Buck

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

JOSHUA B.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-01494-RLH

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

ORDER & OPINION

Plaintiff Joshua B. filed this suit to challenge an administrative law judge’s

finding that he is not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus ineligible to

receive disability benefits. The parties have consented to final disposition of this case

by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (See Doc. 8.) Upon review, the Court finds that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s opinion, so the Court affirms.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. The Social Security Act

The Social Security Act—and the regulations adopted under it—explain in

detail who is eligible to receive social security benefits. To qualify, a claimant must

be sixty-five years of age, blind, or disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202(a)(1)–(3). A claimant

is disabled if she cannot “do any substantial gainful activity” because she suffers from

“any medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that is either life-

threatening or chronic. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To implement that definition, the Social Security Administration has

developed a five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1). The steps

proceed sequentially:

Step One. Is the claimant currently engaged in substantial gainful

activity?

Step Two. Does the claimant have a severe mental or physical

impairment—i.e., an impairment that significantly limits their ability

to do basic work activities—or a combination of them?

Step Three. Does the mental or physical impairment appear on an

enumerated list (called “listings”)? If not, is it nonetheless medically

equal to one of those listings?

RFC Assessment. What is the claimant’s residual functional capacity

(RFC)—that is, the most they can still do despite their limitations?

Step Four. Based on the claimant’s RFC, can they perform their past

work?

Step Five. Based on the claimant’s RFC, can they perform other work?

See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v). The ALJ begins, of course, at step one. If it yields an

affirmative answer (i.e., the claimant is working), the claimant is not disabled, and

the inquiry ends. If step two yields a negative answer (i.e., the claimant does not have

a severe impairment), the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. See id.

§416.920(a)(4)(i)–(ii). Step three, however, is dispositive: If the claimant’s impairment

appears on a listing, the claimant is considered disabled and eligible for benefits. See

id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairment does not appear on or medically

equal a listing, the ALJ crafts an “RFC Assessment,” which analyzes “the claimant’s

ability to do physical and mental work activities on a regular and continuing basis

despite limitations from [their] impairment.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121

(7th Cir. 2014). If either steps four or five yield an affirmative answer (i.e., the

claimant can perform their old job or adjust to a new one in light of the RFC), the

claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv)–(v).

The claimant has the burdens of production and persuasion through step four.

See Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2022). At step five, the burden

shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in some type of

substantial gainful employment. Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.

2011).

II. Standard of Review

A court’s function on review is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal criteria.

See Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, Courts may not try the

case de novo or supplant the ALJ’s factual findings with their own. See Schmidt v.

Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). As such, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner

of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be

conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence, in turn, is “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.

97, 103 (2019) (explaining that the threshold “is not high”); Schneck v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Substantial evidence may be less than the weight of

the evidence, and more than a scintilla.” (citation modified)). Yet, although the ALJ’s

decision commands deference, courts may not simply “rubber stamp” it. Scott v.

Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002).

The Seventh Circuit has emphasized that ALJs are “subject to only the most

minimal of articulation requirements” and “need not address every piece or category

of evidence identified by a claimant, fully summarize the record, or cite support for

every proposition or chain of reasoning.” Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1053

(7th Cir. 2024). Instead, ALJ’s need only “provide an explanation for how the evidence

leads to their conclusions that is ‘sufficient to allow . . . a reviewing court, to assess

the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford [the plaintiff] meaningful

judicial review.’” Id. at 1054 (alteration in original) (quoting Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d

1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014)). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to

differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls

on the Secretary”—not the courts. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990).

Therefore, courts reviewing for substantial evidence may not “reweigh the evidence,

resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute [their]

judgment for the ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence supports” the

decision under review. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021). In short,

the ALJ must build “an accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence in the

record and his conclusions. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 638 (7th Cir. 2013).

BACKGROUND

I. Joshua

Joshua was born in 1978, (R. at 2321), and has received a high school education

and an advanced locksmith certificate, (R. at 255). He has held various jobs, including

as a metal scrapper, a welder, a roadside mechanic, and a caretaker. (R. at 256.) He

was last employed in April 2017. (R. at 69.)

