Shaw

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00226-MR

SANDY MARTIN SHAW, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

MITCHELL COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by the Defendants Mitchell County, Donald Street, Rickey

Wiseman, Stacey Hughes, and Terry Silvers [Doc. 39].

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff Sandy Martin Shaw brings this suit against Mitchell

County, Mitchell County Sheriff Donald Street in his individual and official

capacities, and Mitchell County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) employees Rickey

Van Wiseman, Stacey Hughes, Terry L. Silvers, and Unknown John Doe

Officers, in their official and individual capacities, as well as the Plaintiff’s ex-

wife Wanda Earp, and her daughters Erica Turner Crump and Sidney Marie

Britt, arising from an alleged assault and the Plaintiff’s subsequent

involuntary commitment on September 2, 2021. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff brings

the following claims for relief: (1) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

“unlawful seizure, detention, and involuntary commitment” against

Defendants Wiseman, Hughes, and Silvers [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 69-81]; (2) a § 1983

claim for Monell1 liability against Mitchell County and Sheriff Street [id. at ¶¶

82-93]; (3) an abuse of process claim under North Carolina law against

Defendants Wiseman, Hughes, Silvers, Earp, Crump, and Britt [id. at ¶¶ 94-

100]; and (4) a claim for false imprisonment under North Carolina law against

Defendants Wiseman, Hughes, Silvers, Street, and Mitchell County [id. at ¶¶

101-107].

The Plaintiff has obtained entries of default against Defendants Earp,

Crump, and Britt. [See Docs. 17, 18, 24]. The John Doe Officers have never

been identified or served.

The remaining Defendants now move for summary judgment. [Doc.

39].2 The Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition [Doc. 42], and the

Defendants have filed a reply [Doc. 46]. Having been fully briefed, this matter

is ripe for adjudication.

1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

2 The Defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment did not

comply with the Court’s font requirements. [See Docs. 40, 44]. Accordingly, this

memorandum was stricken, and the Defendants were allowed to file a corrected brief.

[Doc. 45].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “As the Supreme Court has

observed, ‘this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

genuine issue of material fact.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,

Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 519 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).

“Facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the case,

and a genuine issue exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc.,

968 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting News & Observer Publ’g Co. v.

Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010)). When

ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not “weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop.

Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jacobs v. N.C. Admin.

Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015)). “Regardless of

whether he may ultimately be responsible for proof and persuasion, the party

seeking summary judgment bears an initial burden of demonstrating the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 522. If

this showing is made, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who

must convince the Court that a triable issue does exist. Id.

In considering the motion for summary judgment, the Court must view

the pleadings and materials presented “in the light most favorable” to the

nonmovant and must “draw all reasonable inferences” in the nonmovant’s

favor. Adams v. Trustees of Univ. of N.C.—Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 556

(4th Cir. 2011).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewing the forecasts of evidence in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.

The Plaintiff married Wanda Earp in 2012. [Doc. 40-3: Pltf. Dep. at 2].

In 2019, the Plaintiff and his wife moved to their home in Mitchell County,

North Carolina, near the border with Yancey County (the “Shaw Residence”).

[Id. at 3]. The couple made this move because Wanda’s son, Rusty Britt,

had purchased property nearby and wanted the Plaintiff and Wanda to help

him start a “glamping” community called “Rusty’s Roost.” [Id. at 3-4].

On September 2, 2021, the Plaintiff told Wanda that their marriage was

over and that he wanted a divorce. [Id. at 25]. The Plaintiff left the Shaw

Residence and drove to Asheville to look for an attorney. [Id. at 26]. While

in Asheville, the Plaintiff ate a sandwich and had two vodka and cranberry

drinks. [Id. at 28]. Wanda repeatedly called and texted him, begging him to

come back home to talk about the marriage. [Id. at 26-27, 28].

