreement is invalid and

unenforceable. (See doc. 9). THA then argued for the first time in its reply

brief that a delegation provision in the arbitration agreement gives an

arbitrator the exclusive authority to decide issues of arbitrability,

including whether the whole agreement is valid and enforceable (see doc.

10). The court ordered Hall to respond to THA’s new argument (see doc.

11). Hall responded (doc. 12), so the issues are fully briefed.

For the reasons below, the court GRANTS THA’s motion.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Hall is a black woman. She works at THA as a property manager.

In September 2022, Hall realized that she and other black female

employees were being paid less than their white male colleagues, so she

filed a complaint with THA. Once Hall complained, her manager began to

scrutinize her work and require her to “perform tasks which had not been

previously required.” (Doc. 1, p. 4).

A few weeks passed, but THA had still not “advised Hall of the

findings and conclusion of any investigation into her complaint,” even

though THA’s employee handbook required it do so “promptly.” (Id. at p.

5). So Hall took matters into her own hands and filed a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC.

In September 2023, Hall’s manager offered her “a different property

to manage as well as $2.15 an hour raise.” (Id.). Hall asked her manager

if she could receive a larger pay increase, but her manager said that “she

did not negotiate pay for anyone.” (Id.). A few months later, Hall’s

manager assigned Hall to manage a property that was “undesirable and

hostile.” (Id.).

Nearly a year later, in July 2024, Hall requested that the EEOC

issue her a letter granting the right to sue THA. (Doc. 9, p. 2). But before

the EEOC issued the letter, THA required Hall to sign an arbitration

agreement. THA says there is no evidence that it would’ve fired Hall if

she refused to sign the agreement (doc. 10, p. 5), but the agreement plainly

states that the consideration Hall received for signing was THA’s “offer of

employment or continued employment.” (doc. 6-1, p. 1). Faced with the

dilemma of signing an agreement that gave up her right to sue in federal

court or losing her job, Hall signed and continued working for THA.

In February 2025, the Department of Justice issued Hall her right

to sue letter. (See doc. 1-2; doc. 9, p. 3). Two months later, Hall filed her

complaint in this court, bringing claims for: (1) gender discrimination

under Title VII; (2) race discrimination under Title VII; (3) retaliation

under Title VII; (4) pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act; and (5)

retaliation under the Equal Pay Act.

B. THA Moves to Compel Arbitration

THA answered and simultaneously filed its motion to stay and

compel arbitration (docs. 6, 7). According to THA, Hall’s “claims fall within

the scope of the arbitration agreement,” so they should be submitted to

arbitration. (Doc. 6, p. 2). Hall responded by attacking the entire

agreement’s validity and enforceability. Hall argued that THA knew she

had requested a right to sue letter from the EEOC, so THA “conditioned

Hall’s continued employment on her signing an agreement to arbitrate

any claims she had against [THA].” (Doc. 9, p. 4). Hall contended that

THA sought the agreement for an “improper purpose,” and public policy

renders the agreement unenforceable. (Id. at p. 5).

Then, in its reply brief, THA argued for the first time that this court

cannot decide the issue of arbitrability because, THA says, this provision

of the arbitration agreement gives the arbitrator (here, the American

Arbitration Association or “AAA”) the exclusive ability to decide whether

the agreement is valid and enforceable:

Employee have been given the opportunity to review the

AAA’s National Rules for the Resolution of Employment

Disputes that would govern the dispute resolution process

under this agreement.

(Doc. 10, quoting doc. 6-1, p. 3) (emphasis added). THA asserted that this

provision delegates the issue of whether the agreement is enforceable to

the AAA because it incorporates the AAA’s Rules into the arbitration

agreement. And since the AAA’s Rules give the AAA “the power to rule

on their jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the

existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement,” THA says that

only the AAA—not the courts—can decide the threshold issue of whether

THA and Hall’s agreement is valid and enforceable. (Id., citing the AAA’s

Employment/Workplace Arbitration Rules R-7(a)). THA failed, however,

to mention that it expressly saved its own ability to file claims that it may

have against Hall in court and have a judge (not the AAA) decide the issue

of arbitrability:

Notwithstanding any other provision in this Agreement or

the AAA’s rules, a Court, not an arbitrator, shall decide

whether any claim asserted by [THA] against Employee

(and those acting in concert or conspiring with Employee) is

an excepted claim that falls outside the scope of this

Agreement.

(Id. at p. 2). Because THA did not raise its argument about the delegation

provision until its reply brief, the court ordered Hall to file a sur-reply to

give Hall a “fair opportunity to raise a direct, distinct challenge to the

delegation provision.” (Doc. 11, p. 3). She did. (doc. 12).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a motion to compel arbitration, the court uses a

“summary judgment-like standard” to determine whether there is a

“genuine dispute of material fact concerning the formation of … an

[arbitration] agreement.” Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861 F.3d 1338, 1346

(11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court may

consider evidence outside the pleadings. See id.; see also Bazemore v.

Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 837 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).

