Brown

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

BRANDON BROWN, ) CASE NO. 4:24-CV-1465

)

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

v. )

)

MAHONING COUNTY SHERIFF’S ) MEMORANDUM OF

OFFICE et al., ) OPINION AND ORDER

) [Resolving ECF No. 31]

Defendants. )

The Court considers Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56. See ECF No. 31. Plaintiff Brandon Brown accuses the Mahoning County

Board of Commissioners, the Mahoning County Sheriff’s Department, and Deputy Mathew

Bueno1 of violating his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during a brief

detention at the Mahoning County Justice Center (“MCJC”) in 2023. See U.S. Const. amends.

IV, VIII, XIV. For the reasons herein, the Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact by

which a reasonable jury could rule in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendants are therefore entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, and the Motion is granted.

1 In a Motion for Leave to Amend Instanter, Plaintiff confirmed that “[t]]he basic gist of

this motion is to withdraw claims other than those concerning Defendant Matt Bueno.” ECF No.

25 at PageID #: 134.

I.

A.2

Near midnight on August 29, 2023, officers from the Youngstown Police Department

pulled Plaintiff over. See ECF No. 25–1 at Page ID ##: 138–39, ¶ 5. Their computer database

revealed he had an arrest warrant out of Mahoning County. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 183,

¶ 1. Plaintiff disputed the warrant, claiming it was clerical error from a “bogus” child support

case. See ECF No. 25–1 at Page ID #: 139, ¶ 6. The officers arrested Plaintiff and drove him to

MCJC for detention. He was booked there at 3:00 AM the next day, August 30, 2023. See ECF

No. 31–1 at PageID #: 183, ¶¶ 2–4. During the booking process, deputies confiscated $1,495.00

in cash from Plaintiff. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 188, ¶ 44. He expressed suicidal

ideations and was placed on suicide watch consistent with MCJC policy. See ECF No. 31–1 at

PageID ##: 183–84, ¶¶ 4–5, Corrections Division Policies and Procedures, Ex. A at PageID ##:

189–93.

Deputies set Plaintiff in a one-man holding cell at 3:18 AM, offered him a blanket, and

ordered him to change out of his orange jail garb and into a green suicide prevention smock. See

ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 184, ¶¶ 8–9. He refused to disrobe and removed only his shirt. See

ECF No. 31–1 at PageID ##: 184–85, ¶¶ 11–22. After thirty minutes of repeated requests,

Deputies entered the cell at 3:44 AM, handcuffed Plaintiff, and attempted to remove his trousers

and shoes. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID ##: 185–86, ¶¶ 20–26. Again, he declined to cooperate,

refusing to unclothe or lift his feet to ease the unclothing process. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID

2 As it must on summary judgment, the Court construes these facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

#: 186, ¶¶ 24–26. At 3:46 AM, Defendant Bueno and other officers guided Plaintiff to the

ground using a “balance displacement technique” that allowed them remove Plaintiff’s pants and

shoes. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 27. The deputies exited the cell, leaving Plaintiff naked

by his own choice, as he could have donned the green suicide smock at any time. See ECF No.

31–1 at PageID #: 186, ¶ 28.

Over the next hour, Plaintiff refused to allow the deputies to remove his handcuffs, but

consented to uncuffing at 4:55 AM. ECF No. 31–1 at PageID ##: 186–87, ¶¶ 30–36. Around

the same time, MCJC custodians entered and cleaned Plaintiff’s cell for approximately 1.5 hours.

ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 187, ¶¶ 34–35. An MCJC staff nurse checked on Plaintiff twice

between 4:13 AM and 5:04 AM and gave him medication. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 187,

¶¶ 32, 38. Plaintiff continued to refuse to don the green suicide smock and remained naked.

ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 187, ¶¶ 37, 39. At 11:26 AM, a deputy told Plaintiff he was set for

release because his arrest warrant was rescinded. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID #: 187, ¶ 40. At

11:39 AM, he was released from MCJC and taken to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Youngstown for

self-harm monitoring. See ECF No. 31–1 at PageID ##: 187–88, ¶¶ 41. He was released after

approximately eight hours at MCJC and five hours at St. Elizabeth’s.

B.

Plaintiff sued the Mahoning County Board of Commissioners, the Mahoning County

Sheriff’s Office, and Deputy Bueno in state court on August 5, 2024. See ECF No. 1 at PageID

#: 5. Defendants removed the case to the Northern District of Ohio. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #:

1. After discovery and amended pleadings, Plaintiff filed instanter his fifth amended

complaint—now operative––with leave of Court.3 See ECF Nos. 25, 30. He alleges Defendant

Bueno violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through unlawful arrest and excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment, and a deprivation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See ECF No. 25–1 at PageID ##: 140–412, ¶¶ 20–25; U.S. Const.. amends. IV, VIII, XIV.

Defendants timely answered and now move for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 31, 32. The

Motion is fully briefed.4 See ECF No. 33, 34.

II.

A.

Summary judgment is a civil resolution entered by a district court for one party against

another on some or all claims without a full trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. It is appropriate when

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it will affect the outcome of the

litigation. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A dispute is genuine if the evidence

would permit a reasonable jury to rule in the non-moving party’s favor. See id. The moving

party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving

3 Titled the fourth amended complaint, but in reality, the fifth. See ECF Nos. 1, 9, 11, 23,

25.

4 Plaintiff’s response in opposition violates multiple Local Rules of Civil Procedure.

First, his memorandum failed to include a statement certifying the track assigned. See Local

Rule 7.1(f). Second, his memorandum failed to include a statement certifying that it adheres to

the Court’s page limitations. See id. Third, as his memorandum exceeds fifteen pages, he failed

to include a table of contents, table of authorities, issue statement, and argument summary. See

id.

party to present specific, admissible evidence that a genuine issue exists for trial. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When weighing a motion for summary

judgment, a district court views all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Halasz v. Cass City Pub. Schools, 162 F.4th 724 (6th

Cir. 2025).

B.

Section 1983 of the Enforcement Act of 1871 authorizes civil suits for monetary and

injunctive relief against state actors who deprive rights guaranteed by the United States

Constitution or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute “does not confer substantive

rights; rather, it is only a means to vindicate rights already conferred[.]” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a

plaintiff must (1) identify a constitutional right and (2) show that a person acting under color of

state law deprived him of that right. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Miller v. Sanilac

Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2010)

Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]”

U.S. Const.. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures “bars

excessive force against free citizens[.]” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013)

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 393–94). Under the Eighth Amendment, “[e]xcessive bail shall not

be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.

Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bars

excessive force against incarcerated persons. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318–22

(1986). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “When a citizen does not fall clearly

within either [free citizen or incarcerated person]—e.g., pretrial detainees—the Fourteenth

Amendment's more generally applicable Due Process Clause governs to bar a governmental

official's excessive use of force.” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 472 (citing Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d

673, 680–81 (6th Cir. 2008)).

As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

[f]or claims concerning injuries sustained while in police custody,

there is sometimes a dispute over whether the Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendment governs the constitutionality of the officer's conduct.

After all, the point at which the Fourth Amendment's prohibition

against unreasonable seizures ends and the Fourteenth Amendment's

substantive due process right begins is not always obvious. For

instance, in Aldini, we held that when a person in custody asserts an

excessive force claim against an officer, a judicial determination of

probable cause is the “dividing line” between application of the two

amendments. Under the Aldini paradigm, the Fourth Amendment

governs an excessive force claim brought by an “arrestee”—one

who has been arrested but has not yet received a judicial

determination of probable cause, either through an arrest warrant or

a post-arrest probable cause hearing. The Fourteenth Amendment,

on the other hand, provides the same protection for a “pretrial

detainee”—a person who has received a judicial determination of

probable cause but has not yet been adjudicated guilty of a crime.