As the Plaintiff was headed back to the Shaw Residence to talk to

Wanda, Sidney called 911, stating that the Plaintiff was “manic. Very crazy

… and he’s telling her [Wanda] that it’s over and he’s gonna tear shit up and

he’s gonna burn this place down.” [Id. at 33-34; Doc. 40-8: First 911 Call Tr.

at 2]. The 911 operator informed the caller that law enforcement would be

sent to the residence. [Doc. 40-8: First 911 Call Tr. at 4]. Defendant Hughes

received the dispatch call and began making his way to the Shaw residence.

[Doc. 40-5: Hughes Dep. at 3].

The Plaintiff arrived at his home in the early evening. [Doc. 40-3: Pltf.

Dep. at 27]. In addition to carrying a Glock 26 on his person, the Plaintiff had

an AR-15 lying on the front seat of his car. [Id. at 31, 32-33]. The Plaintiff

also had three five-gallon cans filled with gasoline and diesel fuel in his car.

[Id. at 38]. Upon the Plaintiff’s arrival, Sidney asked the Plaintiff to go inside

the home and talk, and the Plaintiff agreed. [Id. at 29]. Sidney and the

Plaintiff began to argue, and the Plaintiff attempted to leave. When he

walked outside onto the porch, he immediately encountered Erica aiming

Wanda’s pistol at him and saying, “I’ll kill you.” [Id. at 29-30]. Fearing for his

life, the Plaintiff attempted to disarm Erica by rushing her, yelling at her,

sweeping her legs, and striking her hand holding the gun. During this

altercation, the pistol discharged, striking the Plaintiff’s left thumb. [Id. at 31].

Erica and the Plaintiff both collapsed on the porch floor, at which point Sidney

grabbed the pistol and began beating the Plaintiff on the back of the head

with the butt of the pistol. [Id.]. Eventually, Wanda said, “that’s enough,” and

Sidney gave her the gun. [Id. at 32]. Although the Plaintiff was lawfully

carrying a firearm pursuant to a concealed carry permit, he never brandished

or displayed his firearm at any time during this altercation. [Id. at 31-32].

At some point after the Plaintiff arrived, Sidney called 911 a second

time and provided a real-time narration of the events as they occurred to the

911 operator. [Doc. 40-9: Second 911 Call Tr.]. The shot that resulted in the

injury to the Plaintiff’s hand could be heard on the 911 call. [Id. at 2]. Sidney

informed the 911 operator that the Plaintiff “went after my sister and the

trigger got pulled and it hit,” and that “he’s like manic, he’s got mental

problems.” [Doc. 40-12: Second 911 Call Tr. at 4, 6]. A male voice can be

heard in the background saying, “you ain’t seen nothing yet”; Sidney

attributed this statement to the Plaintiff.3 [Id. at 7]. Sidney stated,

“Something’s wrong with him, he’s never acted like that. I knew he was

capable of it but we’ve always been able to calm him down, but I knew this

was it for my mama.” [Id. at 12].

The Plaintiff asked Wanda to take him to the hospital, and Sidney told

the 911 operator that the Plaintiff was trying to make her mom get in his car.

[Doc. 40-3: Pltf. Dep. at 33]. Fearing another attack, disoriented, and in

severe pain due to the blood loss and injuries sustained to his thumb and

head, the Plaintiff returned to his vehicle and began driving to the hospital.

[Id. at 32-33, 37].

According to official county records, Mitchell County’s Central

Communications dispatched officers to the Shaw Residence at

approximately 5:45 p.m. [Doc. 43-8: CFS Report]. Separate from this

dispatch, Sheriff Street sent a group text to all MCSO officers asking all of

those who were available to respond to the reports of shots being fired at the

Shaw Residence. [Doc. 43-2: Silvers Dep. at 3, 4-5].

MCSO officers stopped the Plaintiff at approximately 6:06 p.m. on the

road a short distance from the Shaw Residence. [Doc. 40-5: Hughes Dep. at

3 There is nothing in the forecast of evidence to indicate that any other male was present

at the Shaw Residence at the time of the altercation.