II. Procedural History

Joshua applied to the Social Security Administration for disability benefits in

August 2022, alleging that he has been disabled since April 2017.2 (R. at 16.) His

application was initially denied in June 2023 and denied upon reconsideration the

following October. (R. at 16.) He then requested a hearing before an ALJ, (R. at 16),

which took place in February 2024, (R. at 55.) Present at that hearing were Josuha,

his attorney, and a vocational expert. (R. at 55.)

After the hearing, the ALJ issued a written opinion concluding that Joshua

was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability benefits. (R. at 47.) In

response, Joshua sought review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council, but

her request was denied. (R. at 1.) Joshua then filed a complaint in this Court to

1 “R.” refers to the Certified Administrative Record filed on February 6, 2025. (Doc. 6.) The page

numbers cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to the black page numbers at the bottom right

of the transcript, rather than the green page numbers generated automatically by CM/ECF at the top

right of the page.

2 Joshua also filed another application three years prior, which was denied at the initial level and upon

reconsidered, and later denied by an ALJ. (R. at 17.) Joshua appealed to this Court, which affirmed

the ALJ’s denial in September 2022. (R. at 17.) This Court’s denial of Josuha’s prior application

rendered the ALJ’s October 27, 2020 decision “administratively final,” as the ALJ below recognized.

The ALJ also recognized, however, that the prior decision was not determinative of Joshua’s disability

status after October 28, 2020. (R. at 17.) Accordingly, the ALJ narrowed the “subject” of her decision

to Joshua’s disability (or lack thereof) following October 28, 2020. (R. at 17.)

challenge the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 1.) Joshua filed his motion for summary judgment

in March 2025,3 (Doc. 9), the Commissioner responded in May, (Doc. 12), and Joshua

replied in June, (Doc. 13).

III. The ALJ’s Decision

In her opinion, the ALJ used the five-step evaluation process outlined above to

determine whether Joshua was disabled. At step one, she determined that Joshua

had not engaged in “substantial gainful activity” since 2018, “well before the relevant

period in this claim.” (R. at 19.) At step two, the ALJ found that Joshua had the

following severe impairments:

• Fibromyalgia;

• Neuropathy;

• Irritable bowel syndrome with hemorrhoids;

• Obesity;

• PTSD;

• ADHD;

• Dysthymia;

• Generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia; and

3 Plaintiff filed his brief as a motion for summary judgment. In social security appeals, however, Rule

5 of Title XIV of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that actions are “presented for decision by

the parties’ briefs.” And it is settled that district-court review is limited to the four corners of the

administrative record. Cf. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). It thus makes little sense

to file a summary judgment motion: The question is not whether there are genuine disputes of material

fact appropriate for trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, but instead whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence. See Vaile v. Chater, 916 F. Supp. 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“’[S]ummary judgment’

may be inappropriate at the district court level in social security cases.”). In any case, the Court

construes Josua’s motion for summary judgment as his opening brief. The Court also notes that

Joshua’s motion violates Civil Local Rule 5.1(A) because the document margins are smaller than one

inch.

• Intermittent explosive disorder.

(R. at 19.) At step three, the ALJ concluded that none of those impairments met or

medically equaled any of the listed impairments. (R. at 21.) Before proceeding to steps

four and five, the ALJ crafted the following RFC assessment:

[Joshua] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he is limited to

performing simple and routine tasks and making no more than simple

work-related decisions. He can have no more than occasional work-related

interaction with coworkers or supervisors, and he is limited to tasks

performed away from the general public. There should be no strict hourly

production expectations. The work environment should be static in nature

so the tasks remain the same and are unchanging.

(R. at 25.) At step four, the ALJ found that Joshua cannot perform any of his past

relevant work. (R. at 45.) Finally, at step five, the ALJ concluded that Joshua’s RFC

would allow him to perform jobs in the national economy, including “mail clerk,”

“small products assembler,” “inspector,” and “loader, semi-conductor dyes.” (R. at 46.)