Colson v. City of Alcoa, Tennessee, 37 F.4th 1182, 1187 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Aldini v.

Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 865–66 (6th Cir. 2010), Graham, 490 U.S. at 394, and Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1979)) (cleaned up).

III. 5

A.

Once probable cause supports a seizure, the Fourteenth Amendment governs an excessive

force claim from a pretrial detainee. See Colson, 37 F.4th at 1188. Regardless of the

constitutional headwater, the operative standard is the same: objective reasonableness––i.e.,

whether the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances––with built-in deference for on-

the-spot judgments. See Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 594 U.S. 464, 466 (2021);

Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). To

survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that more than de minimis force was used. See

Leary v. Livingston Cnty., 528 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 9–10 (1992). Excessive force claims are assessed through five non-exhaustive factors:

(1) the relationship between need and force used; (2) the extent of injury; (3) efforts to temper

the force; (4) the threat reasonably perceived; and (5) plaintiff's resistance. See Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Bueno, acting under color of state law, violated [his]

Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution by employing excessive force

against him and/or inflicting on him harmful and/or offensive contact without justification.”

ECF No. 25–1 at PageID #: 140, ¶ 20. Defendants argue that Plaintiff repeatedly refused lawful

5 Plaintiff names the Mahoning County Board of Commissioners and the Mahoning

County Sheriff's Office as Defendants, but nowhere in his operative complaint or his response to

the instant Motion does he argue that an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom was the

moving force behind any alleged deprivation. Because Plaintiff has not raised Monell liability,

the Court declines to address it. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

commands at MCJC and that any force used was minimal, reasonable, and constitutionally

permissible. See ECF No. 31 at Page ID ##: 170–80. Plaintiff counters that “[u]nder Kingsley’s

objective standard . . . no reasonable officer could think a naked detainee . . . posed a threat

warranting a knee-strike and takedown.” ECF No. 33 at PageID #: 430. Defendants riposte that

Plaintiff failed to show a constitutional violation occurred, failed to show a clearly established

constitutional right, and misrepresented evidence in the record. See ECF No. 34 at Page ID ##:

442–55.

The force used was objectively reasonable under all five Kingsley factors. Plaintiff self-

reported suicidal ideation at booking. See Brown Dep. Tr., ECF No. 31–4 at PageID #: 221:13–

17. MCJC policy requires removal of all clothing and personal property from inmates on suicide

watch and issuance of a green suicide prevention smock. See Mahoning County Sheriff’s Office

Policies and Procedures, ECF No. 31–3 at PageID #: 201. Plaintiff concededly refused every

verbal command and declined to assist officers in removing his clothing. See Brown Dep. Tr.,

ECF No. 31–4 at PageID #: 319:12–321:5, 321:6–8. They made multiple separate verbal

requests before any physical contact, escalated only after Plaintiff pulled away from an initial

guiding gesture, and terminated force the moment resistance ceased — a graduated approach

supporting objective reasonableness. The resulting brief controlled takedown was a de minimis

use of force, caused no verifiable injury, required no follow-up care, and necessitated “no

documented medical treatment.” Brown Dep. Tr., ECF No. 31–4 at PageID #: 253:8–11; see

Morrison v. Bd. of Trustees of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff's active

physical resistance is undisputed, and the threat that an acutely suicidal detainee would retain the

means to harm himself was both documented and immediate. No reasonable jury could find the

force objectively unreasonable. Defendants acted only to protect Plaintiff from himself, and thus

summary judgment is granted on the excessive force claim.

B.

“A false arrest claim under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] requires a plaintiff to prove that the

arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest [them].” Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake,

Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir.

2009). That is, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, to procure the

warrant, the government knowingly and deliberately (or with a reckless disregard for the truth)

made false statements or omissions that were material to the finding of probable cause. See

Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781,

786–87 (3d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). An arrest executed under a facially valid warrant is a

complete defense to an unlawful arrest claim. See Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677.