4-5]. The Plaintiff stopped his vehicle and got out with his hands up because

“I’d just sat up there and listened to her [Sidney] lie to 911. I knew what was

coming.” [Doc. 40-3: Pltf. Dep. at 39-40, 41]. The officers directed the

Plaintiff to “lay down,” and he complied. [Id. at 40]. An unidentified officer

approached and placed his knee in the center of the Plaintiff’s back. [Id.].

The Plaintiff told this officer that he needed to have surgery on his arm, and

he requested that the officer use two cuffs. [Id.]. The officer replied, “Fuck

your surgery” and jerked the Plaintiff’s arm twice, causing him pain. [Id.]. A

Mitchell County lieutenant then told the officer to use two cuffs on the Plaintiff.

[Id.]. While the Plaintiff was on the ground handcuffed, he moved his head

to relax. At that point, Yancey County4 Sheriff’s deputy Jason Edmonds5

slammed his gun into the back of Plaintiff’s head and said, “You move again,

I’ll blow your fucking brains out.” [Id. at 43-44]. The Plaintiff told the detaining

officers that he was injured and the victim of a premediated attack. [Id. at

42]. At least one MCSO officer laughed at the Plaintiff in response. [Id.].

Defendant Hughes, who was on his way to the Shaw Residence, came

upon the traffic stop of the Plaintiff. He observed the Plaintiff in handcuffs on

4 Officers from both Mitchell County and Yancey County Sheriff’s Departments were on

the scene, as the Plaintiff’s home is right on the Yancey and Mitchell county line. [See

Doc. 40-5: Hughes Dep. at 7].

5 Deputy Edmonds is not named as a defendant in this case.

the ground. He noted that the Plaintiff was “very loud, screaming, yelling at

the officers.” [Doc. 40-5: Hughes Dep. at 6]. The Plaintiff was also bleeding

from his thumb, and it appeared to Defendant Hughes that the Plaintiff was

having “serious emotional, mental something going on” and was a “danger

to himself.” [Id. at 6, 9, 15]. He observed that the Plaintiff also smelled

“strongly of alcohol.”6 [Id. at 11]. Defendant Hughes further observed a rifle

in the car along with some gasoline cans. [Id. at 10]. Hughes then went to

the Shaw Residence to investigate the domestic disturbance, where he took

pictures and interviewed Wanda, Erica, and Sidney. [Id. at 12, 13].

Defendant Wiseman was working at MCSO headquarters on the

evening of September 2, 2021, when he received a call from communications

regarding a domestic violence incident at the Shaw Residence. [Doc. 40-6:

Wiseman Dep. at 2]. The information from dispatch was that the Plaintiff was

in an altercation with his mother, not his wife and her daughters. [Id. at 9].

Before getting to the scene of the Plaintiff’s arrest, Defendant Wiseman

received a call from a Mitchell County deputy sheriff at the scene of the traffic

stop asking him to obtain an involuntary commitment (“IVC”) order for the

Plaintiff. [Id. at 4-6]. Specifically, the deputy informed Defendant Wiseman

6 The Plaintiff’s blood alcohol concentration was .139 when it was tested approximately

six hours later at Blue Ridge Regional Hospital. [Doc. 40-3: Pltf. Dep. at 50-51].

that the Plaintiff “was acting in a manic state [and] that he had been—a

firearm was involved. He had been injured with the firearm. He had cans of

gas and was threatening to burn his house down.” [Id. at 7-8]. Defendant

Wiseman did not check or inquire as to whether the Plaintiff had any history

of mental illness or criminal record prior to seeking the IVC. [Id. at 8-9].

At 7:15 p.m., Defendant Wiseman appeared before a magistrate to

secure a custody order involuntarily committing the Plaintiff for a psychiatric

evaluation. [Doc. 43-10: IVC Petition and Order; Doc. 40-6: Wiseman Dep.

at 10-11]. Defendant Wiseman presented under oath “the facts that [he] was

given by radio from Communications and the deputy.” [Doc. 40-6: Wiseman

Dep. at 7, 11]. The magistrate’s custody order relied solely on the information

provided by Defendant Wiseman. [Doc. 43-10: IVC Petition and Order; Doc.

40-6: Wiseman Dep. at 11]. The IVC Petition stated as follows:

A call came into Mitchell 911 that the respondent was

in a manic state and was in an altercation with his

mother. After an altercation with his family in which

the subject had a gun and during a struggle, a round

went through his hand. Subject told law enforcement

officer that he had 3 cans of gasoline in which he was

going to burn down his house. Due to the subject’s

current mental state, he [is] an immediate danger to

himself and others.

[Doc. 43-10: IVC Petition]. The magistrate found reasonable grounds to

believe the Plaintiff had a mental illness and was dangerous to himself or

others, and therefore entered an Involuntary Commitment Order (“IVC

Order”) ordering the Plaintiff to be taken into custody. [Doc. 40-11 at 4: IVC

Order].

Defendant Wiseman took the IVC Order to Blue Ridge Regional

Hospital, where the Plaintiff was being treated for his thumb. [Doc. 40-6:

Wiseman Dep. at 11-12]. Defendant Wiseman gave the IVC Order to the

officer on the scene, Defendant Silvers, who in turn advised the Plaintiff of

its contents. [Doc. 40-6: Wiseman Dep. at 12; Doc. 40-7: Silvers Dep. at 3,

4, 6]. Despite the statements in the IVC Petition, Defendant Silvers observed

that the Plaintiff appeared to be in pain but non-combative, not in a manic

state, and not a threat to himself or others. [Doc. 43-2: Silvers Dep. at 10-

11, 15-16].

After the Plaintiff was treated at Blue Ridge, Defendant Silvers

transported the Plaintiff to Mission Hospital Copestone in Asheville to be

evaluated. [Doc. 40-7: Silvers Dep. at 5, 7-8].

The first examination was done on September 3, 2021 by Dr. Emily

Felty, who opined that the Plaintiff had a mental illness and was a danger to

himself or others. [Doc. 40-12: First Examination Report]. Dr. Felty

recommended that the Plaintiff be kept in an inpatient commitment for ten

days. [Id. at 4; Doc. 40-3: Pltf. Dep. at 48]. The Plaintiff was examined a

second time on September 5, 2021. That examiner found that the Plaintiff

“needs to be in a safe setting until we can clarify that he is not a danger to

self or others.” [Doc. 40-12: Second Examination Report at 5-7]. The

examiner ordered the Plaintiff to be held inpatient for seven days. [Id. at 7].

The Plaintiff was released from Mission Hospital on September 9, 2021, after

a doctor found that he did not pose a danger to himself or others. [Doc. 40-

3: Pltf. Dep. at 49].

Upon his release, the Plaintiff was served with arrest warrants for

resisting a public officer from the vehicle stop and for assault charges

brought by Erica and Sidney. [Id. at 18, 19-20, 21]. The Plaintiff pled guilty

to the resisting charge. [Doc. 40-13 at 4: Judgment]. The District Attorney’s

Office determined that nobody would be prosecuted for the altercation at the

Shaw Residence. [Doc. 40-5: Hughes Dep. at 16, 17].

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

The Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, imposes civil liability

upon every person who, under color of law, deprives another of rights

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing (1)

the deprivation “of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States,” and (2) that “the alleged deprivation was committed under color of

state law.” Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727 (4th Cir.

1999). By its terms, § 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it merely provides

remedies for deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” City of Okla. City

v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (citation omitted).

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts a singular claim under § 1983

Defendants Wiseman, Hughes, and Silvers in their individual capacities for

“unlawful seizure, detention, and involuntary commitment.” [Doc. 1 at 15-

16]. A closer reading of this claim, however, reveals that the Plaintiff appears

to be asserting claims for excessive force and for unlawful seizure and

detention (i.e., arrest without probable cause and involuntary commitment

without due process). [Id. at ¶ 76]. The Court will address each of these

claims in turn.

1. Excessive Force

The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures….” U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655

(1961). “The Fourth Amendment bars police officers from using excessive

force to effectuate a seizure.” Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 884 (4th Cir.

2016).

Here, the Plaintiff claims that an officer used grossly excessive force

by slamming the back of a pistol into the Plaintiff’s head while he was

handcuffed.7 [Doc. 1 at ¶ 73].

In order for a defendant to be held liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must

“affirmatively show[ ] that the official acted personally in the deprivation of

the plaintiff’s rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985)

(quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). The Plaintiff

has failed to present a forecast of evidence that any of the individual

Defendants were involved in slamming the back of a pistol into his head. On

the contrary, the Plaintiff testified that this action was done by a Yancey

County Sheriff’s deputy who has not been named in this action. Accordingly,

the Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against the individuals Defendants must

necessarily fail.

7 This incident is the only act of excessive force identified in the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

itself. Elsewhere in the Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges other acts of excessive force,

including the jerking of his right arm while handcuffing him and the refusal of “immediate

medical treatment.” [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 48.a, b]. As for the jerking of his arm, the Plaintiff has

not presented any forecast of evidence attributing that action to any of the named

Defendants. As for the delay in medical treatment, the Plaintiff has failed to present a

forecast of evidence that there was an unreasonable delay in providing medical

assistance to the Plaintiff at the traffic stop. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th

Cir. 1988) (holding that pretrial detainee can show a due process violation where medical

treatment is unreasonably delayed where the need for such treatment is apparent).

2. Unlawful Seizure and Detention

In North Carolina, a person who has knowledge of an individual who

has a mental illness and is either “dangerous to himself” or “dangerous to

others,” may appear before a clerk or magistrate and execute an affidavit to

this effect, and petition the clerk or magistrate for issuance of an order to

take the respondent into custody for examination by a commitment examiner.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-261(a). “Dangerous to self” means an individual who

“would be unable, without care….to exercise self-control, judgment, and

discretion in the conduct of the individual’s daily responsibilities and social

relations.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a). “Dangerous to others” is defined

as someone who “has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict

serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a

substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another…” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-

3(11)b.

The involuntary commitment of an individual for an emergency mental

health evaluation constitutes a seizure within the Fourth Amendment. See

Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993). “Determining whether a

person’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated in the mental health

context requires [the court] to determine whether the officials had probable

cause to seize the person for an emergency mental evaluation.” Barrett v.

Pae Gov't Servs., Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 429 (4th Cir. 2020). “Such probable

cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the defendant's

knowledge and of which the defendant had reasonably trustworthy

information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe that the person

poses a danger to himself or others.” Id. (quoting in part Goines v. Valley

Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 172 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Probable cause is determined by a “totality-of-the-circumstances”

approach. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). “While probable cause

requires more than bare suspicion, it requires less than that evidence

necessary to convict.” United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir.

1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is an objective standard of

probability that reasonable and prudent persons apply in everyday life.” Id.

“This is particularly true in the mental health context where police officers and

mental health professionals are called upon to make a number of difficult

judgment calls in their efforts to protect both the individual and the public from

potential dangers, and there is a distinct lack of clarity in the law governing

seizures for psychological evaluations.” Barrett, 975 F.3d at 429 (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Plaintiff was involuntarily committed pursuant to an IVC Order,

which was issued by a magistrate upon a determination that there was

probable cause to believe that the Plaintiff had a mental illness and presented

a danger to himself or to others. [Doc. 40-11 at 4: IVC Order]. The issuance

of a warrant or indictment usually “conclusively determines the existence of

probable cause,” unless it can be shown that an officer “deliberately supplied

misleading information that influenced the [judge's or grand jury's] decision.”

Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012). In addition to being

misleading, such information must also be material to the determination of

probable cause. To determine whether an alleged misrepresentation was

material, the Court must excise the misrepresentation and consider whether

the “corrected” warrant would establish probable cause. See id.; see also

Miller v. Prince George's County, 475 F.3d 621, 628 (4th Cir. 2007).

The Plaintiff argues that Defendant Wiseman’s petition was untrue and

misleading because (1) the Plaintiff had not in fact been in an altercation with

his mother, but with his wife and step-daughters; (2) the Plaintiff did not

brandish a firearm during the altercation, but the petition implies that the

Plaintiff did so and was shot with his own gun; (3) the Plaintiff did not tell law

enforcement that he was going to burn down his house; and (4) the Plaintiff

was not, in fact, an immediate danger to himself or others. With regard to

the first three statements, to the extent that any of these statements were

misleading, they were not material to the determination of probable cause.

If these allegedly inaccurate statements were excised (or corrected) and the

information about whose bullet the gun came from was clarified, Defendant

Wiseman’s petition would read as follows:

A call came into Mitchell 911 that the respondent was

in a manic state and was in an altercation with his

[wife and her adult daughters]. After an altercation

with his family in which the subject had a gun and

during a struggle, a round went through his hand.

[The round came from his stepdaughter’s gun.]

Subject told [his wife and her daughters] that he

had 3 cans of gasoline in which he was going to burn

down his house. Due to the subject’s current mental

state, he [is] an immediate danger to himself and

others.

[Doc. 40-11 at 2: IVC Petition] (bold and bracketed material added). Even

with the allegedly inaccurate statements excised, probable cause still would

exist for the Plaintiff’s detention because there would be enough probable

cause for a magistrate to believe that the Plaintiff presented a danger to

himself or others.

As for the statement that the Plaintiff was “an immediate danger to

himself and others,” this statement was a conclusion that the officers at the

traffic stop reached based on their observations of the Plaintiff. The

undisputed forecast of evidence shows that Defendant Hughes received a

call from dispatch advising that the Plaintiff was in a manic state and that he

was threatening to burn down his house. While Hughes was en route to the

Shaw Residence, an additional message was sent out by dispatch reporting

that shots had been fired and that the Plaintiff had been shot. When the

Plaintiff was stopped by officers a short distance from the residence, he was

clearly injured, smelled strongly of alcohol, was in an agitated and emotional

state, was yelling and screaming at the officers. Critically, the officers also

observed that he had firearms and multiple cans of gasoline in his vehicle.

The Plaintiff argues that there is no forecast of evidence that he made

any statement—to the officers or to his family—indicating that he was a

threat to himself or anyone else. [Doc. 42 at 7]. Even assuming that is true,

however, the undisputed fact remains that the officers had been informed

that he had made such statements. The report of such statements,

combined with the officers’ observation of the Plaintiff’s agitated behavior, his

intoxicated state, the reports of a physical alteration and a shooting at his

residence, and the presence of firearms and gasoline in his vehicle,

reasonably led the officers to believe that the Plaintiff was suffering from a

mental illness and a danger to himself or to others such that an involuntary

commitment was warranted.8 As such, no reasonable jury could conclude

that the inclusion in the IVC Petition of the statement that the Plaintiff was

“an immediate danger to himself and others” was a materially false

statement.

The Plaintiff contends that he was “handcuffed and compliant at all

relevant times” during the traffic stop, and thus, the officers had no basis to

believe that he was an imminent danger to himself or anyone else. [Doc. 42

at 7]. The Plaintiff, however, offers no forecast of evidence in this regard,

and he does not dispute Defendant Hughes’ characterization of his behavior

at the traffic stop. Moreover, the Plaintiff’s argument that he was “compliant

at all relevant times” is precluded by his subsequent plea of guilty to the

charge of resisting a public officer, a charge which stemmed from his conduct

during this traffic stop. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 485-87 (1994).

8 The fact that the Plaintiff was observed to be calm and cooperative a few hours later in

the hospital does not undermine this probable cause determination. A person suffering

from a mental illness may not exhibit symptoms of such illness at all times. Moreover, the

fact that doctors determined several days later that the Plaintiff was not in fact suffering

from a mental illness does not negate the officers’ prior determination that there was

probable cause to believe that the Plaintiff was exhibiting signs of a mental illness. “Just

as actual innocence will not render an arrest invalid if it is based on then-existing probable

cause that criminal activity is occurring, a mental health seizure can rest upon probable

cause even when the person seized does not actually suffer from a dangerous mental

condition.” Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Defendants had

probable cause to believe that the Plaintiff presented a danger to himself and

others. The Plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim arising from his involuntary

commitment, therefore, must be dismissed.9

3. Qualified Immunity

The Defendants contend that even if they lacked probable cause to

seize and detain the Plaintiff for an involuntary commitment, they are entitled

to the protection of qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers

who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established

law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v.

Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether

an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether

the plaintiff has demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right

and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

9 The Plaintiff also argues that Sheriff Street is personally liable for his role in the Plaintiff’s

unlawful detention. [Doc. 42 at 13-16]. The Plaintiff did not present such a claim against

Sheriff Street in his Complaint. “[A] plaintiff may not raise new claims after discovery has

begun without amending his complaint.” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v.

McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 336 (4th Cir. 2009). Even if the Plaintiff had properly asserted

such a claim, it would be dismissed for the reasons asserted supra.

Here, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the

Plaintiff’s right to be free of being detained for involuntary commitment under

these facts was not clearly established. The Fourth Circuit has recognized

that there is a “lack of clarity in the law governing seizures for psychological

evaluations, compared with the painstaking definition of probable cause in

the criminal arrest context.” Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir.

2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike the

determination of probable cause in a criminal case, probable cause in the

mental health context requires an assessment of a “dual concern” not

present in criminal cases. See Cloaninger ex. rel. Estate of Cloaninger v.

McDevitt, 555 F.3d. 324, 334 (4th Cir. 2009) (“the reasonableness of the

officers’ response must be gauged against the reasonableness of their

perceptions—in that case, of a genuine danger not only to the residents of

the apartment complex but to the plaintiff herself”) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Under the facts presented to them in this case,

the Court concludes that the Defendants’ conduct was objectively

reasonable and that they are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

4. Monell Liability

As the Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of evidence to support

any underlying constitutional violation, his municipal liability claims against

Sheriff Street, Mitchell County, and Defendants Hughes, Silvers, and

Wiseman in their official capacities must also fail. See Young v. City of Mount

Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 579 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The law is quite clear in this circuit

that a section 1983 failure-to-train claim cannot be maintained against a

governmental employer in a case where there is no underlying constitutional

violation by the employee.”); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1990)

(“Because it is clear that there was no constitutional violation we need not

reach the question of whether a municipal policy was responsible for the

officers' actions.”).

B. State Law Claims

1. Abuse of Process

The tort of abuse of process “is the misuse of legal process for an

ulterior purpose. It consists in the malicious misuse or misapplication of that

process after issuance to accomplish some purpose not warranted or

commanded by the writ. It is the malicious perversion of a legally issued

process whereby a result not lawfully or properly obtainable under it is

attempted to be secured.” Fowle v. Fowle, 263 N.C. 724, 728, 140 S.E.2d

398, 401 (1965) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). To prove an abuse

of process claim under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1)

a prior proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff by the defendant or used

by him to achieve an ulterior motive or purpose; and (2) once the proceeding

was initiated, the defendant committed some willful act not proper in the

regular prosecution of the proceeding.” Semones v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,

106 N.C. App. 334, 341, 416 S.E.2d 909, 913 (1992).

Here, the Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Wanda Earp conspired

with her two daughters, Erica Crump and Sidney Britt, to lure the Plaintiff

back to the Shaw Residence “to provoke an altercation resulting in [the

Plaintiff’s] death or, failing that, his false arrest and/or involuntary

commitment in an attempt to prevent [the Plaintiff] from divorcing Wanda

Earp and recovering marital and personal assets, including [the Plaintiff’s]

personal investments in Rusty’s Roost….” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 31]. The Plaintiff

further has alleged that as part of this conspiracy, Wanda, Erica, and Sidney

“enlisted the assistance of . . . officers in the MCSO to coordinate a law

enforcement response to the altercation that Wanda Earp, Erica Crump, and

Sidney Britt intended to create.” [Id. at ¶ 32]. Critically, however, the Plaintiff

has failed to present a forecast of evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that any such conspiracy existed.10

10 The Plaintiff testified at his deposition that after his altercation with Erica, he “knew [he

was] being set up” and “that this whole thing was a plot to kill me.” [Doc. 40-3: Pltf. Dep.

at 36]. Other than the Plaintiff’s own conclusory speculation, however, the Plaintiff offers

no forecast of evidence that his wife and step-daughters were plotting to kill him or have

him involuntarily committed, much less that the Mitchell County Sheriff’s Office was

willingly involved with such a conspiracy.

The Plaintiff’s theory—that the Defendant officers conspired with his

ex-wife and stepdaughters to involuntarily commit the Plaintiff when his ex-

wife’s attempt to murder him was unsuccessful—is utterly unsupported by

the record and borders on frivolous. The Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim

against the Defendant officers, therefore, is dismissed.

2. False Imprisonment

A claim of false imprisonment requires a showing of “the illegal restraint

of a person against his will.” Emory v. Pendergraph, 154 N.C. App. 181, 185,

571 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2002) (citation omitted). Thus, a claim of false

imprisonment necessarily “calls for the absence of probable cause.” Massey

v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 358 (4th Cir. 2014). Because the Court concludes

that the Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of evidence from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that probable cause was lacking for his

involuntary commitment, the Plaintiff’s state law claims for false

imprisonment against Defendants Wiseman, Hughes, Silvers, Street, and

Mitchell County also must be dismissed.

C. Doe Defendants

In the caption of his Complaint, the Plaintiff also names as defendants

“Unknown John Doe Officers” in their official and individual capacities. [Doc.

1 at 1]. While the Plaintiff alleges that these Doe Defendants are employees

of the MCSO, the Plaintiff does not assert any specific claims against them.

[See Doc. 1 at ¶ 7 (alleging that “it will require further discovery to identify

these individuals, their specific acts, and their specific omissions”)]. Because

the Plaintiff has not asserted any claims against the Doe Defendants, the

Court will dismiss these defendants without prejudice sua sponte.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted, and the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants

Mitchell County, Mitchell County Sheriff Donald Street, and Mitchell County

Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) employees Rickey Wiseman, Stacey Hughes, and

Terry Silvers, in their official and individual capacities are dismissed with

prejudice. Further, the Defendants identified in the Plaintiff’s Complaint as

“Unknown John Doe Officers” are dismissed without prejudice. Finally, the

Plaintiff will be directed to take further action against Defendants Earp,

Crump, and Britt, so that this action may be drawn to a close.

O R D E R

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

(1) The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 39] is

hereby GRANTED, and the Plaintiff’s claims against the

Defendants Mitchell County, Mitchell County Sheriff Donald

Street, and Mitchell County Sheriff's Office (“MCSO”) employees

Rickey Van Wiseman, Stacey Hughes, and Terry L. Silvers, in

their official and individual capacities, are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

(2) The Defendants identified in the Complaint as “Unknown John

Doe Officers” are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

(3) Within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order, the Plaintiff

shall file an appropriate motion or otherwise take further action

with respect to the Defendants Wanda Earp, Erica Turner Crump,

and Sidney Marie Britt. The Plaintiff is advised that failure to

take further action against these Defendants will result in

the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims against them without

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 9, 2026

ie ey

Chief United States District Judge Ale

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