DISCUSSION

I. Governing Law

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4, governs the parties’

dispute over the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement.

Section 2 is the “primary substantive provision” of the FAA and provides:

A written provision in … a contract evidencing a transaction

involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy

thereafter arising out of such contract … shall be valid,

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). So, as with all other contracts, courts must

enforce arbitration agreements “according to their terms,” unless they are

“invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,

duress, or unconscionability.’” Rent-A-Ctr., W, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S.

63, 67-68 (2010) (quoting Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.

681, 687 (1996)).

Sections 3 and 4 implement § 2’s substantive rule. “Under § 3, a

party may apply to a federal court for a stay of the trial of an action ‘upon

any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such

arbitration.’” Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 68 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3). And under

§ 4, a party seeking to enforce an arbitration against an unwilling party

“may petition” a federal court for an order directing the parties to

arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section 4 requires federal courts to order

arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for

arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.” Id.

In Rent-A-Ctr., the Supreme Court applied the above FAA

provisions to an arbitration agreement that contained a delegation

provision. See 561 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2010). In doing so, the Court held that

a party seeking to avoid arbitration (like Hall) must timely lodge a distinct

challenge to an arbitration agreement’s delegation provision, rather than

the arbitration agreement as a whole, before a court can consider whether

the entire agreement is unenforceable. See id. That’s because a delegation

provision is a “written provision” to “settle by arbitration a controversy”

under § 2, and thus severable from the remainder of an arbitration

agreement. Id.; see also Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., N.A., 835 F.3d 1331,

1334 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Delegation clauses are severable from the

underlying agreement to arbitrate.”). So unless the party seeking to avoid

arbitration “challeng[es] the delegation provision specifically, [courts]

must treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4,

leaving any challenge to the validity of the agreement as a whole to the

arbitrator.” Id. at 72.

A delegation provision binds the parties only when it “clearly and

unmistakably” evidences the parties’ intent “to delegate questions of

arbitrability to the arbitrator.” See JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923, 936-

40 (11th Cir. 2018). In the Eleventh Circuit, provisions that incorporate

specific AAA Rules (like the one in THA and Hall’s agreement) are “clear

and unmistakable” evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate questions of

arbitrability to the arbitrator. See id. at p. 936; see also (doc. 6-1, p. 3). But

just because the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed to a

delegation provision doesn’t mean the delegation provision is

“unassailable.” Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 71. “If the validity of a delegation

provision is challenged in response to a motion to compel arbitration, then

the court, rather than arbitrator, must address those challenges.” Becker

v. Delek US Energy, Inc., 39 F.4th 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Rent-A-

Ctr., 561 U.S. at 71). And “if a party successfully challenges the validity

or enforceability of a delegation [provision], the court should proceed to

resolve any challenges to the validity or enforceability of the parties’

primary arbitration agreement[.]” Attix v. Carrington Mortg. Services,

Inc., 35 F.4th 1284, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Parm, 835 F.3d at

1335).

II. Application to Hall and THA’s Arbitration Agreement

With the above principles in mind, the court starts with the

threshold question: Has Hall specifically challenged the arbitration

agreement’s delegation provision as Rent-A-Ctr. requires? If the answer is

yes, then the court can proceed to the next question: Is the delegation

provision enforceable?

A. Has Hall Attacked the Agreement’s Delegation

Provision?

“Challenging a delegation agreement is a matter of substance, not

form.” Attix, 35 F.4th at 1304. It’s not enough for a party seeking to avoid

arbitration to say, “I am challenging the delegation provision,” nor is it

enough for a party to challenge the arbitration agreement as a whole. Id.

Instead, “[a] party specifically challenges the validity and enforceability

of a delegation agreement if, and only if, the substantive nature of the

party’s challenge meaningfully goes to the parties’ precise agreement to

delegate threshold arbitrability issues.” Id. (citing Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S.

at 71-72).

In her sur-reply, Hall contends the delegation provision is

unenforceable under Alabama contract law because: (a) Hall, as the party

in an inferior bargaining position, lacked a meaningful choice of whether

to agree to the delegation provision; (b) the delegation clause, alongside

the agreement’s cost splitting provision, imposes an increased financial

burden on Hall to dissuade her from pursuing claims against THA; and

(c) THA, as the party in a superior bargaining position, reserved to itself

the opportunity to have a court decide whether a claim made by THA

against Hall falls outside the scope of the agreement. (See doc. 11, pp. 10-

12).

Hall’s first two arguments do not specifically challenge the

delegation provision; they attack the arbitration agreement as a whole.

Indeed, while Hall may have lacked a meaningful choice of whether to

agree to the delegation provision, the same can be said for every other

provision in the arbitration agreement. And while Hall may incur higher

costs because of the arbitration agreement’s cost splitting provision, those

increased costs do not touch on the delegation provision specifically. See

Attix, 35 F.4th at 1304.

But Hall’s last argument—i.e., that THA reserved for itself the

opportunity to have a court decide the arbitrability of its claims—does

attack the delegation provision specifically. According to the arbitration

agreement, Hall is required to bring “all claims or controversies” she may

have against THA in arbitration except (a) claims for workers’

compensation benefits; (b) claims for unemployment benefits; and (c)

claims relating to sexual harassment or sexual assault “based on conduct

the occurs subsequent to the effective date” of the arbitration agreement.

(See doc. 6-1, p. 2). Similarly, THA is required to bring “all claims or

controversies” it may have against Hall in arbitration except for (a) claims

arising from violations of Hall’s “Employee Confidentiality Agreement or

Hall’s “unlawful use of [THA’s] trade secrets, or confidential and/or

proprietary information”; (b) claims arising out of, connecting with, or for

eviction; and (c) any claims for which “THA seeks a temporary restraining

order and/or preliminary injunction.” (Id.). But—and here’s the kicker—

under the below provision of the arbitration agreement, THA can ask a

court to decide whether one of its claims against Hall is an excepted claim:

Notwithstanding any other provision in this Agreement or

the AAA’s rules, a Court, not an arbitrator, shall decide

whether any claim asserted by [THA] against Employee

(and those acting in concert or conspiring with Employee) is

an excepted claim that falls outside the scope of this

Agreement.

(Doc. 10, p. 2). So a court—not the AAA—determines the arbitrability of

“any claim” THA asserts against Hall. Yet, under the delegation provision,

the courthouse doors are always closed to Hall. Hall argues that, because

THA had superior bargaining power and gave itself this benefit, the

delegation provision is unconscionable. This is a specific challenge to the

delegation provision because its “substantive nature” “goes to the parties’

precise agreement to delegate threshold arbitrability issues.” See Attix, 35

F.4th at 1304 (citing Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 71-72).

The court thus finds that Hall has mounted a specific challenge to

the enforceability of the agreement’s delegation provision under § 2. And

because she has, the court must now consider whether the delegation

provision is unenforceable under § 2.

B. Is the Delegation Provision Enforceable?

Because Hall’s challenge to the delegation provision under § 2 of the

FAA is that the provision is unconscionable, the court must apply

Alabama state contract law in assessing her challenge. See Cherry,

Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 582 So.2d 502, 506 (Ala. 1991) (stating that,

in Alabama, contracts are “governed by the laws of the state where it is

made”). Under Alabama law, an arbitration agreement may be held

unconscionable when (1) its terms are “grossly favorable” to one party that

has (2) overwhelming bargaining power. Am. Gen. Finance, Inc. v. Bush,

793 So.2d 738, 748 (Ala. 2000). The Alabama Supreme Court has held that

an agreement may be “grossly favorable” to a party when it reserves that

parties’ “option to litigate” while restricting the other party to arbitration

and limits the remedies the other party can receive in arbitration. See id.

at 749 (citing Roberson v. Money Tree of Ala., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1519, 1526

(M.D. Ala. 1997)).

In short, to prove the delegation provision is unconscionable, Hall

needs to show a loss of forum and a loss of remedy. Hall cannot show both.

While the delegation provision restricts Hall’s access to the courts in a

way that it doesn’t for THA, the delegation provision does not limit Hall’s

remedies. Indeed, the arbitration agreement incorporates the AAA’s

Rules, and Rule 46 states that the AAA “may grant any remedy, relief, or

outcome that the parties could have received in court, including awards of

attorney’s fees and costs, in accordance with applicable law.” (See doc. 12-

1, p. 25). So regardless of whether the decisionmaker is the AAA or a

federal district court, the remedies Hall can receive are the same. And

because her remedies aren’t limited in arbitration, the delegation

provision is not “grossly favorable” to THA under Alabama law.

As a result, Hall’s challenge to the delegation provision fails. That

means an arbitrator must resolve Hall’s overall challenges to the validity

or enforcement of the arbitration agreement. And that, in turn, means

that this court must grant THA’s motion to stay and compel arbitration,

as required by §§ 3-4 of the FAA. See Attix, 35 F.4th at 1294 (“If the

parties’ arbitration agreement applies to their dispute and no grounds

render it invalid or unenforceable, the court ‘shall’ compel arbitration and

stay proceedings in federal court. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4.”).

—

As discussed, Rent-A-Ctr. and its progeny prevent the court from

deciding Hall’s main argument that the arbitration agreement is invalid

and unenforceable because THA made Hall choose to either keep her job

or her federal lawsuit. But the court notes that if Hall had refused to sign

the arbitration agreement while her EEOC charge remained pending, and

THA fired her, THA’s decision would have likely constituted an additional

claim of retaliation under Title VII. See Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co.,

513 F.3d 1261, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2008). It would seem odd for the

conscionability of the Hobson’s choice that THA presented Hall to turn on

which choice Hall made. But for the reasons discussed, that’s a question

left solely to the arbitrator.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the court GRANTS THA’s motion to stay

and compel arbitration (doc. 6). The court ORDERS the parties to submit

a joint status report within seven days following the commencement of

arbitration, and no later than May 8, 2026.

DONE and ORDERED on March 9, 2026.

COREY □□ MAZE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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