The operative complaint shallowly pleads an unlawful arrest claim. See ECF No. 25–1 at

PageID #: 140, ¶¶ 20–21. Plaintiff alleges only that “[t]his action arises out of a series of events

that began with Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest based on a clerical error.” ECF No. 25–1 at PageID #:

138. He offers no legal or factual support for this claim. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot

pursue this cause of action because Plaintiff admits there was a valid warrant, that Youngstown

Police—not Defendants—arrested him, and that he was immediately released once the jail

learned the warrant had been rescinded. Plaintiff attempts to revive that contention in his

response to the instant Motion by claiming, with zero evidentiary support, that “[e]veryone

involved acknowledges that officers rather hauled [Plaintiff] to jail on a void warrant[.]” ECF

No. 33 at PageID #: 422. He pushes the rhetorical boundary later in the same filing by

contending––again, without credible evidence––that “[Plaintiff] underwent arrest . . . for a non-

violent bogus child support warrant.” ECF No. 33 at PageID #: 438.

Defendants have the truth of it. It is uncontested Plaintiff was arrested on a facially valid

warrant. Even if the arrest was unlawful, it was executed by the Youngstown Police Department,

not Defendants. The existence of a valid, outstanding arrest warrant in a police database

provided probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff’s subjective belief that the warrant was

erroneous is immaterial. The arresting officers were entitled to rely on the warrant’s facial

validity. Defendants have satisfied their burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether Plaintiff was detained without probable cause. A reasonable jury

could not conclude that this arrest violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

C.

The Eighth Amendment––which prohibits unnecessary and wanton punishment and

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.

660, 666–67 (1962)––protects only convicted prisoners, not pretrial detainees. See Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). Pretrial detainees receive equivalent protection through the

Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, see Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608 (6th Cir.

2023), and the Sixth Circuit applies the Eighth Amendment standard to such claims “for the sake

of simplicity[.]” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2006). To succeed, a

plaintiff must satisfy both an objective component — that the alleged conduct was sufficiently

serious, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) — and a subjective component — that

the defendant acted with deliberate indifference, meaning conscious disregard of a substantial

risk of serious harm. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).

Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee who had not been convicted of an offense, his

claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff has not pled a Fourteenth

Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, has not identified the legal standard governing

such a claim, and has not adduced evidence in support of his contentions. His Eighth

Amendment claim therefore fails at the threshold. Arguendo, he offers no factual or legal

support for this cause of action irrespective of its constitutional underpinning.6 He also

abandoned that claim in his response to the instant Motion. The Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence on

abandonment of claims is clear: “a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a

plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS of

Michigan, Inc., 545 F. App'x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Hicks v. Concorde Career Coll.,

449 Fed.Appx. 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting the district court properly declined to consider

the merits of a claim when the plaintiff failed to address it in a response to a motion for summary

judgment).

D.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause secures rights procedurally and

substantively. It “bars certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedure

used to implement them.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (cleaned up).

To succeed on a substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show

that (1) they were deprived of a constitutionally protected interest, and (2) “the government's

6 Plaintiff says that “[Defendant] Bueno’s actions during the takedown remain central to

the constitutional claim[s].” ECF No. 33 at PageID #: 426. He is half-right––they are not just

central; they are singular.

discretionary conduct that deprived that interest was constitutionally repugnant.” Halasz v. Cass

City Pub. Schools, 162 F.4th 724, 736 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d

907, 922 (6th Cir. 2019)). “There are various contexts in which courts have found that

substantive due process is violated—including that the action was willful and unreasoning,

shocks the conscience, was extremely irrational, or lacks some factual basis.” Johnson v. City of