Based on the ALJ’s conclusion at step five, she determined that Joshua is not

disabled. (R. at 47.)

DISCUSSION

Joshua challenges the ALJ’s opinion on three grounds. First, he argues that

the ALJ failed to adequately explain why she did not include more mental limitations

in Joshua’s RFC. Second, he argues that the ALJ ignored Joshua’s physical

impairments, including his fibromyalgia, in concluding that he could sustain the on-

task requirements of full time work. And third, he argues that the ALJ improperly

rejected the conclusions of two treating sources. As the Commissioner observes,

Joshua’s arguments amount to little more than a plea to reweigh the evidence. But

the Social Security Act takes that option off the table. Instead, this Court’s inquiry

begins—and ends—with the observation that the ALJ’s findings were supported by

substantial evidence and that she minimally articulated her rationale.

Before turning to Joshua’s arguments, the Court briefly discusses an ALJ’s

obligations when conducting an RFC assessment. As stated, the RFC refers to “the

claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities on a regular and

continuing basis despite limitations from [her] impairment.” Moore, 743 F.3d at 1121.

That determination involves two steps. First, the ALJ must “consider whether there

is an underlying ‘determinable physical or mental impairment that could reasonably

be expected to produce the [claimant’s] symptoms.’” Schneck, 357 F.3d at 701 (quoting

SSR 96-7p). If there is, the ALJ must then “evaluate the ‘intensity, persistence, and

functionally limiting effects of the symptoms’”—that is, the extent to which the

claimant’s symptoms limit her ability to work. Id. (quoting Stevenson v. Charter, 105

F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1997)). Here, the ALJ determined that Joshua’s

impairments “could be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (R. at 28.) That

finding triggered the second step in crafting the RFC, which required the ALJ to

evaluate the extent to which Joshua in fact experiences symptoms that limit his

ability to work. Although couched in different terms, Joshua’s challenges all target

this step of the ALJ’s analysis.

I. Challenge 1: The ALJ Improperly Excluded Certain Mental

Limitations in Joshua’s RFC

Joshua first observes that some evidence in the record demonstrates that he

has difficulty sustaining conversations. (Pl. Br. 10–11.4) This evidence, Joshua

argues, undermines the ALJ’s conclusion at step three that Joshua has only

“moderate” limitations in concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace (CPP)—a

conclusion Joshua characterizes as “tenuous.” (Pl. Br. 11.) According to Joshua, the

ALJ compounded this error in crafting his RFC because she simply “rested” on it and

“failed to provide a more detailed assessment of . . . mental functioning” as it relates

to Joshua’s ability to work. (Pl. Br. 11.) The Court disagrees.

At step three of her analysis, the ALJ concluded that Joshua has “moderate”

CPP limitations. (R. at 23.) As the ALJ recognized, some evidence supported a degree

of limitation in this area, including evidence that (1) Joshua strayed off topic during

his intake interview with a representative from the administration; (2) he has

difficulty following directions, communicating, understanding, and completing tasks;

and (3) he becomes upset, yells, and fights with coworkers, friends, and family. (R. at

23–24.) But the evidence was not one-sided: Other evidence suggested that Joshua

could perform daily activities with certain limitations, that his attention at doctor’s

visits was more often than not “fair or adequate,” and that he reported in 2023 and

2024 that medication improved his attention. (R. at 24.)

Joshua’s argument that the ALJ’s conclusion at step three was “tenuous” is

therefore supported by little more than Joshua’s opinion that the ALJ should have

4 “Pl. Br.” refers to Joshua’s motion for summary judgment, filed March 7, 2025. (Doc. 9.)

attributed more severe CPP limitations. But this Court is not bound by Joshua’s

opinion; it is bound by the Social Security Act, which prohibits it from “reweigh[ing]

the evidence, resolv[ing] debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine[ing] credibility,

or substitute[ing] [its] judgment for the ALJ’s determination.” Gedatus, 994 F.3d at

900. As the Commissioner observes, Joshua’s argument is essentially a plea to

“reweigh the evidence.” (Comm’r Br. 5.5) But because there is evidence that a

“reasonable mind would accept” to show moderate—but not marked—CPP

limitations, this Court must defer to the ALJ. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.

Similarly, Joshua asserts that “the ALJ cancelled out notations of significant

deficits in attention” and “dismissed” Joshua’s “episodes as irrelevant”—a failure

Joshua describes as an “unexplained” “leap in logic.” (Pl. Br. 11.) But it is Joshua’s

logic that does not track: If the ALJ simply dismissed Joshua’s claims out of hand,

then how could she have found any CPP limitations at all? Indeed, the regulations

explain that CPP limitations are classified into five levels of severity: (1) no

limitations, (2) mild, (3) moderate, (4) marked, or (4) extreme. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, App’x 1. And a moderate limitation, the regulations explain, means that

a claimant’s functioning in a given area “independently, appropriately, effectively,

and on a sustained basis is fair.” Id. A moderate limitation is thus greater than

“slightly limited” but less than “seriously limited.” Implicit in the ALJ’s step-three

conclusion, therefore, is that Joshua’s CPP abilities fall between slightly and

seriously limited. Joshua offers no compelling reason to disturb this finding.

5 “Comm’r Br.” refers to the Commissioner’s response brief, filed May 28, 2025. (Doc. 12.)

In a related argument, Joshua faults the ALJ for not “provid[ing] a more

detailed assessment of work-related mental functioning for purposes of assessing”

Joshua’s RFC. (Pl. Br. 11.) He then cites portions of the record that demonstrate that

Joshua exhibited “rapid speech, anxious mood, and tangential thought process,” along

with other symptoms of mental impairments. The ALJ erred, Joshua says, because

she simply acknowledged the existence of this evidence but failed to “wrestle with

how [it] might affect” Joshua’s ability to “sustain any work-related tasks on a full-

time basis.” (Pl. Br. 12.) Again, the Court disagrees.

To start, Joshua is correct that much of the ALJ’s RFC analysis consists of

summarizing the medical record rather than analyzing its implications. And if that

were all the ALJ did, this Court would reverse. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872

(explaining ALJs must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his

conclusion”). But it is not. Indeed, most of the ALJ’s analysis of Joahua’s mental

impairments is found in her discussion of the various medical opinions offered in the

case. For instance, the ALJ discussed at length—and ultimately rejected—an opinion

by Lawrence Yee, a licensed clinical professional counselor. (See R. at 41–43.) In doing

so, the ALJ explained that his opinion that Joshua would be unable to maintain

attention and concentration for 30% or more of an eight-hour workday was “not

persuasive in the least,” in part because it was not supported by the medical records.

(R. at 42.) The ALJ explained that “the mental health records . . . generally indicate

normal memory and cognition and often indicate normal or at least fair/adequate

attention, as well as normal thought content and at least fair insight and judgment.”

(R. at 43.) The ALJ elaborated that extreme restrictions on Joshua’s ability to “ask[]

simple questions and request[] assistance” was “contradicted by the treatment

records, where the claimant asks about changing or modifying medications, asks

providers to complete paperwork to support his disability claim, asks about treatment

options, etc..” (R. at 43.) The ALJ further observed that “more often than not,” Joshua

“displayed appropriate hygiene and grooming, and . . . was cooperative and interacted

appropriately with treating providers.” (R. at 43.) Although the ALJ recognized that

Joshua “did tend to talk over his providers and it could be hard to keep him focused,”

she observed that Joshua “was not physically or verbally aggressive or inappropriate,

was not causing disturbances in the waiting room or the exam room, etc.” (R. at 43.)

The ALJ thus concluded that “the evidence of record better supports only . . . moderate

limitations in interacting with others and in concentration, persistence, or

maintaining pace.” (R. at 43.)

The ALJ did not “fail to explain her findings,” as Joshua suggests. Instead, she

approached her RFC analysis by summarizing the medical record, analyzing the

various opinions, and compared the limitations offered by those opinions to her

interpretation of the medical evidence. Joshua does take issue with this approach.

Nor could he: The Seventh Circuit has held that an ALJ’s analysis in one portion of

their opinion may provide support for their conclusions in another. Cf. Zellweger v.

Saul, 984 F.3d 1251, 1255 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he magistrate judge was wrong to think

he was barred from considering the whole of the ALJ’s decision.”). Nor is it

appropriate for this Court to “nitpick” an ALJ’s decision. Poole v. Kijakazi, 28 F.4th

792, 797 (7th Cir. 2022) The ALJ’s analysis of the medical opinions here provides the

requisite “logical bridge” between the medical evidence of Joshua’s mental limitations

and the ALJ’s RFC assessment. Roddy, 705 F.3d at 638.

Joshua also observes that the complexity of a task is unrelated to a person’s

ability to perform it for a sustained period of time—put differently, someone with

difficulty concentrating may be unable to sustain work regardless of how simple or

complex the work may be. That is true so far as it goes, and the Seventh Circuit has

so held. See Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he relative difficulty

of a specific job assignment does not necessarily correlate with a claimant’s ability to

stay on task or perform at the speed required by a particular workplace.”). But

Joshua’s argument assumes its conclusion. Joshua assumes that the ALJ was

required to find that he had difficulty concentrating, which in turn would have

warranted additional restrictions in his RFC. See id. Yet as discussed, the ALJ

explained why she did not find substantial CPP limitations. And because an RFC

assessment need only include limitations “supported by the medical record.” Varga v.

Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), the ALJ did not err by

omitting those limitations that were not.

II. Challenge 2: The ALJ Inadequately Discussed Joshua’s Physical

Impairments, Including His Fibromyalgia

Joshua’s application was previously denied by an ALJ in October 2020. See

Joshua B. v. Saul, No. 1:21-cv-01172, Dkt. 26 (Sep. 28, 2022). In that decision, the

ALJ found that none of Joshua’s physical impairments were severe. Id. at 4.

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Joshua had the RFC to “perform a full range of work

at all exertional levels,” subject to a handful of non-exertional limitations. Id. But the

second time around (in the decision now under review), the ALJ did find that Joshua

had severe physical impairments, including Fibromyalgia, Neuropathy, Irritable

bowel syndrome with hemorrhoids, and Obesity. (R. at 19.) It follows that the ALJ’s

RFC assessment should reflect that disparity. Joshua argues that the ALJ’s RFC

assessment here did not—in particular, because the ALJ did not consider how his

physical impairments may or may not exacerbate his mental limitations. (Pl. Br. 12–

14.) The Court disagrees.

As an initial matter, the ALJ explicitly addressed this point. She recounted the

prior ALJ’s findings and explained how her RFC reflects the additional evidence of

Joshua’s physical limitations:

The prior ALJ decision issued October 27, 2020, found the claimant to have

no severe physical impairments. Additionally, the ALJ decision found the

claimant’s severe mental impairments limited the claimant to the

performance of simple and routine tasks, and simple work-related

decisions; occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors but no

contact with the general public; and the ability to tolerate only occasional

changes in a routine work setting. As set forth above, the established

residual functional capacity for October 28, 2020, to the present

incorporates the same or similar restrictions, as well as some additional

restrictions, especially as the undersigned finds the evidence of record now

establishes severe physical impairments.

(R. at 28 (emphasis added).) Those “additional restrictions”—above what the prior

ALJ found—included finding that Joshua was limited to light work (as opposed to

work at all exertional levels). This demonstrates that the ALJ was plainly aware of

the prior ALJ’s findings and that she incorporated additional limitations based on

new evidence. It also shows that the evidence of Joshua’s severe physical

impairments not only led the ALJ to include additional exertional limitations, but

also non-exertional ones—namely, the prohibition on “strict hourly production

expectations”—absent from the prior ALJ’s decision. For that reason, Joshua’s

suggestion that the ALJ failed to “wrestle . . . in any way” with additional evidence of

his physical impairments is unfounded. (Pl. Br. 13.)

Joshua points to several pieces of evidence that his physical impairments

impede not only his ability to perform physical tasks but also his ability to meet the

psychological demands of full-time work. (Pl. Br. 13.) But Joshua’s observation that

some of the evidence points in other directions does little to move the needle. There

is no requirement that the ALJ must “address every piece or category of evidence

identified by a claimant.” Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1053. Even so, as the Commissioner

observes, the ALJ did not ignore the evidence that Joshua cites to support his

challenges. (See, e.g., R. at 32 (discussing Joshua’s “anxiety, frustration, and anger”);

R. at 37 (irritable bowel syndrome); R. at 37 – 38 (ability to complete activities of daily

living); R. at 27 (discussing bathroom issues).) Accordingly, the ALJ did not “ignore

an entire line of evidence” that undermined her conclusions. Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27

F.4th 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 2022). Without that kind oversight, this Court must defer

to the ALJ’s findings.

In a similar vein, Joshua contends that the ALJ “failed to properly assess” his

fibromyalgia and widespread pain because she did not include enough limitations in

the RFC to accommodate them. (Pl. Br. 14.) As Joshua concedes, the ALJ “obviously

recognized” that Joshua suffered from fibromyalgia—she concluded at step two that

it was among his severe impairments. (R. at 20.) In doing so, she also found that

sciatica was not among Joshua’s severe impairments, instead attributing Joshua’s

“pain in his back (as well as his extremities)” to his fibromyalgia. (R. at 20.) Joshua

reads this as a concession by the ALJ that Joshua’s fibromyalgia has a “wide-ranging

impact.” (Pl. Br. 14.) But rejecting Joshua’s allegation of sciatica is not a concession

at all; it is merely an observation that particular symptoms are attributable to

another cause. In any case, the ALJ discussed Joshua’s fibromyalgia at several points

in her opinion. (See, e.g., R. at 20; R. at 37; 38; see also, e.g., R. at 39 (discussing

medications and treatment for Joshua’s fibromyalgia).) Although Joshua asserts that

his fibromyalgia limited his lifting and carrying abilities, the ALJ clearly credited his

allegations on this point: His RFC was limited to “light work,” defined by the

regulations as involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). And

the remainder of Joshua’s argument—i.e., that Fibromyalgia limits his ability to sit,

stand, walk, reach, and manipulate—relies entirely on a medical opinion that the

ALJ explicitly rejected. As explained below, the ALJ acted within her discretion in

doing so.

III. Challenge 3: The ALJ Improperly Rejected Two Medical Opinions

Joshua’s final challenge is that the ALJ should have accepted the opinions of

two treating sources: Dr. Miller and Lawrence Yee. But the ALJ articulated her

reasons for rejecting those opinions. Since her conclusion was not patently wrong,

Joshua’s argument fails.

Historically, a treating physician’s opinion was entitled to controlling weight,

so long as it was supported by medical findings and consistent with other evidence in

the record. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. But as Joshua recognizes, the Social Security

Administration eliminated that rule in 2017. Susan T.W. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-1720,

2020 WL 3077591, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c).

Accordingly, for claims filed after March 2017 (like Joshua’s), ALJs must assess

medical opinions in light of several factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Those factors

include: (1) supportability, meaning the objective medical evidence on which the

opinion is grounded; (2) consistency with other evidence; (3) the physician’s

relationship to the claimant; and (4) the physician’s bona fides. See id. §

404.1520c(c)(1)–(5). Unsurprisingly, the supportability and consistency of an opinion

are the most important. See id. § 404.1520c(a).

Start with Dr. Rhett Miller. He treated Joshua two to three times per year,

beginning in 2009. In October 2022, he completed a “Medical Evaluation” report and

opined on Joshua’s work-related limitations. Among them, Dr. Miller found that

Joshua’s reaching, handling, and fingering capacity was limited, (R. at 2063); that he

could never balance or crawl, and only occasionally climb ladders, scaffolds, stairs

and ramps, (R. at 2064); that he could occasionally stoop, kneel, and crouch, (R. at

2064); that he has “marked” limitations in carrying out complex instructions,

interacting with the public, coworkers, and supervisors, (R. at 2067); and moderate

limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, (R.

at 2067). The ALJ, however, found Dr. Miller’s conclusions “largely lacking in

persuasive value.” (R. at 40.) For one thing, the ALJ recognized that portions of the

opinion were internally inconsistent: “Dr. Miller answered ‘No’ to the question asking

if the claimant’s impairments affected his hearing or vision” and also “’No’ to the

questions asking if the claimant retained the ability to hear and understand simple

oral instructions and to communicate simple information . . . .” (R. at 40.) Another

problem with the opinion the ALJ identified was that Dr. Miller “set forth significant

restrictions on the questionnaire” based on “only generalized muscle pain and

hemorrhoids.” (R. at 41.) Dr. Miller “specifically noted the claimant had no loss of

motion of the joints, no deficiencies in hand manipulation, and no weakness in the

extremities.” (R. at 41.) The ALJ also found the opinion “unsubstantiated by the

evidence of record”—for example, because the evidence demonstrated that Joshua

was able to “understand the instructions given by Dr. Miller and other treating

providers, has routinely told Dr. Miller and other treating providers about his health

problems and concerns, . . . and [Joshua] has called the offices of his various providers

as needed to request paperwork be completed, express concerns, or request

medications.”6 (R. at 40.)

Dr. Lawrence Yee also offered a medical opinion in the form of a “Functional

Capacity” questionnaire. He suggested that Joshua was significantly restricted in

6 Joshua contests this finding because “every provider at one time or another has explicitly stated that”

Joshua has not been able to communicate effectively with them. (Pl. Br. 15.) True, some evidence in

the record suggests that Joshua lacks the ability to do so. And the ALJ recognized as much: In one

case, for example, a nurse was “barely able to talk” to Joshua because he completely dominated the

conversation. (R. at 32.) But again, some evidence leans the other way: For example, at a May 11, 2021

therapy session, Joshua “was alert and oriented, cooperative and casually dressed. He displayed motor

stiffness but normal speech.” (R. at 32.) This Court is not entitled to reweigh it. See Herr, 912 F.2d at

181.

several categories of mental functioning, including his ability to “carry out short and

simple instructions,” “understand and remember detailed instructions,” and “perform

activities within a schedule.” (R. at 41; R. at 2011–13.) The ALJ also rejected this

opinion as “not persuasive in the least” because, among other things, it was

“unsupported by [Mr. Yee’s] counseling notes or the treatment notes from the

claimant’s psychiatrist.” The ALJ also found that Mr. Yee’s conclusion that Joshua

was completely unable to function outside the home” inconsistent with a

questionnaire that Joshua himself completed in April 2023, in which he indicated

that he “did his own grocery shopping and . . could go places alone.” (R. at 42.)

All told, the ALJ rejected Dr. Miller’s and Mr. Yee’s opinions because they were

either internally inconsistent, because the significant restrictions proposed were not

supported by the medical record, or both. See also Clifford, 227 F.3d at 871

(explaining that “internal inconsistency” is a permissible reason to reject the opinion

of a treating physician, so long as the ALJ explains the inconsistency); see also Knight

v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Medical evidence may be discounted if it

is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence” in the record.). And

under the substantial evidence standard, an ALJ need only provide “some idea of

why” they refuse to adopt medical opinions. Spicher v. Berryhill, 898 F.3d 754, 758

(7th Cir. 2018). The ALJ here discharged that obligation.7

7 As the Commissioner observes, the ALJ instead largely credited the opinions of the state-agency

psychologists in concluding that Joshua “could perform simple but not complex tasks with modified

social demands.” (Comm’r Br. 4.) Joshua does not challenge the ALJ’s reliance on those opinions.

CONCLUSION

Joshua’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 9), is DENIED. The

Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment

and close this case.

So ordered.

Entered this 9th day of March 2026.

s/ Ronald L. Hanna

Ronald L. Hanna

United States Magistrate Judge