Saginaw, 980 F.3d 497, 513 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

Measured against that demanding threshold, Plaintiff’s Due Process claim fails. The

conduct at issue—officers’ efforts to secure compliance during a suicide-watch clothing

exchange—was neither arbitrary nor conscience-shocking. The officers acted in response to a

legitimate and immediate safety concern: Plaintiff’s refusal to relinquish items that could be used

for self-harm. Their actions were tied to an identified institutional interest in compliance and

safety, were preceded by multiple verbal commands, and ceased upon effect. Nothing in the

record suggests that Defendants acted maliciously, to cause harm, or in a manner divorced from

the safety rationale underlying MCJC suicide-prevention procedures. Even accepting Plaintiff’s

version of events, this conduct falls far short of the type of brutal, abusive, or irrational behavior

that substantive due process forbids. Because Plaintiff has not shown that the officers’ actions

were constitutionally repugnant under the Fourteenth Amendment’s framework, this claim fails

as a matter of law.7

E.

7 Likewise, Plaintiff's allegation that his funds were unlawfully seized is without merit.

He was booked into MCJC with $1,495 and received the full amount upon release. See ECF No.

31–1 at PageID #: 188, ¶¶ 44–45. Custodial safekeeping of an inmate's funds pursuant to a valid

arrest warrant is not a due process violation. See Sickles v. Campbell Cty., 501 F.3d 726, 730 (6th

Cir. 2007).

Civil battery is the intentional infliction of harmful or offensive physical contact with

another person without their consent. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to

Persons § 101 (Am. Law Inst. 2015). To succeed on a battery claim under Ohio law, a plaintiff

must show that (1) the defendant acted with an intent to cause harmful or offensive contact and

(2) such contact occurred. See, e.g., Kouider on behalf of Y.C. v. Parma City Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 480 F. Supp. 3d 772, 791 (N.D. Ohio 2020). It does not require “force capable of causing

physical pain or injury.” Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. 73, 83 (2019).

Plaintiff’s battery claim fails. The undisputed record shows that officers used physical

contact only after Plaintiff refused multiple directives to remove clothing that posed a suicide

risk and physically pulled away from Defendants’ attempt to guide him to the floor. The contact

consisted of a hold and a brief, controlled, “hip displacement” takedown to a padded floor—

force calibrated to secure compliance and to prevent Plaintiff from retaining items that could be

used for self-harm. Because the officers acted within the scope of their duties in response to an

immediate safety concern and used no more force than reasonably necessary under the

circumstances, their conduct was privileged as a matter of law. A privileged use of force cannot

constitute battery, and no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise on this record. Plaintiff's

battery claim thus fails under Ohio's political subdivision tort liability statute. See Ohio Rev.

Code § 2744.02. Law enforcement officers performing a governmental function are immune

from intentional tort claims absent a showing of malicious purpose, bad faith, or wanton and

reckless conduct. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The record supports none of those

findings here.

F.

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It functions not as an affirmative

defense, but “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). District courts assess qualified immunity under a two-step

framework. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. First, they ask whether the alleged facts make out a

constitutional violation. See id. Second, they ask whether the right at issue was clearly

established at the time of the conduct. See id. Although they may address the two prongs in

either order, see id. at 236, the doctrine of qualified immunity ultimately protects “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341 (1986). If the law did not clearly put the defendant on notice that their conduct was

unlawful, summary judgment under qualified immunity is appropriate. See id.

Defendants are protected from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not shown

that a constitutional violation occurred. Even if he had, no clearly established precedent would

have put Defendants on notice that measured force under the circumstances was unlawful and

constitutionally repugnant. Plaintiff's state law battery claim fails for the same reasons, as Ohio

law immunizes officers who use reasonable force within the scope of their duties. See Ohio Rev.

Code § 2744.01(C)(1)(h). Qualified immunity shields Defendants from all claims herein.

IV.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on all

causes of action because there is no genuine dispute of material fact by which a reasonable jury

could rule in Plaintiff’s favor. See ECF No. 31. In the alternative, Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity against all claims. A separate entry of judgment shall issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

February 26, 2026 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge